mi 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 


THE  GREAT  PEACE 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  •    BOSTON  •   CHICAGO  •   DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •   SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •    BOMBAY   •    CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


THE  GREAT  PEACE 


BY 

H.  H.  POWERS 

Author  of  "The  Things1  ken  Fight  For,"    'America 

Among  the  Nations,"  "America 

and  Britain."  etc. 


I3eto  gorfe 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1918 

A.U  rights  reserved 


COPYBIGHT,  1918 
By  H.  H.  POWERS 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published,   December,   1918 


GIFT 


D613 
?6 


PREFACE 

When  I  was  asked  last  August  to  prepare  a  book  on  the 
terms  of  peace,  I  consented  to  have  it  ready  by  March,  1919. 
My  publishers  thought  that  it  should  be  ready  by  February 
first  if  it  was  to  anticipate  the  march  of  events.  The  writing 
was  completed  in  October,  but  even  so,  events  have  gotten 
ahead.  It  is  some  consolation  to  know  that  the  whole  world 
shares  in  this  miscalculation.  Neither  the  peoples  nor  their 
governments,  the  knowing  ones  who  had  all  the  inside  in- 
formation, were  prepared  for  this  headlong  precipitancy.  A 
letter  from  one  of  the  staff  of  the  Department  of  State  at 
Washington  expresses  the  surprise,  not  to  say  the  consterna- 
tion, of  the  government  at  this  sudden  development  for  which 
we  were  so  eager  and  yet  so  utterly  unprepared.  It  was  in 
anticipation  of  this  unpreparedness  that  the  book  was  written, 
and  yet  I  too  am  caught  among  the  unprepared. 

Naturally  I  have  considered  carefully  whether  any  change 
should  be  made  in  the  text  as  the  proofs  pass  through  my 
hands,  but  save  for  a  few  footnotes  and  minor  changes,  I  have 
left  it  as  it  was  written.  The  difficulty  in  the  phraseology, — ■ 
all  of  it  appropriate  to  the  situation  of  last  September, —  is 
pervasive.  Adaptation  to  the  situation  of  today  would  mean 
re-writing.  But  it  is  only  the  phraseology  that  the  armistice 
has  rendered  out  of  date.  The  problems  remain, —  not  one 
of  them  settled  despite  confident  and  contradictory  news- 
paper assertion.  Even  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  an 
event  for  which  we  must  perhaps  long  wait  in  patience,  will 
bring  to  most  of  them  no  immediate  solution.  If  the  great 
truth  be  borne  in  mind  that  we  are  dealing  with  the  slow 
forces  of  race  evolution  rather  than  with  political  fiats  of  in- 


>**&#*&?  »Qi 


M^Sfifi^        ( 


vi  PKEFACE 

stant  effectiveness,  we  shall  be  little  disturbed  by  these  sudden 
eddies  in  the  slow  current  of  events.  Momentous  as  these 
November  days  have  been,  they  do  not  seem  to  me  to  have 
greatly  altered  the  problem.  As  I  read  in  these  days  of 
victory  what  I  wrote  in  the  days  of  struggle,  it  is  only  words 
that  I  would  change. 

No  doubt  the  reader  will  be  impatient, —  as  I  was, —  to 
get  over  the  generalities  of  Part  I  and  get  to  the  concrete 
problems  of  Part  II.  We  have  been  surfeited  with  generali- 
ties and  abstract  propositions.  We  are  eager  to  know  where 
the  new  frontiers  are  to  be  drawn  and  how  much  Germany 
is  going  to  pay  to  Belgium,  and  what  is  going  to  become  of 
the  Kaiser.  But  I  have  found,  as  I  believe  the  reader  will 
find,  that  there  is  no  getting  away  from  these  general  prin- 
ciples. We  must  either  master  them  or  they  will  master  us. 
If  we  do  not  hold  them  as  reasoned  propositions,  we  hold 
them  as  prepossessions  and  unconscious  assumptions.  Thus, 
there  is  a  universal  assumption  that  people  of  one  speech 
ought  to  live  under  one  government,  and  from  that  we  hastily 
conclude  that  there  should  be  an  independent  Poland.  We 
do  not  stop  to  consider  that  by  the  same  token  we  ought  to 
be  British,  Alsace  should  be  German,  and  Switzerland  should 
be  divided  among  Germany,  Italy,  and  France.  Again  we 
assert  the  right  of  all  peoples  to  decide  their  own  allegiance. 
That  would  have  justified  the  Southern  Confederacy  and 
would  insure  the  crumbling  of  half  Europe  into  helpless  frag- 
ments. Or  again  we  assert  the  claim  of  the  past  and  plead 
for  the  restoration  of  historic  arrangements.  That  would 
make  New  England  British  and  Florida  Spanish  while  re- 
uniting the  Poles  and  freeing  the  Bohemians.  In  popular 
discussion  these  and  other  principles  are  confidently  assumed 
as  political  axioms, —  not  conjointly  of  course,  for  this  would 
neutralize  them,  but  singly  and  for  the  most  part  arbitrarily, 
the  particular  assumption  being  requisitioned  which  proves 


PREFACE  vii 

momentarily  convenient.  The  writer  like  the  reader  is  sub 
ject  to  this  lawless  tyranny  of  arbitrary  assumption  unless 
he  sternly  guards  himself  against  it.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  I  have  ventured  to  consider  with  some  care  the  scope 
and  the  limitations  of  these  principles  which  are  so  confidently 
and  so  carelessly  assumed  in  current  discussion.  I  hope  the 
reader  will  have  the  patience  to  do  the  same. 

Those  who  have  done  me  the  honor  to  read  my  earlier 
books  on  these  subjects  will  see  in  the  present  book  a  larger 
recognition  of  the  psychological  factor  and  something  less  .of 
insistence  upon  physical  environment  and  cosmic  forces  than 
in  the  earlier  works.  They  will  perhaps  assume  that  I  have 
changed  my  views  as  to  the  relative  importance  of  these 
factors.  I  should  not  feel  humiliated  to  plead  guilty  to  the 
honorable  indictment.  Strange  indeed  must  be  the  individual 
or  the  nation  that  has  passed  through  these  four  years  with- 
out seeing  things  in  somewhat  different  proportion.  The 
very  hope  of  the  world  lies  in  such  changes  as  the  result  of  its 
travail. 

But  the  change  is  after  all  more  in  my  theme  than  in  my 
attitude.  Hitherto  I  have  dealt  with  permanent  relations 
and  with  influences  extending  over  centuries.  Seen  thus  in 
longer  perspective,  history  seems  primarily  the  product  of 
the  cosmic  forces.  The  fume  and  fret  of  men  seems  but 
froth  on  the  surface.  Altogether  different  is  the  problem 
here  considered,  the  problem  of  effecting  a  working  arrange- 
ment for  the  years  immediately  before  us.  In  this  problem 
of  the  hour  and  of  the  near  tomorrow,  human  forces  are 
everything.  The  hate  of  Bulgar  and  Greek,  the  prejudice 
of  Moslem  and  Orthodox  and  Catholic  among  the  Jugo-Slavs, 
the  resentment  against  German  barbarities, —  what  are  moun- 
tains and  seas  against  these  fierce  energies  of  the  human  soul  ? 
To  treat  these  as  at  once  almighty  and  ephemeral,  this  is  the 
difficult  art  of  the  statesman. 


viii  PREFACE 

I  make  no  apology  for  my  rather  pitiless  insistence  upon 
the  difficulties  of  the  problem  and  the  necessarily  imperfect, 
even  provisional,  character  of  the  adjustments  which  peace 
will  effect.  The  air  is  full  of  that  irrepressible  optimism 
which  is  at  once  the  hope  and  the  despair  of  humanity.  If  I 
have  trudged  along  on  the  ground  while  others  have  aero- 
planed  in  the  clouds,  unmindful  of  the  obstacles  that  beset 
the  pathway  of  plodding  men,  I  have  none  the  less  trudged 
cheerfully,  confident  that  the  obstacles  are  being  overcome 
and  that  we  shall  sometime  attain  our  goal. 

H.  H.  Powees. 
Newton,  Mass., 

November  19,  1918. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  rAGE 

Author's  Preface v 

I    Introduction" 1 


PAET  I.    NATIONALITY 

II  Nationalism 15 

III  Nationality  and  Eace 31 

IV  Nationality  and  Territory 43 

V  Nationality  and  Natural  Resource    ...     55 

VI  Nationality  and  Trusteeship 67 

VII  Nationality  and  Accountability    ....     87 

VIII  Nationality  and  Internationalism      .     .     .  103 

IX  Diplomacy  and  Treaties 127 

PAET  II.    THE  NATIONS 

X  Germany 143 

XI  Belgium 161 

XII  France     .     . 175 

XIII  Italy  . 191 

XIV  Austria 207 

XV  Turkey 242 

XVI  Constantinople  and  the  Balkans    .     .     .     .270 

XVII  Russia  and  Poland 284 

XVIII  The  Eemoter  Powers 297 

XIX  Britain 307 

XX  America 322 


LIST  OF  MAPS 

PAGE 

Map  of  Belgium 163 

Map  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  Khine  Province     .      .      .181 

Map  of  Italy 195 

Map  of  Austria-Hungary 209 

Map  of  Hungary 213 

Map  of  Czecho- Slovakia 217 

Map  of  Eumania .221 

Map  of  Jugo-Slavia 229 

Map  of  The  Turkish  Empire 253 

Map  of  Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles      .     .     .     .  271 

Map  of  Poland 291 

Map  of  South  Africa 311 


CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTION 

The  Great  War  is  passing  and  the  Great  Peace  approaches. 
The  conflict,  prolonged  and  widened  beyond  our  utmost  fears, 
is  entering  upon  its  fifth  year  as  these  lines  are  written. 
The  end  is  not  yet,  but  the  indications  are  getting  clearer 
that  the  end  is  approaching  and  that  the  end  is  to  be  as  we 
wish.  Beyond  doubt  an  extremely  stubborn  conflict  is  still 
before  us.  with  losses  that  will  stagger  humanity  and  with 
possible  vicissitudes  of  fortune  which  may  at  times  obscure 
the  issue,  but  a  calm  survey  of  the  situation  from  a  point 
withdrawn  from  the  smoke  of  battle  permits  but  one  conclu- 
sion. The  initial  advantage  of  German  preparedness  has 
disappeared,  and  the  superior  resources  of  the  Allies  in  men 
and  materials  are  unmistakably  apparent.  The  crude  and 
hesitant  allied  strategy  of  the  early  months  of  the  war  has 
been  succeeded  by  clear  vision  and  fixed  purpose.  The  al- 
most insuperable  difficulties  in  the  way  of  unified  command 
have  been  overcome.  Leadership,  if  not  of  Napoleonic 
genius,  yet  forged  in  the  heat  of  the  great  conflict  and  of 
demonstrated  competency,  has  been  assured.  Above  all  the 
incoherence  of  thought  and  confusion  of  purpose,  always  the 
supreme  danger  in  democratic  governments,  have  been  elimi- 
nated. The  onslaught  of  the  highly  organized  Central  Pow- 
ers, which  so  nearly  overwhelmed  us  at  the  outset,  has  trans- 
formed our  unbridled,  wanton  energy  into  disciplined  power. 
The  more  the  struggle  is  prolonged,  the  more  complete  that 
transformation  will  be  and  the  more  assured  our  triumph. 
Such  is  the  outlook  at  this  hour.  It  may  deceive  us,  for 
nothing  is  sure  before  the  event,  but  if  the  outcome  is  not 

1 


2  ;* •  r  :the  gbeat  peace 

assured,  the  obligation  of  preparedness  for  the  next  step  is 
clear.  It  may  be  presumptuous  to  assume  victory  at  this 
stage  of  the  conflict,  but  it  is  simple  prudence  to  prepare  be- 
times for  an  event  which  we  have  willed  with  all  the  power 
of  our  being  and  which  seems  increasingly  assured. 

And  for  this  event  we  are  not  prepared.  As  far  as  Berlin 
our  pathway  lies  straight  before  us, — difficult  beyond  com- 
pare, but  unmistakable.  But  from  there  it  is  lost  in  a  maze 
of  infinite  intricacy.  If  Germany  were  beaten  tomorrow, 
we  should  be  in  sore  perplexity  to  know  what  to  do  next. 
Preparation  for  war  has  left  us  no  time  to  prepare  for 
peace, —  nay,  more,  it  has  been  a  bar  to  any  such  preparation. 
One  of  the  difficult  lessons  we  have  had  to  learn  is  that  we 
must  cease  discussing  the  issues  of  the  war  until  victory  was 
assured.  The  paramount  need  was  for  agreement.  To  dis- 
agree while  we  were  fighting  Germany  meant  ruin.  Hence 
Germany's  oft  repeated  seductive  invitation :  "  Come,  now, 
let  us  reason  together.' '  Germany  knew  that  if  she  could 
start  a  discussion  of  peace  terms,  she  could  start  a  dis- 
agreement with  all  its  disastrous  consequences.  Fortu- 
nately we  knew  it  too,  and  have  had  the  self-control  to 
adjourn  till  the  hour  of  victory  those  questions  upon  which 
agreement  will  be  sure  to  be  difficult  and  attended  with  many 
heart  burnings.  We  were  agreed  with  certainty  upon  only 
one  thing,  the  necessity  of  defeating  Germany.  For  this 
every  nation,  every  class,  every  school  of  opinion,  had  its 
own  reasons.  Latin  and  Saxon,  capital  and  labor,  imperialist 
and  anti-imperialist,  all  were  in  sharpest  disagreement  on 
some  of  the  issues  involved.  Fortunately  they  were  agreed 
that  the  defeat  of  Germany  was  more  than  the  issues  upon 
which  they  disagreed.  The  Latin  wished  to  defeat  her  be- 
cause she  held  provinces  rightfully  his ;  the  Briton  because  she 
menaced  his  necessary  sea  communications.  The  laborite  rec- 
ognized Germany  as  unfriendly  to  the  political  ascendancy  of 


ItfTKODUCTIOJST  3 

labor,  while  the  manufacturer  feared  the  ruthless  aggression 
of  German  "  big  business."  The  imperialist  saw  in  imperi- 
alist Germany  a  redoubtable  competitor ;  the  anti-imperialist 
saw  in  her  the  chief  protagonist  of  a  hated  principle.  It 
was  thumbs  down  all  round,  but  for  the  most  varied  and  even 
opposite  reasons.  The  one  condition  of  successful  coopera- 
tion under  such  circumstances  is  that  individual  aims  shall 
be  subordinated.  This  has  been  perhaps  our  hardest  lesson 
as  allies,  but  we  have  learned  it.  A  few  remain  who  will  not 
be  silenced,  who  are  so  intent  upon  their  particular  purpose 
that  they  are  willing  to  risk  defeat  rather  than  that  victory 
should  fail  to  realize  their  hopes.  Thus  a  recent  champion 
of  ultra  democratic  reforms  declares  that  if  these  reforms  are 
not  realized  in  the  forthcoming  peace,  the  war  will  have  been 
fought  in  vain.  Our  allies  "  must  not  be  permitted  to  deter- 
mine our  purposes  "  in  the  war,  but  we  must  constrain  them 
to  make  these  purposes  their  own,  knowing  that  this  will  be 
"  for  their  ultimate  good."  To  this  end  he  urges  that  Presi- 
dent Wilson  should  force  their  hand  by  the  threat  of  with- 
drawing from  the  alliance.  Our  aid  being  indispensable, 
our  terms  would  necessarily  be  accepted.  This  enthusiast 
does  not  raise  the  question  of  what  would  happen  if  Britain 
should  threaten  to  withdraw  unless  we  acquiesced  in  a  pro- 
gram of  annexation.  He  sees  no  disturbing  analogy  between 
his  proposal  and  the  action  of  Bulgaria  who  demanded  her 
price  and  sold  out  to  the  highest  bidder,  or  that  of  Italy  who 
conditioned  her  support  upon  the  doubtful  acquisition  of  ter- 
ritories across  the  Adriatic.  To  sanction  these  purposes  is 
farthest  from  his  thoughts,  for  they  are  purposes  which  he 
does  not  approve.  But  "our"  (?)  purposes  are  different, 
and  since  they  have  as  yet  not  commended  themselves  to  our 
allies,  and  these  allies  show  no  inclination  voluntarily  to  adopt 
them,  it  is  obvious  strategy  to  bargain  with  those  who  oppose 
these  purposes  when  they  are  in  a  tight  place. 


4  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

It  needs  no  very  profound  insight  to  see  that  this  is  intro- 
ducing the  principle  of  belligerency  into  the  Allied  camp. 
Strategy  is  a  principle  of  war,  and  its  use  against  allies  means 
war  against  allies.  If  every  people,  class,  or  party  should 
choose  this  time  to  push  its  advantage  under  penalty  of  re- 
fusing to  cooperate,  it  is  obvious  that  cooperation  would  at 
once  cease.  For  while  the  radical  declares  that  if  peace  does 
not  assure  radical  democracy,  the  war  will  have  been  fought 
in  vain,  a  conservative  is  simultaneously  declaring  that  if 
ultra  democracy  prevails,  "  then  we  have  lost  the  war."  To 
the  insinuating  demand  that  we  should  state  our  case  against 
Germany,  there  has  been  one  consistent  answer.  We  have  no 
single  case  against  Germany.  We  have  individual  cases 
against  her,  but  as  yet  no  common  case.  Each  belligerent 
has  purposes  peculiar  to  itself,  purposes  in  which  its  allies 
have  little  interest,  purposes  which  are  even  mutually  antago- 
nistic. Italy  wants  the  Trentino  and  Trieste,  but  has  no 
direct  interest  in  the  recovery  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  France 
wants  Alsace-Lorraine,  but  is  little  interested  in, —  perhaps 
is  secretly  jealous  of, —  Britain's  control  of  the  sea.  And  so 
on  indefinitely.  The  discussion  of  these  aims  may  produce, — 
almost  certainly  will  produce, — antagonisms  and  estrange- 
ments, not  only  between  allies,  but  also  between  classes  and 
special  interests  within  each  individual  country.  No  suc- 
cessful war  of  modern  times  has  failed  to  have  its  aftermath 
of  disappointment  and  recrimination.  England's  clemency  to 
the  Boers  alienated  large  sections  of  British  political  opinion. 
The  Treaty  of  Erankfort  left  divided  counsels  in  Germany, 
and  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  well  nigh  produced  a  revolution 
in  Japan.  This  war  will  be  no  exception  to  the  rule.  It  will 
rather  be  an  exceptional  case  in  point.  Hence  the  just  char- 
acterization of  all  Germany's  peace  offensives  as  traps.  If 
these  inherent  conflicts  of  interest  and  opinion  could  be  lifted 


INTRODUCTION  5 

up  into  consciousness  while  Germany  is  still  redoubtable,  a 
judicious  concession  to  war-wear v  Italy  or  some  other  ap- 
proachable unit  might  disclose  another  Caporetto  and  breach 
the  line.  Failing  this,  it  would  at  least  lessen  the  cohesion 
and  weaken  the  morale  upon  which  victory  depends.  It  is  all 
but  certain  that  if  the  belligerents  were  to  agree  to  an  armis- 
tice and  meet  in  council,  conditions  would  develop,  as  the 
result  of  their  discussions,  which  would  make  the  resumption 
of  hostilities  impossible,  no  matter  how  unsatisfactory  the 
results  obtained. 

All  such  proposals  have  fallen  flat,  save  in  the  deplorable 
case  of  Russia,  whose  fate  has  not  been  without  its  lessons  for 
the  Allies.  These  proposals  have  found  their  supporters,  but 
they  have  everywhere  been  a  dwindling  minority.  Not  with- 
out difficulty  has  a  people  habituated  to  free  speech  and  politi- 
cal discussion,  seen  the  reasonableness  of  refusing  to  reason. 
Yet  in  nothing  have  they  so  justified  the  claim  of  democracy 
to  be  the  arbiter  of  these  difficult  questions.  It  is  democracy's 
supreme  achievement  to  have  perceived  that  the  will  to  victory 
must  exclude  all  else  until  victory  makes  it  possible  to  dis- 
agree and  not  perish.     For  disagree  we  shall  and  must. 

It  is  thus  that  preparation  for  war  has  postponed  prepara- 
tion for  peace,  by  excluding  from  negotiation,  from  public 
discussion,  even  from  individual  thought,  the  grave  questions 
incident  to  peace.  With  all  the  pronouncements  that  have 
appeared,  there  is  as  yet  scarce  a  beginning  of  formulated 
terms.  These  pronouncements  have  been,  for  the  most  part, 
literary  or  rhetorical  generalizations  valuable  for  rallying 
purposes  but  not  of  a  nature  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  peace. 
To  destroy  militarism,  to  make  the  world  safe  for  democracy, 
to  secure  the  right  of  self-determination  for  all  peoples,  these 
are  legitimate  formulas  for  ideals,  but  it  is  clear  that  if  these 
ends  are  to  be  furthered  by  treaty,  these  propositions  must 


6  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

be  translated  into  concrete  terms,  territorial,  economic,  and 
commercial.  This  is  the  task  of  peace  making,  the  task  which 
we  have  adjourned. 

Yet  in  another  sense  the  adjournment  has  furthered  the 
formulation  of  peace  terms  in  a  way  which  no  discussion  or 
negotiation  could  have  done.  The  concrete  task  has  waited, 
but  the  psychology  of  the  peoples  who  are  to  perform  the  task, 
has  undergone  constant  and  far-reaching  change.  We  have 
ceased  to  be  citizens  of  a  country  or  a  state  and  have  all  un- 
consciously become  citizens  of  the  world.  Undreamed  pos- 
sibilities of  cooperation  among  nations  have  been  realized  as 
incidents  to  the  great  struggle.  Equally,  the  marauder  has 
disclosed  a  power  and  a  will  to  injure  which  nothing  but  the 
experience  could  have  made  credible.  In  particular,  our  own 
nation  has  forever  discarded  the  myth  of  isolation.  It  long 
ago  ceased  to  be  a  fact,  but  the  tradition  lingered,  and  along 
with  it,  not  a  little  of  the  ignorance,  the  arrogance,  and  the 
indifference  of  which  it  was  the  fertile  source.  If  there  are 
those  who  still  think  we  might  have  avoided  this  war,  they 
must  at  least  recognize  that  we  have  not  avoided  it,  and  being 
what  we  are,  we  should  not  be  likely  to  avoid  it  under  like 
circumstances  again.  If  the  physical  conditions  permit  iso- 
lation, the  psychic  conditions  do  not.  Whatever  reluctance 
we  may  have  felt  to  accept  this  conclusion,  the  constant  neces- 
sities of  international  concert  and  the  fellowship  of  prolonged 
suffering  and  achievement  have  tended  rapidly  to  dissipate  it. 
We  are  reconciled  to  being  a  part  of  the  world,  an  indis- 
pensable pre-requisite  of  intelligent  participation  in  the  great 
world  task.  If,  therefore,  we  still  know  little  of  the  compli- 
cated problems  with  which  the  peace  conference  must  deal,  we 
have  been  getting  ready  to  know.  We  have  been  developing 
the  "  international  mind." 

This  was  peculiarly  necessary  for  the  Allies  who  repre- 
sent,—  partly  by  chance,  to  be  sure,  but  not  the  less  really, — 


INTRODUCTION  7 

the  cause  of  democracy.  Democracy,  despite  its  ancient  line- 
age, is  a  comparatively  modern  thing.  Its  ancient  applica- 
tions were  to  units  so  small  as  to  have  no  modern  significance, 
and  its  modern  applications  have  been  partial  at  best. 
Broadly  speaking,  its  success  has  been  in  inverse  ratio  to  the 
size  of  its  domain.  The  town  meeting  has  been  a  success ;  the 
state  has  been  less  successful.  In  the  broadest  field  of  inter- 
national relations  democracy  has  yet  to  demonstrate  its  ca- 
pacity. The  great  democracy  of  Britain  has  had  a  wonderful 
diplomacy,  but  not  a  very  democratic  one.  Nowhere  does 
democracy  defer  so  willingly  to  expert  wisdom  as  in  the 
matter  of  foreign  relations.  Our  own  experience  is  also  un- 
convincing. Our  diplomacy  has  been  neither  wholly  demo- 
cratic nor  wholly  successful,  and  withal  its  tasks  have  been 
much  simpler  than  those  of  other  nations,  largely  because  we 
have  deliberately  minimized  our  relations  with  other  states. 

But  throughout  the  domain  of  democracy  there  is  a  clear 
announcement  that  democracy  is  to  assume  the  responsibili- 
ties of  diplomacy.  There  is  to  be  no  more  secret  diplomacy. 
International  relations  like  domestic  relations  are  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  popular  will.  Doubtless  the  change  will  be 
less  sweeping  than  these  demands  would  suggest,  but  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that  there  will  be  a  change  and  that  it  will 
be  in  the  direction  indicated.  The  people  may  not  know  how 
to  rule,  but  they  are  plainly  determined  to  try.  The  forth- 
coming settlement  is  sure  to  feel  a  democratic  pressure  never 
known  before.  That  settlement  will  not  only  involve  concrete 
problems  affecting  every  nation  on  the  planet,  but  it  will  prob- 
ably establish  new  principles  and  lay  the  foundations  of  a 
most  radical  reconstruction  of  the  world  order.  It  is  not 
simple  tasks  but  supreme  incentives  that  call  democracy  into 
action.  Such  an  incentive  the  present  conflict  has  furnished. 
The  settlement  will  be  a  people's  peace  as  has  been  no  other. 
No  matter  who  the  people's  representative  may  be,  he  will 


8  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

listen  to  the  people's  voice  for  the  constant  renewal  of  his 
mandate.  Not  once  but  a  thousand  times  in  the  course  of 
the  long  negotiations,  will  be  heard  the  words :  "  Our  people 
demand  this."  "  Our  people  will  not  accept  that."  If  used 
at  times  as  a  screen  for  personal  insistence,  it  will  owe  its 
serviceableness  in  this  connection  to  its  substantial  truth. 
The  people  will  dictate,  vaguely,  fitfully,  ambiguously,  but 
not  the  less  imperiously.  We  have  invoked  democracy,  and 
democracy  has  come  at  our  bidding,  unskilled  and  unknowing, 
but  not  the  less  unafraid. 

Not  to  the  diplomats,  whose  skill  I  respect  but  do  not 
emulate,  but  to  the  people,  their  masters,  these  pages  are  dedi- 
cated. What  shall  be  the  terms  of  the  people's  peace,  the 
Great  Peace  ?  What  are  the  principles  of  that  better  state- 
craft which  has  been  slowly  and  half  unconsciously  taking 
shape  in  the  minds  of  those  who  through  the  will  to  victory 
have  slowly  won  the  right  to  will  the  world's  peace?  And 
what  do  these  principles  require  in  the  way  of  concrete  ad- 
justments and  arrangements  among  the  mountains  and  the 
rivers  and  the  seas  where  men  have  chanced  to  be  born  and 
have  snugly  nested  themselves  in  the  traditions,  the  preju- 
dices, the  loves  and  the  hates  of  a  hundred  generations  i 

On  one  point  let  there  be  no  misunderstanding.  Not  until 
victory  crowns  our  arms  do  these  questions  become  the  order 
of  the  day.  With  the  enemy  in  arms  there  can  be  no  parley, 
none  even  among  ourselves  until  we  can  be  sure  of  our  own 
uncompromising  and  inflexible  purpose.  Our  enemy  will  not 
spare,  and  we  must  not  spare.  The  most  criminal  of  all  wars 
is  the  one  begun  for  a  righteous  purpose  and  stopped  short  of 
a  possible  triumph.  Such  a  war  exacts  its  toll  of  misery  and 
devastation,  yet  relinquishes  the  prize  which  alone  can  justify 
the  sacrifice.  War  is  the  negation  of  reason,  the  confession 
that  moral  forces  have  failed  to  safeguard  essential  human 
interests.     A  beaten  enemy  or  one  who  knows  that  to  go  far- 


INTEODUCTIOJST  9 

ther  is  to  fare  worse,  will  grasp  at  the  ruse  of  negotiation. 
The  nation  that  is  fooled  thereby  has  not  learned  the  lesson 
of  war.  Negotiation  to  the  uttermost  before  war  begins ;  war 
to  the  uttermost  when  negotiation  has  failed.  There  is  no 
half  way  ground  in  the  law  of  war.  This  is  not  spite.  These 
lines  are  written  in  no  vindictive  or  implacable  spirit.  It  is 
the  plainest  statement  of  inexorable  law  that  they  who  draw 
the  sword  must  accept  its  arbitrament.  These  pages  are  not 
written  for  the  enemy,  but  for  his  conquerors  against  the  day 
of  victory.  If  they  are  written  somewhat  in  advance  of  that 
day,  it  is  in  the  firm  conviction  that  the  will  to  victory  is 
assured.  If  victory  is  still  to  tarry  long  in  its  coming,  it  is 
not  too  early  to  prepare  for  its  arrival.  When  it  comes  there 
can  be  no  waiting.  The  misery  of  the  world  will  brook  no 
long  and  hesitant  negotiations. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  the  writer  is  not  attempt 
ing  to  draft  a  treaty  of  peace.  Such  an  instrument,  of  neces 
sity  a  task  for  experts,  is  but  an  incident  in  the  larger  problem 
of  settlement  and  reconstruction  which  will  require  many 
minds  and  many  agencies  for  its  accomplishment.  Our  at- 
tempt will  be  simply  to  answer  the  question :  What  should 
the  Allies  demand?  This  question  takes  no  account  of  the 
detailed  problem  of  ways  and  means,  nor  yet  of  the  probable 
ability  of  the  Allies  to  impose  their  will.  The  question  is 
perhaps  best  discussed  as  an  academic  question.  It  is  well 
to  be  clear  as  to  what  we  seek,  whether  or  not  the  fate  of  arms 
puts  the  prize  within  our  reach.  'Not  by  way  of  prophecy, 
however  legitimate,  but  by  way  of  working  hypothesis,  we 
assume  the  defeat  of  Germany  as  the  basis  of  our  inquiry. 
If  Germany  threw  up  her  hands  and  cried  "  Kamerad,"  what 
would  we  do  with  her  ?  What  with  her  wretched  partners  ? 
What  of  the  powers  now  our  allies,  and  of  the  great  world  in 
general  and  possible  better  guaranties  for  its  peace  and  order  ? 
We  will  be  as  concrete  and  practical  as  possible  in  our  an- 


: 


10  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

swers.  It  avails  little  to  say  that  frontiers  should  follow 
ethnic  lines.  Where  are  those  lines,  and  what  sort  of  a  Eu- 
rope would  we  have  if  we  followed  them?  A  little  map 
drawing  will  throw  much  light  upon  a  difficult  principle 
which,  in  the  untested  abstract,  seems  so  attractively  simple. 
Similarly,  such  principles  as  self-determination  and  independ- 
ence. Who  or  what  is  the  "  self  "  involved  and  what  is  the 
scope  of  the  desired  "  determination."  Accepting  without 
question  the  principle  of  making  the  world  safe  for  democ- 
racy, what  measures  is  it  desirable  or  practicable  for  the 
nations  in  council  to  adopt  looking  to  that  end  ?  In  a  word, 
the  purpose  will  be  to  concrete  the  problem,  not  to  technical- 
ize  it. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  inquiries  of  this  kind  are 
peculiarly  necessary  for  the  American  people.  We  no  doubt 
have  a  very  considerable  aptitude  for  practical  affairs,  but  in 
the  present  struggle  we  are,  by  our  very  location,  ignorant  of 
the  practical  issues  involved.  Not  one  in  a  thousand  of  us 
knows  that  the  fate  of  the  world  may  be  determined  by  the 
possession  of  a  great  iron  mine  in  Lorraine,  or  a  pass  across 
the  Taurus  Mountains,  or  a  harbor  in  the  Adriatic.  We  are 
tolerably  good  judges  of  iron  mines  and  passes  and  harbors 
when  once  we  discover  their  existence,  but  we  do  not  live  in 
Europe,  and  have  not  thought  it  worth  our  while  as  a  nation 
to  take  note  of  its  outworn  equipment.  So  our  unencum- 
bered minds  find  in  this  field,  thus  artificially  denuded  of  all 
its  concrete  realities,  a  rare  opportunity  for  that  aerial  po- 
/  litical  philosophy  which  we  as  a  people  affect.     It  is  appall- 

Sing  with  what  confidence  we  generalize  from  our  own  highly 
exceptional  experience  regarding  situations  in  Europe  which 
we  totally  misconceive.  We  invoke  democracy  as  the  cure 
for  all  the  ills  which  the  Central  Powers  are  inflicting  upon 
the  world,  quite  overlooking  the  fact  that  both  the  German 
Eeichstag  and  the  Austrian  Eeichsrat  are  almost  ideally 


INTRODUCTION  11 

democratic  bodies.  A  man  can  vote  for  deputy  in  either 
Austria  or  Germany  who  could  not  vote  for  Congressman  in 
Massachusetts.  These  bodies  have  no  real  power,  we  are 
told.  True,  because  they  do  not  take  it.  They  have  all  the 
power  that  the  British  House  of  Commons  ever  had  to  curb 
autocracy,  if  they  and  the  people  back  of  them  had  the  will 
to  do  so.  But  these  peoples  do  not  wish  to  curb  autocracy 
which  they  believe  necessary  to  give  them  the  unity  which 
popular  government  would  destroy.  The  most  superficial 
knowledge  of  these  countries,  and  especially  of  Austria,  re- 
veals conditions  with  which  our  democracy  has  never  shown 
itself  able  to  cope.  A  knowledge  of  these  facts  of  physical 
environment  and  political  condition  should  be  valuable,  if  for 
nothing  else,  to  moderate  the  excessive  confidence  of  our  po- 
litical generalizations. 

Finally,  let  it  be  insisted  with  all  possible  emphasis,  that 
the  terms  of  peace  to  be  agreed  upon  should  be  based  upon  the 
fullest  recognition  of  the  special  problems  and  wishes  of  the 
associated  nations.  There  is  a  disposition  in  some  quarters 
to  recall  the  fact  that  we  entered  the  war  as  a  free  lance,  not 
bound  by  any  pledge  to  make  peace  in  common  with  those  who 
had  so  long  borne  the  burden  before  us.  This  fancied  liberty 
gives  us  a  freedom  of  action,  so  we  are  told,  which  enables  us 
to  dictate  terms.  Conceivably,  to  those  who  see  no  obligation 
that  is  not  "  so  nominated  in  the  bond."  But  no  possible 
course  of  action  could  be  more  unworthy  or  unreasonable. 
The  nearness  of  the  Allies  to  the  scene  of  conflict  and  their 
immediate  dependence  upon  the  result  gives  them  a  right  to 
speak  which  we  can  scarcely  claim.  Were  our  detachment 
entirely  a  matter  of  disinterestedness  instead  of  being  chiefly 
a  matter  of  ignorance,  our  ambition  to  act  as  arbiter  might 
have  some  justification.  As  it  is,  any  such  pretension  on  our 
part  is  quite  unwarranted  and  its  enforcement  by  coercion, 
direct  or  indirect,  altogether  intolerable.     We  are  not  more 


12  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

disinterested  than  the  Allies.  We  are  simply  more  ignorant 
of  our  interests.  Above  all  we  are  ignorant  of  their  interests. 
It  is  therefore  earnestly  to  be  hoped  that  our  study  of  the 
problem  of  peace  will  be  conducted  throughout  in  a  spirit  of 
prof oundest  deference  for  the  views  and  the  wishes  of  those 
who  are  associated  with  us  in  the  struggle  and  who  are  so 
immediately  and  vitally  dependent  upon  the  outcome. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  technical  task  of  treaty  draft- 
ing, frontier  delimitation,  and  financial  adjustment  which 
must  complete  the  agreement  reached,  is  a  task  for  experts 
and  one  quite  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  work. 


PAET  1 
NATIONALITY 


CHAPTEE  II 

NATIONALISM 

As  we  approach  the  problem  of  peace,  the  first  question  is, 
who  is  at  war  ?  This  question  may  seem  superfluous  in  view 
of  common  knowledge  on  the  subject,  but  a  moment's  reflec- 
tion will  convince  us  that  here  at  the  outset  of  our  inquiry- 
there  exists  a  serious  confusion  of  thought.  The  surface 
fact  that  we  are  at  war  with  Germany  is  held  by  many  to 
conceal  a  deeper  fact  of  very  different  purport.  On  the  one 
hand  we  are  assured  that  our  quarrel  is  not  with  the  German 
people  but  with  the  German  government,  the  latter  being  con- 
ceived primarily  as  a  principle  of  rule  represented  by  a  lim- 
ited clique  of  persons  who  are  at  present  its  exponents. 
Making  due  allowance  for  the  diplomacy  associated  with  this 
assertion  and  recognizing  its  apparent  conflict  with  the  logic 
of  events,  it  can  not  be  doubted  that  this  doctrine  has  a 
strong  hold  upon  the  popular  mind.  The  fact  that  the  powers 
allied  against  Germany  have  been  from  the  first  predomi- 
nantly democratic  and  that  the  fortunes  of  war  have  elimi- 
nated the  most  conspicuous  exception, —  autocratic,  German- 
modeled  Japan  being  easily  overlooked, —  has  tended  to  con- 
firm this  impression  that  this  is  a  war,  not  between  nations  as 
such,  but  between  principles  of  political  and  social  organiza- 
tion. That  it  is  so  in  fact  admits  of  no  reasonable  doubt. 
Popular  government  is  a  reality  in  the  western  peoples  and 
is  not  yet  realized  in  the  Central  Powers.  If  the  western 
nations  win,  their  ideas  will  win  with  them,  while  a  German 
victory  would  undoubtedly  give  a  long  lease  of  life  and  a  pos- 
sible extension  of  domain  to  autocracy.  No  doubt  autocracy 
and  democracy  stand  to  win  or  lose  with  their  present  cham- 

15 


16  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

pions,  at  least  for  long  years  to  come.  But  whether  these 
nations  have  gone  to  war  primarily  as  champions  of  democ- 
racy or  autocracy  is  not  so  clear.  Had  this  been  the  issue  in 
1914,  Japan  and  Russia  would  certainly  have  taken  the  other 
side.  On  the  outskirts  of  the  two  great  camps  are  others 
whose  status  is  not  clear.  As  regards  democracy,  there  is  at 
present  little  to  choose  between  China  and  Turkey,  between 
Bulgaria  and  Serbia,  yet  they  are  in  opposite  camps.  It  is 
difficult  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  other  considerations  have 
influenced  these  nations, —  all  of  them  considerably,  some  of 
them  overwhelmingly.  Democracy  and  autocracy  will  share 
the  fate  of  other  characteristics,  language,  religion,  etc.  A 
German  victory  would  enormously  extend  the  domain  of  the 
German  language,  as  an  allied  victory  will  extend  or  confirm 
that  of  English  and  French.  Yet  no  one  claims  that  this  is 
a  war  of  languages.  Incidentally  it  is  so,  for  the  victor's 
language  will  triumph  with  him,  nor  would  it  be  safe  to 
assume  that  peoples  are  unconscious  of  this  fact  or  uninflu- 
enced by  it.  Consciously,  and  still  more  unconsciously,  they 
are  committed  in  heart  to  their  own  familiar  speech  and  will 
sacrifice  much  for  its  sake.  But  this  is  but  one  of  many 
things  to  which  they  are  committed  and  for  which  they  will 
suffer  and  die. 

Quite  comparable  to  the  view  that  this  is  a  war  between 
principles,  is  the  widely  held  theory  that  it  is  a  war  of  classes, 
a  capitalists'  war,  as  popular  phrase  puts  it.  The  argument 
is  that  wars  are  brought  on  by  financial  interests  in  the  hope 
of  gain.  This  gain  may  be  in  the  shape  of  direct  profits  from 
industries  created  or  stimulated  by  the  war,  or  the  more  subtle 
gain  of  tactical  advantage  in  the  class  struggle  always  in  prog- 
ress. The  argument  is  often  forced  and  obviously  convinces 
less  by  its  cogency  than  by  its  congeniality.  That  there  are 
facts  which  lend  themselves  to  this  interpretation  is  clear. 
War  contracts  of  immense  extent  are  let  on  easy  terms  and 


NATIONALISM  17 

result  in  enormous  profits.  Currency  inflation,  always  a  con- 
comitant of  war,  even  when  best  financed,  sends  up  prices, 
scales  down  debts  and  creates  fictitious  values.  Every  war 
has  left  its  legacy  of  great  fortunes,  often  persisting  through 
many  generations.  Sentiment,  too,  throws  its  weight  into  the 
scale.  Labor  is  adjured  in  the  name  of  patriotism  not  to 
press  its  advantage,  and  its  response  may  at  times  enable  capi- 
tal to  improve  its  tactical  position. 

It  would  be  strange  if  these  possibilities  did  not  appeal  to 
certain  individuals.  That  "  high  finance "  or  u  big  busi- 
ness "  should  avail  itself  in  a  measure  of  the  opportunities 
thus  offered  is  to  be  expected.  That  it  has  at  times  done  so 
on  a  considerable  scale  and  with  far-reaching  results  is  prob- 
able. The  action  of  the  National  Liberal  party, —  the  party 
of  "  big  business  " —  in  Germany  in  the  present  war  appar- 
ently furnishes  an  example.  Nor  is  the  influence  exerted  by 
so  mighty  an  organization  as  Krupps  on  minor  nations 
through  well  conducted  propaganda  a  negligible  factor  in 
determining  their  decisions  for  war  or  peace. 

But  when  all  is  said,  the  facts  are  hopelessly  against  this 
theory  as  an  explanation  of  war.  War  is  destruction,  and 
wealth  prospers  only  by  production.  The  disturbance  of 
values  brings  wealth  to  a  few  but  takes  wealth  from  many. 
The  fortunes  that  war  creates  are  as  nothing  to  the  fortunes 
which  it  destroys.  If  individuals  in  hope  of  gain  are  moved 
to  favor  war,  even  to  promote  it  by  organized  effort,  im- 
mensely greater  numbers  are  moved  by  identical  interests  to 
preserve  peace,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  them  less 
alert  or  capable  than  their  opponents.  Similarly,  if  war 
gives  the  employer  an  advantage  over  patriotic  labor,  it  gives 
labor  a  far  greater  advantage  over  capital  when  industry, 
feverishly  stimulated  and  penalized  for  failure,  can  suffer  no 
interruption.  If  the  rise  of  wages  does  not  always  outstrip 
the  rise  in  prices,  the  thoughtful  laborer  will  realize  that  he 


18  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

scores  an  enormous  gain  if  he  maintains  his  standard  of  living 
at  a  time  when  society  as  a  whole  is  put  on  short  rations. 
War  comes  to  no  class  as  a  boon,  but  upon  none  does  its  hand 
rest  more  lightly  than  upon  labor. 

All  of  these  considerations  are  greatly  enhanced  as  war 
passes  from  the  local  to  the  general.  It  is  possible  to  imag- 
ine big  business  in  America  or  England  deriving  advantage 
from  a  war  in  the  Balkans  in  which  we  were  non-participants 
and  our  profits  as  purveyors  were  undiminished  by  war  taxes. 
Even  so,  a  close  analysis  would  disclose  offsets  for  these  advan- 
tages, though  hardly  sufficient  to  neutralize  their  temptations. 
But  when  the  conflagration  becomes  general,  these  advantages 
disappear.  The  farmer  whose  crop  is  good  in  a  season  of 
partial  crop  failure,  may  prosper  and  even  come  to  associate 
prosperity  with  crop  failure.  But  let  the  blight  extend  to 
his  own  crop  and  the  truer  relation  reveals  itself.  Even  with- 
out this  immediate  loss,  it  must  slowly  become  clear  that  pros- 
perity is  sadly  limited  under  conditions  of  widespread  indi- 
gence. 

No,  the  "  interests  "  find  their  opportunity  in  a  condition 
of  general  prosperity  and  maximum  production  of  wealth. 
Nothing  is  more  certain  than  that  the  great  capital  interests 
in  modern  states  are  overwhelmingly  committed  to  peace. 
The  destroyer  of  wealth  is  their  enemy,  no  matter  where  he 
operates,  for  he  destroys  the  medium  in  which  they  operate, 
the  sole  possible  source  of  their  gains.  So  clear  is  this  fact 
that  sanguine  experts  before  our  present  war  were  found  to 
declare  that  organized  industry  and  finance  had  made  war 
impossible.  The  holders  of  the  purse  strings  held  the  dogs 
of  war  in  leash.  This  was  an  exaggeration  of  the  power  of 
organized  finance,  as  others  then  contended  and  as  the  result 
has  shown,  but  there  was  never  a  question  then, —  there  can 
be  no  question  now, —  as  to  where  the  interests  of  capital  and 


NATIONALISM  19 

finance  really  lie  and  on  which  side  their  representatives  are 
to  be  found. 

But  while  this  is  not  fundamentally  a  class  war,  it  is  so  to 
a  degree  incidentally.  No  one  of  the  present  belligerents 
entered  this  war  to  emancipate  labor  or  to  subject  it  to  the 
tyranny  of  capital.  Yet  it  will  not  escape  any  fair-minded 
observer  that  the  status  of  labor  is  far  different  on  the  one  side 
from  what  it  is  on  the  other.  Despite  their  enormous  accu- 
mulations of  capital,  no  countries  have  so  restricted  the  power 
of  capital  by  legislative  and  social  action  as  have  Britain  and 
the  United  States.  In  none  is  the  influence  of  labor  so  pow- 
erful. Not  only  in  the  great  Anglo-Saxon  centers  but  still 
more  in  the  self-governing  dominions  of  Australia  and  New 
Zealand,  labor  sits  in  the  seat  of  the  mighty  as  nowhere  else 
in  the  world.  Neither  the  equity  nor  the  adequacy  of  these 
conditions  is  here  in  question.  We  are  concerned  only  to  note 
the  fact  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries  stand  as  the  supreme 
representatives  of  the  principle  of  labor  emancipation.  Noth- 
ing approximating  these  conditions  can  be  found  in  Germany 
and  Austria.  On  the  other  hand,  in  Germany  especially, 
organizations  of  capital,  instead  of  being  checked  by  anti- 
trust laws  as  with  us,  have  been  favored,  even  forced,  in  the 
interest  of  national  efficiency.  Again  we  will  waive  the  ques- 
tion of  desirability  or  undesirability  of  these  policies.  It  is 
sufficient  to  note  the  facts. 

Once  more,  it  behooves  us  to  recognize  that  this  antithesis 
does  not  hold  throughout.  Industrial  conditions  in  China, 
Japan,  Serbia,  or  Greece,  bear  little  resemblance  to  those 
above  described.  Least  of  all  did  Bussia,  at  the  time  of  her 
entering  the  conflict,  rank  with  the  emancipated  powers,  nor 
has  her  orgy  of  liberty  contributed  certainly  to  the  emancipa- 
tion of  labor,  however  effectually  it  has  destroyed  capitalist 
tyranny.     It  is  perfectly  certain  that  the  line-up  was  not  on 


20  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

this  issue,  yet  it  is  equally  certain  that  the  line  chances  to  be 
drawn  between  the  forces  of  industrial  freedom  and  reaction. 
A  German  victory  will  mean  the  perpetuation  of  the  all- 
powerful  Cartels  of  German  industrial  organization  and  the 
extension  of  their  sway  over  new  territories  together  with  the 
subjection  of  labor.  A  victory  for  the  Allies  must  as  cer- 
tainly extend  their  industrial  system  with  its  attendant  eman- 
cipation of  labor. 

Other  popular  theories  of  war  might  be  considered,  but 
always  with  the  same  result.  The  contestants  in  the  great 
struggle  are  not  fighting  in  the  first  instance  for  an  abstract 
principle  or  for  a  virtue,  or  for  a  private  or  class  interest, 
but  for  a  great  concrete  human  thing  which  embodies 
these  principles  and  interests  only  incidentally  and  im- 
perfectly, and  that  along  with  many  others.  For  this  is  a 
war  between  nations.  And  we  find  our  place  in  the 
ranks,  not  because  we  approve  the  principles  or  interests 
there  represented,  but  for  the  very  much  humbler  reason  that 
we  were  born  there  and  have,  for  the  most  part,  no  option  but 
to  stay.  This  does  not  mean  that  we  do  not  care  for  these 
principles,  virtues,  or  interests,  but  that  we  recognize  the 
impracticability  of  working  for  them  otherwise  than  as  em- 
bodied in  the  nation.  We  try  to  make  our  nation  represent 
the  principles  and  the  special  interests  that  we  believe  in,  al- 
ways with  but  partial  success,  but  we  accept  the  result  and 
make  the  best  of  it.  For  after  all  the  nation  is  the  only  place 
where  these  things  have  any  real  existence.  The  only  virtue 
there  is  in  the  world  is  the  virtue  that  is  in  virtuous  men,  and 
they  are  only  partially  virtuous  at  best.  So  with  nations. 
None  of  tbem  have  ideal  class  relations  or  perfect  democracy, 
but  they  have  the  only  democracy  and  the  only  class  relations 
that  there  are  in  the  world.  Outside  of  them  there  is  only 
imagination,  a  valuable  thing,  but  not  at  all  to  be  mistaken 
for  the  .reality.     It  is  only  out  of  the  democracy  of  the  pres- 


NATIONALISM  21 

ent  and  the  imperfect  class  relations  of  the  present  that  the 
better  democracy  and  the  more  perfect  class  relation  can  grow. 
Thus  the  nation  is  the  repository  of  all  that  the  race  has 
achieved  in  the  way  of  democracy  and  all  related  interests,  a 
very  imperfect  repository,  no  doubt,  but  the  only  one.  The 
treasure  is  in  earthen  vessels,  but  there  are  no  other  vessels, 
and  without  them  there  would  be  no  treasure. 

It  is  therefore  the  deepest  of  all  social  instincts,  an  instinct 
more  imperious  than  that  of  our  own  self -protection,  which 
impels  us  to  defend  the  nation.  Within  the  home  circle  we 
may  criticise,  attack,  and  modify  to  any  extent,  but  we  must 
not  sacrifice  the  nation  or  carry  our  criticism  to  the  point  of 
weakening  it  in  the  great  competition  of  the  nations.  When 
the  existence  of  the  nation  is  ever  so  remotely  at  stake,  criti- 
cism and  party  struggle  must  cease.  Thus  the  two  great 
parties  in  the  British  government  are  usually  in  sharpest 
antagonism,  but  when  a  foreign  crisis  menaces  the  British  na- 
tion, it  is  the  unfailing  practice  that  the  leader  of  the  oppo- 
sition in  Parliament  rises  at  the  first  opportunity  and  pledges 
the  support  of  his  party  to  the  government.  There  must  be 
no  opposition  within,  no  criticism,  no  discussion  of  principles, 
while  there  is  danger  from  without.  These  lines  are  written 
not  by  way  of  advocacy,  but  simply  in  explanation  of  the 
fundamental  political  principle  of  our  age.  Men  have  every- 
where judged  that  the  nations  are  essential  as  repositories  of 
the  great  social  forces  and  that  they  must  be  defended  from 
all  attacks,  violent  or  insidious.  There  are  a  few  who  seem 
to  think  this  policy  a  mistake.  They  see  in  the  nation  not  so 
much  a  repository  of  social  forces  as  an  interference  with 
their  larger  play.  They  would  quite  disparage  nationalism 
or  abolish  it  altogether.  Perhaps  the  future  may  have  such 
things  in  store,  but  certainly  not  the  present.  To  eliminate 
the  nation  in  the  interest  of  humanity  would  be  like  tearing 
down  our  house  that  we  might  see  the  sky. 


22  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  in  this  cult  of  the  nation 
we  have  usually  very  little  choice  as  to  which  nation  we  shall 
support.     The  nations  are  not  all  alike,  and  it  is  often  pos- 
sible for  the  intelligent  citizen  to  see  that  some  other  meets 
his  ideas  of  justice  and  political  wisdom  far  better  than  his 
own.     But  he  can  not  usually  change  his  allegiance  on  that 
account,  nor  would  it  be  well  if  he  could.     The  free  lance  may 
espouse  the  cause  of  a  nation  with  which  he  is  in  sympathy, 
as  Lord  Byron  espoused  the  cause  of  Greek  independence,  but 
few  are  so  situated  that  they  can  play  this  part,  and  it  is  a 
very  ineffectual  part.     Changes  of  allegiance  are  difficult  and 
are  seldom  made  for  political  reasons.     The  allegiance  of 
adoption  is  always  an  imperfect  allegiance.     But  quite  aside 
from  this  question  of  feasibility  is  the  deeper  question  of 
right.     The  crude  and  imperfect  nation  may  have  quite  as 
good  reason  to  exist  as  the  more  advanced  nation.     It  is  all 
the  nation  that  somebody  has.     It  may  hold  little  as  yet  in 
the  way  of  finished  achievements,  but  it  holds  unknown  pos- 
sibilities, possibilities  that  no  other  nation  may  be  able  to 
hold,  and  that  are  somebody's  all.     Hence  the  instinct  of 
national  support  is  unquestioning*     Stand  for  principle,  vir^ 
tue,  party,  class,  within  the  nation,  but  never  as  between  na- 
tions.    Stand  for  your  nation.     Such  is  the  instinct  and  law 
of  being  in  the  twentieth  century.     Perhaps  no  people  has 
ever  shown  more  devotion  to  abstract  principles  or  contended 
more  earnestly  for  them  than  the  French,  and  never  were 
they  more  engrossed  in  their  several  advocacies  than  in  1914. 
But  ask  a  French  soldier  what  he  is  fighting  for,  and  what 
will  he  reply  ?     For  liberty,  equality,  fraternity  ?  for  democ- 
racy? for  socialism?     Not  one  of  these.     The  answer  will 
not  vary  among  a  thousand.     "  Four  la  France/* 

Perhaps  the  most  disturbing  thought  about  this  blind  in- 
stinct of  nationalism  is  that  it  so  often  tenaciously  maintains 
barriers  and  divisions  that  are  clearly  superfluous.     It  has 


NATIONALISM  23 

the  vices  as  well  as  the  virtues  of  conservatism.  We  could 
all  mention  manifestations  of  nationalism  today  that  are  an 
unqualified  nuisance,  though  there  might  be  disagreement  as 
to  the  examples  chosen.  Indeed  there  are  no  more  serious 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  settlement  that  we  seek  than  cer- 
tain perfectly  gratuitous  and  obstructive  assertions  of  nation- 
alism. Virtues  like  individuals  have  the  defects  of  their 
qualities.  It  is  friction  that  makes  it  so  hard  to  move  the 
railway  train,  but  it  is  friction  that  makes  it  possible  to  move 
it  at  all,  for  without  friction  the  wheels  would  not  grip  the 
rails.  Nationalism  must  therefore  be  dealt  with  in  its  dual 
capacity  of  conserving  and  obstructing  force.  Few  will  ques- 
tion the  wisdom  of  the  French  soldier  who  fights  for  France, 
but  we  did  question, —  and  as  the  world  judges,  justly  —  the 
wisdom  of  those  who  fought  to  make  a  separate  nation  out  of 
our  southern  states.  There  are  other  cases.  The  mere  shout 
of  nationalism  for  any  chance  unit  without  consideration  of 
size,  location,  or  suitability,  is  not  a  claim  to  our  endorsement. 
For  in  one  important  particular  nations  are  not  like  men. 
They  are  after  all  only  devices  for  human  convenience,  with- 
out assignable  limit  as  to  size  or  character.  Hence  it  is  that 
they  are  able  to  devour  and  absorb  one  another,  either  wholly 
or  in  part,  becoming  thereby  proportionally  larger.  Men 
have  fixed  frontiers,  and  though  they  may  greatly  interfere 
with  one  another's  privilege  and  convenience,  this  frontier 
of  personal  identity  is  never  passed.  Not  so  with  nations. 
They  may  not  only  annex  one  another's  territories,  but  may 
quite  assimilate  one  another's  people,  displacing  the  senti- 
ments and  habits  which  constituted  their  former  nationality 
by  others  suitable  to  the  new  allegiance.  This  latter  process, 
to  be  sure,  is  often  slow  and  difficult,  and  seemingly  becomes 
more  difficult  as  the  national  organization  becomes  more  elab- 
orate. But  if  we  take  a  long  glance  backward  over  history 
we  shall  not  only  discover  cases  in  which  it  has  been  com- 


24  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

pletely  successful,  but  we  shall  perceive  that  this  process  of 
merger  and  assimilation,  often  violent  and  painful,  has  been 
the  regular  method  of  national  growth  in  its  earlier  stages. 
Indeed,  it  is  not  clear  how  else  great  nations  could  have 
come  into  being  in  a  world  which  was  all  parceled  out  among 
little  ones.  It  is  pretty  clear  that  nations  ultimately  reach  a 
stage  of  development  where  such  merger  and  assimilation  is 
no  longer  possible, —  indeed  it  seems  to  be  one  of  the  mistakes 
of  our  great  adversary  not  to  have  fully  appreciated  this  fact, 
but  up  to  a  certain  point,  while  nations  are  still  plastic,  such 
mergers,  even  though  temporarily  unwelcome,  are  a  normal 
method  of  uniting  men.  The  principle  of  self-determina- 
tion,—  a  principle  vital  to  nations  as  to  individuals, —  pre- 
supposes in  each  case  a  certain  maturity.  Applied  rashly  it 
means  disintegration. 

Since  nations  are  but  conveniences  and,  as  it  were,  way- 
stations  on  the  road  toward  unity,  why,  it  may  be  asked, 
should  we  not  at  once  effect  the  inevitable  union,  thus  ending 
once  for  all,  these  conflicts  which  threaten  to  engulf  human- 
ity ?  Easier  said  than  done.  Nations  serve  the  purpose  of 
social  convenience,  but  it  is  not  therefore  to  be  assumed  that 
they  are  mechanical  contrivances  which  can  be  used  or  junked 
at  pleasure.  The  nation  is  not  contrived;  it  grows.  Its 
essence  is  not  an  agreement  but  a  sentiment,  or  rather,  a  com- 
plex maze  of  sentiments,  associations  and  attachments,  the 
product  of  incredibly  slow  growth.  Have  we  any  idea  of  the 
painful  experiences  through  which  man  has  come  to  his  pres- 
ent estate  ?  Slowly,  with  countless  misgivings  and  misadven- 
tures, he  has  stumbled  out  of  the  isolation  of  his  early  cave, 
living  down  old  suspicions,  laying  the  ghosts  of  strange  ter- 
rors, accustoming  himself  to  new  restrictions,  and  learning 
new  arts,  new  wants,  and  new  loves.  Eor  millenniums  each 
he  has  conned  the  lesson  of  the  family,  the  clan,  the  tribe,  the 
petty  state,  the  nation,  learning  their  passwords,  their  sym- 


NATIONALISM  25 

bols,  and  their  mystic  rites,  ever  revolting  and  as  often 
scourged  back  to  his  arduous  task.  With  every  widening  of 
his  frontier  he  has  faced  new  terrors  and  met  new  foes,  ever 
constrained  to  enter  upon  new  pathways  where  his  progress 
has  been  marked  by  his  blood.  Ever  and  anon  the  frontier 
has  claimed  him  as  its  victim,  yielding  him  a  sullen  obedience 
only  at  the  price  of  the  amenities  and  the  attachments  which 
were  the  glory  of  the  narrower  circle,  and  making  him  the 
outlaw  of  progress.  The  structure  of  civilization  is  cemented 
with  the  blood  of  humanity,  and  not  with  that  of  the  soldier 
alone. 

And  now  comes  our  heedless  enthusiast  and  asks :  "  To 
what  purpose  all  this  clamor  of  the  nations  ?  Why  love  the 
one  more  than  the  other?  How  are  you  better  off  to  live 
under  this  government  than  under  that  I  "  Forsooth !  How 
am  I  better  off  to  live  in  my  own  skin  ? 

It  is  the  A  B  C  of  our  inquiry  to  recognize  the  fundamental 
character  of  nationality.  It  is  beside  the  mark  to  descant 
upon  the  weakness  of  nationality  and  the  advantages  of  inter- 
nationalism. We  have  the  one  and  we  have  not  the  other. 
That  the  larger  circle,  the  wider  horizon,  to  the  limit  of  a 
unified  humanity,  is  preferable  to  our  present  national  units 
we  may  readily  admit.  The  unification  of  humanity  is  the 
obvious  goal  of  human  progress,  the  unavoidable  hypothesis 
of  all  constructive  thought.  But  the  question  is  not  as  to  the 
merits  of  human  unity.  The  question  is  how  to  get  it. 
We  shall  not  get  it  by  the  disparagement  of  nationality  or 
by  the  reversal  of  the  process  by  which  organization  has  thus 
far  been  attained.  Nations  have  their  unlovely  traits. 
They  are  selfish,  suspicious,  and  prone  to  resort  to  force  in 
the  assertion  of  their  claims.  Scrupulosity,  candor,  and 
deference  have  not  been  the  rule  in  international  relations. 
That  is  unbeautiful,  seemingly  bad,  though  an  exact  appraisal 
of  results  is  difficult.     But  nations  have  their  beautiful  side. 


26  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

Sheltered  behind  their  barriers  of  prejudice  and  suspicion  are 
discipline  and  forbearance,  cooperation,  protection,  and  love. 
There  the  ritual  of  life  works  its  marvel  of  harmony  in  feel- 
ing, thought,  and  action.  These  things  are  good,  just  the 
kind  of  things  that  the  great  human  nation  of  the  future  will 
require  in  larger  measure.  To  decry  nationality,  to  belittle 
its  services,  to  emphasize  its  limitations  and  picture  it  as  the 
antithesis  of  human  unity  instead  of  its  partial  realization, 
this  is  not  to  advance  the  cause  of  unity  but  to  retard  it. 
Nationality  is  human  unity  half  grown.  If  we  ever  get  full 
unity,  it  will  be  by  the  further  development  of  nationality. 
Even  now  that  further  development  is  visibly  taking  place 
before  our  eyes.  It  is  seemingly  to  be  the  crowning  glory 
of  our  own  race  to  develop  the  super-nation,  the  unforced 
merger  of  independent  nations  committed  to  pacific  coopera- 
tion in  the  field  of  the  largest  human  interests. 

It  is  not  irrelevant  to  note  in  this  connection  that  the  critics 
of  nationality,  though  ever  reprehending  its  divisive  influence, 
seem  to  have  little  real  sympathy  with  unity  as  hitherto  real- 
ized in  human  experience.  The  emphasis  is  always  upon 
liberty,  with  a  visible  sense  of  the  irksomeness  of  cogent  or- 
ganization. Their  ideal  seems  rather  to  be  that  of  an  easy- 
going fellowship  in  which  friction  is  reduced  by  reducing  the 
points  of  contact,  an  organization  that  is  less  exacting,  more 
Bohemian  in  spirit,  and  free  from  the  irksome  constraints  of 
the  more  strenuous  nationalism.  It  is  significant  that  inter- 
nationalism, rather  than  supernationalism  or  pan-nationalism, 
is  the  term  chosen  to  express  this  ideal.  The  assumption  is 
that  present  nations  are  to  persist,  but  with  their  teeth 
drawn,  this  concession  to  the  rejected  principle  of  nationality 
being  made  as  a  matter  of  expediency.  But  nationality  as 
thus  tolerated,  is  to  lose  its  old  time  significance  as  the  unifier 
of  humanity. 

Concurrently  with  this  emasculation  of  nationality,  the 


NATIONALISM  27 

utmost  emphasis  is  laid  upon  local  independence  or  self-deter- 
mination. It  is  easy  to  see  what  all  this  comes  to.  Divisive 
tendencies  now  held  in  check  by  the  demands  of  nationalism 
would  be  released  and  half  completed  assimilations  inter- 
rupted. The  painfully  widening  mental  horizon  would  again 
narrow.  Localism,  provincialism,  with  an  unsubstantial  fic- 
tion of  human  unity,  these  are  the  inevitable, —  perhaps  the 
desired, —  result.  The  internationalist  is  conspicuously  the 
advocate  of  local  and  internal  reforms.  Fortunately  for  our 
instruction,  this  philosophy  is  being  applied  by  Russia,  with 
what  results,  those  most  concerned  may  soon  be  expected  to 
judge. 

These  conclusions  will  evoke  protest.  The  internationalist 
disclaims  any  intention  of  disparaging  nationality.  A  promi- 
nent socialist  has  recently  declared :  "  Internationalism  is 
not  anti-nationalism.  Internationalism  presupposes  nation- 
alism. It  is  the  inter-relation  of  nations.  The  maintenance 
of  national  integrity  and  independence  is  one  essential  con- 
dition of  internationalism."  No  doubt  these  declarations  are 
sincere  and  represent  the  attitude  of  internationalists  as  a 
class.  They  have  no  intention  of  destroying  nationalism. 
But  we  are  less  concerned  with  intentions  than  with  tend- 
encies. The  internationalist  recognizes  in  nationalism  an 
"  essential  condition  of  internationalism,"  but  does  he  recog- 
nize the  essential  conditions  of  nationalism  ?  International- 
ism may  not  purpose  the  destruction  of  nationalism,  but  the 
disparagement  of  nationalism  has  always  been  its  concomi- 
tant, its  pervasive  spirit.  The  animating  spirit  of  interna- 
tionalism has  ever  been, —  not  national  solidarity,  but  class 
solidarity, —  and  it  is  national  solidarity  which  is  the  "  essen- 
tial condition  "  of  nationalism. 

It  is  to  be  noted  finally  that  nationalism  is  the  striking 
characteristic  of  recent  political  development.  This  means 
that  the  present  age  is  preeminently  the  age  of  nations  and 


28  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

that  sentiment  and  doctrine  have  followed  in  the  wake  of  fact. 
The  definiteness  and  coherence  acquired  by  the  modern  na- 
tions in  the  last  two  or  three  centuries  and  above  all  the 
immense  increase  in  the  daily  services  rendered  by  the  nation 
in  our  time,  all  this  has  developed  a  corresponding  group 
consciousness  out  of  all  proportion  to  anything  known  in 
earlier  times.  When  the  individual  knew  the  nation  only  as 
the  tax  gatherer  or  through  the  summons  to  the  corvee  or  the 
army,  his  enthusiasm  for  the  nation  was  not  very  ardent.  In- 
deed, had  the  call  to  service  not  come  through  his  local  liege 
lord  to  whom  he  sustained  a  closer  and  more  human  relation, 
it  is  doubtful  whether  the  state  could  have  commanded  his 
allegiance.  But  when  he  meets  the  state  daily  in  the  post- 
man, when  the  railway,  the  highway,  and  all  the  complex  ma- 
chinery of  modern  national  life  reveal  the  state  as  the  great 
doer  of  needful  things,  the  national  consciousness  becomes  an 
abiding,  all-overshadowing  fact.  Hence  the  tendency, — 
seemingly  somewhat  counter  to  the  spirit  of  the  age, —  toward 
separation  under  the  lead  of  nationalism.  The  languid  na- 
tionalism of  an  earlier  day  permitted  the  pseudo-union  of 
[Norway  and  Sweden,  presaged  a  like  union  of  Spain  and 
Portugal,  and  permitted  the  drastic  germanizing  policy  of 
Maria  Theresa  and  her  son  with  but  feeble  opposition.  The 
nationalism  of  today,  tenfold  intensified  by  the  larger  service- 
ableness  of  the  state  and  reinforced  by  the  literary  revival 
which  has  restored  the  consciousness  of  past  achievement,  has 
made  short  work  of  these  unions  based  on  indifference.  Nor- 
way and  Sweden  have  separated,  Portugal  repudiates  the 
idea  of  merger  with  vehemence,  and  the  strangely  consorted 
nationalities  of  the  dual  empire  are  obsessed  with  a  spirit  of 
virulent  nationalism.  Beyond  question  this  is  but  a  cross 
current.  The  dominant  tendency  of  the  age  is  toward  the 
formation  of  larger  nations,  a  tendency  which  necessarily 
implies  merger  and  the  disappearance  of  nationalism  in  some 


NATIONALISM  29 

of  its  narrower  and  more  obstructive  manifestations.  But 
this  tendency  toward  merger  is  offset  by  the  tendency  toward 
the  intensification  of  nationality.  The  units  to  be  merged 
become  more  resistant,  less  assimilable.  If  the  American 
colonies  had  not  united  when  they  did,  they  could  not  now  be 
made  into  a  nation. 

It  is  with  this  paramount  fact  of  nationality,  a  fact  legiti- 
mate in  its  essence,  however  extravagant  and  troublesome  in 
its  occasional  manifestations,  that  we  have  to  deal.  The  task 
of  the  peace  conference  is  essentially  a  task  in  nation  making. 
Prepossessions  against  this  fundamental  fact  of  nationalism 
will  make  that  task  impossible.  Equally,  such  prepossessions 
will  make  it  impossible  for  us  to  anticipate  and  contribute  to 
that  task. 

It  is  a  corollary  of  nationalism  that  nations  have  rights 
which  are  exclusive  as  regards  one  another.  If  nations  have 
a  right  to  exist,  they  have  a  right  to  rule  within  their  own 
domain.  That  is  the  meaning  of  nationality,  the  meaning  of 
democracy,  the  basic  principle  of  our  western  civilization. 
Never  is  that  principle  likely  to  be  so  sorely  tested  as  in  the 
moment  of  its  triumph.  What  a  temptation  to  our  emanci- 
pated labor  to  compel  the  emancipation  of  labor  in  the  Cen- 
tral Powers !  What  more  generous  than  to  reach  a  helping 
hand  to  an  oppressed  fellow  worker!  What  more  prudent 
than  thus  to  eliminate  the  danger  of  his  underpaid  competi- 
tion !  How  eagerly  certain  elements  in  Germany  itself  would 
welcome  such  intervention !  The  clamor  of  appeal  is  already 
raised.  Similarly  the  cause  of  temperance,  of  suffrage,  of 
democracy,  see  here  their  opportunity  to  follow  in  the  wake 
of  the  ponderous  war  tank  into  fastnesses  otherwise  so  difficult 
of  assault.  It  is  no  disparagement  of  any  of  these  interests 
to  sternly  resist  their  plea.  Triumphs  thus  won  would  be 
specious,  premature,  and  in  the  long  run,  disastrous.  "  Lib- 
erty is  not  a  gift;  liberty  is  an  achievement."     For  liberty 


30  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

conferred  but  unachieved  is  not  liberty  but  only  indulgent 
autocracy. 

In  particular  should  democracy  be  on  its  guard  lest,  in  a 
moment  when  its  triumph  necessitates  the  wholesale  recon- 
struction of  alien  systems,  it  forget  its  own  nature  in  its  eager- 
ness to  prevail.  Make  the  world  safe  for  democracy, —  yes, 
by  all  means,  at  any  sacrifice  of  blood  and  treasure.  But  the 
safety  of  democracy  is  infinitely  more  dependent  upon  for- 
bearance than  upon  aggression.  The  people  that  wills,  even 
passively,  to  have  an  autocratic  government,  is  more  nearly 
exercising  a  democratic  prerogative  than  the  people  who 
would  force  a  democratic  government  upon  them.  The  ut- 
most that  can  be  justified, —  and  this  only  with  the  extremest 
circumspection, —  is  to  demand  for  subject  or  component  peo- 
ples the  right  of  self-expression.  Even  so  we  rob  them  of 
the  stimulating  privilege  of  self-achievement.  If  it  be 
argued  that  the  very  existence  of  an  autocratic  Germany  with 
its  militarist  traditions  and  purposes,  threatens  the  liberties 
of  neighboring  peoples,  the  reply  must  be  that  Germany  will 
be  autocratic  until  she  elects  to  be  otherwise.  Have  we  not 
learned  the  futility  of  baptizing  the  unregenerate  ?  To  com- 
pel Germany  to  desist  from  her  attack  on  our  liberties, —  that 
is  our  plain  duty.  To  compel  her  to  adopt  free  institutions  is 
to  misjudge  both  our  rights  and  our  powers.  Germany  thus 
veneered  would  not  be  less  hostile,  nor  should  we  profit  by 
a  deceptive  reliance  upon  her  democratic  mask.  It  would 
be  a  grave  abuse  of  the  happiest  of  rallying  cries  if  we  should 
try  to  make  the  world  safe  for  democracy  by  forcing  an  un- 
sought freedom  upon  an  unprepared  people. 


CHAPTER  III 

NATIONALITY  AND  RACE 

Since  nationality  holds  thus  the  supreme  place  in  the 
human  scheme  of  things,  the  problem  of  peace  becomes  a 
problem  in  constructive  nationality.  The  war  has  put  exist- 
ing nations  to  a  terrible  test,  and  in  addition  to  the  damage  it 
has  wrought,  it  has  disclosed  every  sort  of  defect  and  patho- 
logical condition.  There  seems  to  be  no  likelihood  that  this 
peace  conference,  like  that  of  a  hundred  years  ago,  will  try 
to  restore  the  status  quo  ante.  A  radical  reconstruction  seems 
inevitable.  It  therefore  becomes  highly  important  to  under- 
stand the  essential  conditions  of  national  life. 

In  seeking  the  basis  of  nationality  the  first  thought  is  that 
it  rests  on  the  foundation  of  race.  Words  used  in  this  con- 
nection seem  everywhere  to  imply  such  a  dependence.  But  if 
by  race  is  meant  blood  relationship,  no  existing  nation  can 
lay  much  claim  to  race  unity.  If  we  carry  our  inquiry  back 
to  the  earliest  social  group,  the  primitive  family,  we  shall 
find  nothing  that  can  be  called  race  purity.  The  mixing 
process  is  already  at  work.  Marriage,  especially  in  the  days 
of  wife  purchase,  is  the  reverse  of  exclusive,  and  slavery  is 
even  more  indulgent.  Even  the  Hebrews  had  their  Gibeon- 
ites. 

But  such  race  purity  as  the  family  represents  quickly  van- 
ishes in  the  turmoil  of  early  nation  building.  Migration, 
conquest,  and  wholesale  deportation  with  the  ruthless  disre- 
gard of  all  prejudices  and  race  barriers,  mingles  the  most 
alien  elements.  With  the  advent  of  more  settled  conditions, 
these  violent  agencies  are  less  active,  but  their  place  is  taken 

31 


32  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

by  individual  migration,  that  silent  infiltration  of  alien  ele- 
ments which  permeates  the  entire  population,  and  that  the 
more  as  civilization  advances  and  the  facilities  for  movement 
increase.  What  we  see  going  on  in  America  is  what  goes  on 
everywhere  and  always  in  the  growing  parts  of  the  world. 
The  notion  of  a  pure  bred  race  is  a  fiction. 

It  is  perhaps  worth  noting  that  within  wide  limits  this 
mingling  of  the  races  encounters  no  protest  of  reason  or  in- 
stinct. The  union  of  Caucasian  and  Mongolian,  of  black  and 
white,  is  repugnant  to  civilized  instincts,  but  aside  from 
purely  prudential  considerations  as  affecting  problems  of 
language,  religion,  life  habit  or  social  status,  unions  between 
our  closely  related  western  races  occasion  no  repugnance.  It 
seems  to  be,  as  indeed  it  is,  the  natural  thing.  Blood  rela- 
tionship is  a  negligible  factor  in  our  problem. 

But  though  the  fact  of  kinship  is  negligible,  the  name  is 
still  a  name  to  conjure  with.  The  consciousness  of  race, — 
the  latter  vaguely  conceived  as  connoting  kinship, —  is  one  of 
the  most  stubborn  with  which  we  have  to  deal.  Though  a 
people  may  be  mingled  of  every  race  and  may  know  them- 
selves to  be  so,  yet  there  is  no  cry  to  which  they  will  rally  as 
they  will  to  that  of  kinship.  The  most  mongrel  of  nations 
will  sacrifice  its  most  substantial  interests  and  risk  its  very 
existence  in  the  service  of  its  assumed  kin.  This  is  the 
animus  of  pan-slavism,  irridentism,  and  the  like.  The  ap- 
peal, to  be  sure,  has  often  had  its  ulterior  motive.  The  Pan- 
slavist  Russian,  so  much  in  evidence  in  earlier  discussions, 
was  much  more  concerned  about  the  Dardanelles  than  about 
his  Polish  or  Balkan  relatives,  while  the  Pan-German,  with 
characteristic  effrontery,  uses  the  race  catchword  in  behalf 
of  the  annexation  of  territories  never  inhabited  by  the  Ger- 
man people.  But  these  very  abuses  are  suggestive  of  the 
strength  of  race  sentiment.  The  German  expansionist  would 
not  call  his  program  Pan-German  if  there  were  not  something 


NATIONALITY  AND  KACE  33 

in  that  covert  suggestion  of  race  unity,  even  in  the  most  inap- 
propriate connections.  How  much  more  when,  as  in  the  case 
of  Italy,  the  assumption  has  an  outward  semblance  of  justi- 
fication ?  If  blood  unity  is  gone  forever,  the  consciousness  of 
it  is  not,  and  no  factor  in  our  problem  requires  to  be  handled 
with  more  deference  and  tact. 

The  truth  is  that  while  kinship  is  a  fiction,  race  is  a  fact. 
We  are  united  by  blood  only  in  the  most  casual  way,  but  we 
are  united  by  other  bonds  which  are  far  more  tangible  and 
significant,  and  which  are  almost  as  closely  associated  with 
birth  as  kinship  itself.  We  may  be  born  of  the  bondwoman 
in  the  house,  but  we  are  none  the  less  born  in  the  house. 
The  brotherhood  that  really  counts  in  the  world  as  such 
doesn't  come  from  being  born  of  the  same  parents,  but  from 
growing  up  in  the  same  family.  Members  of  the  same  race 
are  therefore  those  that  have  grown  up  in  the  same  race  fam- 
ily, that  have  joined  in  the  same  concert  exercises  and  have 
learned  the  same  ritual  of  life.  Included  in  this  ritual  are 
all  the  most  fruitful  activities  of  our  lives.  Our  much 
vaunted  individuality  is  and  must  be  only  a  trifling  interest 
in  an  essentially  ritualized  existence.  More  than  this  be- 
comes social  weakness ;  much  more  becomes  insanity.  Every 
people  is  constantly  busy  in  developing  its  ritual,  in  reducing 
all  the  activities  of  life  to  uniformity,  and  correlating  them 
with  one  another,  all  in  the  interest  of  efficiency  and  economy. 
The  way  chosen  is  often  arbitrary.  It  matters  little  what 
tune  we  sing,  but  we  must  sing  together.  Correlation  is  the 
very  essence  of  society. 

The  supreme  example  of  this  correlation  is  language.  To 
be  able  easily  and  with  precision  to  communicate  our  ideas 
and  feelings  to  those  with  whom  we  must  cooperate  is  an  ob- 
vious necessity,  yet  one  hardly  appreciated  till  once  we  are 
deprived  of  it.  A  few  hours'  isolation  among  a  people  whose 
language  he  did  not  speak  has  more  than  once  made  the 


34  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

writer  appreciate  the  embarrassments  of  the  builders  of  the 
Tower  of  Babel.  As  language  develops,  it  becomes  the  intel- 
lectual counterpart  of  our  entire  life,  establishing  relations  of 
incredible  finesse,  and  in  turn,  stimulating  and  enticing  life 
into  activities  of  unlimited  subtlety  and  complexity.  Inas- 
much as  language  is  the  counterpart  of  all  else  and  the  con- 
dition of  all  else,  it  is  often  assumed  to  be  the  effective  basis 
of  race. 

But  there  is  much  else  than  language.  Indeed  pretty  much 
all  else  that  there  is  falls  under  this  same  great  law  of  cor- 
relation. The  food  that  we  eat  is  determined  originally  by 
the  spontaneous  resources  of  our  habitat,  but  this  option  of 
nature  rapidly  disappears.  Time  was  when  Peru  grew  pota- 
toes and  our  own  country  maize,  but  now  both  are  grown  over 
the  world.  We  are  learning  to  make  nature  very  subservient. 
If  the  choice  of  our  food  was  once  with  her,  it  is  now  with  us. 
If  France,  Germany,  and  America,  drink  three  different 
kinds  of  coffee,  it  is  not  because  they  produce  different  kinds, 
for  none  of  them  produce  any,  and  all  of  them  get  the  ingredi- 
ents on  essentially  the  same  terms.  The  choice  of  articles  of 
food  and  still  more  of  the  methods  of  preparation  and  service, 
are  not  nature's  choices  but  social  choices.  This  is  still  more 
true  as  regards  costume,  household  organization,  business  and 
social  procedure.  Every  department  of  life,  every  possible 
human  interest,  comes  under  the  sway  of  this  same  great  law 
of  correlation  and  concert.  The  result  is  an  all-embracing 
social  ritual,  a  ritual  with  antiphonal  and  responses,  a  ritual 
with  parts  for  the  few  and  parts  for  the  many  and  parts  for 
all,  but  a  ritual  without  which  we  are  nothing.  The  indi- 
vidual voice,  to  be  sure,  is  heard,  but  to  no  purpose  unless  it 
in  turn  becomes  ritual.     Failing  that,  it  is  only  discord. 

All  this  is  truism,  but  truism  too  often  forgotten  at  the 
moment  when  recognition  is  vital.  More  truisms  must  be 
noted  if  we  are  to  proceed  with  hope  of  profit. 


NATIONALITY  AND  RACE  35 

The  obvious  function  of  all  this  correlation  is  convenience, 
—  convenience  of  so  cogent  a  character  as  to  be  virtual  neces- 
sity. Suppose  we  decide  to  eat  different  food  from  that 
usually  eaten  about  us,  food  quite  as  wholesome  and  equally 
congenial  to  climate  and  soil,  but  not  the  social  choice.  Sup- 
pose even  less,  that  we  merely  decide  to  have  it  prepared  or 
served  by  other  than  the  usual  method.  The  result  is  at 
the  least,  a  vast  inconvenience  and  an  expenditure  of  time  and 
effort  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  advantage  gained,  which 
last  is  almost  invariably  nil.  The  writer  has  had  rather  un- 
usual opportunity  to  notice  the  application  of  this  principle 
to  his  fellow  countrymen  in  travel, —  laborious  and  time  con- 
suming effort  repeated  day  after  day  and  meal  after  meal, 
to  effect  trivial  changes  in  the  ritual  of  foreign  cookery  or 
service,  when  a  tithe  the  effort  devoted  to  self  adaptation 
would  have  removed  the  annoying  friction  by  conformity  of 
the  traveler  to  the  ritual  of  the  land  of  which  he  is  the  guest. 
Equally  and  more  true  is  this  principle  in  other  parts  of 
social  procedure.  Imagine,  if  it  be  possible,  that  no  social 
standards  afford  guidance  in  the  matter  of  dress, —  that  each 
must  devise  and  in  some  way  secure  the  necessary  costume. 
Conceive  the  labor  involved  in  devising,  in  securing  the  neces- 
sary materials,  in  making  or  guiding  the  making,  to  say  noth- 
ing of  the  weird  and  soul  estranging  result.  Intelligent 
women  are  sometimes  criticised  for  subserviency  to  "  sense- 
less "  fashion.  The  sufficient  answer  is  that  they  can  not 
afford  the  time  and  effort  to  do  anything  else.  The  purpose 
of  social  ritual  is  to  lighten  the  burden  of  life,  to  bring  pro- 
ducer, purveyor,  and  user  into  frictionless  correlation,  and 
to  make  the  myriad  perplexities  of  social  choice  forgettable 
things. 

But  social  ritual,  though  originating  in  convenience,  is  not 
therefore  a  mere  utilitarian  calculus  of  advantage.  It 
quickly  develops  a  counterpart  of  unreasoning,  passionate 


36  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

attachment  which  finds  its  only  equal  in  maternal  affection. 
Customs  the  most  arbitrary  and  the  most  irksome  in  the  learn- 
ing, ultimately  intrench  themselves  behind  this  barrier  of 
feeling  and  resist  all  encroachment.  We  may  recognize  that 
our  way  is  no  better  than  another,  that  in  a  given  situation 
it  is  a  handicap  and  that  we  can  come  to  the  mountain  far 
easier  than  the  mountain  can  come  to  us, —  the  suggestion  of 
change  is  none  the  less  intensely  repugnant  to  us.  More  often 
we  quite  lose  the  power  to  recognize  the  true  relation,  and  our 
ritual  becomes  to  us  the  very  constitution  of  nature.  The 
Englishman  who  thought  the  French  word  for  bread,  pain, 
very  peculiar  "  because  it  is  bread,  you  know,"  is  a  classic 
illustration.  When  the  ritual  of  social  procedure  is  thus 
completely  assimilated  to  the  fundamentals  of  nature  and  the 
normal  attachments  have  been  developed,  innovation  becomes 
sacrilege. 

This,  then,  is  our  definition  of  race,  a  body  of  men  united 
by  a  social  ritual.  Born  into  this  ritual,  no  matter  from  what 
stock,  they  grow  up  in  almost  abject  dependence  upon  it.  The 
adaptation  once  effected,  any  second  adaptation  becomes  im- 
mensely difficult  and  is  perhaps  never  complete.  The  mere 
learning  of  a  foreign  language  is  but  the  most  trifling  begin- 
ning. Said  an  American  who  lived  for  years  in  Germany 
and  had  brought  back  with  him  a  beautiful  German  wife: 
"  I  thought  I  had  become  German  in  sympathy  and  in  habit, 
but  if  I  had  known  how  many  trifling  differences  of  instinc- 
tive judgment  and  procedure  existed  between  us,  recurring 
day  by  day  and  creating  friction  in  the  most  unexpected  rela- 
tions, I  would  never  have  married  her." 

The  essence  of  the  social  ritual  is  thus  twofold.  Objec- 
tively it  is  convenience.     Subjectively  it  is  congeniality. 

We  now  have  to  notice  certain  facts  in  this  connection 
which  are  vital  to  our  problem.  The  first  is  the  arbitrary 
character  of  this  ritual.     All  important  as  it  is,  the  impor- 


NATIONALITY  AND  EACE  37 

tance  is  in  the  ritualization,  not  in  the  thing  ritualized. 
When  an  army  receives  the  order,  "  march,"  it  might  conceiv- 
ably start  with  either  foot,  but  it  is  imperative  that  all  start 
with  the  same  foot.  Judged  by  inherent  fitness,  many  social 
forms  are  absurd.  What  more  arbitrary  than  that  an  obso- 
lete riding  coat  with  skirts  split  to  go  over  the  horse's  back 
and  cut  away  in  front  to  accommodate  the  rider's  bended 
legs,  should  have  become  the  exacting  model  for  full 
dress  of  men  who  never  mount  a  horse.  It  is  the  pitfall 
of  the  inexperienced  to  judge  these  social  prescriptions 
by  intrinsic  fitness.  But  intrinsic  fitness  is  as  nothing  to 
social  uniformity,  especially  in  connections  where  forms  are 
primarily  of  symbolical  value.  Any  one  could  devise  a  coat 
more  suitable,  but  probably  no  society  in  the  world  could 
secure  its  adoption  and  emotional  consecration,  as  inscrutable 
influences  have  secured  it  for  the  coat  in  question.  As  society 
progresses,  this  arbitrariness  of  social  choice  tends  to  increase. 
As  our  mastery  over  nature  increases,  the  range  of  theoretic 
choice  widens.  But  the  range  of  actual  choice  does  not  widen 
in  proportion.  Social  considerations  of  propriety  take  the 
place  of  nature's  vanishing  barriers  and  again,  straight  is  the 
gate  and  narrow  is  the  way  that  leadeth  unto  life.  For  the 
multiplication  of  options  means  confusion,  and  ritual  and 
convention  are  the  only  escape  from  chaos.  Not  that  the  new 
options  bring  no  advantage,  but  they  are  available  only  with 
social  sanction.  They  must  be  ritualized  to  be  really  avail- 
able and  legitimate. 

It  is  therefore  illegitimate  to  assume  that  race  character, 
resting  as  it  does  essentially  upon  arbitrary  choices,  is  inher- 
ently sacred.  Some  other  word  for  bread  would  do  quite  as 
well  if  once  adopted.  Language,  custom,  even  religion  and 
government,  are  largely  arbitrary  as  regards  their  inherent 
character.  Their  only  advantage, —  a  very  great  one,  to  be 
sure, —  is  that  they  have  acquired  social  and  emotional  sane- 


38  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

tion.  There  is  much  talk  today  of  reuniting  religious  denom- 
inations which  are  no  longer  separated  by  differences  in  the 
"  essentials."  In  fact  they  are  separated  by  something  far 
more  essential  than  articles  of  creed, —  by  unconsciously 
developed  rituals  of  form  and  expression  in  a  multitude  of 
insignificant  things  which  are  an  obstacle  to  that  congeniality 
which  is  the  condition  of  helpful  association.  This  is  no 
disparagement  of  the  project  of  union,  a  policy  often  dictated 
by  the  weightiest  considerations  of  economy  and  efficiency. 
It  is  merely  a  suggestion  of  where  the  true  obstacle  to  union 
is  to  be  found.  The  tenacity  of  social  ritual  and  the  difficulty 
of  changing  it  can  scarcely  be  exaggerated,  but  broadly  speak- 
ing, other  forms  would  do  as  well.  The  practical  man  will 
urge  changes  only  with  extreme  circumspection,  but  he  is  not 
dealing  with  the  sacro-sanct. 

One  final  and  all  important  consideration  remains.  What 
determines  that  a  given  people  shall  develop  a  ritual  ?  There 
are  numberless  observations  to  be  made  in  this  connection, 
but  only  one  that  is  of  vital  importance.  One  fact  over- 
shadows and  embraces  all  others.  They  develop  a  ritual  be- 
cause they  live  together.  They  can  not  develop  it  unless  they 
live  together ;  they  must  develop  it  if  they  do.  This  means 
that  race  is  a  'product  of  association,  a  result  of  living  to- 
gether. 

But  this  important  truth  is  always  at  variance  with  the 
facts  of  the  moment.  There  are  at'  all  times  people  living  in 
a  unit  territory  who  are  not  of  one  race,  and  people  of  one 
race  who  are  not  living  in  one  territory.  Thus,  it  would 
seem  that  the  Transylvanians  and  the  Hungarians  or  the 
Poles  and  the  Germans,  separated  by  no  natural  barriers, 
ought  to  be  united  in  race,  but  they  are  sharply  opposed. 
Conversely,  the  ancient  Phoenicians  and  Greeks  and  the  mod- 
ern Anglo-Saxons  are  conspicuous  examples  of  race  unity, 
though  occupying  widely  scattered  territories.     The  obvious 


NATIONALITY  AND  RACE  39 

explanation  is  that  these  races  have  changed  their  habitat. 
They  lived  together  long  enough  to  develop  their  language  and 
race  character,  and  then  migrated  to  another  territory  where 
the  diverse  race  characters  have  as  yet  resisted  the  unifying 
influence  of  habitat.  Sometimes,  however,  a  more  subtle 
change  has  taken  place  in  the  territory  itself,  barriers  have 
been  virtually  eliminated  and  habitats  once  distinct  thus 
merged  into  a  unit.  This  little  noticed  tendency  is  peculiarly 
characteristic  of  recent  years.  Time  was  when  very  moder- 
ate barriers  kept  peoples  pretty  effectually  apart.  The  Ap- 
ennines almost  prevented  communication  between  Venice  and 
Florence,  giving  to  the  two  peoples  a  markedly  different  char- 
acter through  the  distinctive  period  of  their  history.  Today 
the  barrier  is  scarcely  noticeable,  and  Italy  is  a  unit  habitat. 
The  very  considerable  diversity  which  had  grown  up  between 
the  different  parts  of  Italy  has  perceptibly  diminished  since 
railways  and  other  modern  facilities  have  lowered  the  divid- 
ing barriers,  the  process  of  unification  being  aided,  of  course, 
by  the  substantial  unity  bequeathed  to  all  by  Rome.  In  the 
great  plains  of  eastern  Europe,  mere  extent  and  sparseness  of 
population  long  prevented  unification.  With  extreme  sim- 
plicity of  life  and  the  feeblest  incentive  for  intercourse  and 
exchange,  mere  expanse  and  other  trivial  obstacles  sufficed  to 
keep  peoples  apart  and  slowly  to  diversify  them.  Witness  the 
separatism  of  the  Ukraine  unmotived  by  barriers  of  mountain 
and  sea.  Against  such  separatism  the  quickened  life  of  the 
present  with  its  freer  communication  and  its  more  varied  re- 
gional demands  operates  as  a  powerful  unifying  influence. 
The  result,  however,  is  to  unify  the  habitat  much  more  than 
the  people.  Hence  the  irritating  incongruity  between  race 
and  habitat,  the  seeming  refutation  of  the  truth  that  the  one 
is  the  product  of  the  other.  The  tendency  is  in  consequence 
to  attribute  to  race  an  absolute  character  and  to  accord  to  it 
a  deference  to  which  it  is  not  entitled.     Race  character  is 


40  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

derivative  in  origin  and  arbitrary  in  essence.  The  forces 
making  for  unification  are  undoubtedly  gaining  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  divisive  forces.  While  recognizing  the  tenacity 
with  which  races  hold  to  their  language  and  customs,  political 
prevision  can  not  wholly  ignore  the  fact  that  they  are  a 
waning  power.  When  a  conflict  presents  itself  between  race 
integrity  and  the  most  obvious  requirements  of  territorial  con- 
venience, the  former  may  not  unreasonably  be  asked  to  make 
concessions.     Race  interests  are  not  always  paramount. 

It  will  be  noted  that  this  conclusion  is  somewhat  in  con- 
trast with  that  reached  in  the  preceding  chapter  regarding 
nationality.  Nationality  must  not  be  confounded  with  race. 
Race  is  merely  one  of  the  bases  of  nationality,  ordinarily  the 
most  important  one,  but  never  the  only  one,  and  in  exceptional 
cases  quite  subordinate  to  other  factors.  It  is  a  great  ad- 
vantage to  a  nation  to  be  based  on  race  unity,  but  it  is  not  a 
necessity.  Switzerland  is  a  nation,  and  withal  a  very  suc- 
cessful one,  but  the  Swiss  are  not  of  one  race.  Physical 
conditions  of  habitat  are  here  so  much  more  important  than 
race  unity  that  they  not  only  effect  the  union  of  diverse  races, 
but  that  without  appreciable  tendency  toward  assimilation. 
Great  Britain,  again,  is  a  nation,  but  the  diverse  races  united 
under  its  sway,  English,  Scotch,  Welsh,  and  Cornish,  being 
less  separated  by  physical  barriers,  are  visibly  undergoing 
assimilation.  The  Cornish  have  lost  their  separate  language, 
the  Scotch  nearly  so,  and  the  Welsh  in  part,  and  complete 
assimilation  seems  plainly  foreshadowed,  but  as  yet  British 
unity  is  a  unity  of  nationality  with  but  an  incomplete  unity 
of  race. 

More  striking  and  difficult  examples  are  found  in  the  great 
imperial  combinations  of  Britain  and  of  Rome.  Roman 
unity  made  no  pretense  to  being  a  unity  of  race.  Indeed, 
for  a  long  time  nothing  more  was  attempted  than  the  barest 
recognition  of  Rome's  paramount  authority.     Rome  had  long 


NATIONALITY  AND  KAOE  41 

been  mistress  of  the  world  before  she  even  attempted  unity  of 
administration.  With  the  ultimate  unification  of  adminis- 
tration, however,  there  inevitably  came  a  steadily  increasing 
measure  of  cultural  and  even  of  racial  unity.  Koman  archi- 
tecture, with  wide  variation  of  forms,  but  always  Koman,  be- 
came universal.  Even  the  Eoman  language  displaced  the 
less  developed  of  the  subject  tongues,  thus  completing  the 
unity  of  what  we  now  instinctively  call  the  "  Latin  races,"  a 
unity  developed  from  the  most  pronounced  diversity  within 
historic  times.  More  significant  still  is  the  consciousness  of 
unity  which  persisted  in  Eoman  Europe  for  many  centuries 
after  the  decay  of  the  Eoman  power,  a  feeling  that  the  world 
unity  which  that  power  represented  must  somewhere  still 
exist,  however  much  in  abeyance.  This  was  neither  a  unity 
of  race,  for  none  such  existed,  nor  a  unity  of  state,  for  politi- 
cal authority  had  long  since  passed  away,  but  a  unity  essen- 
tially national,  although  on  so  vast  a  scale  that  usage  hesi- 
tates to  apply  the  term.  The  more  recent  and  less  developed 
case  of  the  British  Empire  presents  similar  phenomena. 

We  waste  our  time  here  in  attempts  at  exact  classification. 
The  cases  are  few  and  so  highly  individual  that  classification 
helps  us  little.  But  it  is  clear  that  the  group  solidarity  which 
has  received  such  accentuation  in  our  day,  is  something  else 
than  race  unity.  Eace  consciousness  should  unite  the  Dutch 
and  Flemish,  the  Germans  and  Austrians,  the  Americans  and 
Canadians,  and  divide  the  Swiss.  If  given  full  sway,  it 
would  recast  very  extensively  the  political  map  of  the  world. 
But  race  is  a  waning  rather  than  a  growing  power.  The 
awkward  recrudescence  of  race  separatism  in  our  day  at- 
tests rather  than  disproves  the  assertion.  It  is  the  protest 
of  an  alarmed  race  consciousness  which  foresees  its  doom. 

Nationality  is  again  to  be  distinguished  from  mere  po- 
litical authority  resting  upon  no  foundation  but  physical 
coercion.     The  authority  of  the  Austrian  monarchy  has  not 


42  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

succeeded  in  uniting  the  diverse  elements  of  that  perplexing 
population  into  a  nation,  though  they  unquestionably  con- 
stitute a  state.  It  is  difficult  to  speak  of  the  United  King- 
dom of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  as  a  nation,  though  it  is 
undoubtedly  a  state.  But  while  the  state  is  not  the  nation, 
it  tends  to  become  one.  German  Alsace  became  completely 
merged  in  the  French  nation  (though  not  in  the  French  race). 
Cornwall,  Wales,  and  Scotland  have  become  merged  in  the 
British  nation,  and  are  apparently  in  process  of  a  further 
merger  into  the  British  race.  There  is  a  clear  dependence 
of  state  upon  nation,  and  of  nation  upon  race,  but  each  de- 
pends upon  other  things  as  well.  Moreover  the  dependence 
works  the  other  way.  The  state  requires  national  feeling  as 
the  condition  of  its  stability,  but  let  the  state  be  once  estab- 
lished and  judiciously  maintained,  and  national  feeling  will 
result.  Prussia  was  built  upon  the  resentful  incorporation 
of  Frankfort  and  Hanover,  but  both  are  now  safely  Prussian. 
Bavaria  and  Saxony  were  hardly  more  favorable  to  the  Em- 
pire, but  their  loyalty  in  1914  was  unquestioned.  Nor  can 
the  general  desirability  of  these  mergers  be  questioned,  what- 
ever their  present  embarrassments. 

To  summarize,  race  unity  based  on  language  and  custom, 
has  lost  ground  in  our  day,  and  nationality,  a  unity  based  on 
other  considerations,  chiefly  economic,  territorial,  and  poli- 
tical, has  acquired  the  ascendancy.  Nationalism  stands,  on 
the  whole,  for  the  larger,  though  not  for  the  complete  union 
of  mankind. 


CHAPTEK  IV 

NATIONALITY  AND  TERRITORY 

We  have  seen  that  nationality  is  the  key  to  our  problem 
and  that  nationality  is  closely  connected  with  race.  Indeed 
some  would  have  it  that  the  two  should  be  identical,  that  a 
race  should  always  be  a  nation  and  a  nation  always  a  race. 
The  trouble,  it  is  contended,  lies  just  here,  that  nations  have 
been  formed  which  are  not  based  on  unity  of  race  and  so 
are  inharmonious,  one  race  tyrannizing  over  the  other  as  the 
Austrians  do  over  the  Bohemians,  the  Magyars  over  the 
Croats,  and  the  like.  Let  each  of  these  races  be  a 
nation  by  itself  and  all  will  be  well.  This  is  an 
enticing  theory  in  the  abstract,  but  when  we  begin  to  apply 
it,  we  at  once  discover  that  something  besides  race  is  neces- 
sary to  make  a  satisfactory  nation.  It  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary that  the  race  that  is  to  form  a  nation  should  be  satisfac- 
torily situated.  For  instance,  if  a  race  is  divided  and  scat- 
tered, some  here  and  some  there,  with  alien  populations  in 
between,  it  is  usually  recognized  as  impracticable  to  form 
them  into  a  single  ethnic  nation.  Either  they  must  form  a 
number  of  smaller  nations  alike  in  race  but  unable  to  unite 
because  they  lack  the  necessary  territorial  unity,  or  they  must 
be  formed  into  a  single  nation  with  incorporation  of  the  alien 
elements.  In  either  case  race  unity  is  plainly  not  enough. 
Territorial  unity  is  also  necessary  to  the  forming  of  a  satis- 
factory nation.  Even  the  sea, — which  is  quite  as  much  a 
bond  as  a  barrier, —  usually  makes  national  union  difficult. 
It  has  made  it  impossible  for  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  to  form 
a  single  nation,  despite  its  pronounced  unity  and  its  control 

of  sea  communications. 

43 


4:4  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

But  the  territorial  requirement  is  for  something  more  than 
unity.  There  are  certain  elemental  conveniences  which  are 
quite  as  necessary  as  unity  itself  to  successful  national  life. 
To  start  nations  without  these  is  to  run  so  large  a  risk  of 
failure  that  no  prudent  people  will  attempt  it.  First  among 
these  requirements  is  defense.  A  nation's  territory  and  the 
wealth  which  it  accumulates  upon  it  in  the  shape  of  houses, 
roads,  factories  and  the  like,  constitute  its  capital.  The  na- 
tion that  can  not  put  its  possessions  under  lock  and  key,  as 
it  were,  simply  invites  aggression.  Undoubtedly  we  may 
hope  for  greater  respect  for  national  rights  and  something 
of  collective  enforcement  of  them  as  time  goes  on,  but  recent 
events  have  not  tended  to  reassure  us  as  regards  the  present. 
Kor  can  we  hope  that  the  time  will  ever  come  when  the  nation 
like  the  householder  will  not  need  to  take  reasonable  precau- 
tions. In  any  case  it  is  a  present  necessity  of  nations  to  pro- 
tect themselves,  and  therefore  a  prime  requisite  that  the 
national  domain  should  be  reasonably  capable  of  defense. 
In  particular  it  becomes  important  that  nations  should  be 
delimited  on  reasonably  equitable  terms.  A  national  bound- 
ary may  be  an  arbitrary  line  through  a  plain, —  not  an  ideal 
frontier,  surely,  nor  easily  capable  of  defense,  but  still  an 
equitable  one,  as  the  two  neighbors  face  each  other  on  essen- 
tially equal  terms.  But  when  a  natural  barrier  exists  be- 
tween two  peoples  with  fastnesses  of  immense  strength,  and 
the  line  is  so  drawn  as  to  give  these  all  to  one  party,  making 
his  domain  impregnable  and  leaving  that  of  the  neighbor 
completely  indefensible,  the  inequity  is  such  as  virtually  to 
destroy  the  latter's  independence  and  create  a  relation  of 
vassalage.  Very  few  are  aware  of  the  number  of  strategic 
frontiers  which  are  now  of  that  character  and  the  part  they 
have  played  in  the  present  conflict.  Thus,  Italy  has  lived 
all  her  national  life  under  the  sword  of  Damocles,  her  fron- 
tier towards  Austria  running,  not  along  the  mountain  crests, 


NATIONALITY  AND  TEEEITORY  45 

but  far  down  the  Italian  slope.  This  has  made  Austria  per- 
fectly safe,  while  Italy  was  always  exposed  to  Austrian  ag- 
gression. A  nation  so  situated  could  not  disagree  with  so 
dangerous  a  neighbor.  It  was  this  helplessness  which  drove 
Italy  into  the  Triple  Alliance,  a  most  unnatural  combination, 
and  this  again  that  induced  her  to  join  the  Allies,  hoping 
thus  to  remove  the  hated  menace  and  secure  an  equitable  and 
defensible  frontier.  It  so  happens  that  the  territory  needed 
to  rectify  this  frontier  is  all  Italian  so  that  racial  and  terri- 
torial considerations  unite  in  demanding  the  change,  but  it  is 
easy  to  understand  that  if  the  population  were  alien, —  as  in 
certain  like  situations  it  is, —  the  strategic  consideration 
might  be  of  so  great  importance  as  to  overbear  the  claims  of 
race.  It  would  in  any  case  be  a  factor  that  could  not  be 
ignored. 

But  territorial  demands  do  not  stop  here.  War,  though 
a  possibility  which  a  prudent  people  can  never  leave  out  of 
account,  is  after  all  the  exception.  Provision  for  peace  is 
even  more  necessary.  There  are  territorial  requirements 
of  peace  as  well  as  of  war,  and  these  have  rapidly  become 
more  exacting  with  the  development  of  civilization.  Here, 
perhaps,  more  than  anywhere  else,  popular  notions  are  in- 
adequate, particularly  in  countries  whose  perceptions  have 
not  been  sharpened  by  need.  A  country  so  completely 
equipped  as  is  our  own,  with  all  the  facilities  for  modern 
civilized  existence,  easily  overlooks  its  debt  to  an  exception- 
ally favorable  situation.  That  which  it  owes  to  accident  or 
good  fortune,  it  easily  assumes  to  be  the  common  lot  of  na- 
tions. It  is  safe  to  say  that  there  is  not  a  single  nation  in 
existence  that  does  not  lack  some  important  element  of  our 
wonderful  endowment.  If  we  had  more  experience  of  their 
needs,  we  should  have  more  sympathy  with  their  strivings. 

It  is  important  to  note  in  this  connection  that  the  develop- 
ment of  civilization  in  the  last  two  or  three  centuries  has 


46  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

materially  modified  what  we  may  call  the  minimum  terri- 
torial requirements  of  nationality.  The  exceedingly  simple 
life  of  an  earlier  age  was  essentially  local  and  self-sufficing. 
Every  community,  almost  every  household,  raised  its  own 
food,  built  its  own  dwellings,  made  its  own  tools,  and  wove 
its  own  garments.  Things  brought  from  distant  localities, 
—  mostly  articles  of  personal  adornment  and  luxuries  of 
limited  use, —  demanded  little  in  the  way  of  transportation 
facilities.  The  pack  horse  and  mountain  trail  were  suf- 
ficient. Access  to  foreign  lands  was  a  convenience,  but  not 
a  necessity,  the  more  so  as  life,  thus  compelled  to  be  local 
and  self-sufficient,  developed  local  possibilities  that  are  now 
undreamed  of.  For  a  woman  of  the  Middle  Ages  to  be  de- 
nied the  privileges  of  the  cloth  mart  was  small  privation. 
She  might  still  be  decently,  perhaps  sumptuously  clad.  For 
the  woman  of  today  the  cloth  mart  is  absolutely  necessary. 

This  all-roundness  of  community  life  had  its  political  con- 
sequences. It  made  little  nations  possible  and  that  in  com- 
paratively indifferent  situations.  Bohemia  might  be  not 
only  happy  and  prosperous  but  highly  civilized  without  hav- 
ing harbors  or  extensive  commercial  facilities.  Even  in  the 
interior  of  Russia  such  independent  political  units  could  and 
did  flourish. 

But  something  has  changed  all  that.  Perhaps  the  steam 
engine  was  chiefly  responsible.  But  whatever  it  was,  the 
result  was  that  industry  of  every  kind  became  specialized, 
communities  ceased  to  be  self-sufficing  and  became  dependent 
upon  one  another,  sending  great  distances  and  in  many  di- 
rections, not  for  a  few  things  of  exceptional  use,  but  for  every- 
thing. Probably  the  modern  American  brings  his  food  an 
average  of  a  hundred  miles  and  other  things  much  farther. 
Hardly  a  home  is  so  humble  that  its  equipment  does  not  lay 
under  tribute  every  grand  division  of  the  globe. 

It  is  a  peculiarity  of  the  new  industrial  order  that  it  was 


NATIONALITY  AND  TERRITORY  47 

compelled  from  its  very  nature  to  be  virulently  competitive. 
The  new  way  of  making  goods,  by  great  mechanisms  driven 
by  nature  energies,  was  cheaper,  vastly  cheaper,  than  the  old 
way,  but  on  one  condition,  namely,  that  they  should  be  made 
in  very  great  quantities.  But  if  made  in  great  quantities, 
there  would  obviously  be  more  than  single  communities  or 
small  districts  could  use.  It  was  therefore  necessary  to  get 
the  largest  possible  markets.  Hence  the  belligerent  imperial- 
ism of  the  new  industry.  It  could  not  remain  contentedly 
at  home  and  allow  other  countries  to  go  on  in  their  old  way. 
It  simply  had  to  have  world  markets  or  it  could  not  work  at 
all.  It  broke  into  these  old  countries  with  their  hand  artisan- 
ship  and  local  self-sufficiency,  as  a  desolating  revolutionary 
force.  Some  of  them  like  China  tried  to  stem  the  tide  but 
to  no  avail.  Had  the  new  system  been  capable  of  local  appli- 
cation, the  innovators  might  possibly  have  been  more  con- 
siderate. As  it  was,  they  developed,  as  men  always  do, 
a  philosophy  of  society  consonant  with  their  needs  and  sword 
in  hand  demanded  its  recognition.  The  intrinsic  legitimacy 
of  honest  trade  had  became  an  axiom  of  western  thought  and 
was  maintained  by  force  of  arms. 

The  all  important  characteristic  of  this  new  order  was  the 
increase  of  transportation.  For  every  one  of  us,  every  day, 
four  tons  of  goods  are  moved  a  mile  by  the  railroads  alone. 
Other  agencies  probably  move  as  much  more.  Transporta- 
tion has  probably  increased  a  hundred-fold  as  compared  with 
the  days  of  Elizabeth.  Such  an  increase  has  been  made 
possible  only  by  a  complete  change  in  transportation  methods. 
The  development  of  transportation  facilities  has  become  a 
prime  concern  with  modern  nations.  They  are  in  that  re- 
spect somewhat  like  private  concerns.  When  one  firm  em- 
ploys auto  trucks,  its  competitor  can  not  get  along  with  pack 
mules  or  carts.  The  securing  of  favorable  sites  for  rail- 
roads  (one  accession  to  the  territory  of  the  United  States 


48  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

was  made  exclusively  for  that  purpose),  for  industrial  plants, 
and  above  all  for  the  great  harbors  which  modern  shipping 
requires,  is  of  capital  importance  and  is  indeed  a  chief  pre- 
occupation of  modern  statecraft. 

It  will  readily  be  understood  how  completely  such  a  revolu- 
tion invalidates  the  territorial  standards  of  earlier  national 
life.  It  is  important  to  notice  this  because  nationality  is  be- 
ing continually  advocated  on  the  strength  of  former  national 
possession  and  achievement.  Bohemia,  Poland,  Serbia,  and 
other  nations  of  the  past  are  applicants  for  readmission  to 
the  family  of  nations  on  old  territorial  lines.  The  argu- 
ment is  simple  and  at  first  sight  plausible.  "  We  once  were 
independent,  prosperous,  and  civilized.  Why  can  we  not, 
with  the  same  territories,  be  so  again  ?  "  The  answer  should 
be  easy  in  the  light  of  the  foregoing.  "  Prosperity  and 
civilization  now  rest  on  a  different  basis  from  what  they  did 
in  your  day."  The  modern  nation  can  no  more  get  along 
with  the  old  outfit  than  the  modern  housewife  can  get  along 
with  the  spinning  wheel  and  the  distaff.  This  is  not  to 
prejudice  the  case  of  these  or  other  candidates  for  nation- 
hood, but  they  must  meet  the  new  requirements  if  they  are 
to  win  the  privilege  anew.  No  greater  folly  could  be  com- 
mitted than  to  set  up  new  nations  without  the  basic  requisites 
of  present-day  national  life. 

The  consciousness  that  new  things  can  not  be  as  the  old  is 
curiously  betrayed  in  certain  of  the  extreme  nationalist  pro- 
posals recently  offered  for  our  consideration.  Thus  an  ardent 
protagonist  of  Bohemian  independence  urges  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  Bohemia  as  an  independent  nation,  but  can  not  for- 
get the  fact  that  Bohemian  territory  has  no  access  to  the  sea. 
This,  he  sees,  will  never  do.  He  therefore  proposes  that 
Bohemia  be  accorded  a  narrow  strip  of  territory  which  should 
serve  as  a  runway  to  the  sea.  This  pipestem  appendage 
would,  of  course,  be  alien  in  population  and  would  work  havoc 


NATIONALITY  AND  TEKEITOKY  49 

with  other  nationalities  quite  as  much  entitled  to  unity  and 
perhaps  to  independence  as  Bohemia  herself.  It  would  be 
a  standing  provocation  to  hostilities  and  yet  entirely  indefen- 
sible, a  positive  marvel  of  misadjustment.  But  what  would 
you?  An  independent  Bohemia  must  have  access  to  the 
sea.  Assuredly,  but  the  historic  Bohemia  in  whose  name 
the  new  Bohemia  is  invoked,  had  no  harbors  and  needed 
none.  Thus  she  has  bequeathed  no  raw  material  out  of 
which  the  necessities  of  a  modern  Bohemia  can  be  constructed. 
Similar  difficulties  present  themselves  in  connection  with  the 
reconstitution  of  Poland,  and  perhaps  in  other  cases  as  well. 

The  meaning  of  it  all  is  clear.  The  past  has  bequeathed 
to  us  a  lot  of  little  nations  with  their  little  patrimonies,  once 
ample  for  nationhood.  They  ask  to  be  continued  under  new 
conditions  which  permit  none*  but  nations  more  ample  and 
more  liberally  endowed.  Professing  themselves  willing  to 
be  little,  they  demand, —  the  conditions  demand, —  an  equip- 
ment which  is  possible  only  for  the  big.  We  will  not  attempt, 
for  the  moment,  to  reconcile  this  conflict  of  interests.  We 
are  concerned  to  note,  first,  that  such  a  conflict  exists,  that 
race  unity  is  at  war  with  the  requirements  of  modern  equip- 
ment, and  second,  that  race  unity  is  an  old  fact,  the  product 
of  existence  under  conditions  that  have  now  passed  away, 
and  the  other  is  a  new  fact,  the  requirements  which  new  con- 
ditions have  inexorably  forced  upon  the  modern  world.  It 
requires  little  insight  to  predict  the  ultimate  outcome  of  such 
a  struggle.  The  Bohemians  will  have  a  seaport,  whether  or 
no,  and  they  will  pay  for  it  by  such  concessions  from  race 
unity  as  are  necessary. 

With  all  possible  insistence  let  it  be  repeated  that  these 
words  are  written  in  no  unsympathetic  spirit.  It  is  not  the 
intention  to  disparage  these  products  of  the  patient  dis- 
cipline of  past  ages.  The  legacy  of  race  ideals,  race  sympa- 
thies, and  race  inspiration  which  the  past  has  left  us  must 


50  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

be  accounted  among  our  most  precious  possessions.  To  treat 
them  lightly  as  things  to  be  brushed  aside  at  convenience,  to 
note  only  the  barriers  which  they  interpose  in  the  way  of 
progress,  this  is  the  opposite  of  wisdom  and  of  statesman- 
ship. But  there  is  not  one  of  these  precious  inheritances 
that  has  not  itself  been  purchased  at  the  expense  of  lesser  but 
like  sentiments  which  have  died  that  it  might  live.  With 
what  agonies  of  heartache  the  Scottish  clans  yielded  to  the 
strong  hand  that  welded  them  into  the  weapon  of  Eobert  the 
Bruce !  How  many  memories  of  Bannockburn  have  had  to 
be  forgotten  or  remembered  with  kindlier  thoughts  ere 
the  kilties  could  find  their  glory  in  Waterloo  and  the  Marne ! 
That  the  one  must  increase  and  the  other  decrease  is  the  lesson 
of  all  history.  The  process  will  not  be  hastened  by  con- 
tumely and  reproach.  The  existing  horizon  is  the  possible 
horizon  for  the  moment,  and  the  enthusiasms  of  today  are  the 
only  possible  parents  of  the  larger  enthusiasms  of  tomorrow. 
We  must  reckon, —  not  grudgingly  but  sympathetically, — 
with  the  products  of  historic  nationality.  But  we  must  not 
sacrifice  to  them, —  we  are  powerless  to  sacrifice  to  them, — 
the  vital  requirements  of  modern  life.  These  new  require- 
ments, these  larger  physical  conditions,  have  the  same  power 
to  create  their  spiritual  counterpart  of  sentiment  and  con- 
geniality, their  new  race  unity,  that  former  conditions  have 
had.  Prudence  requires  respect  for  the  nationality  of  the 
past,  but  progress  requires  respect  for  the  nationality  of 
the  future. 

It  will  long  ago  have  occurred  to  the  impatient  reader  that 
an  easy  way  of  removing  this  conflict  is  to  be  found  in  co- 
operation. An  independent  Bohemia  must  indeed  have  ac- 
cess to  the  sea,  but  why  a  monopolized  Bohemian  access? 
Why  can  not  some  neighboring  seaboard  nation  permit  the 
use  of  its  facilities  by  arrangement?  It  can.  This  is  not 
a  matter  of  speculation  but  of  fact.     Such  arrangements 


NATIONALITY  AND  TEKKITOEY  51 

exist.  Germany  ships  via  Antwerp,  Switzerland  via  Genoa, 
and  the  like.  But  while  experience  attests  the  possibility 
of  such  arrangements,  it  also  witnesses  beyond  question  that 
they  are  never  satisfactory.  They  are  impeded,  partial,  and 
precarious.  They  are  better  than  nothing,  better,  it  may 
be,  than  any  available  alternative,  but  they  remain  irksome 
at  the  best.  It  may  seem  very  unreasonable  of  Germany  to 
want  Antwerp  for  her  very  own,  but  what  would  we  say  to 
an  alien-owned  New  York  which  we  were  permitted  to  use 
by  arrangement?  It  is  safe  to  say  that  such  a  New  York 
would  never  have  attained  a  quarter  of  its  present  size  and 
that  the  diverted  traffic  would  have  followed  more  expensive 
routes  to  less  convenient  harbors. 

Here,  quite  naturally,  the  internationalist  sees  in  his  pro- 
posal a  cure  for  the  evils  of  jarring  national  interests.  Let 
the  precarious  arrangements  referred  to  be  guaranteed  by 
the  associated  nations  and  the  uncertainty  is  removed.  Yes, 
if  something  can  guarantee  the  associated  nations.  The  pro- 
posal to  neutralize  or  internationalize  important  ports  or 
traffic  ways  which  are  necessarily  used  by  different  nations, 
is  an  elaboration  of  the  same  principle.  Such  an  arrange- 
ment, it  is  urged,  would  make  it  possible  to  have  an  inde- 
pendent Bohemia,  and  in  short,  any  number  of  little  nations 
without  territorial  distortions. 

It  may  seem  ungracious  to  suggest  that  this  is  one  of  the 
very  objections  to  internationalism.  It  summons  men  to  the 
larger  brotherhood  by  promising  them  a  larger  freedom  to 
indulge  their  narrower  prejudices.  The  world  feels  uncom- 
fortable just  now  because  of  an  unusual  amount  of  readjust- 
ment which  it  is  called  upon  to  make.  The  little  unities 
that  stand  for  nothing  but  the  past,  that  correspond  to  noth- 
ing in  the  life  conditions  of  the  present,  are  feeling  the  piti- 
less pressure  of  these  new  conditions.  We  are  constrained 
to  enter  into  larger  relationships,  to  adjust  ourselves  to  larger 


52  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

groups  and  get  acquainted  with  strange  people.  It  is  all  so 
uncongenial,  so  irksome.  We  are  homesick  for  the  little  home 
circle  out  of  which  we  have  been  driven  into  this  great  cheer- 
less, uncongenial  world. 

And  just  as  we  are  feeling  the  irksomeness  of  this  larger 
relationship,  and  uneasiness  is  passing  into  resentment  and 
revolt,  along  comes  the  internationalist  and  launches  his 
anathema  against  this  thing  that  irks  us.  He  tells  us  that 
polyglot  empires  and  unions  not  based  on  congeniality  ought 
not  to  be.  How  welcome  such  doctrine!  In  exchange  for 
this  odious  reality  which  chafes  us,  he  summons  us  to  a  su- 
preme unity,  to  the  world  fellowship,  a  fellowship  that  seems 
to  demand  no  concrete  sacrifices,  to  entail  no  immediate  and 
irksome  relations.  And  withal  and  above  all  it  permits  and 
even  enjoins  the  return  to  the  earlier  congenial  relation  with 
its  local  exclusiveness  and  prejudices.  The  appeal  is  en- 
ticing. 

It  may  be  conceded  that  this  response  to  the  appeal  of  in- 
ternationalism is  quite  illogical.  If  internationalism  ever 
becomes  a  fact  among  men,  it  will  be  no  painless  union.  It 
will  require  such  a  shedding  of  prejudices  and  such  a  read- 
justment of  mental  habit  as  no  nationalism  ever  yet  imposed, 
and  the  serious  internationalist  doubtless  realizes  this  and  is 
willing  to  pay  the  price.  Nor  need  we  question  for  a  moment 
the  sincerity  of  its  prophets  or  the  elevation  of  their  motives. 
But  all  unconsciously  the  gospel  of  internationalism  owes 
its  glamour  in  large  part  to  its  indulgent  attitude  toward 
provincialism.  Its  immediate  tendency  is  disintegrating, 
whatever  its  promise.  So  pronounced  is  this  relation  that  dis- 
integration is  usually  the  first  plank  in  the  internationalist 
platform,  the  one  upon  which  present  effort  is  chiefly  con- 
centrated. Russia  is  not  altogether  a  fair  example,  but  her 
case  is  none  the  less  relevant.  She  has  proclaimed  the  larger 
human  unity  and  denounced  the  irksome  unity  of  the  nation 


NATIONALITY  AND  TEKEITORY  53 

under  the  name  of  self-determination.  The  resulting  disin- 
tegration is  apparent,  but  hardly  the  resulting  unity. 

Conceding  all  that  may  be  claimed  for  internationalism 
as  the  goal  of  human  endeavor,  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  the 
query  whether  the  disintegration  of  the  present  larger  aggre- 
gates is  the  way  to  get  it.  These  have  been  painfully  formed 
by  the  slow  removal  of  obstructive  sentiments,  the  formation 
of  larger  cohesions,  and  the  successive  widening  of  men's 
horizons.  The  little  has  grown  into  the  large.  May  not 
the  large  grow  into  the  universal  ? 

In  summary,  nationality  is  based  upon  race  and  upon 
physical*  conditions.  But  race  is  itself  the  product  of  earlier 
and  long  standing  physical  conditions.  Conflicts  between 
the  two  are  due  to  changes  in  physical  conditions,  changes 
due  in  part  to  migration,  but  in  greater  part  to  the  develop- 
ment of  larger  relations  of  co-operation  and  interdependence. 
In  its  present  high  stage  of  development  race  sentiment  is  ex- 
ceedingly tenacious  and  imperious,  often  arrogating  to  itself 
an  absolute  and  permanent  character  and  yielding  reluctantly 
to  changed  physical  conditions.  Changes  in  physical  condi- 
tion have  of  late  been  rapid  and  far-reaching,  the  newer  de- 
mands for  successful  national  life  requiring  larger  areas  and 
better  facilities  than  were  formerly  necessary.  Present  race 
feeling,  therefore,  does  not  fit  present  national  requirements, 
which  latter  are  too  recent  to  have  developed  the  larger  race 
sentiments  except  imperfectly  in  certain  favored  localities  like 
Great  Britain.  It  is  a  transition  age,  an  age  of  narrow  senti- 
ments and  broad  requirements.  Working  arrangements  must 
be  based  on  compromise.  Yet  it  is  well  to  remember  that  race 
sentiment  is  itself  a  product  of  physical  conditions  and  that 
new  conditions  inevitably  produce  new  sentiments.  Historic 
nationalism  is  a  stubborn  but  a  waning  force;  specialized 
industrial  civilization  a  permanent  and  growing  power.  This 
must  increase  and  that  must  decrease.     The  working  adjust- 


54  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

ments  which  we  are  called  upon  to  effect  will  call  for  very 
large  concessions  to  these  great  spiritual  inheritances  from 
the  past,  but  these  concessions  should  be  made  in  full  recog- 
nition of  this  fundamental  fact.  The  Great  Peace  must  be 
based  on  a  larger  justice,  a  deeper  sympathy,  and  a  fuller 
deference  than  we  have  hitherto  known,  but  it  would  indeed 
be  pitiful  if  that  deference  and  sympathy  were  construed  in 
the  interest  of  provincialism  and  the  perpetuation  of  petty 
prejudice  among  men.  Not  so  would  it  become  the  Great 
Peace. 


CHAPTEE  V 

NATIONALITY  AND  NATURAL  RESOURCE 

At  the  basis  of  national  life  there  is  always  an  economic 
problem.  An  essential  condition  of  the  nation  as  of  the 
family  is  an  assured  livelihood.  Briefly  and  by  exception, 
a  nation  may  live  upon  its  endowment  as  a  family  may  live 
by  consuming  its  patrimony,  but  such  an  existence  is  preca- 
rious and  demoralizing.  Nations  can  not  long  escape  the 
wholesome  necessity  of  providing  for  their  own  necessities. 
Exemption  from  this  requirement,  even  for  a  brief  period, 
results  in  a  degeneration  of  tissue  which  is  speedily  followed 
by  national  decay.  Spain  and  Portugal  are  classic  examples 
of  nations  ruined  by  being  privileged  for  a  time  to  live  on 
the  fruits  of  other  men's  labors. 

It  is  therefore  pertinent  to  inquire  at  the  founding  of  the 
nation  as  at  the  founding  of  the  new  household, —  is  economic 
support  assured?  If  not,  then  nationality  will  be  handi- 
capped and  stunted.  Such  a  result  has  its  dangers,  not  only 
for  the  nation  in  question,  but  for  the  general  community 
of  nations.  The  indigent  nation  is  apt  to  be  the  tool  of  the 
unscrupulous,  like  the  indigent  individual.  Relations  of  ex- 
treme dependence  involve  responsibilities  which  may  well 
be  the  subject  of  the  closest  public  scrutiny. 

First  in  importance  in  the  inventory  of  a  nation's  economic 
resources  must  be  reckoned  its  soil.  This,  with  its  correlate 
of  climate,  is  the  natural  source  of  its  food,  clothing,  and 
much  of  its  shelter  and  permanent  equipment.  It  is  true 
that  all  these  things  may  be,  and  commonly  are,  secured  in 
part  from  outside  the  national  limits,  but  to  the  extent  that 

55 


56  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

this  is  necessary,  the  nation  becomes  obviously  dependent 
in  its  most  fundamental  interests.  In  war,  importation  is 
difficult  if  not  impossible,  and  dependence  upon  it  quickly  be- 
comes onerous.  But  not  alone  in  war  is  the  relation  irk- 
some. The  purveyor  is  always  in  some  sense  a  master,  and 
national  independence,  under  such  conditions  of  dependence, 
is  to  a  degree  a  contradiction  in  terms. 

The  present  war  has  served  to  emphasize  what  all  the 
world  knew  but  had  not  previously  appreciated.  That  some- 
thing like  universal  famine  was  a  possibility  as  a  result  of 
interruption  of  world  commerce,  had  hardly  occurred  to  us. 
Yet  we  have  seen  the  food  producing  countries  themselves 
put  on  short  rations,  while  millions  of  bushels  of  the  coveted 
wheat  spoiled  for  lack  of  transport.  Equally,  we  have  seen 
local  production  stimulated  beyond  precedent  or  supposed 
possibility  by  distress.  It  may  be  doubted  whether  nations 
will  ever  again  accept  complacently  the  extreme  dependence 
which  has  characterized  England  and  Belgium  in  recent 
years.  Possibly  the  accumulation  of  a  surplus  may  help  to 
insure  against  possible  lean  years ;  but  for  the  most  part,  these 
nations  must  resort  to  the  unwelcome  expedient  of  costly 
artificial  stimulation,  if  their  limited  agriculture  is  to  meet 
the  increasing  demand. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  in  our  task  of  nation  building,  we  can 
hardly  overlook  the  importance  of  these  fundamental  re- 
quisites of  successful  nationality.  Europe  has  not  always  re- 
membered this  need  in  her  nation  making.  When  Greece  in 
1830  was  constituted  an  independent  nation,  by  the  European 
powers,  the  very  able  prince  who  was  called  to  guide  the 
destinies  of  the  little  state,  declined  the  invitation  on  the 
ground  that  Thessaly,  the  natural  granary  of  Greece,  was 
not  included.  But  the  powers  were  timid  and  were  guided 
as  usual  by  a  great  variety  of  considerations  which  made  it 
seemingly  impracticable  to  provide  adequately  for  the  wants 


NATIONALITY  AND  NATURAL  RESOUKCE     57 

of  the  fledgling  nation.  Their  decision  held,  and  an  impru- 
dent and  incompetent  prince  rashly  assumed  the  responsibili- 
ties which  the  other  had  declined.  The  result  was  complete 
failure.  The  powers  were  obliged  to  do  their  work  over 
again,  to  include  the  necessary  grainland,  and  to  secure  a 
more  competent  leader. 

Capacity  to  produce  food  staples  is  of  prime  importance, 
but  by  no  means  the  only  desideratum.  Ability  to  provide 
a  "  balanced  ration  "  is  most  desirable.  Agricultural  variety 
with  its  larger  guaranty  against  the  vicissitudes  of  nature, 
stock  and  their  products,  fruit  and  the  numberless  delicacies 
of  the  civilized  table,  these  all  count.  Nor  does  the  require- 
ment stop  with  food.  The  impending  shortage  of  wool  and 
the  disappointing  cotton  crop  of  the  present  year  are  re- 
minders of  our  dependence  for  other  essentials  upon  the  soil. 
A  narrow  and  highly  specialized  productivity,  even  though 
ample  in  amount,  again  necessitates  exchange  and  involves 
dependence,  and  this  again  incites  to  effort  to  better  the  na- 
tion's economic  position,  it  may  be  by  those  violent  efforts 
which  it  is  our  problem  to  prevent. 

The  needs  above  noted  are  fundamental  to  all  nations  and 
to  all  civilizations.  The  Indian  who  disputed  the  possession 
of  hunting  grounds  with  a  rival  tribe  was  actuated  by  the 
same  motives  that  today  impel  Germany  to  annex  the  grain 
fields  of  Courland.  But  there  has  slowly  developed  in  the 
western  nations  a  need  which  in  its  magnitude  has  not  char- 
acterized earlier  civilizations  and  is  not  now  felt  by  certain 
great  peoples.  The  distinctive  characteristic  of  our  western 
civilization  is  its  dependence  upon  minerals.  In  this  it  dif- 
fers from  the  great  civilizations  of  the  east.  Their  equip- 
ment is  essentially  of  vegetable  origin.  Nothing  so  impresses 
the  traveler  in  China  as  the  number  of  things  made  of  bam- 
boo which  with  us  are  made  of  metal.  If  to  vegetable  prod- 
ucts we  add  earthenware  of  one  sort  or  another,  the  product 


58  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

of  minerals  whose  supply  is  universal  and  unlimited,  we  Lave 
the  essential  basis  of  these  great  civilizations. 

In  contrast,  our  civilization  has  learned  to  avail  itself, — 
and  that  at  a  rapidly  increasing  rate, —  of  minerals  and  more 
particularly  of  metals  the  annual  production  of  which  already 
mounts  into  the  hundreds  of  millions  of  tons.  Scarcely  a 
year  passes  that  does  not  witness  the  transfer  of  some  im- 
portant article  from  the  vegetable  to  the  mineral  category, 
apparently  never  to  return.  The  recent  general  adoption 
of  metal  bedsteads  and  the  introduction  of  metal  office  fix- 
tures now  in  progress,  are  cases  in  point. 

The  advantage  of  this  metal  civilization  is  obvious.  Noth- 
ing else  could  make  possible  the  mighty  enginery  of  modern 
industry  or  war.  We  perhaps  do  not  often  enough  reflect  that 
it  has  the  great  defect  of  ultimate  exhaustion.  Great  as  is 
the  wealth  of  certain  metals  like  iron  still  reposing  in  the 
bowels  of  the  earth,  the  supply  is  not  unlimited,  and  local 
scarcity  is  already  acutely  felt.  Eurthermore,  continued 
exploitation  must  be  under  less  favorable  conditions,  with 
the  possibility  that  we  may  experience  economic  exhaustion 
even  if  physical  exhaustion  is  still  remote.  The  time  may 
yet  come  when  men  will  hunt  iron  as  men  hunted  it  in  the 
Middle  Ages,  reserving  the  costly  stuff  for  necessary  imple- 
ments and  invoking  for  vulgar  uses  again  the  unfailing  timber 
or  bamboo. 

Be  the  future  what  it  will,  wealth  of  iron  and  coal  is  to- 
day the  much  sought  dower  of  favored  nations.  A  reasonable 
supply  of  both  is,  if  not  indispensable,  at  least  of  such  ex- 
treme importance  to  modern  nations  that  they  will  go  to  al- 
most any  lengths  to  secure  them.  Doubtless  a  people  may 
live  happily  without  these  resources,  but  they  cannot  form 
a  nation  of  great  wealth  and  power  without  them.  The  na- 
tions that  have  developed  great  population,  great  wealth,  and 
great  political  power,  have  all  been  industrial  nations,  at 


NATIONALITY  AND  NATURAL  RESOURCE     59 

least  in  modern  times.  Agriculture  creates  no  such  accumu- 
lations of  capital,  no  such  enginery  of  power,  no  such  huge 
masses  of  population,  as  does  industry,  which,  in  the  western 
nations,  is  directly  or  indirectly  based  on  the  exploitation  of 
mineral  resources.  Doubtless  such  a  development  brings 
its  grave  problems  and  perplexities.  The  philosopher  might 
perhaps  counsel  a  people  to  resist  these  dangerous  advantages, 
but  peoples  in  their  onward  groping  find  little  opportunity 
to  heed  philosophic  counsel.  In  our  war  with  man  or  nature, 
the  all-compelling  demand  is  power.  That,  the  exploitation 
of  metal  industries  assures  beyond  the  wildest  imaginings 
of  a  soil  tilling  people. 

Again  this  war  has  emphasized  the  great  lesson.  The  na- 
tions that  are  winning  are  those  that  can  forge  the  heavier 
sword.  Here,  everywhere,  the  cry  is  for  more,  and  ever  more, 
millions  of  tons  of  coal  and  steel.  It  takes  steel  to  make 
cannon,  and  steel  to  make  shells,  and  steel  to  make  ships. 
And  the  while  we  are  straining  every  nerve  to  provide  these 
things,  we  are  reminded  on  every  side  of  the  myriad  demands 
of  peace  which  passed  unnoticed  until  denied.  Contrast 
the  pitiful  weakness  of  Italy  that,  without  coal  or  iron  of 
her  own,  waits  a  suppliant  for  the  supplies  that  are  needed 
to  stem  the  tide  of  invasion.  There  is  warrant  for  the  belief 
that  with  coal  and  iron  mines  of  her  own,  Italy,  even  the 
weaker  Italy  of  today,  might  have  been  knocking  at  the  gates 
of  Vienna.  But  Italy  with  coal  and  iron  of  her  own  would 
not  have  been  the  Italy  of  today.  An  immensely  larger 
population,  a  vastly  larger  accumulation  of  capital  and  in- 
dustrial appliances  capable  of  conversion  to  war's  emergency 
uses  would  have  changed  the  problem  in  toto.  Is  it  any 
wonder  that  the  nations  want  coal  and  iron I 

It  will  of  course  be  urged  that  economic  provision  is  not 
necessarily  dependent  on  political  control.  This  is  true,  as 
present  conditions  prove.     Italy  and  other  nations  have  se- 


60  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

cured  their  coal  and  iron,  like  many  other  commodities,  by 
importation,  and  must  apparently  continue  to  do  so.  It  is 
not  to  be  supposed,  however,  that  such  provision  is  satisfac- 
tory, even  if  assured.  Districts  having  coal  and  iron,  com- 
modities that  are  difficult  of  transport,  have  an  immense  ad- 
vantage in  the  development  of  the  basic  industries  over  dis- 
tricts not  thus  provided.  The  mere  mining  of  coal  and  ore 
employs  a  large  population,  and  this  necessarily  belongs  to 
the  district  in  question.  When  it  is  remembered  that  it  takes 
four  tons  of  coal  and  several  tons  of  ore  and  stone  to  make  a 
single  ton  of  steel,  it  will  readily  be  seen  that  the  basic  in- 
dustries tend  strongly  to  gravitate  likewise  to  the  locality 
where  nature  has  located  their  heavy  materials.  Thus  a 
farther  increment  of  industrial  population  tends  to  develop 
in  such  centers. 

To  those  to  whom  nationality  is  nothing  but  an  inconse- 
quential prejudice,  it  may  seem  of  no  moment  whether  such 
a  population  own  the  allegiance  of  a  particular  nation  or  not. 
But  men  do  not  so  judge.  These  men  pay  taxes  and  their 
wealth, —  often  very  large, —  is  an  asset  of  the  state.  They 
are  available  to  recruit  the  armies  of  their  state.  They  are 
in  all  respects  of  the  stuff  that  states  are  made  of.  If  the 
members  of  a  nation  are  of  importance,  by  the  same  token, 
these  possible  additions  are  important. 

But  we  may  perhaps  add  another  reason  for  desiring  the 
incorporation  of  such  districts  into  the  territory  of  the  na- 
tion. It  is  important,  not  only  to  get  population,  but  to  as- 
similate it  to  the  race  which  is  nationally  paramount.  The 
assimilation  of  agricultural  populations  is  very  slow.  In- 
frequent contact  with  assimilative  elements,  and  perhaps  a 
mental  habit  less  susceptible  to  these  influences,  makes  such 
a  population  tenacious  of  alien  speech  or  ways.  But  such 
industrial  centers  as  above  described,  especially  if  developed 
by  the  alien  annexing  power,  draw  their  population  from 


NATIONALITY  AND  NATURAL  RESOURCE  61 

other  sources  and  predominantly  from  the  dominant  nation- 
ality, if  it  is  suitable.  It  is  comparatively  easy  to  implant 
the  new  language  and  race  sentiments  in  such  a  mobile  popula- 
tion during  the  period  of  its  fluidity.  Such  additions,  there- 
fore, not  only  strengthen  the  nation,  but  strengthen 
the  race,  results  obviously  to  be  desired  if  race  and 
nationality  are  conceived  to  be  important.  Whatever 
the  reasons, —  and  it  is  safe  to  say  that  aggressive 
nationalism  is  but  secondarily  concerned  with  the  reasons, 
—  there  is  nothing  that  the  nations  want  more  than  deposits 
of  coal  and  iron.  Campaigns  are  conducted  and  treaties 
framed  with  very  large  regard  for  these  prime  essentials 
of  national  life.  Some  of  the  most  sensitive  frontier  prob- 
lems in  Europe  turn  on  these  stores  of  mineral  wealth.  On 
debatable  ground,  with  a  population  already  hybrid,  they 
are  the  most  tempting  of  all  opportunities  to  shift  by  slight 
changes  of  boundary  or  effort,  the  whole  political  and  racial 
equilibrium  of  the  family  of  nations.  The  enormous  in- 
dustrial development  of  central  Europe  in  the  last  fifty  years 
has  inured  to  the  benefit  of  Germany  because  she  acquired 
the  mineral  basis  of  that  development  from  Erance  in  1871. 
By  that  transaction  Germany  acquired  more  than  the  fields 
of  Alsace-Lorraine,  more  than  their  iron  and  coal,  more  than 
their  two  million  people.  Quite  beyond  the  limits  of  these 
provinces,  in  the  region  of  the  belching  furnaces  and  the  busy 
workshops,  some  millions  of  men  today  speak  German  and 
loyally  support  the  German  cause  who  would  never  have  ex- 
isted had  the  trains  carried  their  coal  and  their  ore  the  other 
way  and  fed  them  to  the  furnaces  of  France,  to  call  into 
being  there  the  other  millions  that  have  not  been.  For  the 
mines  bring  forth  men,  and  men  after  the  nation's  kind. 
Small  difference  in  the  end,  will  some  one  be  found  to  sug- 
gest ?  Perhaps  so  to  those  who  view  the  whole  with  an  out- 
sider's indifference,  but  to  Erance  with  her  thinning  line  of 


62  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

defenders,  and  to  Germany  with  her  plans  of  world  dominion, 
these  millions  one  way  or  the  other  may  be  the  difference 
between  success  and  failure. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  other  minerals  enter 
largely  into  the  list  of  national  requisites,  especially  copper 
for  which,  in  its  rapidly  widening  uses,  there  is  no  known 
substitute.  Manganese,  tungsten,  and  other  metals,  some  of 
them  but  yesterday  unknown,  have  speedily  become  indispen- 
sable as  ingredients  in  that  ever  changing  marvel  of  products 
which  still  goes  by  the  old  name  of  steel.  Other  minerals 
of  chemical  importance  extend  the  list.  Many  of  these, 
though  of  highest  importance,  are  used  in  small  quantities 
and  derived  from  limited  and  local  sources,  where  they  are 
easily  controlled  by  individuals,  with  possible  exclusive  ad- 
vantage to  single  powers.  In  this  field  of  obscure  but  vital 
interests,  unpracticed  statesmanship  and  diplomatic  tradi- 
tion are  easily  misled  and  popular  judgment  is  hopelessly  in- 
competent. It  is  neverthless  in  the  realm  of  these  subtle 
forces  that  the  destiny  of  nations  may  henceforth  be  decided. 

No  attempt  is  here  made  to  enumerate  the  necessary  in- 
dustrial requirements  of  the  nation.  A  complete  inventory 
is  the  work  of  the  industrial  expert,  a  functionary  too  little 
employed  in  most  national  counsels.  Nor  has  it  been  the  at- 
tempt to  show  that  nations  ought  to  insist  upon  these  re- 
sources as  conditions  of  their  existence.  The  purpose  has 
been  rather  to  indicate  that  nations  do  seek  these  things,  and 
that  their  presence  or  absence  reacts  strongly  upon  the  wealth, 
population,  and  power  of  the  states  in  question.  And  since 
wealth,  population,  and  power  have  much  to  do  with  the  sur- 
vival of  nations,  the  builders  of  nations  must  have  large  re- 
gard for  these  things. 

So  far  we  have  dealt  exclusively  with  natural  resources. 
There  are,  however,  other  and  derivative  factors  which  de- 
termine the  economic  life  of  a  nation  quite  as  much,  perhaps, 


NATIONALITY  AND  NATURAL  RESOURCE     63 

as  these  gifts  of  nature.  The  possession  of  mines  determines 
whether  a  nation  shall  have  a  mining  industry  or  not.  But 
it  does  not  determine  quite  absolutely  whether  the  nation 
shall  have  a  smelting  industry  or  not.  If  the  materials  are 
all  there,  the  tendency  is  strong  to  develop  such  an  industry, 
but  still  these  materials  may  be  shipped  elsewhere  and  the 
smelting  done  by  another  nation,  as  in  fact  happens.  Con- 
versely, as  this  case  indicates,  it  is  possible  for  a  nation  with- 
out such  resources  to  develop  the  industry  appropriate  to 
them.  The  derivative  industry  is  not  quite  controlled  by  the 
primary  industry. 

As  we  go  farther  from  the  primary  industry  toward  in- 
dustries more  and  more  elaborative,  the  dependence  becomes 
ever  less.  Watch  springs  need  not  be  made  near  coal  and 
iron  mines.  They  may  be  made  anywhere  where  other  con- 
ditions are  favorable.  Thus  a  very  large  option  is  opened 
in  the  broad  field  of  industry.  Not  that  the  choice  ever 
becomes  a  matter  of  indifference.  There  are  always  potent 
if  not  compelling  economic  reasons.  It  pays  to  make  watch 
springs  in  some  places  and  not  in  others,  but  no  longer  be- 
cause of  the  location  of  the  mines.  And  since  large  scale 
industry  and  the  grouping  of  kindred  industries  is  always 
advantageous,  it  follows  that  there  is  everywhere  a  tendency 
toward  specialization  and  far  reaching  dependence.  This 
specialization  is  at  bottom  quite  as  natural  as  that  which 
rests  on  the  presence  or  absence  of  natural  resources,  but  it 
is  far  more  flexible.  Left  to  themselves,  industries  will  mass 
themselves  as  stated,  but  it  is  quite  possible  for  nations  to 
prevent  this  massing  and  to  develop,  by  judicious  stimulation, 
industries  of  a  varied  character.  Economically  this  does  not 
pay.  Nations  do  not  get  rich  by  bribing  themselves  to  main- 
tain unprofitable  industries.  No  matter  how  many  complexi- 
ties and  side  issues  are  brought  into  the  argument,  nothing 
can  change  this  fundamental  economic  relation.     Nor  do 


64  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

high  wages  and  full  dinner  pails  result  from  this  mainte- 
nance of  non-paying  industries,  unless  temporarily,  by  avert- 
ing the  collapse  of  an  artificial  order  which  the  system  itself 
has  created. 

But  while  such  a  policy  does  not  make  us  rich  it  may  make 
us  independent.  The  reasons  that  impel  nations  to  seek 
varied  natural  resources  may  justly  impel  them  to  develop 
varied  national  industries.  Complete  national  self-suffi- 
ciency, either  in  resources  or  in  developed  industries,  is  a 
chimera,  but  relative  self-sufficiency  is  an  attainable  and  a 
desirable  goal. 

But  it  will  be  objected  that  this  is  a  national  rather  than 
an  international  problem.  It  has  already  been  urged  in  an 
earlier  chapter  that  the  peace  conference  can  not  better  show 
its  wisdom  than  by  resolutely  refraining  from  interference 
in  matters  of  purely  national  concern.  It  is  much  to  be 
wished  that  the  rule  might  be  observed  in  this  connection. 
Unfortunately  it  is  all  but  certain  that  certain  powers  with 
which  we  have  to  deal  will  recognize  no  such  limitation.  The 
German  industrial  development,  so  much  admired  and  in 
some  ways  so  admirable,  has  been  as  ruthless  and  as  aggres- 
sive as  German  militarism  itself.  For  the  widespread  Ger- 
man practice  of  selling  goods  below  cost  in  invaded  markets 
and  making  up  the  loss  in  protected  home  markets,  there  is 
probably  no  remedy,  especially  as  against  a  nation  that  has 
no  respect  for  its  promises.  But  certain  industries  so  fos- 
tered are  of  a  character  which  perhaps  entitles  them  to  inter- 
national consideration.  A  German  manufacturer  of  dye- 
stuffs  is  said  to  have  declared,  anent  a  proposal  to  develop 
that  industry  in  Italy,  that  he  would  do  business  there  with- 
out profit  for  ten  years, —  would  if  necessary  sacrifice  the 
profits  of  ten  years  past, —  to  defeat  that  project.  This  seems 
harmless  until  we  learn  that  the  reason  for  this  German 
specialty  is  that  the  dyestuff  industry  can  be  converted  with- 


NATIONALITY  AND  NATURAL  RESOURCE     65 

out  change  of  materials  or  appliances,  into  the  manufacture 
of  high  explosives.  Such  specialization  has  a  significance 
in  connection  with  the  problem  of  national  defense  that  makes 
it  a  legitimate  interest  to  alliances  formed  for  that  purpose. 
Whether  effective  measures  can  be  devised  is  not  so  clear. 

More  imperative  and  more  practicable,  however,  is  it  to 
see  that  nations  disorganized  by  the  war  do  not  resume  their 
national  life  under  conditions  that  destroy  their  economic 
freedom.  If  we  may  not  dictate  the  economic  policy  of  other 
nations,  by  the  same  token  we  must  see  that  others  do  not  do 
so.  We  may  be  perfectly  certain  that  every  effort  will  be 
made  by  certain  powers  to  prevent  the  development  of  econo- 
mic independence,  with  its  concomitants  of  wealth  and  power, 
by  certain  other  nations  whose  subserviency  and  helplessness 
are  desired.  The  attempt  will  be  to  accomplish  by  an  in- 
dustrial offensive  that  which  the  military  offensive  has  failed 
to  achieve.  Prudence  forbids  us  to  interpose  a  veto,  but  it 
requires  us  to  insure  the  square  deal. 

No  rule  can  be  laid  down  as  to  the  economic  requisites  of 
national  existence,  but  it  is  clear  that  such  requisites  exist 
and  that  they  are  among  the  weightiest  considerations  in  the 
nation  builders'  problem.  Ample  and  varied  resources  are 
a  condition  of  national  strength  and  independence.  Such 
provision  our  own  country  enjoys  in  a  high  degree.  Prob- 
ably no  other  nation  is  so  nearly  self-sufficing  as  the  United 
States,  nor  is  it  probable  that  its  like  is  possible  without  ex- 
tensive mergers  of  states  now  separate. 

For  nations  not  blessed  with  this  all-round  provision,  the 
possession  in  abundance  of  some  material  or  product  which 
is  vitally  necessary  to  other  nations,  is  the  nearest  equivalent. 
Germany's  potash  makes  her  a  strong  bargainer  for  our  cot- 
ton. If  little  Greece  had  been  known  to  have  iron  in  her 
mountains,  she  might  have  gotten  on  without  Thessaly. 
Those  who  have  iron  can  always  buy  wheat. 


66  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

But  they  cannot  buy  the  capital  which  their  industry  is 
not  of  a  nature  to  create,  or  the  thousands  of  their  own  kind 
which  their  industry  is  not  competent  to  support.  Above 
all  they  can  not  buy  the  varied  human  types  that  the  raising  of 
the  wheat  and  the  forging  of  the  iron  produce.  Their  build- 
ing must  be  done  with  less  differentiated  human  material. 
The  result  must  be  a  simpler  organism  and  one  perhaps  less 
fitted  to  survive  under  modern  conditions. 

In  conclusion,  a  single  fact  calls  for  emphasis.  Economic 
resource,  like  territorial  convenience  or  defensibility,  is  an 
independent  requisite  of  national  existence.  The  economic 
demands  of  today  are  totally  unlike  those  of  earlier  times  and 
stand  in  no  necessary  relation  to  historic  sentiments  or  his- 
toric frontiers.  Where  race  sentiment  or  historic  boundaries 
conflict  with  economic  requirements,  concession  is  inevitable. 
In  particular  must  purely  local  sentiment  be  subordinated 
to  the  interests  of  the  larger  populations  affected.  How  in- 
adequate the  proposal  that  the  disposition  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
should  be  determined  by  a  plebiscite!  The  industrial,  po- 
litical, and  cultural  future  of  two  great  nations  is  dependent 
upon  the  decision  in  a  way  of  which  the  humble  Alsatian 
peasant  is  utterly  unconscious.  There  could  be  no  greater 
travesty  of  justice  than  to  settle  these  far-reaching  questions 
of  human  destiny  by  reference  to  the  transient  sentiment  of 
a  single  generation  of  distracted  border  peasantry.  To  in- 
voke the  principle  of  self-determination  in  connections  where 
its  exercise  would  give  to  the  unknowing  few  the  power  to  de- 
termine the  fate  and  even  the  existence  of  millions  who  have 
no  voice  in  the  settlement,  can  have  no  other  result  than  to 
bring  discredit  upon  a  vital  principle. 


CHAPTER  VI 

NATIONALITY  AND  TRUSTEESHIP 

The  present  peoples  of  the  world  are  clearly  very  unequal 
in  their  capacity  for  the  duties  of  nationality.  These  in- 
equalities, again,  are  of  the  most  varied  character.  There  are 
differences  of  location,  of  climate,  of  education,  and  of  his- 
torical inheritance.  The  English  have  been  peculiarly  fav- 
ored by  their  location,  enjoying  at  once  exceptional  oppor- 
tunity for  contact  with  the  world  and  at  the  same  time  a  rare 
immunity  from  attack.  They  have  consequently  developed 
a  remarkable  aptitude  for  affairs  and  for  political  and  social 
organization.  The  French  have  profited  greatly  from  their 
Roman  inheritance  which  laid  the  foundation  of  their  ex- 
traordinary political  unity.  The  Germans,  enjoying  neither 
of  these  advantages,  have  been  but  recently  and  imperfectly 
unified  and  have  been  unable  to  develop  the  capacity  for  self 
government  which  the  inherent  capabilities  of  the  people 
should  lead  us  to  expect.  Here  location  and  inheritance  ac- 
count for  differences  of  the  most  far  reaching  character,  but 
differences  which  seemingly  do  not  inhere  in  race  character. 
The  Germans  are  socially  akin  to  the  English  and  were  joint 
originators  of  their  political  institutions.  Very  large  Teu- 
tonic elements  have  continually  recruited  the  Anglo-Saxon 
stock,  and  at  an  earlier  date,  the  French  stock  as  well,  with 
no  sign  of  inferiority  or  misadaptation  after  a  generation 
or  two  of  assimilation.  Differences  are  here  purely  a  mat- 
ter of  situation  and  circumstance,  though  not  necessarily 
slight  or  transient  on  that  account.  In  more  extreme  cases, 
like  that  of  the  Russians  and  the  Poles,  where  access  to  the 
world  is  still  more  limited  and  natural  defenses  almost  wholly 

67 


68  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

lacking,  political  development  has  been  effectively  checked, 
though  again,  we  have  no  reason  to  doubt  the  capacity  of  the 
race. 

But  there  are  other  cases  where  the  difference  is  more 
fundamental  and  significant.  Where  climatic  conditions  are 
essentially  a  bar  to  energy,  a  type  of  character  develops  which 
is  undoubtedly  less  capable  of  political  development. 
Whether  the  inhabitants  of  the  tropics,  when  transferred  to 
temperate  climates,  are  capable  of  developing  the  qualities  of 
the  northern  races  is  a  disputed  question,  but  one  of  little 
moment.  There  is  little  opportunity  for  such  transfer,  and 
whatever  the  result  to  those  thus  circumstanced,  those  that  are 
left  behind  remain  unmodified  and  determine  the  character 
of  the  race.  It  is  this  character  that  concerns  us.  What 
are  the  possibilities  of  political  development  in  the  less  fav- 
ored climates,  more  particularly  in  the  broad  zone  between 
thirty  degrees  north  and  south  of  the  Equator,  the  tropics 
as  defined  by  the  ethnologist? 

The  writer  has  elsewhere  *  given  at  length  his  reasons  for 
believing  that  the  political  inferiority  of  the  tropics  is  in- 
herent and  permanent.  It  was  in  the  tropics  that  civiliza- 
tion first  developed,  but  that  civilization  was  based  on  slavery, 
sure  sign  of  the  irksomeness  of  exertion.  Even  this  slave 
organization  seems  to  have  been  effected  by  members  of  more 
energetic  races.  With  the  passing  of  slavery  and  the  intro- 
duction of  a  more  efficient  principle  of  organization,  civiliza- 
tion transferred  its  headquarters  to  the  energy  zone  and  the 
tropics  ceased  to  progress,  even  retrograded,  separated  from 
the  developing  northern  peoples  by  an  ever  widening  gulf, 
until  the  northerner  himself  chose  to  bridge  it.  It  has  been 
justly  said  that  no  tropical  people  has  ever  yet  developed  a 
civilization  that  would  pass  muster  according  to  the  most 
tolerant  of  modern  standards.     Such  governments  have  ex- 

i "  America  Among  the  Nations,"  Chapter  XII. 


NATIONALITY  AND  TKUSTEESHIP  69 

isted  within  the  tropics,  and  in  particular  exist  there  today, 
but  they  are  established  and  maintained  by  peoples  from  the 
temperate  zones.  Such  participation  in  these  governments 
as  the  native  peoples  have  acquired,  has  been  under  the  tute- 
lage of  the  suzerain  peoples.  The  actual  choice  of  human 
agents, —  always  the  test  of  self  government, —  has  never 
rested  with  the  native.  Possibly  this  too  will  come,  but 
even  so  it  will  not  prove  or  constitute  equality.  It  will  mean 
at  most  that  they  are  capable  of  development, —  not  that  they 
are  capable  of  seZ/-development. 

The  question  of  ultimate  capacity,  however,  concerns  us 
very  little.  It  is  at  best  a  question  whether  these  peoples 
will  never  develop  political  capacity,  or  will  develop  it  very, 
very  slowly.  Any  suggestion  that  tropical  races  as  a  whole 
are  the  equals  of  the  northern  peoples  in  political  capacity 
is  a  palpable  absurdity.  Making  allowance  for  certain  fa- 
vored localities  in  the  tropics  where  elevation  or  dryness 
counteract  in  a  measure  the  enervating  effects  of  climate, 
the  general  condition  of  the  tropics  speaks  for  itself.  They 
are  not  young  peoples,  novices  at  their  task.  The  tropical 
peoples  are  among  the  oldest  on  the  globe.  They  are  not 
few  or  scattered.  The  tropics  in  Africa,  India  and  South 
America  bulk  large  among  the  world's  inhabited  areas,  and 
India  alone  has  a  population  nearly  equal  to  that  of  all  Eu- 
rope, with  natural  defenses  unrivaled  in  the  world.  They  are 
not  lacking  in  resources,  for  nowhere  has  nature  been  more 
lavish.  Yet  India  passed,  almost  without  a  struggle,  under 
the  control  of  a  power  one  tenth  her  size  and  ten  thousand 
miles  away.  Tropical  Africa  was  partitioned  with  scarce 
a  protest,  and  tropical  America  appropriated  as  though  it 
were  an  empty  land.  We  can  explain  these  facts  only  on 
the  assumption  of  the  inferior  political  capacity  of  tropical 
peoples. 

It  is  sometimes  urged  that  this  is  not  inferiority  but  only 


70  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

adaptation  to  tropical  conditions.  True,  but  not  an  adapta- 
tion to  world  conditions,  and  it  is  with  world  conditions  that 
modern  civilization  and  modern  political  conditions  have  to 
deal.  All  the  tendencies  of  modern  life, —  the  harnessing 
of  nature  forces,  quantity  production,  world  markets,  uni- 
versal transportation  and  communication, —  tend  to  make 
all  parts  of  the  world  dependent  upon  one  another.  The 
tropical  peoples  may  themselves  be  quite  satisfied  to  be  in- 
dolent, unorganized,  and  inefficient,  but  the  organized  and 
energetic  northern  people  need  the  products  of  the  tropics 
in  a  measure  which  only  organization  and  industry  can  sup- 
ply. Diseases  due  to  carelessness  and  sloth  may  be  a  small 
matter  to  the  native,1  but  when  foreign  ships  carry  the  infec- 
tion to  distant  ports,  it  requires  intervention.  Finally,  and 
most  of  all,  tropical  peoples  require  protection  from  the 
cupidity  and  ruthless  energy  of  the  powerful  peoples  who 
are  tempted  or  compelled  to  seek  their  products.  Thus,  the 
discovery  of  rich  tin  deposits  in  the  Malay  Peninsula  at  a 
time  when  other  known  deposits  of  this  indispensable  metal 
were  beginning  to  be  exhausted,  put  a  pressure  upon  these 
feebly  organized  folk  which  they  were  entirely  unable  to 
bear.  Imagine  the  conditions  that  would  have  followed  such 
a  discovery  if  no  strong  government  had  intervened  to  pro- 
tect native  interests.  A  few  vigorous  and  unscrupulous  ad- 
venturers such  as  are  found  among  all  strong  peoples, —  men 
like  Cortez  or  Pizarro  or  Drake,  or  Hawkins, —  would  seize 
the  territory,  coerce  the  natives  into  working  the  mines,  sub- 
ject them  to  unspeakable  cruelties,  and  virtually  exterminate 
the  race  in  the  pursuit  of  private  gain,  as  was  done  in  the 
West  Indies.     It  is  useless  to  say, —  wrong  to  say, —  that  the 

i  The  inhabitants  of  Guayaquil  are  said  to  have  protested  against  the 
eradication  of  yellow  fever  on  the  ground  that  they,  being  semi-immune, 
survived  its  attacks,  while  the  more  susceptible  foreigner  succumbed. 
It  constituted  thus  a  natural  protection  against  dreaded  commercial 
competition. 


NATIONALITY  AND  TKUSTEESHIP         71 

foreigner  should  keep  out.  He  will  not  and  he  should  not 
keep  out.  It  would  be  a  breach  of  trust  toward  civilization 
to  leave  unutilized  a  necessary  instrument  of  progress  be- 
cause an  inefficient  people  have  accidentally  located  on  the 
spot.  Anyway  it  will  not  be  done.  There  is  no  power  in 
the  world  that  can  keep  out  the  lawless  adventurer  under 
such  circumstances.  The  prize  is  too  great,  the  place  too  re- 
mote, and  foreign  prohibition  too  ineffectual. 

The  tin  mines  of  Malaysia  offer  an  easy  illustration  of 
the  problem  of  tropical  exploitation,  but  it  is  only  one  case 
among  many.  All  natural  products  of  the  tropics,  products 
demanded  by  western  civilization  with  ever  increasing  im- 
portunity, present  similar  temptations  and  dangers.  The 
frightful  cruelties  of  rubber  gathering  in  the  Putumayo  il- 
lustrate the  danger  of  letting  the  strong  race  go  as  exploiter 
without  carrying  his  own  strong  restraints  and  protections 
with  him.  Similar  conditions  obtained  in  the  Congo  while 
under  the  control  of  an  irresponsible  commercial  combination, 
conditions  which  even  the  assumption  of  responsibility  by 
Belgium  did  not  at  once  remove. 

When  the  demand  for  tropical  products  exceeds  nature's 
spontaneous  supply,  new  reasons  for  tutelage  present  them- 
selves. The  Malay  can  collect  wild  rubber,  but  when  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  establish  a  rubber  plantation,  neither  co- 
ercion nor  inducements  will  make  him  equal  to  the  task. 
Larger  power  of  organization,  more  sustained  purpose,  and 
fuller  knowledge  than  tropical  man  possesses  are  required 
for  the  purpose.  Yet  the  purpose  is  perfectly  legitimate. 
It  is  as  reasonable  that  the  soil  of  the  tropics  should  be  tilled 
as  that  the  tin  should  be  mined  in  the  service  of  civilization. 
Yet  this  mobilization  of  world  resources  which  is  at  once 
the  necessity  and  the  glory  of  our  civilization,  requires  the 
organizing  abilities  and  the  effective  restraints  which  only 
the  most  advanced  nations  can  furnish.     The  strong  races 


72  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

must  help  the  weak  and  yet  must  protect  them  from  the  im- 
pact of  their  own  strength. 

The  tropics  perhaps  furnish  the  clearest  case  of  obvious 
dependence,  but  not  by  any  means  the  only  one.  Peoples  of 
undoubted  capacity  may  be  quite  as  dependent  by  reason  of 
limited  area  and  peculiar  situation.  Denmark  is  an  example. 
No  expansion  of  Danish  territory  is  practicable,  and  con- 
sequently, no  considerable  expansion  of  the  race.  Denmark 
is  surrounded  by  powerful  nations  who  would  find  her  ter- 
ritories a  most  convenient  addition  to  their  domain.  Ob- 
viously the  integrity  of  Denmark  must  depend  on  something 
else  than  her  own  strength.  Lack  of  coal,  of  access  to  the 
sea,  or  of  other  vital  needs  of  national  life  create  further 
conditions  of  helplessness,  a  helplessness  very  different  from 
that  of  the  tropical  peoples,  but  not  the  less  real.  What 
they  can  not  do  for  themselves,  stronger  nations  must  do  for 
them. 

Hence  the  relation  which  we  may  call  trusteeship,  a  re- 
lation not  to  be  confounded  with  mere  control.  There  has 
been  plenty  of  control  in  the  world,  but  little  trusteeship. 
The  higher  relation  has  slowly  developed  from  the  lower. 
The  early  conquerors  were  merely  marauders.  They  took 
everything  they  could  turn  to  account  and  destroyed  the  rest. 
It  was  an  advance  when  the  great  Pharaoh  of  the  eighteenth 
dynasty  hit  upon  the  idea  of  making  annual  raids,  plunder- 
ing with  moderation,  and  leaving  enough  food  and  seed  so 
there  might  be  something  for  him  next  year.  Then  came 
the  system  of  tribute  in  which  the  helpless  bought  immunity 
from  the  annual  raid  by  an  advance  payment.  It  is  the 
principle  accepted  by  early  empire  builders  and  dominant 
still  in  the  days  of  more  enlightened  Rome,  that  helpless,  ap- 
propriated peoples  are  the  property  of  their  suzerain,  to  be 
farmed  for  his  benefit  like  a  private  estate,  and  with  such 
regard  for  native  interests  as  a  prudent  farmer  shows  to- 


NATIONALITY  AND  TKUSTEESHIP  T3 

ward  his  horses  or  cattle,  the  source  of  his  profits.  Even 
Cicero  pleads  for  good  government  in  the  provinces,  not  at 
all  in  the  interest  of  the  provincials,  but  on  the  ground  that 
it  will  increase  the  revenue  that  can  be  derived  from  them. 
In  justice  to  Kome  it  must  be  recognized  that  she  became 
better  than  her  theories  and  that  much  of  the  spirit  of  trus- 
teeship animated  her  best  officials.  But  their  higher  temper 
never  had  the  support  of  a  recognized  social  principle. 

In  the  awful  collapse  of  civilization  which  followed  the 
decay  of  Kome,  the  fugitive  principle  was  quite  lost  sight  of. 
With  the  rise  of  modern  nations  and  the  world  discoveries 
which  established  dependencies  of  unprecedented  extent,  the 
unschooled  nations  began  again  at  the  first  lessons.  The 
plundering  of  Peru  and  the  depopulation  of  the  West  Indian 
Islands  were  eighteenth  dynasty  performances  or  worse. 
Drake  and  Hawkins  hardly  represented  a  higher  principle. 
The  policy  of  the  British  East  India  Company  in  the  early 
period  of  its  unexpected  imperial  responsibilities,  reflect  but 
little  of  the  later  British  temper.  The  attempt  to  tax  the 
American  Colonies,  though  moderate  in  amount  and  reason- 
able in  its  alleged  purpose,  was  suggestive  of  the  earlier  idea 
of  ownership.  And  so  still  is  the  terminology  handed  down 
from  an  earlier  time  and  an  earlier  set  of  political  ideas.  We 
still  hear  of  "  British  Possessions,"  and  the  realities  of  the 
modern  relation  are  still  concealed  under  the  symbols  of 
ownership. 

Slowly  the  principle  of  trusteeship  has  emerged  from  the 
brutal  relation  of  force.  The  incontinent  marauder  slowly 
learns  prudence  and  gives  his  victims  the  benefit  of  a  closed 
season,  as  did  the  great  Pharaoh.  Then  he  protects,  multi- 
plies, and  organizes  them,  the  better  to  harness  them  for  his 
purpose.  Such  was  the  policy  of  Rome  in  the  great  days,  a 
wise  and  humane  exploiter,  but  still  not  a  trustee.  But  at 
last,  in  accordance  with  a  principle  of  universal  application, 


74  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

lie  becomes  interested  in  the  objects  of  his  care.  Like  the 
horse  fancier,  whose  passion  for  horses  leads  him  to  spend  his 
money  freely  upon  them,  so  the  care-taker  of  the  peoples  be- 
comes engrossed  in  his  task,  proud  of  his  constructive  achieve- 
ment, eager  to  give  rather  than  to  get,  and  the  ulterior  pur- 
pose of  his  effort  at  the  beginning  is  slowly  subordinated  and 
then  forgotten.  He  is  no  longer  an  owner,  an  exploiter,  but 
a  trustee.  The  relation  here  indicated  is  not  at  all  one  of 
self-denying  devotion  or  religious  self-abnegation.  It  is  one 
that  results  naturally  from  honest  and  competent  devotion  to 
a  constructive  task.  We  learn  to  enjoy  the  task.  Once  we 
have  learned  the  delight  of  building,  we  would  rather  build 
than  occupy.  The  typical  trust  administrator  is  a  practical, 
business  man,  largely  competent,  and  capable  of  a  large  satis- 
faction in  his  own  competency.  No  self-denying  altruism 
need  supplement, —  still  less  can  it  ever  replace, —  his  sturdy 
respect  for  professional  honor,  his  repugnance  for  the  cheap 
betrayal  of  the  implicit  trust  placed  in  him,  and  his  satisfac- 
tion at  seeing  his  city  of  brick  become  a  city  of  marble.  The 
man  who  has  once  known  these  recompenses  cares  little  for 
any  other.  Especially  if  he  continues  a  long  line  of  those 
who  have  so  wrought  and  so  judged,  any  other  judgment  or 
attitude  becomes  impossible. 

The  same  holds  of  nations,  possibly  in  an  even  greater 
degree.  They  are  slower  to  move,  slower  to  become  imbued 
with  a  principle,  but  correspondingly  slow  to  abandon  it, 
especially  if  it  is  backed  by  a  long  tradition.  It  is  cheap 
tirade  to  denounce  the  great  order-creating  powers  as  land 
grabbers,  bandits,  and  brigands.  There  have  been  nations 
that  were  selfish  and  short-sighted,  without  inspired  vision  or 
constructive  wisdom.  And  there  have  been  others  that  have 
built  greatly  and  enduringly,  asking  little  by  way  of  recom- 
pense save  the  privilege  of  building,  because  their  pleasure 
was  in  that.     The  world  has  nothing  more  valuable  to  show 


NATIONALITY  AND  TKUSTEESHIP         75 

as  the  result  of  its  age-long  travail  than  such  men  and  such 
nations  as  these. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  spirit  of  trusteeship  has  been 
very  differently  developed  in  modern  nations.  It  is  not  al- 
ways possible  to  account  for  these  differences  which  seem  to 
stand  in  no  uniform  relation  to  experience  or  national  tem- 
perament. The  beginners  seem  to  have  fared  worst.  Spain 
and  Portugal  had  the  unfortunate  privilege  of  plundering  the 
treasure  houses  of  the  newly  discovered  world.  Possibly 
other  peoples  would  have  plundered  as  ruthlessly  at  that  time 
and  would  have  paid  as  heavy  a  penalty.  That  penalty  came 
in  the  form  of  a  demoralizing  tradition  of  unearned  wealth 
which  no  later  experience  or  enlightenment  could  overcome. 
Contrary  to  popular  opinion,  Spain's  colonial  legislation  was 
for  the  most  part  well  conceived  and  unselfish.  But  nothing 
could  secure  its  administration  in  that  spirit.  The  habit  of 
"  milking  "  the  colonies  dominated  the  official  and  the  national 
consciousness.  This  administrative  plunder  did  not  find  its 
worst  effect  in  the  constant  drain  upon  colonial  resources,  but 
in  the  destruction  of  the  constructive  tradition.  The  habit  of 
thinking  of  the  colonies  in  terms  of  revenue  made  it  impos- 
sible to  think  of  them  in  terms  of  constructive  opportunity. 
It  isn't  the  collector  of  rents  in  slum  tenements  who  dreams 
dreams  of  architectural  reconstruction.  This  depressing 
temper  was  not  that  of  individuals ;  it  was  the  temper  of  the 
nation.  With  imperial  decline  and  the  growing  need  of  earn- 
ing her  own  living,  the  reluctant  nation  responded  with 
increasing  shift  and  evasion.  It  was  the  loss  of  her  last 
colony  that  started  Spain  on  the  wholesome  path  of  self- 
support.  To  her  had  been  committed  one  of  the  world's 
greatest  trusts,  but  she  had  never  learned  the  secret  of  trustee- 
ship. 

Spain  is  a  conspicuous  example  of  failure  in  the  trusteeship 
of  dependent  peoples,  but  she  is  neither  the  only  failure  nor 


76  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

the  worst  one.  The  failure  of  Portugal  has  been  more  abject 
and  pitiful.  Her  mighty  power  in  the  East  has  dwindled  to 
the  merest  speck,  a  fossil  reminder  of  things  extinct,  while 
her  African  colonies,  the  only  considerable  remains  of  her  vast 
empire,  are  the  blackest  spots  on  the  dark  continent.  Even 
more  than  Spain,  too,  she  has  suffered  the  demoralizing  home 
reaction  of  unearned  existence.  Her  chief  monument  is 
African  slavery,  her  invention.  The  world  owes  to  her  in- 
famous trusteeship  the  most  insoluble  of  all  social  and  race 
problems. 

But  distinctly  worse  than  either  is  the  case  of  Turkey. 
She  hardly  surpasses  them  in  cruelty  or  destructiveness,  but 
against  her  trusteeship  lies  this  damning  indictment,  that  it 
has  been  the  subjection  of  the  higher  to  the  lower.  The  Turk- 
ish Empire  has  included  the  most  civilized  peoples  of  the 
ancient  world  and  of  all  the  later  times  down  to  the  Kenais- 
sance.  It  has  scarcely  included  at  any  time  a  people, — 
Arab,  Jew,  Greek,  Armenian,  or  other, —  which  was  not  supe- 
rior to  the  Turk  himself.  Upon  these  subject  races  the  Turk 
has  never  conferred  any  gift  of  organization.  He  has  never 
even  learned  their  own  higher  secret.  He  has  simply  al- 
lowed their  organization  to  continue,  using  at  times  the  con- 
quered as  agents  of  administration,  and  through  them  farming 
his  estate  for  his  own  benefit.  Thus  the  Kumanian  princi- 
palities were  always  ruled  by  Christians.  Before  the  con- 
quest Christians  ruled  them  in  the  interest  of  Christians; 
afterward,  Christians  ruled  them  in  the  interest  of  Turks. 
The  governorship  was  sold  in  Constantinople  to  the  highest 
bidder,  and  the  purchaser,  always  a  Greek,  recouped  himself 
from  the  revenues  that  should  have  gone  to  the  development 
of  the  provinces.  Meanwhile  the  Turk  sat  at  home,  good- 
natured,  tolerant,  unimaginative,  amid  the  decaying  splen- 
dors of  an  empire  that  he  did  not  create  and  could  not  pre- 
serve.    It  is  not  an  uncommon  thing  that  a  crude  people  has 


NATIONALITY  AND  TRUSTEESHIP  77 

conquered  a  more  highly  developed  one,  but  it  would  be  dif- 
ficult to  find  a  case  in  which  the  conqueror  has  learned  so 
little  from  the  conquered.  If  there  is  any  power  among 
men  to  rectify  the  demonstrated  misfits  of  history,  the  Turk 
may  well  be  asked  to  give  an  account  of  his  stewardship. 

If  we  turn  from  these  deplorable  examples  in  almost  any 
direction,  the  contrast  is  striking.  In  trusteeship  of  the  high- 
handed imperial  sort,  the  Russian  has  given  us  much  to 
admire.  Doubtless  Russian  provincial  development  has  been 
for  the  sake  of  the  empire  rather  than  for  the  sake  of  the 
provinces,  but  there  has  at  least  been  provincial  development, 
and  that  of  a  sort  that  would  have  done  honor  to  Trajan.  To 
one  who  compares  the  squalid  quarters  of  old  Tiflis  with  the 
magnificently  appointed  city  which  Russia  has  built  beside 
it,  or  who  looks  out  upon  the  superb  avenues  and  quays  of 
Dalny  which  displace  the  Chinese  fisher  huts  of  a  few  years 
before,  it  is  plain  that  with  all  her  faults,  Russia  was  no 
mere  parasite,  no  wearer  of  the  cast-off  purple  of  older  em- 
pires. Nor  was  her  constructive  power  confined  to  the  build- 
ing of  cities.  Under  a  dynasty  which  despite  its  recent  fiasco 
has  been  characterized  for  a  century  and  a  half  by  a  remark- 
able degree  of  ability  and  public  spirit,  Russia  was  one  of  the 
great  constructive  powers  in  the  world.  It  was  her  misfor- 
tune that  the  democratic  preoccupations  of  the  western  pow- 
ers should  make  us  primarily  conscious  of  Russia's  unlearned 
lessons,  her  rudimentary  development  of  popular  government 
and  safeguards  for  individual  right.  We  neither  realized  the 
impossibility  of  achieving  these  things  first,  nor  yet  the  fact 
that  they  were  being  rapidly  achieved.  The  Duma  and  the 
Zemstvos,  despite  their  limited  prerogatives,  were  rapidly 
building  popular  government  on  the  soundest  of  foundations 
when  the  avalanche  of  fanaticism  and  treason  swept  their 
work  away.  The  writer  holds  no  brief  for  Russia.  Her 
efforts  will  be  needed  at  home  for  a  long  time  to  come.     Even 


78  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

were  she  with  us  still  in  her  coherent  power,  her  trusteeship 
for  the  wards  of  the  nations  was  more  to  be  dreaded  than 
sought.  But  now  that  she  has  left  the  stage  we  may  freely 
recognize  her  as  one  of  the  great  players. 

A  mixed  record,  but  on  the  whole  an  honorable  one  is  that 
of  France.  The  problem  presented  by  North  America,  a 
problem  of  colonization  more  than  of  trusteeship  of  the  native 
races,  was  little  suited  to  the  France  of  the  ancien  regime. 
Eeligious  bigotry  hindered  settlement,  and  state  aid  proved  a 
demoralizing  inducement.  International  conflicts  prevented 
any  rational  policy  toward  the  natives,  even  had  the  insight 
of  the  time  made  such  a  policy  possible.  It  is  rare  that  a 
historic  decision  has  been  better  justified  than  was  that  on  the 
Heights  of  Abraham  in  1759. 

But  the  free  France  of  a  later  day  has  had  a  very  different 
history.  No  wars  with  European  rivals  have  been  fought 
within  the  limits  of  her  great  modern  dependencies.  No  at- 
tempt has  been  made  to  displace  their  native  populations. 
From  the  first  the  policy  has  been  one  of  development,  and 
so  far  from  exploiting  these  possessions  for  tribute,  they  have 
uniformly  entailed  a  charge  upon  the  home  government  for 
their  maintenance  and  development.  It  is  just  here  that 
France  has  been  oftenest  criticised.  She  has  not  been  preda- 
tory or  parasitic, —  despite  a  certain  tendency  to  officialism 
on  the  part  of  French  residents, —  but  she  has  not  always 
seemed  to  be  practical.  Perhaps  the  difficulty  lies  with  the 
home  people.  They  are  less  disposed  to  grasp  colonial  oppor- 
tunities for  business  and  less  inclined  to  let  foreigners  do  so. 
Hence  the  development  of  the  dependencies  is  slower  and  the 
day  of  self-support  is  postponed. 

Possibly  it  should  be  added  that  French  devotion  to  the 
principles  of  free  government  has  at  times  hindered  her  work. 
In  her  effort  to  do  for  her  dependents  she  has  gone  so  far  as 


NATIONALITY  AND  TKUSTEESHIP         79 

to  incorporate  Algeria  into  the  body  of  France,  giving  it  rep- 
resentation in  the  French  Parliament  and  at  one  time  extend- 
ing the  entire  body  of  French  law  to  this  province.  The 
result  only  demonstrated  the  futility  of  arrangements  not 
based  on  nature.  Algeria  is  not  France,  and  her  representa- 
tives show  a  dangerous  provincialism  and  detachment  from 
general  interests.  Above  all,  Mohammedans  are  not  French- 
men, and  the  well  meant  privileges  of  French  law  were  for 
them  a  hardship  and  an  irritation. 

But  despite  these  excesses  of  zeal  and  other  limitations  of  a 
less  excusable  kind,  French  rule  has  shown  in  a  high  degree 
the  spirit  of  trusteeship,  and  an  increasing  mastery  of  its 
problems.  It  is  a  matter  of  regret,  to  those  who  chiefly  de- 
sire the  expansion  of  the  French  race,  that  the  Frenchman  is 
so  little  disposed  to  emigrate  and  challenge  the  native  posses- 
sion of  Algeria  and  Tunis,  but  as  the  trustee  of  dependent 
peoples  France  is  certainly  not  to  be  criticised  for  showing 
so  little  disposition  to  displace  them.  That  she  is  creating 
in  these  lands  the  material  conditions  of  civilization  in  a 
degree  that  they  have  never  known,  and  that  she  is  sincerely 
devoted  to  their  development  rather  than  to  a  policy  of 
exhausting  exploitation  is  hardly  to  be  questioned.  France 
is  one  of  the  great  trustees. 

The  case  of  Britain  is  too  well  known  and  recognized  as 
a  model  to  require  lengthy  discussion.  The  most  striking 
fact  is  the  immensity  of  her  trust.  About  one-fourth  of  the 
population  as  of  the  area  of  the  globe  is  in  her  keeping,  and 
of  these  more  than  three-fourths  are  essentially  wards.  In- 
deed if  we  take  account  of  the  scanty  population  of  the  self- 
governing  dominions,  a  population  quite  unable  to  protect 
itself  unaided  against  possible  aggressors,  then  all  outside  the 
United  Kingdom,  or  more  than  nine-tenths  of  the  vast  aggre- 
gate, must  be  classed  as  dependent.     Trusteeship,  however, 


80  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

as  regards  the  self-governing  dominions  can  be  nothing  more 
than  protection  from  foreign  aggression.  Beyond  this  they 
are  self-sufficing. 

Toward  the  dependent  peoples  the  policy  of  Britain,  though 
persistently  misrepresented,  is  not  open  to  doubt.  Its  first 
requisite  is  order,  as  is  that  of  every  true  government.  But 
this  assured,  all  effort  is  bent  toward  the  care  and  develop- 
ment of  the  people  held  in  trust.  Burke's  declaration  that 
England  was  not  powerful  enough  to  oppress  the  humblest 
dweller  on  the  banks  of  the  Ganges  and  protect  the  proudest 
lord  on  the  banks  of  the  Thames,  may  fairly  be  taken  as  the 
guiding  principle  of  British  trusteeship,  a  principle  whose 
strength  lies  not  so  much  in  its  acceptance  by  the  British 
people  as  in  the  slowly  developed  tradition  of  the  British 
administrator.  This  tradition  which  is  not  the  creation  of 
any  single  individual  or  the  result  of  any  legislative  act,  has 
slowly  come  to  envelop  the  whole  service  like  an  atmosphere. 
It  is  not  the  sentimental  devotion  of  the  altruist,  but  the  self- 
respect  of  a  superior  race.  From  his  first  day  in  the  service 
the  future  administrator  breathes  this  atmosphere  of  matter- 
of-course  recognition  of  native  rights  and  suzerain  obliga- 
tions. The  petty  tricks,  the  lies,  the  nameless  exasperations 
of  his  wards  must  not  exhaust  his  patience.  That  would  be 
to  show  weakness.  His  word  must  be  inviolable,  the  more  so 
because  theirs  is  not.  To  take  advantage  of  them  is  con- 
temptible, unsportsmanlike.  Not  saintliness  but  sportsman- 
ship is  the  key  to  this  finest  service  ever  rendered  by  race  to 
race. 

But  the  great  thing  about  British  trusteeship  is  not  merely 
its  justice,  competency,  and  professional  honor.  It  is  rather 
to  be  found  in  its  democracy.  To  the  limit  of  the  possible 
it  is  Britain's  policy  to  place  responsibility  in  native  hands. 
This  policy,  so  well  exemplified  and  advocated  by  Lord 
Cromer  in  his  administration  of  Egypt,  means  in  the  first 


NATIONALITY  AND  TRUSTEESHIP  81 

place  the  use  of  native  agents  so  far  as  possible  in  adminis- 
trative service,  a  general  practice  in  all  trusteeships,  for  only 
the  most  bungling  incompetent  seeks  posts  for  "  deserving  " 
partisans  in  such  a  service.  But  British  policy  goes  farther, 
—  and  in  this  finds  its  distinctive  characteristic, —  placing 
the  actual  direction  of  affairs  little  by  little  in  native  hands. 
In  this  Britain  never  dogmatizes  about  the  inalienable  right 
of  men  to  govern  themselves.  She  feels  her  way.  She  is 
chiefly  concerned  with  their  ability  to  govern  themselves,  and 
justly  concludes  that,  failing  the  ability,  the  right  has  no 
present  application.  Withal,  she  has  shown  herself  inclined 
to  give  them  the  benefit  of  the  doubt.  In  recent  years  espe- 
cially, she  has  taken  long  chances  in  her  extension  of  the 
principle  of  native  control.  Unlike  Erance,  she  cares  not  a 
whit  for  logical  consistency.  Her  procedure  is  empirical. 
But  she  is  sincerely  devoted  to  the  principle  that  men  should 
be  permitted  the  use  of  their  powers  and  encouraged  to  develop 
them.  The  discontent  among  her  educated  colonials  is  an 
indication  of  success  in  the  attainment  of  both  these  aims. 

The  striking  outward  fact  is  the  material  success  of  British 
trusteeship.  Her  colonies  prosper,  prosper  beyond  the  imagi- 
nation of  those  unfamiliar  with  them.  Not  one  of  them 
pays  a  penny  of  tribute  or  contributes  perforce  even  to  impe- 
rial defense.  Yet  not  one  of  them  entails  a  charge  upon  the 
imperial  budget.  Their  increase  in  wealth  has  been  enor- 
mous, an  increase  which  has  accrued  primarily, —  especially 
in  Egypt, —  to  the  poorest  classes  of  the  population.  And 
the  English  have  prospered. —  justly  prospered, —  in  trade 
with  the  people  that  England  has  made  rich.  That  wealth 
and  intelligence  have  not  brought  submissiveness  and  content 
is  quite  in  accordance  with  their  nature.  It  is  a  unique 
record.     Britain  is  the  great  trustee. 

Our  own  experiments  in  this  unwonted  relationship  call 
for  brief  notice.     Our  experience  has  been  but  recent  and 


82  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

has  been  complicated  from  the  first  by  prepossessions  and 
divided  counsels.  We  had  no  thought  of  assuming  trust 
obligations.  We  had  little  sympathy  with  them  or  apprecia- 
tion of  their  necessity.  In  particular  we  felt  that  they  were 
inconsistent  with  our  own  political  institutions.  In  conse- 
quence our  policy  has  been  characterized  by  not  a  little  of 
half-heartedness  and  vacillation,  the  more  so  as  our  first  great 
acquisition, —  that  of  the  Philippines, —  was  of  a  peculiarly 
unpremeditated  and  unnecessary  character.  Our  hesitancy 
has  naturally  reacted  powerfully  upon  the  Eilipino  mind, 
arousing  aspirations  of  the  vaguest  and  most  troublesome 
character.  Said  an  American  who  had  listened  to  a  Fili- 
pino's glowing  words  on  independence:  "What  could  you 
do,  if  you  were  independent,  that  you  cannot  do  now  I "  "I 
could  build  my  house  there  in  the  middle  of  the  street,  if  I 
wanted  to."  "  But  suppose  your  neighbor  objected  and  in- 
terfered." "  I  would  get  him."  "  But  suppose  he  got  you." 
A  shrug  of  the  shoulders  was  the  only  answer. 

Yet  despite  these  handicaps,  American  administration  in 
the  Philippines  is  an  undeniable  success.  Material  prosper- 
ity, enormous  improvement  in  physical  and  sanitary  condi- 
tions, well  nigh  universal  education,  and  the  establishment  of 
order  and  safety  such  as  the  islands  have  never  known,  are  its 
indisputable  results.  Objections  on  the  ground  of  imperial- 
ism and  the  strategy  of  national  defense  simply  lose  all  hold 
upon  the  mind,  when  once  we  are  in  the  actual  presence  of 
this  great  undertaking.  We  are  doing  the  white  man's  work 
and  doing  it  worthily.  We  have  learned  much  from  Britain, 
but  possibly  have  a  thing  or  two  that  we  might  teach  her.  In 
the  extension  of  self-government  to  the  people,  we  have  vied 
with  Britain  in  the  audacity  of  our  faith. 

One  fact  is  worthy  of  especial  notice.  In  the  mountainous 
interior  of  the  islands  have  dwelt  from  time  immemorial  the 
head  hunters  whose  strange  rites  are  so  inimicable  to  civiliza- 


NATIONALITY  AND  TKUSTEESHIP  83 

tion.  They  are  also  found  in  Formosa,  Borneo,  and  other 
localities  where  they  are  the  wards  of  the  Japanese  and  the 
Dutch,  expert  trustees  in  their  way.  Both  these  powers  have 
been  compelled  to  adopt  a  policy  of  extermination  toward 
these  untamable  savages.  The  Japanese  have  surrounded 
their  habitat  with  a  barrier  of  barbed  wire  which  is  advanced 
from  time  to  time  as  parts  of  the  area  are  cleared,  and  in  this 
narrowing  circle  the  savages  are  trapped  and  destroyed.  In 
the  Philippines,  Americans  have  risked  their  lives  to  learn 
the  secret  of  these  strange  peoples  and  to  reconcile  them  to 
civilized  ways,  an  effort  that  has  been  crowned  with  success. 
They  are  today  among  the  most  promising  of  our  Filipino 
wards. 

But  American  trusteeship  has  not  stopped  with  the  Philip- 
pines. The  building  of  the  Panama  Canal,  and  the  slowly 
dawning  consciousness  of  its  vital  place  in  our  developing 
commerce  and  our  national  defense,  have  awakened  us  to  the 
necessity  of  order  and  business-like  administration  in  the 
Caribbean  region.  Faced  with  the  possibility  of  foreign 
complications  of  the  most  dangerous  character,  we  have  shed 
our  prepossessions  and  accepted  our  inevitable  task.  We 
stand  guard  over  Cuba,  protecting  her  alike  from  foreign 
aggressors  and  from  herself.  We  have  annexed  Porto  Rico 
and  the  Virgin  Isles.  We  have  a  protectorate  over  Hayti  and 
Panama.  We  are  unofficially  in  control  of  the  Dominican 
Republic.  Our  marines  occupy  the  Nicaraguan  capital. 
The  Canal  Zone  is  ours  by  a  perpetually  renewable  lease. 
Not  one  of  these  trusts  was  sought ;  not  one  of  them  could  be 
avoided;  and  the  end  is  not  yet.  The  inexorable  logic  of 
events  has  brushed  aside  our  theories  and  our  prepossessions. 
Not  with  exultation  but  with  a  grave  sense  of  responsibility 
we  may  accept  our  place  among  the  world's  trustees. 

The  coming  settlement  is  primarily  a  problem  of  trustee- 
ship.    What  is  to  become  of  the  German  colonies,  the  Portu- 


84  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

guese  colonies,  the  Turkish  subject  territories  ?  Who  are  to 
be  sponsors  for  Belgium,  for  Denmark,  for  Switzerland,  for 
Holland,  for  the  Balkan  and  near-Balkan  states  ?  Who  will 
maintain  the  free  passage  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Darda- 
nelles? The  answer  will  depend  largely  on  our  conception 
of  the  relation  involved. 

On  the  one  hand  is  heard  the  claim  of  ownership.  Give 
us  back  "  our  colonies,"  our  share  of  the  plums.  Colonies 
are  property  to  be  farmed  like  an  estate.  Their  people  are 
our  servants  to  be  used  subject  only  to  such  limitations  as  self- 
interest  and  public  conscience  with  its  feeble  instruments  for 
the  prevention  of  cruelty  may  dictate.  This  was  the  answer 
of  Spain  to  all  charges  of  cruelty  and  incompetency  in  Cuba. 
"  Cuba  is  ours."  It  was  the  plea  of  ownership,  pure  and 
simple.  To  this  claim  we  instinctively  opposed  the  principle 
of  trusteeship.  The  opposition  was  not  one  of  argument  or 
theory.  It  was  the  instinct  of  a  free  people.  Spain's  his- 
toric title  was  unquestioned.  The  great  trust  was  indubitably 
hers.  But  she  had  been  guilty  of  breach  of  trust,  and  through 
incompetency  and  maladministration  her  title  was  forfeit. 
There  was  no  other  possible  attitude  for  a  free  nation  com- 
mitted to  the  cause  of  human  freedom.  There  is  no  other 
possible  attitude  today. 

But  if  trusteeship,  then  who  is  to  be  the  trustee  ?  Again 
the  internationalist  is  heard.  Eor  the  common  interest  there 
should  be  a  common  trust.  An  international  trusteeship  is 
proposed  for  the  administration  of  the  Dardanelles,  the  great 
canals,  the  little  nations,  the  tropical  colonies  and  the  like. 
The  proposal  is  logically  plausible.  But  the  opinion  may 
safely  be  hazarded  that  the  trusteeship  which  is  to  give  the 
world  a  stable  peace  will  depend  much  less  on  logic  than  on 
competency.  Beyond  a  doubt  the  spirit  of  trusteeship  must 
be  maintained.  Territories  and  interests  which  are  incapa- 
ble of  self-administration,  must  be  administered  in  the  inter- 


NATIONALITY  AND  TRUSTEESHIP  85 

est  of  their  own  people  and  the  community  of  nations.  But 
whether  such  administration  can  better  be  secured  by  an  un- 
tried international  agency  than  by  experts  in  the  work  who, 
all  uncoerced,  have  developed  compelling  traditions  of  sound 
trusteeship,  may  well  be  doubted.  Possibly  an  administra- 
tion could  be  devised  for  Egypt  which  would  better  satisfy 
the  equities  of  international  theory  than  that  now  established 
there,  but  hardly  one  that  would  better  conserve  the  inter- 
ests of  the  Egyptians,  or  the  legitimate  interests  of  other 
powers.  The  case  is  not  unrepresentative.  The  possibilities 
of  internationalism  will  be  considered  in  another  chapter. 
Meanwhile  it  behooves  us  to  note  to  how  great  an  extent  the 
greater  nations  of  the  world  have  acquired  not  only  inter- 
national functions  but  the  international  spirit.  A  recent 
writer  has  aptly  described  the  British  Empire  as  "  a  great 
and  sacred  international  trust  with  responsibilities  of  vital 
importance  for  all  mankind."  These  words  are  no  figure  of 
speech.  The  British  Empire  is  not  an  empire  but  a  group 
of  free  nations  holding  numerous  wards  in  trust.  That  trust 
is  administered  with  strictest  impartiality  not  only  as  re- 
gards the  associated  nations,  but  as  regards  nations  in  general. 
The  prudent  will  think  twice  before  they  relinquish  such 
tried  instruments  as  this  for  untried  theoretical  creations. 

But  whatever  the  ultimate  choice,  the  great  national  trusts 
must  long  continue.  We  may  propose  internationalization 
of  the  Dardanelles  and  the  like,  but  no  man  in  his  senses  ex- 
pects Britain  to  surrender  India  or  France  Madagascar. 
Whether  these  trusts  are  to  be  permanent  or  are  ultimately 
to  give  way  to  international  agencies,  the  chief  wards  of  hu- 
manity are  still  to  be  long  in  their  keeping.  There  can  be 
no  more  urgent  duty  in  this  terrible  hour  than  to  emphasize 
their  character  as  trusts.  Discriminating  tariffs,  adminis- 
trative partiality,  parasitism,  and  official  intimidation  such 
as  have  marred  and  still  mar  certain  otherwise  fair  records, 


86  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

are  one  and  all  incompatible  with  the  spirit  of  the  trust. 
Such  excellent  administrators  as  Holland  and  France  may 
hesitate  to  grant  to  all  nations  the  advantages  which  they  enjoy 
in  the  farming  of  their  rich,  tropical  possessions,  but  any 
other  policy  is  sure  to  jeopardize  both  their  title  and  the 
peace  of  the  world.  No  more  vital  interest  is  involved  in 
the  forthcoming  settlement  than  to  establish  on  the  firmest 
foundations  the  principle  of  trusteeship,  the  principle  that  the 
control  of  helpless  peoples  is  to  be  in  their  interest  and  in 
the  common  interest  of  all  nations.  The  trustee  must  find 
his  reward  in  the  mere  privilege  of  doing,  not  in  any  monop- 
oly of  trade  or  exploitation.  We  may  with  perfect  legiti- 
macy consider  the  removal  of  Germany  from  her  trusteeship. 
Whether  we  can  justly  or  safely  exclude  her  from  traffic  with 
these  colonies  or  with  any  colonies  is  a  very  different  question. 
To  so  exclude  her  would  be  to  deny  her  a  place  in  the  family 
of  the  nations. 


CHAPTER  VII 

NATIONALITY  AND  ACCOUNTABILITY 

Wab  is  in  part  an  effort  to  hold  nations  accountable  for 
their  acts,  an  effort  usually  culminating  in  the  imposition  of  a 
penalty  by  the  victor.  We  have  here  to  consider  the  efficacy 
and  practicability  of  certain  conventional  penalties  as  a  means 
of  holding  offending  nations  to  account.  In  particular  the 
popular  penalty  of  indemnity  calls  for  careful  consideration. 

There  is  nothing  that  a  belligerent  does  to  an  enemy  in 
war  that  he  may  not  do  to  the  same  enemy  after  surrender 
if  he  chooses.  The  collapse  of  all  resistance  leaves  the  victor 
sole  arbiter.  In  earlier  warfare  the  worst  horrors  were  often 
reserved  for  the  hour  of  victory.  The  story  of  Samuel  who 
cursed  Saul  and  deposed  him  from  the  kingship  because  he 
had  spared  the  king  of  the  Amalekites  and  the  best  of  the 
flocks  condemned  by  the  implacable  Samuel  is  familiar. 
From  that  time  down  to  Tilly's  capture  of  Magdeburg  in 
the  Thirty  Years'  War,  the  harsh  old  rule  has  been  of  inter- 
mittent if  not  regular  application.  Even  among  the  most 
civilized  ancient  races  the  selling  of  prisoners  of  war  into 
slavery  and  the  beheading  of  enemy  generals  on  the  battlefield 
was  the  high  watermark  of  leniency.  Confiscation  of  estates 
and  looting  of  personal  property  was  a  matter  of  course. 

Self-interest  mitigated  the  rule  in  case  of  conquest.  What 
was  the  use  of  conquered  provinces  if  nobody  remained  to 
till  them  for  the  benefit  of  the  conquerors  ?  The  notion  that 
these  lands  were  necessary  for  the  expansion  of  the  conquer- 
or's people  did  not  at  first  suggest  itself.  Race  lines  were 
trivial  in  a  day  when  language  was  rudimentary  and  slavery 
obliterated  all  distinctions.     With  primitive  sense  of  thrift, 

87 


88  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

therefore,  a  conquered  population  might  be  conserved,  the 
while  personal  effects  as  before  were  ruthlessly  confiscated. 
This  was  the  easier  because  of  the  fact  that  such  effects  were 
almost  exclusively  articles  of  personal  gratification  rather 
than  productive  capital.  When  the  Egyptian  Pharaoh 
proudly  records  the  thousands  of  pounds  of  gold  that  he 
carried  off  as  the  result  of  a  marauding  campaign,  we  must 
beware  of  attaching  to  the  transaction  a  modern  significance. 
No  doubt  the  feelings  of  the  conquered  suffered  severely  from 
the  loss  of  their  earrings  and  bracelets,  and  the  vanity  of 
the  conqueror  was  correspondingly  flattered,  but  the  economic 
functions  of  society  were  little  disturbed.  Gold  was  not  a 
circulating  medium  or  a  measure  of  values,  and  the  transfer 
of  gold  from  one  locality  or  owner  to  another  was  a  matter 
of  no  serious  consequence. 

To  a  very  large  degree  these  conditions  continued  down  to 
comparatively  modern  times.  The  precious  metals,  to  be 
sure,  became  money  in  Greek  and  Roman  days,  and  the  indus- 
trial fabric  became  somewhat  sensitive  to  disturbances  from 
this  source.  But  even  in  the  great  days  industry  remained 
simple,  credit  relations  were  few,  productive  instruments  were 
but  tools  of  small  value,  and  accumulations  of  industrial 
capital  were  comparatively  small.  During  the  Middle  Ages 
again  the  world  lapsed  into  a  far  more  primitive  condition, 
and  simplicity  again  brought  the  immunity  which  is  charac- 
teristic of  all  simple  organisms. 

But  with  the  development  of  power  industry  came  the  enor- 
mous accumulations  of  industrial  capital  and  with  them  the 
all-embracing  credit  relations  and  the  sensitiveness  to  mone- 
tary values  which  are  the  characteristic  of  our  time.  It  is 
not  necessary  or  fitting  that  we  here  go  into  detail.  It  is 
sufficient  to  remind  ourselves  of  the  perfectly  recognized  fact 
that  the  industrial  fabric  of  the  world  is  now  a  unit,  that  its 
parts  are  all  interdependent,  and  that  an  extreme  sensitive- 


NATIONALITY  AND  ACCOUNTABILITY      89 

ness  pervades  the  whole.  Violent  transfers  of  the  precious 
metals  or  of  industrial  capital  are  attended  with  disastrous 
results  which  are  apt  to  outweigh  their  benefits.  Without 
attempting  to  go  into  this  subject  fully,  we  may  give  a  few 
illustrations. 

Let  us  take  the  subject  of  indemnity  in  its  crudest  form  as 
popularly  conceived,  the  payment  of  a  large  sum  of  gold  by  a 
country  whose  currency  is  gold  or  on  a  gold  basis.  It  is  a 
well  known  fact  that  prices  are  determined  by  the  ratio  be- 
tween the  amount  of  money  in  circulation  and  the  amount  of 
business  done.  Suppose  we  could  violently  take  from  Ger- 
many a  billion  dollars  and  add  it, —  as  we  should  do  in  this 
money  age, —  to  our  circulation.  There  would  be  a  general 
rise  in  prices  everywhere,  that  is,  a  cheapening  of  money. 
All  creditors,  including  holders  of  insurance  policies,  owners 
of  liberty  bonds,  receivers  of  fixed  salaries,  and  the  like, 
would  lose  in  proportion  to  the  cheapening  of  money.  Other 
classes  would  reap  correspondingly  unexpected  profits. 
Hardship  and  extravagance  inevitably  follow  such  changes. 
But  this  is  only  the  beginning.  Every  country  depends  some- 
what,—  usually  a  great  deal, —  on  foreign  commerce.  When 
prices  rise,  manufacturers  are  compelled  to  charge  more  for 
their  goods.  If,  for  instance,  they  wished  to  sell  goods  in 
South  America,  their  prices  would  be  very  high.  Mean- 
while Germany,  having  reduced  her  money  supply  by  a  bil- 
lion dollars,  would  have  experienced  a  general  fall  in  prices, 
and  her  manufacturers  would  be  able  to  offer  their  wares  in 
South  America  at  a  very  low  price.  The  first  result  of  our 
seizure  of  Germany's  gold  would  be  to  shut  ourselves  com- 
pletely out  of  the  South  American  market. 

But  the  matter  would  not  stop  here.  There  are  always 
some  industries  in  which  there  is  close  competition  even  for 
our  home  market.  Let  us  take  the  cotton  industry  as  an  illus- 
tration.    We  have  a  tariff  on  imported  cotton  goods  to  pro- 


90  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

tect  our  home  producers.  Even  so  there  are  usually  some 
kinds  of  cotton  goods  which  can  be  bought  so  cheaply  abroad 
that  even  after  payment  of  the  duty  they  will  undersell  Amer- 
ican goods.  Now  let  us  suppose  that  prices  rise  violently  in 
America  and  fall  correspondingly  in  Germany.  That,  of 
course,  would  include  the  price  of  manufactured  cottons  along 
with  the  rest.  Immediately  the  German  manufacturer  could 
undersell  the  American  manufacturer  and  we  should  all  soon 
be  wearing  goods  "  made  in  Germany."  Sentiment,  of  course, 
might  prevent  this  for  a  time  and  to  some  extent,  but  no  boy- 
cott based  on  sentiment  ever  long  restrains  economic  forces. 
The  second  result  of  our  billion  dollar  indemnity  would  there- 
fore be  to  close  our  own  factories,  turn  our  people  out  of 
employment,  and  boom  the  industries  of  Germany.  So  cer- 
tain are  these  results  that  it  is  now  recognized  as  economi- 
cally impossible  to  transfer  large  quantities  of  the  money 
metals, —  that  which  is  the  nation's  normal  quota, —  from  one 
nation  to  another.  So  extreme  is  this  sensitiveness  that  even 
peace  transactions  on  a  large  scale  have  to  be  managed  with 
the  greatest  care.  When  the  United  States  acquired  the 
Panama  Canal  from  Prance  for  the  sum  of  forty  millions, 
special  experts  were  called  in  to  devise  means  of  transferring 
this  sum, —  now  so  seemingly  insignificant, —  without  creat- 
ing serious  disturbances  of  the  kind  above  mentioned. 

It  is  characteristic  of  the  ruthlessness  of  German  militarism 
that  they  planned  on  huge  indemnities  in  case  of  victory. 
At  the  close  of  the  war  of  1870-71  Germany  exacted  from 
France  an  indemnity  of  a  billion  dollars,—  a  'huge  sum  for 
those  days, —  and  took  it  in  gold.  She  is  said  to  have  locked 
up  this  sum  as  a  war  chest  in  preparation  for  "  the  next  war  " 
for  which  she  is  always  preparing.  This  prevented  the  flood- 
ing of  her  own  currency  and  the  consequent  rise  in  prices, 
but  it  did  not  prevent  the  reverse  effect  in  France.  The 
result,  though  mitigated,  was  distinctly  unfavorable  to  Ger- 


NATIONALITY  AND  ACCOUNTABILITY      91 

man  industry  which  did  not  begin  to  forge  ahead  until  the 
effect  of  this  was  lived  down.  Conversely,  France  surprised 
the  world  by  the  rapidity  of  her  economic  recovery.  Ger- 
many is  now  repeating  this  blunder.  In  her  peace  with  Rus- 
sia  she  has  exacted  an  enormous  indemnity  which  is  now 
being  paid  by  installments  and  in  gold.  Her  economists  have 
not  failed  to  warn  her  of  the  danger  of  this  course,  but  the 
nation  has  not  yet  mastered  its  crude  passion  of  cupidity. 
Among  the  numerous  extravagant  peace  demands  heard  in 
Germany  during  the  last  four  years,  none  is  heard  so  often 
as  the  demand  for  indemnities. 

But  there  are  subtler  ways  of  securing  indemnities  than 
this.  One  is  to  take  over  productive  property  in  some  form. 
Thus  the  railways  of  Germany,  now  state  owned,  might  con- 
ceivably be  made  over  to  foreign  governments  to  be  run  for 
their  benefit  or  sold  to  foreign  or  German  syndicates.  This 
would  in  itself  be  an  immense  indemnity.  The  surrender  of 
German  ships  is  also  proposed,  a  proposal  which  has  the  more 
pertinence  because  of  the  destruction  of  Allied  shipping  by 
submarine  warfare.  Still  another  proposal, —  this  time  from 
German  sources, —  is  that  colonies  be  transferred  as  an  in- 
demnity. Finally,  a  transfer  of  national  credits  or  obliga- 
tions is  proposed.  Thus,  Germany,  when  considering  an  in- 
demnity from  France,  proposed  that  Russia's  huge  debt  to 
France  should  be  paid  to  Germany.  Again  a  would-be  Ger- 
man conciliator  proposed  that  Belgium  be  indemnified  for  her 
losses  by  England  against  the  surrender  to  the  latter  of  the 
German  colonies.  A  proposal  closely  akin  to  the  above  is  that 
the  indemnity  exacted  should  be  paid  in  installments  as  is 
now  being  done  by  Russia.  This  was  urged  by  German  chau- 
vinists at  a  time  when  Germany,  still  suffering  from  the 
effects  of  the  French  indemnity,  was  urged  to  again  despoil 
the  too  rapidly  recovering  France.  Such  an  indemnity, 
though  expressed  in  terms  of  money,  would  not  be  really  paid 


92  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

in  money,  but  by  transfers  of  goods  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
international  trade. 

These  proposals  all  have  the  merit  that  they  do  not  dis- 
order the  delicate  credit  system  of  the  world  in  the  way  above 
described.  Each  has  its  individual  merits  and  objections 
which  deserve  brief  notice  before  we  turn  to  the  general  prin- 
ciple underlying  them  all. 

The  railroads  are  the  largest  industrial  asset  of  the  German 
states.  They  have  the  merit  of  tangibility.  But  if  oper- 
ated in  the  interest  of  foreign  states  or  their  citizens,  they 
would  inevitably  become  the  target  for  unfriendly  legislation 
and  regulation  at  which  the  Germans  are  past  masters,  and 
for  which  there  is  no  limit  and  no  remedy.  It  may  be  naively 
objected  that  Germany  would  be  bound  by  treaty  pledges  on 
these  points.  Doubtless,  but  conceding  that  these  difficulties 
could  all  be  anticipated, —  an  extreme  concession, —  what  is 
to  compel  Germany  to  respect  these  pledges  ?  Foreign  owned 
railroads  would  be  a  most  irritating  constant  reminder  of  Ger- 
many's humiliation.  Cheating  the  railroad  would  become  a 
point  of  honor,  and  German  law,  administered  by  utterly 
unfriendly  officials,  would  give  no  redress.  If  the  foreign 
powers  protested,  Germany  would  in  effect  reply:  "What 
are  you  going  to  do  about  it  ?  Will  you  make  another  world 
war  to  redress  your  grievances  ?  "  The  net  result  would  be 
that  Germany  would  submit  to  any  hardship  to  ruin  these 
hated  foreign  properties.  Bankruptcy  would  follow,  and 
with  little  or  no  payment  the  properties  would  pass  into  Ger- 
man hands  again.  Hence,  the  only  thing  would  be  to  dis- 
pose of  them  at  once  to  German  owners.  This  would  mean 
merely  an  ordinary  indemnity  with  the  railroads  as  a  cum- 
brous intermediate  term  for  determining  the  amount. 

The  transfer  of  ships  is  not  open  to  these  objections,  and 
is  of  all  these  proposals  the  most  appropriate.  It  presents 
only  such  objections  as  hold  against  all  indemnities,  objections 


NATIONALITY  AND  ACCOUNTABILITY      93 

which  we  reserve  for  later  consideration.  Even  more  innocu- 
ous, unless  in  this  most  general  way,  is  the  proposed  transfer 
of  international  obligations.  The  principal  question  is  as  to 
the  value  of  the  obligations  available  for  transfer.  If  Ger- 
many were  victor,  France  might  be  compelled  to  surrender 
her  claims  against  Eussia  as  formerly  proposed,  but  their 
value  is  now  doubtful.  Our  own  country  would  be  the  chief 
loser.  We  now  hold  obligations  against  governments  for  the 
most  part  solvent,  amounting  to  over  seven  billions  of  dollars. 
To  transfer  these  obligations  to  Germany  would  not  only 
largely  offset  her  own  vast  debt,  but  what  is  even  more  im- 
portant, it  would  give  her  absolute  financial  control  of  some 
or  all  of  these  countries  during  the  long  period  of  indebted- 
ness. Such  a  country  as  Italy,  for  instance,  would  become 
absolutely  a  tributary  state,  unable  to  make  a  single  impor- 
tant decision  without  Germany's  consent.  The  establishment 
of  this  relation  of  financial  control  over  countries  not  avail- 
able for  annexation,  was  indeed  a  prominent  feature  of  Ger- 
many's plan  of  world  conquest  which  contemplated  indem- 
nities from  France  which,  as  one  noted  writer  urged,  "  can 
scarcely  be  made  too  heavy." 

But  with  the  Allies  as  victors,  what  can  be  gotten  in  this 
way  ?  Immense  sums  are  due  from  Russia  to  Germany,  but 
one  purpose  of  the  Allies  is  to  liberate  Russia  from  this  Ger- 
man tyranny.  We  can  not  collect  further  installments  from 
Russia.  We  must  if  possible  compel  Germany  to  return  what 
she  has  taken.  We  shall  be  fortunate  if  our  financial  rela- 
tions with  Russia  do  not  involve  much  heavier  burdens. 

Turkey,  Bulgaria,  and  presumably  Austria  owe  vast  sums 
to  Germany.  But  we  have  seemingly  decided  to  dismember 
at  least  two  of  these  countries.  The  value  of  their  obligations 
under  these  circumstances  is  problematical.  If  the  Turks 
lose  Constantinople,  Armenia,  Palestine,  Syria,  Arabia,  and 
Mesopotamia,  two  thirds  of  which  is  an  accomplished  fact 


94  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

and  the  rest  an  almost  inevitable  sequence  of  victory,  how 
will  they  pay  the  huge  war  debt  they  have  contracted  ?  Bul- 
garia, too,  is  likely  to  issue  from  the  war  with  diminished 
wealth  and  credit  if  not  with  diminished  territories.  The 
case  of  Austria  is  more  obscure  but  not  more  hopeful. 

It  will  be  plain  from  the  foregoing  that  such  transfers 
promise  small  relief  for  the  war  burdened  Allies.  Neverthe- 
less this  is  the  one  form  of  indemnity  which  it  is  most  im- 
perative to  exact.  These  obligations  carry  with  them  of  ne- 
cessity a  large  measure  of  political  dependence,  and  the  Allies 
will  leave  their  work  half  done  if  they  leave  the  component 
parts  of  the  menacing  Mittel  Europa  in  financial  bondage  to 
Germany.  Turkish  bonds  may  be  below  par,  but  they  at 
least  command  Turkish  allegiance  and  that  must  not  be  to 
Germany.  Such  a  transfer  would  come  much  more  under  the 
head  of  guaranty  than  of  indemnity,  but  it  is  not  the  less 
important  for  that  reason. 

The  possibility  that  Germany  may  hold  pre-war  obligations 
against  foreign  states  such  as  Brazil  which  may  have  good 
value  is  worth  considering,  but  these  obligations  are  doubt- 
less in  private  hands  and  are  hardly  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  manifold  assets  of  that  character  which  make  so  large  a 
part  of  a  nation's  financial  capital.  There  is  little  to  be 
gained  by  singling  out  these  securities  in  indemnity  calcula- 
tions. 

There  remains  to  be  considered  the  proposed  transfer  of 
colonies.  Aside  from  the  fact  that  these  colonies  are  already 
in  Allied  possession  and  their  assimilation  into  their  several 
colonial  administrations  already  far  advanced,  it  can  not  be 
too  emphatically  asserted  that  colonies  can  not  be  considered 
as  indemnity.  Nations  want  them,  as  men  want  wives,  but 
they  should  not  be  gotten  by  purchase  in  the  one  case  or  the 
other.  To  count  colonies  as  financial  assets  inevitably  im- 
plies the  idea  of  exploitation  for  profit.     This  is  the  bane  of 


NATIONALITY  AND  ACCOUNTABILITY      95 

all  colonial  relations,  the  vicious  principle  that  wrecked  the 
colonial  empires  of  Spain  and  Portugal  and  made  their  names 
a  byword  and  a  hissing.  It  is  a  vicious  theory  which  only 
the  Anglo-Saxon  seems  completely  to  have  outgrown.  He 
makes  money,  to  be  sure,  from  colonial  trade,  but  only  as  he 
makes  money  from  trade  with  Germany,  or  as  a  German 
makes  money  by  trade  with  these  same  Anglo-Saxon  colonies. 
The  sole  meaning  of  possession  in  such  cases  should  be, —  and 
very  nearly  is, —  the  artificial  maintenance  of  conditions  of 
world  commerce  which  more  developed  peoples  can  maintain 
for  themselves.  No  nation  that  assumes  the  burden  of  main- 
taining these  conditions  with  fair  equity  toward  the  civilized 
world  should  be  asked  to  pay  for  the  privilege.  The  sale  of 
colonies  is  on  a  par  with  the  Turkish  system  of  selling  gov- 
ernorships. It  is  significant  that  Germany  should  think  such 
a  sale  quite  a  business  proposition.  It  gives  us  the  measure 
of  German  trusteeship. 

The  difficulty  of  finding  available  assets  for  the  collection  of 
indemnities  is  plainly  considerable.  Nevertheless  it  may 
safely  be  assumed  that  the  collection  of  an  indemnity  in  the 
form  of  capital,  if  discreetly  managed  and  especially  if  dis- 
tributed over  a  long  period,  is  not  economically  impossible. 
Germany  has  vast  powers  of  recuperation  and  if  skillfully 
farmed  for  indemnity  purposes,  would  prove  productive. 

There  remain,  therefore,  the  general  questions,  what  do 
we  wish  to  accomplish  by  means  of  indemnity  and  how  far 
are  our  ends  attainable  ? 

The  first  idea  is  that  of  punishment,  to  hurt  Germany  be- 
cause she  has  hurt  us.  This  again  may  be  simply  from  anger, 
a  desire  to  inflict  injury  without  much  thought  of  conse- 
quences, or  it  may  be  a  more  reasoned  attempt  to  make  Ger- 
many think  twice  before  she  tries  it  again.  The  first  we  will 
not  discuss,  though  sentiments  of  resentment  will  perhaps 
bulk  large  at  times  during  the  long  struggle.     It  is  much  to 


96  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

be  hoped,  however,  that  we  shall  keep  a  cool  head  and  see 
where  we  are  going.  If  so,  our  desire  to  make  Germany 
smart  as  a  deterrent  to  future  aggression  will  probably  re- 
solve itself  into  the  more  tangible  and  reasonable  demand  of 
recompense  for  injuries  suffered.  We  will  not  for  the  mo- 
ment dwell  on  the  fact  that  the  injury  is  incalculable  and 
utterly  beyond  Germany's  power  to  recompense.  It  may  well 
be  that  certain  particular  injuries  will  be  deemed  to  have 
prior  claim  and  that  they  will  not  be  open  to  this  objection. 
Wherever  the  line  is  drawn,  we  may  concede  the  possibility 
of  formulating  a  practicable  demand  and  of  enforcing  it  at 
the  peace  settlement. 

There  is  still  another  criterion  for  the  determination  of 
an  indemnity,  namely,  the  weakening  of  the  rival.  This  has 
been  the  avowed  purpose  of  Germany  both  in  the  historic  case 
of  1871  and  in  the  proposals  made  later  with  regard  to  in- 
demnities to  be  exacted  from  Britain,  France,  and  America. 
This  is  of  course  an  entirely  different  thing  from  the  recom- 
pensing of  injuries,  but  in  practice  it  works  out  much  the 
same.  The  losses  are  always  so  colossal  that  no  indemnity 
can  cover  them,  and  whether  the  indemnity  be  demanded  for 
this  purpose  or  for  the  weakening  of  the  enemy,  it  may  very 
well  be  the  limit  of  what  the  conquered  can  pay.  Our  prob- 
lem, therefore,  simplifies  itself  to  this.  What  will  be  the 
result  to  us  of  exacting  an  indemnity  from  Germany  ? 

First  of  all,  we  must  continue  our  military  occupation  of 
the  country  until  the  indemnity  is  paid.  This  has  been  the 
rule  in  such  cases.  If  the  indemnity  is  collected  at  once,  the 
occupation  will  be  brief,  but  in  that  case  the  amount  can  not 
be  considerable.  It  can  not  be  too  strongly  insisted  that  the 
means  for  paying  a  large  indemnity  do  not  exist  in  Ger- 
many at  present.  Possibly  Germany  could  raise  the  amount 
by  foreign  loans  as  France  did  in  1871,  but  the  odds  are  much 
against  her,  and  if  she  succeeded,  it  would  amount  to  our 


NATIONALITY  AND  ACCOUNTABILITY      97 

lending  her  the  money  to  pay  our  indemnity  with  all  the  risk 
of  later  repudiation  which  would  he  involved  in  taking  her 
promise  to  start  with.  In  all  probability  such  an  indemnity 
would  have  to  be  paid  in  installments,  and  if  we  did  not  con- 
tinue military  occupation  of  the  country,  the  installments 
simply  would  not  be  paid.  Germany  would  have  no  con- 
science about  repudiating  a  debt  which  she  believed  unright- 
eous, and  she  would  know  perfectly  that  her  enemies  would 
not  undertake  another  world  war  to  collect  a  debt  that  would 
not  cover  a  tenth  their  expenses.  The  cost  of  such  a  military 
occupation  would  in  itself  be  prohibitive,  though  it  would  be 
the  least  of  the  objections  to  such  a  course.  It  would  not  be 
peace  but  war. 

It  has  been  urged  that  the  Allies  possess  an  easy  alternative 
to  this  expensive  and  dangerous  expedient  of  armed  occu- 
pation. They  hold  and  presumably  will  retain  the  tropical 
world  and  many  of  the  raw  materials  necessary  to  German 
industry.  Any  failure  on  Germany's  part,  it  is  argued,  can 
be  met  by  a  refusal  to  furnish  the  raw  materials  which  Ger- 
many needs.  But  a  moment's  reflection  will  make  it  clear 
that  the  Allies  possess  no  such  power.  It  is  not  the  nations 
that  buy  and  sell  rubber  and  cotton,  but  individuals  who  act 
quite  independently  and  ask  only  protection  in  their  opera- 
tions. Doubtless  the  Allied  nations  will,  in  their  national  ca- 
pacity, control  the  supply  of  necessary  raw  materials  to  pre- 
vent cornering  in  a  scarcity  market,  but  to  continue  to  do  so 
would  mean  the  abandonment  of  the  fundamental  principle 
of  our  economy.  It  is  conceivable  that  that  principle  may  be 
abandoned,  but  certainly  not  suddenly,  nor  in  the  interest  of 
collecting  an  indemnity.  So  long  as  the  regime  of  individ- 
ual liberty  continues,  Germany  will  find  purveyors  for  her 
wants.  If  the  Allies  should  abandon  the  policy  of  the  open 
door  as  regards  the  territories  they  hold  in  trust,  and  should 
forbid  the  sale  of  their  products  to  Germany,  it  would  not 


98  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

only  invalidate  their  title  to  trusteeship  but  would  raise  a 
storm  of  protest  from  their  own  citizens.  There  may  well 
be  opportunities  for  wise,  concerted,  economic  action  on  the 
part  of  the  Allied  governments,  but  they  will  hardly  find  it  in 
abrogating  their  long  standing  rule  of  industrial  liberty.  As 
compared  with  the  havoc  which  such  a  step  would  work,  the 
gain  of  an  indemnity,  even  the  largest,  would  be  as  dust  in 
the  balance.  Moreover  the  Allies  do  not  altogether  monopo- 
lize these  supplies,  and  any  attempt  so  to  do  would  stimulate 
competitive  production  elsewhere  with  disastrous  results. 

But  we  will  not  allow  even  this  difficulty  to  keep  us  from 
the  deeper  issue.  Possibly  ingenuity  and  statesmanship  of 
a  high  order  could  overcome  these  obstacles  and  could  secure 
from  Germany  the  regular  payments  of  a  deferred  indem- 
nity of  large  amount.  What  would  be  the  result?  The 
immediate  result  would  of  course  be  to  enrich  the  Allies  and 
impoverish  Germany.  In  the  same  way  a  gift  to  charity  re- 
lieves suffering.  But  it  is  the  rarest  thing  in  the  world  that 
the  forces  set  in  motion  stop  with  the  first  happy  result. 
Habits  are  formed  and  character  adjustments  effected  which 
are  often  the  opposite  of  what  is  intended.  As  the  world 
emerges  from  the  colossal  contest,  the  supreme  fact  will  be 
the  impoverishment  of  the  world.  For  this  there  is  but  one 
possible  cure,  the  devotion  anew  of  human  energy  to  the  con- 
quest of  nature,  the  practice  of  thrift  and  self-denial.  The 
nation  that  learns  these  habits  soonest  and  best,  will  inherit 
the  future.  Any  trifling  handicap  in  the  way  of  initial  allot- 
ment will  rapidly  disappear  in  the  face  of  this  all  potent  fac- 
tor. We  are  awed  by  the  immensity  of  the  world's  momen- 
tary stock  of  wealth.  That  is  as  nothing  to  the  great  stream 
which  is  ever  emerging  from  the  void  and  disappearing  in  the 
channels  of  human  service.  Give  to  a  favored  nation  any 
advantage  you  please  in  the  way  of  initial  supply,  and  if  its 
rival  has  an  advantage,  say,  of  ten  per  cent,  in  habits  of  pro- 


NATIONALITY  AND  ACCOUNTABILITY      99 

ductivity  and  thrift,  it  will  pass  its  favored  competitor  in  a 
single  generation.  Bismarck  thought  he  had  disabled  France 
for  fifty  years  by  his  crushing  indemnity.  Within  a  decade 
he  confessed  his  miscalculation  and  showed  undisguised  alarm 
at  the  recovery  of  his  humbled  enemy.  Impoverishment  only 
stimulated  thrift,  such  thrift  as  no  other  nation  in  Europe 
knows,  and  reversed  the  great  Chancellor's  calculation. 

Despite  all  her  losses,  Germany  is  going  to  emerge  from 
this  war  tremendously  strong  for  the  ensuing  industrial 
struggle.  Her  colossal  debt  is  not  a  liability  against  the 
German  people,  but  against  Germans  in  behalf  of  other  Ger- 
mans. Every  cent  paid  by  the  taxpayer  will  be  wrung  from 
him  by  enforced  economy  which  will  become  a  law  of  his 
being.  But  every  cent  so  paid  will  be  paid  to  a  person  who 
is  for  the  most  part  an  investor,  an  accumulator.  It  would 
be  impossible  to  devise  a  better  method  for  coercive  thrift.  It 
will  mean  enormous  privation,  the  loss  for  whole  generations 
of  much  that  makes  life  worth  living,  but  it  will  mean  the 
rebuilding  of  the  industrial  machine  of  Germany  in  the 
shortest  possible  time. 

If  we  impose  farther  burdens  we  shall  possibly  postpone 
that  recovery  (though  even  that  is  not  sure,  as  the  experience 
of  France  would  seem  to  show),  but  we  should  assure  only  the 
more  certainly  the  ultimate  result.  Meanwhile  we  should 
just  as  surely  experience  a  disastrous  reaction  ourselves. 
Nothing  so  bodes  ill  to  us  in  our  future  competition  with 
Germany  as  the  certainty  that  we  shall  not  be  willing  to  pay 
the  price  for  success  that  she  will  offer.  We  shall  demand 
shorter  hours,  lighter  tasks,  more  favorable  and  expensive  con- 
ditions of  labor.  Above  all  we.  shall  demand  higher  wages 
which  means  that  we  shall  refuse  to  set  aside  as  large  a  part 
of  the  national  income  as  Germany  will  do,  to  restore  and 
enlarge  the  great  industrial  plant  of  society.  This  may  be 
the  wise  decision.     Certainly  the  ampler  living  is  one  of  the 


100  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

things,  nay,  the  very  thing,  for  which  industry  exists.  But 
the  eternal  obstacle  to  the  attainment  of  these  ends  is  the  com- 
petition of  lower  paid  and  less  exacting  labor.  It  is  an  eco- 
nomic truism  that  slave  labor  makes  free  labor  impossible. 
In  precisely  the  same  way  the  prolonged  enslavement  of  Ger- 
man labor  would  be  an  insuperable  obstacle  to  the  emancipa- 
tion of  our  own. 

In  the  face  of  these  considerations,  it  is  scarcely  worth  our 
while  to  urge  or  refute  the  so-called  ethical  arguments  for 
indemnity.  Germany's  guilt  for  the  great  war  is  incalcu- 
lable, but  it  is  a  guilt  for  which  the  feeble  means  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  victor  offer  no  atonement.  Perhaps,  too,  in  our 
moments  of  calmer  thought,  we  may  realize  that  it  is  guilt  of 
a  somewhat  different  order  from  that  with  which  our  puny  tri- 
bunals are  accustomed  to  deal.  In  the  surging  torrents  of 
race  assertion  and  the  conflict  of  race  ideals  individuals  count 
for  so  little  and  their  freedom  of  choice  is  so  narrowed  that 
our  human  codes  and  tribunals  seem  to  have  no  competent 
jurisdiction.  This  is  no  attempt  to  minimize  the  guilt  of 
Germany.  The  writer  can  not  see  it  otherwise  than  as  a 
monstrous,  immeasurable  thing.  Not  because  it  is  so  little 
but  because  it  is  so  great,  he  feels  the  hopelessness  of  any 
attempt  to  assess  a  penalty.  The  great  case  takes  us  back 
through  a  chain  of  causes  which  we  shall  not  soon  follow  to 
the  end.     We  may  as  well  wait  for  the  judgment  day. 

Our  conclusion  is,  therefore,  that  as  a  general  measure  of 
reprisal,  or  restitution,  or  deterrent,  or  economic  repression, 
indemnities  are  not  available.  'Above  all  in  a  war  of  such 
magnitude  as  this,  the  defeated  can  not  pay  and  the  victors 
can  not  collect  an  indemnity  at  all  commensurate  with  either 
injury  or  guilt.  Could  they  do  so,  the  indemnity  would  ulti- 
mately defeat  its  own  end  by  its  reactions  upon  the  habits  of 
the  peoples  involved.     Indemnity  is  no  remedy  for  war. 

But  it  is  possible  that  in  a  limited  way  indemnity  may  be 


NATIONALITY  AND  ACCOUNTABILITY     101 

a  remedy  for  the  abuses  of  war.  There  is  a  distinction,  pos- 
sibly artificial,  but  not  the  less  important,  between  things 
sanctioned  and  things  forbidden  in  war  by  the  consensus  of 
civilized  nations.  The  sinking  of  the  Queen  Mary  is  in  a 
different  class  from  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania.  The  inva- 
sion of  France,  the  recognized  rival  of  Germany,  unprovoked 
as  it  was,  is  different  from  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  whose 
neutrality  Germany  had  promised  to  protect.  The  execution 
of  Captain  Fryatt  was  not  war,  but  plain  official  murder  of  a 
civilian.  These  acts,  appalling  as  is  their  aggregate,  are 
after  all  just  the  things  which  our  governments  and  our  tri- 
bunals have  been  established  to  deal  with.  Indemnities  for 
the  victims  of  the  Lusitania  and  for  at  least  certain  of  the 
injuries  suffered  by  Belgium,1  if  kept  within  limits  not  too 
disturbing  to  the  economic  order,  may  have  a  wholesome  effect 
in  establishing  the  limits  of  warfare.  Even  here,  however, 
only  the  most  conspicuous  cases  can  be  dealt  with.  Any  at- 
tempt to  cover  the  field  of  Germany's  violations  of  interna- 
tional law  would  at  once  encounter  the  obstacles  already  noted. 

The  writer  ventures,  with  much  hesitation,  to  raise  the  ques- 
tion of  other  possible  penalties  in  certain  cases.  There  were 
things  done  in  Belgium  as  elsewhere  which  have  no  relation 
to  war  and  which  no  nation  condones.  Many  of  these  are  on 
record  and  their  perpetrators  perfectly  known.  The  sugges- 
tion is  reasonable  and  perhaps  practicable,  that  certain  of 
these  monsters,  men  often  high  in  authority,  should  be  handed 
over  to  civil  tribunals  and  punished  in  accordance  with  civil 
law.  A  few  public  trials  and  legal  executions  would  have 
results  of  possibly  permanent  value.  Care  should  be  taken  to 
choose  such  cases  as  even  the  German  conscience  would  con- 
demn. Yet  here  again  the  suggestion  appalls  by  its  vast 
scope.  Only  the  most  limited  application  of  the  principle  of 
peace  reprisals  can  have  other  than  disastrous  reactions. 

i  This  subject  is  considered  at  length  in  the  chapter  on  Belgium. 


102  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

If  the  peace  for  which  we  are  striving  is  to  be  worthy 
of  our  struggles,  it  must  be  a  peace  that  will  bring  prosperity 
to  the  world,  and  ultimately  reconciliation  to  men.  The  no- 
tion that  the  crippling  or  impoverishment  of  a  competing 
nation  can  permanently  enrich  our  own  is  a  fallacy  con- 
demned by  all  human  experience  and  unworthy  of  thoughtful 
men.  Let  us  not  be  guilty  of  following  Germany  in  the 
grossest  of  her  blunders.  Germany  is  at  present  a  colossal 
example  of  misdirected  energy,  but  destruction  is  not  her  only 
art.  German  proficiency  is  as  marked  in  constructive  as  in 
destructive  lines.  The  problem  of  the  world  is  not  to  destroy 
this  energy  but  to  subdue  it  to  its  service.  Let  us  not  forget, 
in  the  just  indignation  of  the  moment,  the  immense  poten- 
tial serviceableness  of  this  misguided  people.  The  Germans 
are  after  all  a  people  that  the  world  can  not  spare.  Even 
from  the  low  standpoint  of  commerce  the  repression  of  Ger- 
many would  have  disastrous  consequences.  Germany  is  not 
only  England's  redoubtable  competitor.  She  is  also  Eng- 
land's best  customer.  If,  therefore,  the  suppression  of  Ger- 
many brought  profit  to  certain  industries  it  would  bring  ruin 
to  other  and  greater  industries.  The  full  benefits  of  afflu- 
ence are  impossible  except  in  an  affluent  world.  It  is  indica- 
tive of  Germany's  abuse  and  degradation  of  the  function  of 
war  that  she  should  see  in  it  an  opportunity  for  wholesale 
plunder. 

Above  all  it  is  fitting  that  a  nation  which  never  exacted  an 
indemnity,  but  which  has  established  the  precedent  of  pay- 
ment for  the  territories  annexed,  a  nation  that  entered  this 
war  in  pursuit  of  no  material  interests  and  that  rejects  with 
scorn  the  imputation  of  sordid  aims, —  it  is  fitting  that  such 
a  nation  should  refuse  to  compound  its  ideals  for  money  pay- 
ment. And  may  reparation,  where  necessary,  be  so  made  as 
to  carry  with  it  no  taint,  no  clouding  of  tha  ideal  which  is 
the  glory  of  Belgium  and  France. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

NATIONALITY  AND  INTERNATIONALISM 

Internationalism,  in  its  necessity  and  its  crude  reality, 
is  the  outstanding  fact  in  the  present  world  situation.  Na- 
tions can  do  nothing  alone, —  will  never  again  do  anything 
alone.  There  are  no  more  local  problems,  no  exclusively 
national  interests.  Alliances  are  the  supreme  problem  of 
war,  as  cooperation  is  the  supreme  fact  in  peace.  With  the 
passing  of  the  old  local  civilization  and  of  the  self-sufficient 
community,  independent  nationality  in  any  complete  sense 
of  the  word  becomes  a  fiction.  International  dependence  is 
the  ever  increasing  fact  as  civilization  develops.  The  prob- 
lem of  the  hour  is  to  match  this  growing  independence  with 
both  the  mood  and  the  mechanism  of  effective  cooperation. 
The  dependence  is  inevitable,  and  that  in  itself  means  weak- 
ness. Effective  cooperation  is  indispensable.  Only  that 
means  power. 

A  time  like  this  tends  to  emphasize  and  at  the  same  time 
to  pervert  the  problem  of  internationalism.  Our  thought 
turns  too  exclusively  to  the  prevention  of  war.  The  problem 
seems  to  be  a  judicial  one,  and  the  supreme  need  a  tribunal 
for  the  settlement  of  disputes.  The  great  international  in- 
terests, on  the  contrary,  are  peace  interests,  and  the  problem 
is  administrative  far  more  than  judicial.  It  is  a  question 
of  the  official  management  of  certain  great  business  interests 
of  the  nations  much  more  than  a  problem  of  punishing  or 
preventing  breaches  of  the  peace. 

Among  these  interests  perhaps  the  most  obvious  is  the  use 
of  the  sea,  the  inevitable  international  area  and  the  highway 
of  the  nations.     The  problem  is  to  keep  it  open  and  safe, 

103 


104  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

safe  from  the  pirate  or  individual  marauder,  and  safe  from 
the  shock  of  contending  nations  who  pursue  their  enemies 
upon  this  world  domain.  This  problem  will  be  discussed 
more  fully  in  the  chapter  on  Britain.  For  the  present  it  is 
sufficient  to  note  its  obviously  international  character. 

Then  there  are  certain  strategic  sites  of  special  importance, 
an  importance  so  great  as  to  overshadow  the  problems  of  their 
own  population.  Gibraltar  is  an  extreme  example.  Its  in- 
significant population  is  little  more  than  an  appendage  of  the 
garrison.  Its  interests  as  compared  with  those  of  the  na- 
tions whose  busiest  trade  route  is  controlled  by  the  great  rock, 
are  so  insignificant  that  all  question  of  democratic  privilege 
is  completely  forgotten.  The  double  passageway  of  the  Dar- 
danelles and  the  Bosphorus  presents  a  like  problem,  though  it 
is  less  easily  detached  from  adjacent  territories  and  the  prob- 
lem of  its  local  population  is  not  so  readily  subordinated. 
But  it  is  alike  in  this  that  the  world  interest  is  paramount. 
The  people  who  live  there  have  rights  which  must  be  re- 
spected, but  they  can  not  be  permitted  to  control  the  water- 
way, nor  yet  to  block  the  highway,  almost  equally  important, 
which  crosses  it  from  north  to  south. 

The  great  canals,  Suez,  Panama,  and  Kiel,  are  quite  sim- 
ilar, but  with  the  important  difference  that  they  are  artificial 
and  have  been  built  at  enormous  expense.  Those  who  have 
made  this  outlay  have  acquired  a  title  which  can  not  be 
ignored,  yet  one  which  can  not  be  allowed  to  obscure  their 
obviously  international  function. 

Certain  small  nations,  Denmark,  Belgium,  Greece,  Swit- 
zerland, and  others,  have  something  of  this  paramount  inter- 
national character.  They  are  nations  with  a  considerable 
population  and  a  historic  national  consciousness  for  which  we 
instinctively  claim  the  usual  privileges  of  self-determination 
and  independent  sovereignty.  Yet  they  have  something  of 
the  Gibraltar  character  in  that  their  occupation  or  use  by  a 


NATIONALITY  AND  INTERNATIONALISM     105 

great  power  would  give  it  an  overwhelming  advantage  over 
its  rivals.  Such  states  necessarily  lose  some  of  the  ordinary 
attributes  of  sovereignty  and  become  in  a  sense  wards  of  the 
powers  whose  fate  they  can  not  but  determine.  They  are 
international  interests. 

Quite  distinct  are  those  peoples  who  are  wards  because  of 
inability  to  manage  their  own  affairs  in  a  manner  to  meet 
modern  requirements.  There  is  an  irreducible  minimum  of 
decency,  order,  and  safety  which  all  parts  of  the  world  are 
now  required  to  provide.  The  doctrine  of  liberty  is  no 
longer  construed  as  giving  to  any  people  the  right  to  breed 
pestilence  or  rob  and  kill  peaceable  persons,  or  withhold  from 
the  world  the  resources  which  civilization  has  requisitioned 
for  its  higher  uses.  There  is  still  much  of  all  this  in  the 
world,  but  it  is  recognized  as  an  abuse,  and  it  is  a  legitimate 
international  problem  to  remove  it.  The  peoples  that  can  not 
eliminate  pestilence  and  anarchy  and  make  it  safe  for  men 
to  go  and  come  within  their  borders  must  be  helped  to  do  so 
or  made  to  do  so.  For  such  peoples  a  receivership  must  be 
established.  This  does  not  mean  that  they  have  no  rights, 
but  that  they  are  incompetent  to  protect  their  rights,  and  still 
more,  to  protect  those  larger  rights  to  which  all  local  rights 
are  necessarily  subordinate.  All  backward  peoples  are  thus 
of  necessity  the  wards  of  the  nations.  Under  present  condi- 
tions the  guardian  is  necessarily  a  nation,  but  the  interest  is 
plainly  international.  The  perception  of  this  fact  has  led  to  a 
proposal  that  international  agencies  be  created  for  the  admin- 
istration of  these  trusts,  more  particularly  for  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  German  colonies  which  this  war  is  seemingly 
going  to  throw  upon  the  world  for  disposal. 

Most  important  of  all  international  interests,  however,  are 
the  great,  civilized  nations  themselves  in  that  range  of  their 
interests  which  do  not  come  within  their  recognized  individ- 
ual jurisdiction.     The  great  civilized  powers  are  after  all  the 


106  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

\ 

great  disturbers  of  the  peace,  the  great  destroyers  of  civiliza- 
tion. If  the  savage  becomes  a  ward  by  reason  of  his  inability 
to  keep  the  peace  and  protect  life  and  property,  then  by  the 
same  token  the  great  powers  call  for  guardianship.  The 
problem  is  to  find  a  guardian. 

Let  us  recognize  at  the  outset,  if  possible,  that  the  impor- 
tant thing  is  to  get  the  work  properly  done,  rather  than  to  get 
it  done  in  a  particular  way.  There  are  always  those  who 
wish  procedure  to  be  logical.  There  are  others  who  demand 
only  that  it  should  be  effectual.  Possibly  if  we  perfectly 
understood  all  factors  in  our  problem,  the  logical  and  the 
effectual  would  be  seen  to  be  very  nearly  identical,  but  with 
our  half  knowledge  the  seemingly  logical  often  diverges 
widely  from  the  effectual.  It  is  characteristic  of  the  very 
successful  Anglo-Saxon  that  he  invariably  prefers  the  effec- 
tual, no  matter  what  its  seeming  incongruity.  It  is  in  this 
Anglo-Saxon  spirit  that  we  approach  the  study  of  this  much 
debated  subject.  We  seek  an  effectual  administration  of 
international  interests  in  a  manner  consonant  with  their  inter- 
national character.  The  presumption  is  enormously  in  favor 
of  any  existing  administration  which  meets  these  require- 
ments, as  it  is  in  favor  of  the  further  use  of  experienced  and 
efficient  agencies.  It  is  the  logical  thing  to  provide  inter- 
national agencies  to  administer  international  interests,  just 
as  it  is  the  logical  thing  to  have  the  community  own  its 
bakeries  because  all  citizens  eat  the  bread.  But  such  logic 
often  reposes  on  mere  verbal  suggestion.  The  real  ques- 
tion is,  which  way  gives  us  the  most  and  the  best  bread. 
It  is  a  slow  and  difficult  task  to  create  effectual  admin- 
istrative agencies.  It  means  knowledge  which  transcends 
the  individual's  power  to  acquire  and  guiding  traditions 
which  transcend  his  personal  sense  of  obligation.  Such 
an  administration  can  only  rest  back  on  a  coherent  and  well 
defined  entity  such  as  only  national  bodies  have  yet  been  able 


NATIONALITY  AND  INTEENATIONALISM     107 

to  supply.  The  creation  of  such  a  great  spiritual  entity  is  a 
matter  of  secular  slowness.  It  can  be  done,  it  almost  cer- 
tainly will  be  done,  but  by  what  methods  and  whether  for 
immediate  availability  is  not  so  clear.  It  is  rather  to  be 
anticipated  that  for  a  long  time  to  come  we  shall  find  the 
great,  mature,  disciplined  nations  the  most  effectual  agencies 
for  purposes  of  international  administration.  The  important 
thing  in  the  meantime  is  to  recognize  clearly  the  nature  of 
the  trust  and  their  accountability  to  the  community  of  nations. 

With  this  general  observation  we  may  reserve  for  discus- 
sion in  other  chapters  the  various  concrete  interests  which  are 
involved  in  the  present  war.  The  freedom  of  the  sea  is  essen- 
tially the  problem  of  Britain,  so  long  its  guardian.  The 
problem  of  Belgium,  nation  and  international  bulwark,  is 
necessarily  the  subject  of  an  entire  chapter.  Constantinople, 
the  problem  of  a  thousand  years,  calls  for  treatment  which 
may  require  a  break  with  all  tradition.  The  German  col- 
onies, again,  must  be  considered,  not  as  cases  under  a  general 
rule,  but  in  relation  to  adjacent  territories  and  the  problem 
of  their  political  development.  If  full  account  be  taken  of 
local  peculiarities,  these  problems  raised  by  the  war  will  be 
found  capable  of  individual  solution. 

There  remains  the  great  problem  of  establishing  an  inter- 
national agency  for  the  one  task  for  which  the  nations  are 
individually  incompetent.  All  the  other  tasks,  the  control  of 
the  sea,  the  occupation  of  strategic  sites,  the  protection  of 
little  nations,  the  administration  of  backward  territories, 
may  be, —  and  thus  far  have  been, —  distributed  among  the 
great  powers,  but  the  control  of  these  powers  themselves  obvi- 
ously requires  a  higher  authority.  That  authority  can  be  no 
other  than  the  joint  authority  of  these  nations  themselves  or 
a  preponderant  portion  of  them.  Proposals  to  form  such  a 
joint  authority  and  to  equip  it  with  machinery  suitable  for 
its  function  have  acquired  unusual  importance  from  the  ap- 


108  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

parent  adhesion  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  who  has 
given  prominence  to  this  subject  in  all  his  addresses  and  pro- 
nouncements relative  to  conditions  of  peace.  Statesmen  of 
nearly  all  the  Allied  nations  and  even  the  chancellors  of  the 
German  Empire  have  also  expressed  their  approval  in  more 
or  less  guarded  phrase.  The  subject  therefore  rises  quite 
above  its  usual  status  of  theory  and  speculation,  and  becomes 
one  of  the  great  practical  issues  of  the  day.  As  such  it  de- 
serves our  careful  consideration,  both  in  its  present  form  and 
in  its  origin. 

The  earlier  proposals  were  purely  permissive  and  moral. 
Little  more  was  attempted  than  to  have  a  place  and  an  agency 
always  ready  to  arbitrate  the  differences  of  those  who  were 
unable  to  reach  an  agreement  unaided.  The  verdict  rendered 
by  this  tribunal  was  to  have  no  other  sanction  than  its  pre- 
sumptive competency  and  impartiality  and  the  force  of  inter- 
national opinion.  No  doubt  such  an  arrangement  would  meet 
certain  requirements.  Its  defect  lay  in  its  basic  assumption 
that  nations  were  willing  to  live  and  let  live  and  asked  only 
for  equity  under  this  principle.  Now  if  never  before,  the 
world  should  realize  how  far  this  is  from  the  facts  with  which 
we  have  to  deal. 

Slowly  it  became  apparent  that  an  element  of  force  was 
necessary  in  dealing  with  a  problem  whose  essence  was  force. 
Proposals  to  compel  the  submission  of  disputes  to  arbitration, 
to  enforce  the  acceptance  of  the  award,  and  the  like,  were 
made, —  always  with  this  result  that  they  raised  the  ques- 
tion of  who  or  what  was  to  do  the  compelling.  To  the  popu- 
lar mind  this  question  has  never  come  home  with  its  true 
force.  The  writer  has  been  interested  to  note  with  what  ease 
proposals  of  internationalization  of  every  sort  find  acceptance 
with  the  public.  If  the  Dardanelles  proves  a  bone  of  conten- 
tion over  which  the  great  powers  exhaust  their  energies,  the 
popular  remedy  is  always  there.     Internationalize  the  straitt 


NATIONALITY  AND  INTERNATIONALISM     109 

and  make  them  all  stand  back.  It  rarely  occurs  to  any  one  to 
ask,  who  is  to  make  them  stand  back.  Even  after  Germany 
has  snapped  the  bonds  of  international  law  like  tow  burned  in 
the  fire,  the  assumption  is  still  unthinkingly  made  that  she 
would  stand  in  awe  of  an  internationalized  Constantinople. 
There  is  an  easy  and  very  creditable  explanation  for  this  per- 
sistent illusion.  We  live  under  conditions  of  social  order  s*o 
secure  that  obedience  to  the  judgments  of  tribunals  is  a  matter 
of  course.  We  never  think  of  trying  conclusions  with  the 
policeman's  club  or  the  armed  power  of  the  state.  Eor  us  the 
pronouncement  of  recognized  authority  is  final.  We  nat- 
urally assume  that  the  pronouncement  of  recognized  authority 
will  everywhere  be  final.  Yet  nothing  is  more  certain  than 
that  it  is  the  policeman  and  the  armed  power  of  the  nation,  • 
no  matter  how  unnoticed  and  forgotten,  which  give  to  con- 
stituted authority  its  finality. 

This  fact  has  not  escaped  the  attention  of  practical  men. 
Attention  has  therefore  been  devoted  of  late,  and  especially 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  great  war,  to  the  question  of  sanc- 
tion or  enforcing  power.  This  can  be  furnished,  of  course, 
only  by  the  nations  themselves,  and  must  be  in  essence,  how- 
ever disguised,  a  super-state.  Proposals  looking  to  this  end 
are  best  represented  by  the  strongly  urged  League  to  Enforce 
Peace  which  numbers  among  its  promoters  many  distin- 
guished names,  and  commends  itself,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the 
statesmen  of  most  of  the  nations  now  at  war. 

The  League  proposes  a  union  of  nations  pledged  to  submit 
their  differences  to  a  tribunal,  if  "  justiciable,"  or  to  a  com- 
mission of  inquiry  if  the  issues  are  adjudged  vital  to  the 
existence  or  honor  of  the  nation.  In  the  latter  case,  according 
to  plans  which  have  been  given  the  widest  currency,  it  is  not 
proposed  to  make  the  commission's  report  binding  upon  the 
parties  to  the  dispute.  They  are  pledged,  as  members  of  the 
league,  only  to  await  the  result  of  the  inquiry.     They  are 


110  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

then  free  to  go  to  war  if  they  elect  to  do  so.  It  is  judged 
that  this  very  moderate  demand  will  commend  the  plan  to 
those  nations  whose  power  and  pride  make  them  hesitate  to 
commit  their  existence  and  honor  to  the  keeping  of  other 
nations.  Finally  and  chiefly,  the  members  of  the  league  are 
to  use  their  power,  military  and  economic,  to  compel  obedi- 
ence and  the  observance  of  pledges  to  the  league.  It  is  plausi- 
bly urged  that  a  power  so  overwhelming  would  effectually  awe 
any  rebellious  power. 

It  is  plain  that  such  a  league  would  involve  a  great  en- 
croachment upon  the  traditional  authority  of  the  nations. 
It  is  not  simply  the  right  to  make  war  which  is  withdrawn 
or  curtailed  but  the  right  to  adjudicate  or  investigate  all 
those  questions  which  give  rise  to  war.  In  current  plans, 
this  encroachment  upon  national  prerogative  is  held  within 
the  most  moderate  limits,  but  this  moderation  is  confessedly 
prudential  and  temporary.  The  concession  of  the  right  to 
go  to  war  after  investigation  is  a  reluctant  one,  not  to  say 
a  specious  one,  for  the  intention  is  plainly  to  make  war  vir- 
tually impossible  by  the  investigation.  More  would  be  de- 
manded if  more  were  judged  possible,  but  in  this  transition 
state  it  is  thought  best  to  leave  the  nations  at  least  the  outer 
semblance  of  national  prerogative.  But  the  avowed  purpose 
of  the  proposed  league  is  to  prevent  war,  and  this  can  be 
accomplished  only  by  developing  an  extensive  and  powerful 
supernational  authority.  The  assumption  usually  is  that 
with  the  establishment  of  such  an  authority,  national  differ- 
ences would  tend  to  disappear  and  that  the  supernational 
authority  would  have  little  to  do.  Such  an  assumption  seems 
unwarranted.  If  the  nations  become  submissive  and  indif- 
ferent to  national  aggrandizement,  it  can  only  be  because 
they  have  ceased  to  be  the  doers  of  the  real  things,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  States  of  the  American  Union.  But  the  lessen- 
ing interest  in  the  states  has  not  meant  a  lessening  activity 


NATIONALITY  AND  INTERNATIONALISM     111 

on  the  part  of  the  Federal  government.  It  is  because  the 
Federal  government  has  absorbed  the  substance  of  state  au- 
thority that  we  no  longer  care  much  about  their  individual 
interests  or  aggrandizement.  When  we  recall  that  all 
equilibriums  among  nations,  localities,  families,  and  the  like 
are  continually  being  upset  by  new  discoveries  and  inventions, 
above  all  by  the  unequal  power  of  growth  which  so  mysteri- 
ously manifests  itself  in  peoples,  we  may  assume  with  cer- 
tainty that  the  supernational  authority  thus  established  would 
either  break  down  or  be  progressively  extended  and  strength- 
ened. If  the  nations  continue  to  be  the  real  power,  the  old 
ambitions,  jealousies,  and  conflicts  of  interest  will  continue. 
If  international  authority  holds  these  turbulent  elements  in 
permanent  equilibrium,  it  can  only  be  by  increasingly  ab- 
sorbing such  of  their  functions  as  have  international  re- 
actions. This  would  mean  the  gradual  establishment  of  a 
vast  administrative  mechanism  with  numerous  functions  and 
an  extensive  personnel,  in  short,  the  formation  of  a  true  super- 
state. 

Such  a  super-state  once  formed  and  experienced  in  its  ad- 
ministrative functions,  would  almost  inevitably  take  over 
in  turn  those  international  trusts  which  for  the  present  are 
administered  by  the  nations.  The  policing  of  the  seas  would 
ultimately  be  done  by  ships  flying  the  flag  of  the  league  and 
owning  only  its  authority.  Gibraltar  and  the  Dardanelles 
could  hardly  fail  to  accept  like  administration.  Belgium 
and  Denmark  and  the  great  canals  would  continue  under  in- 
ternational guaranties  of  a  sort  very  different  from  those  they 
have  hitherto  known.  Above  all,  the  tropics  and  all  the  lands 
of  the  backward  peoples  would  be  the  charge  of  the  super- 
state. Or,  not  to  make  too  violent  an  assumption,  if  these 
various  trusts  were  still  administered  by  individual  nations, 
it  would  be  by  delegated  authority  and  under  the  sanctions 
of  the  super-state. 


112  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

The  writer,  for  one,  is  not  deterred  by  this  prospect.  Let 
us  hedge  and  hesitate  as  we  will,  the  conclusion  is  unescap- 
able  that  the  world  is  moving  toward  Cosmos  rather  than  to- 
ward Chaos.  If  it  is  not,  it  is  not  worth  bothering  about  or 
staying  in.  Nor  can  the  writer  conceive  of  this  Cosmos  as 
essentially  other  than  a  state  with  its  organs  for  repressing 
disorder  and  organizing  for  effective  cooperation  the  multi- 
farious energies  of  nature  and  man.  This  organization  does 
not  take  place  spontaneously  nor  without  coercion  of  reluc- 
tant and  suppression  of  malignant  forces.  The  world  unity 
must  be  essentially  a  state.  Nor  can  the  argument  that  in- 
ternational authority  is  inconsistent  with  national  sovereignty 
be  recognized  as  having  any  weight.  Absolute  sovereignty 
is  and  always  has  been  a  fiction.  No  state  has  more  authority 
than  it  has  power,  and  no  state  has  unlimited  power.  The 
very  existence  of  other  states  limits  the  power  of  the  state, 
and  there  is  no  reason  why  that  power  should  not  be  further 
limited  in  the  interest  of  the  ends  for  which  states  exist. 

But  all  this  is  ultimate  and  immeasurably  remote.  Be- 
tween us  and  the  attainment  of  ideal  internationalism 
stretches  a  long,  long  road  of  difficult  progress,  and  it  is 
near  its  hither  end  that  ]ies  the  problem  with  which  we  have 
to  deal.  For  the  coming  settlement  will  be  after  all  only 
a  transition  adjustment,  one  destined  to  give  place, —  peace- 
ably, let  us  hope, —  to  another  and  to  many  another  before 
the  end  of  the  road  is  reached.  And  the  way  is  not  plain  nor 
is  the  distance  measured,  however  clear  the  goal.  Turning, 
therefore,  from  ultimate  or  ideal  internationalism  to  in- 
ternationalism as  a  practical  problem  of  the  immediate  pres- 
ent, let  us  consider  how  far  it  is  available  as  a  solution  of 
present  difficulties. 

It  is  a  precaution  never  to  be  omitted  in  such  cases  to  in- 
quire what  light,  if  any,  history  has  to  throw  upon  our  prob- 
lem.    Very  few  people  seem  to  be  aware  to  how  large  an 


NATIONALITY  AND  INTEENATIONALISM     113 

extent  the  experiment  of  international  control  has  already 
been  tried.  Despite  the  complicating  circumstances  that 
are  always  present,  certain  of  these  cases  are  exactly  in  point 
and  their  outcome  is  the  most  reliable  guide  we  can  have. 

A  significant  case  is  that  of  Denmark.  Controlling  by 
her  situation  the  entrance  to  the  Baltic,  she  is  yet  too  weak 
to  protect  herself  against  her  powerful  neighbors.  In  the 
interest  of  the  European  balance  of  power,  the  great  powers 
of  that  day,  England,  France,  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Russia, 
pledged  themselves  in  1853  to  respect  the  integrity  of  Den- 
mark and  to  join  forces  against  any  one  of  their  number 
who  should  violate  it.  But  in  1864  Prussia  and  Austria, 
having  quite  changed  their  views  as  to  their  needs,  attacked 
Denmark  and  despoiled  her  of  Schleswig-Holstein.  Erance 
found  herself  too  busy  and  too  little  interested  to  interfere. 
England  threatened  to  the  last,  but  ultimately  backed  down, 
and  Kussia,  most  concerned  of  them  all,  was  powerless  to  pre- 
vent the  spoliation. 

It  will  of  course  be  urged  that  this  was  not  a  fair  test,  that 
not  all  powers  were  represented,  and  that  only  a  single  object 
was  included.  It  will  be  clear  on  reflection,  however,  that 
these  were  elements  of  strength  rather  than  of  weakness  in 
the  scheme.  If  all  the  nations  had  been  included,  would 
Argentina  or  Guatemala  or  Turkey  or  the  United  States  have 
been  likely  to  oppose  Germany  and  Austria  if  a  country  so 
nearly  interested  as  France  refused  to  interfere?  And  if 
they  could  not  stand  together  on  this  vital  question  which 
they  had  distinctly  foreseen,  is  it  likely  that  they  would  have 
risked  a  war  with  such  powers  on  other  and  more  unexpected 
issues?  The  case  was  a  very  favorable  one  and  illustrates 
another  factor  with  which  we  have  always  to  deal,  namely, 
national  growth.  Prussia  had  prospered  and  the  vision  of 
sea  power  had  come  to  her.  The  difficult  Danish  straits  gave 
but  unsatisfactory  access  to  her  long  Baltic  sea  coast  and  in 


114  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

war  time  were  impassable.  Her  navy  which  must  protect 
her  toward  the  east  and  toward  the  west,  must  be  able  to  pass 
the  Danish  peninsula  at  will,  or  but  half  of  it  wouH  be  avail- 
able against  either  foe.  In  short  the  idea  of  the  Kiel  Canal 
had  come  to  her,  and  the  Danish  neck  must  be  acquired. 
Pretexts,  the  most  barefaced  imaginable,  were  found,  the 
situation  of  the  hostile  powers  shrewdly  estimated,  Austria 
wTon  by  false  inducements,  and  the  deed  accomplished. 

Belgium  offers  another  case,  almost  identical  with  the 
foregoing,  save  that  there  were  fewer  guarantors  and  no 
acquiescence  in  the  spoliation.  But  again  the  agreement  was 
violated  because  conditions  had  changed  and  one  of  the  guar- 
antors deemed  it  advantageous  to  violate  its  pledge. 

Whether  we  invoke  internationalism  as  the  custodian  of 
some  special  and  local  interest  or  as  the  general  arbiter  of 
all  international  disputes,  we  encounter  the  same  difficulties 
which  wrecked  these  experiments.  The  larger  applica- 
tions of  the  principle  do  not  essentially  change  the  problem. 
The  argument  of  preponderant  force  takes  no  account  of  the 
ease  with  which  great  combinations  are  formed  in  our  day. 
It  is  impressive  to  say  that  in  a  league  of  twenty  nations,  the 
nineteen  could  always  bring  the  one  disturber  to  book.  What 
guaranty  have  we  that  it  would  be  nineteen  against  one? 
So  it  was  argued  about  Denmark,  that  four  could  always 
control  the  one.  But  it  proved  to  be  three  against  two,  and 
that  at  a  moment  when  one  of  the  three  was  embarrassed  and 
another  weakly  led.  In  a  combination  of  twenty  nations  this 
situation  might  easily  repeat  itself.  [Nothing  is  more  de- 
ceptive than  general  talk  about  "nations"  with  counting 
on  the  finger  tips.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  nations  are  very 
unequal  in  size  and  are  so  situated  that  they  fall  into  natural 
groups  which  have  no  choice  but  to  act  as  units.  If  an  in- 
ternational agreement  were  reached  neutralizing  the  Dar- 
danelles and  signed  by  all  the  present  powers  of  Europe,  and 


NATIONALITY  AND  INTERNATIONALISM     115 

Germany  should  violate  the  agreement  and  attempt  to  seize 
the  straits  herself,  the  other  powers  could  not  line  up  against 
her.  Holland,  Belgium,  and  Denmark  would  be  compelled 
to  remain  neutral  or  join  with  her,  as  she  might  choose,  under 
pain  of  annihilation.  The  same  might  be  true  of  Norway 
and  Sweden,  to  say  nothing  of  the  Balkan  states.  Opposi- 
tion could  come  only  from  a  few  great  powers.  But  it  is  al- 
most certain  that  Germany  would  choose  a  time  for  such  an 
adventure  when  one  or  more  of  these  powers  would  be  em- 
barrassed, and  that  inducements  would  bring  one  or  more 
of  them  to  her  side.  There  has  been  hardly  a  decade  in  the 
last  hundred  years  when  a  statesman  of  the  sagacity  of  Bis- 
marck could  not  have  found  conditions  favorable  to  such  an 
enterprise.  And  the  Dardanelles  once  seized  and  Constanti- 
nople occupied  by  Germany  and  her  allies,  they  might  very 
possibly  hold  it  against  all  comers  and  through  it  attain  their 
end  of  world  domination. 

Even  greater  than  the  danger  of  direct  violence  would  be 
the  danger  of  intrigue,  the  manipulation  or  corruption  of 
international  agents,  the  scheming  to  control  their  appoint- 
ment, and  the  accusation,  true  or  false,  but  deadly  in  either 
case,  of  partiality.  And  if  the  administrator  were  not  partial 
when  partiality  was  sought,  the  accusation  of  partiality  would 
be  the  certain  device  for  removing  the  unpliable  official.  It 
is  a  situation  in  which  Potiphar's  wife  could  play  her  role  to 
perfection.  Nor  would  these  dangers  menace  international- 
ism less  in  its  role  of  world  arbiter  than  in  its  function  as 
local  administrator.  The  losing  nations  would  be  dissatis- 
fied nations,  and  their  dissatisfaction,  whatever  its  cause, 
would  be  laid  to  the  charge  of  the  league,  engendering  schism 
and  faction  within  the  group  of  the  nations. 

And  there  would  always  be  losing  and  dissatisfied  nations. 
The  great  and  eternal  disturber  of  equilibrium  among  na- 
tions is  growth,  unequal  growth,  which  makes  the  equities  of 


116  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

today  seem  the  inequities  of  tomorrow.  The  losing  will 
falsely  explain  their  loss.  The  growing  will  protest  against 
their  straitened  allotment  of  opportunity.  They  will  not 
willingly  give  of  their  growth  and  their  strength  to  swell 
the  ranks  of  other  peoples  and  assure  the  triumph  of  other 
cultures  than  those  they  love.  We  may  decry  these  impulses 
but  we  can  not  escape  them.  These  forces  that  menace  the 
nations  are  the  forces  that  built  the  nations  and  the  forces 
that  must  maintain  them.  The  fundamental  weakness  of 
all  schemes  to  stabilize  international  relations  is  that  they 
assume  rigidity  and  finality  where  the  norm  is  flux  and 
growth.  They  are  like  attempts  to  survey  town  lots  on  a 
glacier  or  to  prescribe  once  for  all  the  size  of  a  boy's  shoes. 

Viewed  in  what  is  perhaps  its  most  significant  aspect,  the 
present  conflict  is  a  struggle  between  these  two  principles  of 
rigidity  and  plasticity.  The  western  nations,  mature  in 
their  development,  have  attained  to  relative  permanence  of 
frontier  and  the  idea  of  finality  has  become  fundamental  in 
their  thought.  The  nations  of  Central  Europe  and  still 
more  of  Eastern  Europe  have  established  their  boundaries 
more  recently  and  with  less  conformity  to  nature,  conveni- 
ence, and  race.  To  a  large  extent  these  boundaries  are  ob- 
viously artificial  and  perhaps  provisional.  It  is  impossible 
for  these  nations  to  attribute  thus  instinctively  to  their  ar- 
rangements this  character  of  finality.  It  seems  to  them  a 
monstrous  thing  to  conceive  of  the  present  European  hodge- 
podge with  which  they  are  but  too  familiar,  as  a  finality,  a 
thing  to  be  petrified  and  held  fast  forever.  With  this  con- 
sciousness of  plasticity  comes  inevitably  the  dream  of  con- 
solidation, of  leadership,  of  world  dominion.  This  is  with 
them,  not  an  argument  or  a  conviction,  but  an  instinct.  In 
this  struggle,  therefore,  two  great  race  instincts  are  in  con- 
flict, and  each  race  tries  to  interpret  the  other  in  terms  of  its 


NATIONALITY  AND  INTEKNATIONALISM     117 

own  instinct.  Each  utterly  fails  to  take  account  of  the  in- 
stincts which  it  attempts  to  harmonize. 

This  conflict  of  instincts  is  pathetically  and  amusingly  il- 
lustrated by  the  reception  of  the  peace  league  proposal  in 
Germany.  This  reception  has  taken  two  opposite  but  per- 
fectly consistent  forms.  On  the  one  hand  the  proposal  has 
been  scornfully  rejected  as  a  scheme  to  put  Germany  at  the 
mercy  of  a  combination  dominated  by  her  present  enemies. 
The  assumption  was  that  the  league  would  be  under  Anglo- 
Saxon  leadership  and  that  it  would  mean  Anglo-Saxon  world 
empire.  On  the  other  hand,  the  German  chancellor  early 
in  the  war  announced  that  Germany  not  only  approved  such 
a  league  but  that  she  would  he  willing  to  assume  the  leader- 
ship of  it.  This  proposal  has  recently  been  repeated  with 
the  suggestion  that  Germany  should  take  the  initiative  in 
preparing  plans  for  such  a  league  and  the  farther  naive  sug- 
gestion that  the  natural  capital  for  such  a  league  would  be 
Berlin.  We  laugh  at  such  proposals,  but  they  are  perfectly 
serious,  and  the  German  can  not  understand  why  we  laugh. 
It  will  be  noted  that  whether  he  accepts  or  rejects  the  pro- 
posal, the  one  thing  he  sees  in  it  is  the  possibility  of  a  dom- 
inating leadership  ending  in  world  empire  for  a  single  race. 
This  is  fundamental  to  all  his  thinking,  an  axiom  of  his 
political  philosophy.  A  league  of  nations,  to  his  mind,  could 
not  be  other  than  an  instrument  for  world  domination  by  a 
single  race.  He  would  accept  it  with  perfect  sincerity  and 
set  to  work  all  his  powers  of  organization  and  intrigue  to 
secure  that  domination  for  his  own  race.  It  is  not  incon- 
ceivable that  he  should  succeed.    » 

There  are  other  minor  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  pro- 
gram of  inclusive  internationalism  as  it  was  originally  pro- 
posed, difficulties  in  themselves  sufficient  to  insure  its  failure 
under  present  conditions.     One  is  the  group  dependence  of 


118  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

nations  which  deprives  them  of  the  liberty  of  action  which 
the  plan  of  the  league  presupposes.  How  can  we  ask  Hol- 
land to  promise  in  certain  eventualities  to  attack  Germany 
or  even  to  withhold  supplies  when  we  know  that  she  will 
be  annihilated  if  she  does  so?  The  same  of  Denmark,  of 
Rumania,  of  Bulgaria.  What  possible  freedom  of  choice 
have  Portugal  and  Finland  and  the  Poland  that  is  to  be? 
They  have  no  option  but  neutrality  or  cooperation  with  the 
nation  that  can  destroy  them.  The  world  is  made  up,  not 
of  many  independent  nations,  large  and  small,  but  of  a  few 
great  groups,  vague  in  outline  but  predetermined  in  their 
essence,  which  necessarily  act  as  units. 

Again,  it  is  provided  that  in  those  matters  concerning 
which  nations  refuse  to  surrender  the  right  of  war,  they  shall 
hold  that  right  in  abeyance.  They  may  not  fight  until  after 
their  quarrel  has  been  investigated,  but  then  they  may.  But 
then  they  can  not,  or  if  they  do,  they  must  do  so  under  vitally 
changed  conditions.  How  can  we  expect  Japan  to  give 
Russia  a  year's  notice  of  her  intention  to  defend  a  cause  which 
she  dares  not  arbitrate,  when  we  know  that  her  only  hope  lies 
in  promptness  and  surprise?  Such  a  proposal  simply  dis- 
arms the  quick  nations  in  favor  of  the  slow,  the  little  nations 
in  favor  of  the  big.  Whether  this  would  be  in  favor  of  ul- 
timate equity  is  doubtful,  but  the  nations  unfavorably  af- 
fected will  hardly  consent  thus  to  give  away  their  case. 

Most  of  all  are  to  be  feared  in  such  a  league  the  possibilities 
of  racial  propaganda,  the  inevitable  formation  of  parties, 
the  coalition  of  nations  having  common  interests  or  instincts, 
the  deepening  schism  between  groups,  as  the  forces  of  growth, 
energy,  or  accident  slowly  tipped  the  scale  toward  the  one  or 
the  other,  the  reappearance  within  the  league  of  the  hostilities 
which  it  was  meant  to  suppress.  How  certain  the  charge 
that  the  winning  group  was  the  favored  group!  How  in- 
evitable the  suspicion  of  partiality,  a  suspicion  as  fatal  as 


NATIONALITY  AND  INTEKNATIONALISM     119 

the  fact!  How  irresistible  the  temptation  of  the  losers  to 
secede,  to  redress  the  balance  with  the  sword!  When  Flor- 
ence, hampered  in  her  growing  industry  by  the  feuds  of  her 
country  barons,  suppressed  them  and  destroyed  their  castle 
tollgates,  she  thought  to  insure  peace  by  forcing  them  to  live 
within  her  walls  where  she  could  watch  and  control  them. 
The  result  was  that  they  brought  their  feuds  with  them  and 
rallied  the  Florentines  to  the  one  or  the  other  side.  Flor- 
ence was  rent  with  strife  for  a  hundred  years  until  in  despair 
she  banished  them  in  a  body  to  fight  it  out  away  from  her 
presence  and  carry  their  mischief  where  they  would.  Until 
men  are  peaceable,  such  a  league  to  enforce  peace  will  be  a 
trap  and  a  pretext  for  war. 

But  under  peace  conditions,  it  may  be  urged,  men  will  be 
peaceable.  Germany  would  not  care  to  seize  the  Dardanelles 
if  she  were  certain  of  being  free  to  use  it.  She  would  not 
seek  colonies  with  all  their  burdens  of  administration  if  she 
were  certain  to  have  the  freedom  of  their  markets  and  her 
fair  share  of  their  raw  materials.  Assure  her  this  by  in- 
ternationalization and  she  will  be  content.  So  in  her  dis- 
tress she  would  fain  assure  us.  Would  that  it  were  so.  But 
if  this  war  has  taught  us  anything,  it  is  that  Germany  wants, 
—  not  the  freedom  of  this  our  world, —  but  its  lordship.  We 
utterly  mistake  the  temper  of  nationalism  in  these  its  more 
virulent  forms  if  we  do  not  perceive  that  it  desires  to  pre- 
vail, to  dominate  and  subordinate  other  nations  and  other 
civilizations.  Germany  does  not  believe  in  a  fellowship  of 
equal  nations.  She  believes  in  a  triumphant  Germanism. 
Freedom  of  the  seas,  freedom  to  use  the  Dardanelles,  free- 
dom to  trade  with  the  tropics,  all  these  she  has  had  and  these 
nowise  meet  her  demands.  She  seeks  the  control  of  the 
world's  vantage  points  and  the  world's  resources,  that  she  may 
make  them  serve  the  ends  of  Germanism.  There  is  nothing 
unique  about  this  except  the  virulence  and  ruthlessness  which 


120  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

it  acquires  from  German  character,  but  it  is  in  square  contra- 
diction with  the  purpose  of  the  proposed  league,  and  if  Ger- 
many joins  such  a  league  it  will  be  to  use  it  for  her  purpose. 

The  objections  to  the  proposed  league  have  been  urged  at 
some  length  because  of  the  great  and  influential  support 
which  the  project  has  received  and  because  of  the  writer's 
conviction  that  it  involves  very  great  peril.  In  particular 
we  should  be  on  our  guard  against  the  thoughtless  argument 
that  "  it  will  do  no  harm  to  try  it."  It  may  do  infinite  harm 
to  try  it.  The  natural  and  necessary  concomitant  of  any  such 
scheme  is  disarmament,  partial  or  complete.  There  is  no 
known  way  of  effectually  enforcing  such  a  measure.  If 
actual  armament  is  reduced,  there  are  still  ways  of  accumu- 
lating military  advantage  by  the  cornering  of  necessary  ma- 
terials, the  equipment  of  munition  plants,  the  specialization 
of  national  industries  in  directions  favorable  to  military  pre- 
paredness, the  manipulation  of  national  education  and  the 
like.  The  nation  that  wishes  to  evade  the  purpose  of  the 
peace  league  can  do  so.  Germany,  by  a  misdirected  military 
move  has  roused  the  peaceably  disposed  nations  and  armed 
them  against  her.  She  can  not  hope  to  prevail  against  a 
world  in  arms.  Her  next  move  must  of  necessity  be  to  again 
disarm  the  world.  For  that  purpose  a  peace  league  with  its 
program  of  universal  disarmament  is  admirably  suited. 

Once  more  we  grasp  at  straws.  Will  not  the  war  change 
the  German  temper  ?  Yes  and  no.  It  is  reasonable  to  hope 
that  Germany  will  ultimately  learn  the  lesson  of  these  ex- 
periences. The  German  people  can  not  suffer  as  they  have 
suffered  without  at  last  reflecting  to  some  purpose  on  the 
blindness  of  conceit,  the  abysmal  ignorance,  the  world  alienat- 
ing arrogance,  and  the  maddening  brutalities  that  have  neu- 
tralized all  their  science,  their  industry,  and  their  organiza- 
tion and  dragged  them  down  to  defeat.  These  things  will 
sometime  be  written  so  that  Germans  will  read  them  and  will 


NATIONALITY  AND  INTERNATIONALISM     121 

understand.  No  people  can  be  wholly  immune  to  the  cor- 
rective influences  of  experience.  But  this  change  will  not 
come  soon.  One  of  the  most  extraordinary  phenomena  of  his- 
tory is  the  persistence  of  Prussian  character.  Such  as  they 
have  been  in  this  war,  they  have  been  ever  since  they  were 
known  in  history.  Yet  they  have  again  and  again  passed 
through  these  chastening  experiences.  While  conceding 
therefore,  that  the  Germans  will  be  influenced  by  this  ex- 
perience, we  must  not  expect  that  the  change  will  be  so  im- 
mediate or  so  far  reaching  as  to  constitute  in  itself  a  safe- 
guard for  the  peace  of  the  world. 

Yet  it  may  easily  seem  to  be  so.  Over  and  above  all  the 
bitterness  and  resentment  which  will  follow  defeat,  will  ap- 
pear a  war-weariness  approaching  utter  exhaustion.  This 
weariness  will  conceal  from  us,  perhaps  even  from  the  Ger- 
man himself,  his  deeper  and  more  permanent  sentiments. 
He  may  easily  seem  broken,  humble,  perhaps  contrite.  Even 
without  the  dissembling  of  which  he  is  a  master,  he  may 
easily  disarm  those  who  are  incapable, —  as  they  always  have 
been  incapable, —  of  understanding  his  intractable  nature. 
Under  such  circumstances  the  enthusiast  with  whom  the  wish 
is  so  easily  the  father  of  the  thought,  may  think  the  candi- 
date ripe  for  baptism  into  the  circle  of  the  changed  in  heart. 
Alas  for  the  peace  of  the  circle  when  old  passions  return 
with  the  new  currents  of  life.1 

But  the  foregoing  objections  which  the  writer  has  felt 
compelled  to  urge  with  so  much  earnestness,  hold  only  against 
plans  of  immediate,  universal  internationalism.  Interna- 
tionalism is  immediately  practicable  and  necessary,  but  it 
is  practicable  only  among  a  limited  number  of  nations.  Uni- 
versal internationalism  will  sometime  be  practicable,  but  not 

i  The  same  point  of  view  is  expressed  by  Mr.  Roosevelt  in  his  vigor- 
ous assertion  that  to  include  Germany  and  Turkey  in  a  league  to  enforce 
peace  would  be  like  attempting  to  eliminate  burglary  by  including  all 
the  burglars  in  the  police  force. 


122  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

now.  Successful  internationalism  must  rest  on  a  spiritual 
basis  of  common  aims,  common  instincts,  and  common  sym- 
pathies. "No  nation  is  ready  for  internationalism  until  it 
has  outgrown  even  the  wish  to  dominate  other  nations  that 
have  learned  how  to  provide  the  common  decencies  of  na- 
tionhood. The  nation  that  even  feels  the  inclination  to  im- 
pose its  will  upon  the  civilized  Belgians,  is  not  ready  for 
internationalism.  It  must  come  to  feel  an  instinctive  aver- 
sion for  that  sort  of  thing.  Above  all,  it  is  necessary  that 
this  sentiment  should  exist  toward  the  members  of  the  group 
itself.  The  true  league  of  nations  finds  its  analogue  rather  in 
good  society  than  in  the  mechanically  organized  state.  As 
we  exclude  the  ill  bred  person  from  the  society  of  the  well 
bred,  setting  thus  the  highest  possible  price  upon  good  breed- 
ing, so  the  ill  bred  nation  that  has  not  learned  the  decencies 
of  live-and-let-live,  can  not  be  more  effectually  corrected  than 
by  exclusion  from  the  society  of  those  who  have  learned  the 
lesson  of  civilization. 

The  league  we  seek  is  in  existence,  guaranteeing  to  an  ex- 
tent that  few  appreciate,  the  peace  of  the  world.  Its  nu- 
cleus is  the  great  fellowship  of  independent  British  nations 
(misnamed  the  British  Empire)  in  whose  circle  our  own 
country  has  long  unconsciously  held  its  place  on  almost  ex- 
actly the  same  terms  as  the  rest.  These  nations  with  their 
wards  control  one  third  the  surface  of  the  earth  and  one  third 
of  its  population.  Within  this  vast  area  there  is  peace.  No 
one  makes  or  dreams  of  making  war  upon  another.  All  are 
moved  by  a  common  impulse, —  so  much  more  effectual  than 
a  common  agreement, —  to  enforce  peace  upon  other  less  pa- 
cific peoples.  This  league  was  not  made ;  it  grew,  as  all  liv- 
ing things  do.     It  needs  but  the  privilege  of  larger  growth. 

The  present  war  with  its  fellowship  in  arms  has  been  an 
immense  stimulus  to  this  vital  league.  It  has  lifted  it  from 
the  unconscious  into  the  conscious  realm  and  defined  and 


NATIONALITY  AND  INTERNATIONALISM     123 

intensified  its  purpose.  Does  any  one  imagine  that  if  the 
existence  of  Anglo-Saxon  civilization  were  again  imperiled, 
our  country  would  wait  two  years  and  a  half  before  it  lifted 
a  finger  in  protest  or  preparation  ?  The  spiritual  reunion  of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples,  the  only  reunion  that  they  desire 
or  need,  is  Germany's  unintentional  contribution  to  world 
unity  thus  far. 

But  there  is  other  growth  and  more  significant.  France, 
with  her  wards,  twenty  times  the  homeland  in  area  and  vitally 
related  to  territories  in  Anglo-Saxon  trust,  has  been  added 
to  the  league  of  the  changed  in  heart.  It  is  not  implied  that 
France  has  ceased  to  be  imperialistic.  No  nation  has.  The 
desire  for  colonies,  the  desire  to  control  the  untamed  peoples 
and  subdue  the  uncouth  to  the  uses  of  ordered  life  is  the  corol- 
lary of  virility  and  manhood.  But  France  no  longer  desires 
to  rule  Italy  or  Spain  as  Napoleon  made  her  do.  She  has  en- 
tered the  circle  of  the  well  bred.  The  same  for  Belgium  with 
her  vast  trust  of  the  Congo.  Do  we  realize  what  a  guaranty 
of  peace  is  contained  in  these  handclasps  across  the  Channel  I 
If  we  assume  that  by  the  exercise  of  vigilance,  forbearance, 
and  tact,  our  own  country  can  answer  for  the  peace  of  that 
Latin  America  for  which  it  unwittingly  made  itself  sponsor 
nearly  a  century  ago,  then  two  thirds  of  the  world's  surface 
and  two  thirds  of  its  people  are  already  within  the  fold. 

It  is  by  no  means  certain  that  this  is  the  limit  of  our  ef- 
fective achievement.  The  bulk  of  the  remaining  world  is 
the  Mongolian  East.  Of  this,  China  is  at  present  inert. 
The  controlling  element  is  Japan,  her  control  having  been 
assured  during  the  present  war,  both  by  her  aggressive  policy 
toward  China  and  by  her  astute  diplomacy  regarding  our- 
selves. By  the  one  she  obtained  a  virtual  suzerainty  over 
China  and  by  the  other  she  obtained  our  recognition  of  it.1 

iThe  "notes"  exchanged  between  Viscount  Ishii  and  Secretary  Lan- 
sing amount  to  a  treaty  recognition  of  Japan's  "  paramount  interests  " 
in  the  East. 


124  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

What  will  be  Japan's  part  in  the  struggle  between  Cosmos 
and  Chaos?  It  would  be  idle  to  assume  that  she  is  bound 
to  her  present  allies  by  any  such  bonds  of  sympathy  as  those 
that  unite  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples  or  even  the  British  and 
Erench.  There  is  no  kinship  of  race  or  culture.  Nor  has 
the  Orient  had  reason  to  look  upon  the  western  nations  as 
natural  protectors  of  the  weak.  But  considerations  of  ad- 
vantage of  which  the  Japanese  have  shown  themselves  singu- 
larly appreciative,  constitute  a  very  effectual  pledge  of  co- 
operation with  the  group  above  indicated.  All  discussion 
of  the  ease  with  which  Japan  could  seize  the  Philippines  or 
the  possibility  of  the  capture  of  Hawaii  or  of  a  successful 
descent  upon  the  California  coast  are  beside  the  mark.  Japan 
is  a  naval  power  and  must  remain  so.  She  will  not  and  can 
not  risk  collision  with  the  power  that  controls  the  sea.  That 
power  is  and  must  continue  to  be  the  league  above  mentioned. 
During  three  and  a  half  years  of  the  great  struggle  Japan 
watched  to  see  which  way  the  scale  would  incline.  When 
the  decision  became  plain,  Viscount  Ishii  voiced  the  sincere 
and  inevitable  decision  of  the  Japanese  people  when  he  said : 
"  Japan  has  decided  to  cast  in  her  lot  with  the  English 
speaking  peoples  of  the  world."  This  decision  rests  on  the 
larger  opportunism  rather  than  on  affection,  but  it  is  not 
therefore  untrustworthy.  It  is  certainly  preferable  to  the 
sullen  acquiescence  of  a  beaten  and  revengeful  Germany. 

Our  league  as  thus  enlarged  is  so  nearly  all  embracing 
that  it  has  but  to  take  note  of  its  power  and  extent  to  assure 
peace  in  the  world.  It  must  expect  to  maintain  that  peace 
with  a  very  large  element  of  mobilized  force  as  long  as  there 
are  peoples  in  the  world  that  are  willing  to  use  their  force, 
not  to  maintain  order,  but  secure  domination.  That  price 
must  cheerfully  be  paid  for  the  boon  which  it  can  assure  and 
which  as  yet  can  not  be  assured  without  it.  But  if  the  price 
be  paid  and  the  boon  assured,  the  outsiders  will  not  long  re- 


NATIONALITY  AND  INTEKNATIONALISM     125 

main  unreconciled.  Let  it  be  established  beyond  reasonable 
doubt  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  solidarity  has  come  to  stay  and 
that  cooperation  with  France  and  Japan  is  a  settled  fact  in 
international  relations,  and  the  present  century  will  witness 
such  a  transformation  of  German  policy  and  of  German 
sentiment  as  no  coercion  or  artificial  fellowship  could  ever 
effect. 

Such  a  conclusion  will  be  unwelcome  to  those  who  hope, 
as  the  sanguine  have  always  hoped,  that  this  struggle  would 
be  the  last.  The  air  is  full  of  cries  that  if  this  war  be  not 
the  end  of  war,  if  it  end  not  in  the  full  recognition  of  inter- 
nationalism, then  we  shall  have  fought  in  vain  and  our  peace 
will  be  but  a  truce.  But  victories  are  never  final  in  this 
struggle  between  right  and  might,  and  if  all  is  vain  that  is 
not  final,  how  vain  our  human  struggle  has  been. 

It  is  a  relief  to  note  that  the  manifest  impossibility  of  in- 
ternational confidence  between  the  chief  contestants  in  the 
present  struggle  has  made  itself  felt  even  in  the  circle  of  the 
sanguine.  The  American  society  of  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace  whose  earlier  plans  we  have  had  under  consideration, 
now  announces  a  revised  plan,  with  much  of  complicated 
definition  and  machinery,  which  makes  provision  for  cer- 
tain of  the  special  cases  which  we  have  considered.  Mem- 
bership is  to  be  restricted  and  based  on  fitness  as  determined 
by  a  vote  of  the  existing  membership.  It  may  also  be  com- 
plete or  partial,  the  members  being  pledged  in  the  one  case 
to  use  both  military  and  economic  pressure  to  enforce  the 
mandates  of  the  league,  and  in  the  other  case  economic  pres- 
sure alone.  This  is  evidently  a  recognition  of  the  delicate 
position  in  which  certain  of  the  smaller  or  more  exposed  na- 
tions find  themselves.  Simultaneously  there  comes  from  Eng- 
lish sources  a  cautious  and  limited  proposal  of  a  "  League 
of  Free  Nations  "  whose  constituency  could  not  be  other  than 
that  already  noted.     The  questions  of  procedure  and  ma- 


126  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

chinery  which  so  greatly  interest  the  advocates  of  these  pro- 
posals, need  not  here  detain  us.  What  concerns  us  is  to  note 
that  the  limitations  thus  admitted  imply  the  complete  aban- 
donment of  the  original  principle.  The  plan,  if  adopted  in 
this  form,  would  mean  essentially  the  perpetuation  of  the 
present  Allied  group,  with  the  addition  of  certain  machinery 
whose  usefulness  has  yet  to  be  tested.  The  prospect  is  less 
dazzling  but  far  more  hopeful.  Eor  in  fact  such  a  plan  as 
this  corresponds  to  the  great  reality. 

Internationalism  is  a  thing,  not  of  the  flesh,  but  of  the 
spirit.  It  is  a  growth,  not  a  contrivance.  What  we  need  is 
to  recognize  it,  not  invoke  it.  The  league  that  we  have 
dreamed  of  is  here,  less  symmetrical  and  mechanical  than 
that  of  which  we  had  dreamed,  but  infinitely  more  vital  and 
effective.  Its  widening  circle  passes  from  the  English  to 
the  British,  from  the  British  to  the  Anglo-Saxon,  from  the 
Anglo-Saxon  to  the  democratic.  It  has  but  one  more  step, 
—  from  the  democratic  to  the  human.  That  is  a  long  step, 
but  a  step  to  be  hastened  rather  than  forced,  and  not  to  be 
hastened  by  force. 


Note.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  our  present  administration  that 
has  insisted  not  only  upon  a  league  of  nations,  but  upon  disarmament 
as  its  corollary,  now  urges  a  tremendous  increase  of  our  navy,  an  in- 
crease apparently  intended  to  make  it  the  largest  in  the  world.  This 
may  seem  inconsistent  with  the  idea  of  international  guaranty.  On  the 
contrary  it  marks  the  first  sane  appreciation  of  what  such  a  guaranty 
implies.  It  is  a  popular  fallacy  that  internationalism  would  make  na- 
tional defense  unnecessary,  the  assumption  being  that  social  action  in 
like  manner  relieves  the  individual  of  the  necessity  of  protecting  him- 
self. But  does  it?  Let  anyone  who  so  imagines,  visit  a  bank  vault  and 
observe  the  intricate  and  ponderous  mechanism  installed  to  protect  the 
bank's  funds.  Could  the  bank  count  on  police  protection  if  it  left  the 
front  door  unlocked  and  the  money  heaped  upon  the  counter?  When 
that  becomes  possible,  it  will  be  legitimate  to  cite  the  analogy  of  social 
protection  of  the  individual  as  an  argument  for  internationalism  and 
disarmament.  Even  the  most  successful  internationalism  could  only 
protect  those  nations  that  do  their  utmost  to  protect  themselves. 


CHAPTEE  IX 

DIPLOMACY  AND  TREATIES 

It  is  the  bad  luck  of  the  dike  keeper  that  when  the  flood 
breaks  through  he  is  always  busy  working  at  the  breach. 
The  suspicion  vis  inevitable  that  he  did  not  do  all  that  might 
have  been  done  to  stop  the  breach,  that  he  was  negligent  or 
incompetent, —  possibly  even  that  he  opened  the  breach  him- 
self. So  with  breaks  in  the  dikes  between  nations.  The 
menace  has  been  there  for  months  or  years.  By  a  vigilance 
and  a  resourcefulness  almost  superhuman,  the  diplomats  in 
charge, —  possibly  on  both  sides, —  have  been  endeavoring 
to  prevent  the  break.  At  the  moment  when  the  break  comes 
they  are  at  their  busiest,  contriving  check  and  brace  and 
counterweight,  but  all  in  vain.  Their  work  goes  down  to 
ruin  and  almost  invariably  drags  them  down  with  it.  Then 
the  comfortable  burghers  whom  nothing  but  disaster  arouses 
to  consciousness,  overwhelm  in  their  turn  the  wretched 
keeper  and  all  his  work.  Why  all  this  intricacy  and  con- 
trivance, these  subterranean  works  carried  out  without  our 
knowledge?  Why  were  we  not  called  to  the  dike?  We 
could  have  averted  the  disaster. 

The  metaphor  is  doubtless  imperfect  as  all  metaphors  are. 

The  storms  that  beat  upon  the  dikes  of  the  nations  are  largely 

human  storms,  with  a  measure  of  consciousness  and  volition 

which  it  is  not  meant  to  deny.     But  when  all  allowance  is 

made  for  this  element  of  knowledge  and  choice,  these  storms 

so  far  transcend  common  knowledge  and  individual  volition 

that  they  closely  resemble  the  great  nature  forces  of  wave 

and  flood  that  breach  our  dikes  against  the  sea.     Nor  does 

the  analogy  end  here.     There  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt 

127 


128  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

that  diplomats  have  been  as  a  class  devoted,  patriotic,  and 
skillful,  honest  keepers  of  the  dikes.  There  is  scarcely  a 
recorded  case  of  betrayal  of  trust,  rarely  even  one  of  negli- 
gence. Incompetence  has  been  frequent  enough,  but  not  more 
frequent  than  in  other  responsible  positions,  not  so  frequent 
even  as  we  think,  for  failure  is  alwavs  construed  as  incom- 
petence  by  a  public  never  cognizant  of  the  deeper  facts  in 
the  case. 

Yet  now  that  the  dikes  have  broken,  the  demand  is  again 
heard  for  drastic  remedies.  We  challenge,  not  the  individual 
diplomat  nor  yet  the  individual  negotiation,  but  the  whole 
principle  and  practice  of  diplomacy.  There  must  be  an  end 
of  secret  diplomacy,  an  end  of  secret  treaties.  Even  more 
drastically  it  is  demanded  that  the  very  privilege  of  treaty 
and  of  negotiation  itself  be  withdrawn  as  between  individual 
nations,  all  relations  being  subject  to  supernational  regu- 
lation. These  demands,  like  certain  others  noted  in  the  pre- 
ceding chapter,  derive  an  added  interest  from  the  endorse- 
ment of  the  President  of  the  United  States  who  has  not  hesi- 
tated to  give  to  these  principles  a  foremost  place  among  the 
conditions  of  peace.  They  therefore  call  for  our  careful 
consideration. 

The  proposed  curtailment  of  diplomatic  and  treaty  privi- 
lege as  between  individual  nations  is  in  a  class  by  itself.  It 
is  in  fact  a  feature  of  the  plan  for  a  league  of  nations  al- 
ready discussed.  If  this  plan  is  to  be  adopted  in  its  com- 
prehensive and  unqualified  form,  a  certain  limitation  of  in- 
dependent diplomatic  relations  is  inevitable.  Little  leagues 
and  private  understanding  might  easily  render  nugatory 
the  provisions  of  the  larger  agreement.  The  privilege  of  such 
private  understandings  is  therefore  quite  logically  withheld. 

Quite  logically,  but  not  so  certainly  effectually.  This  is 
one  of  a  multitude  of  popular  remedies  which  look  to  ends 
without  sufficient  regard  to  means.     What  means  has  the 


DIPLOMACY  ANT)  TREATIES  129 

family  of  nations  at  its  disposal  for  preventing  such  private 
understandings?  It  is  specifically  in  connection  with  the 
plan  for  a  complete  league  of  nations  that  this  restriction  is 
proposed.  Such  a  league  would  include  Germany,  Austria, 
and  Turkey.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  for  a  very  long  time 
to  come  sentiments  of  bitterness  toward  the  western  powers 
and  of  common  interest  as  among  themselves  are  likely  to 
characterize  these  peoples.  Suppose  Germany  and  Austria 
see  an  opportunity  to  advance  their  own  interests  by  a  policy 
of  solidarity.  What  is  going  to  hinder  them  ?  Even  the 
most  flagrant  violation  of  the  league  provision  would  be  dif- 
ficult to  detect  and  still  more  difficult  to  punish,  but  the 
really  dangerous  cases  would  not  be  the  flagrant  ones.  The 
trouble  is,  there  is  the  usual  insensible  gradation  from  the 
admissible  to  the  inadmissible,  and  that  in  two  ways. 

In  the  first  place,  no  one  can  contemplate  an  absolute  pro- 
hibition of  agreements  between  nations.  Such  a  prohibi- 
tion would  have  no  counterpart  or  analogy  in  either  indi- 
vidual or  federal  relations.  The  states  of  the  American 
Union  are  not  prohibited  from  making  agreements  with  one 
another,  and  such  agreements  are  frequent.  Their  rights 
in  this  connection  are  of  course  limited  and  can  not  legally 
be  used  against  the  defined  federal  interest,  but  it  is  plain 
that  they  could  be  and  would  be  so  used  if  any  group  of 
states  were  unfriendly  to  the  union.  The  one  flagrant  case 
of  such  use  is  familiar,  but  the  really  significant  cases  are  of 
constant  occurrence,  cases  of  sectional  solidarity  unfavorable 
to  federal  interests  which  nothing  but  the  overwhelming  pre- 
ponderance of  federal  loyalty  holds  within  the  limits  of  safety. 
Eeduce  the  privilege  of  local  international  agreement  to  a 
minimum,  and  it  will  still  be  possible  to  find  in  it  a  medium 
for  the  expression  of  disloyal  sympathies  and  local  cohesions 
having  all  the  dangers  of  present  alliances. 

The  second  difficulty  is  that  international  cooperation  and 


130  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

solidarity  depends  but  little  on  overt  official  agreements.  Let 
the  law  forbid  marriage  between  undesirable  parties,  and  the 
usual  result  is  that  they  cohabit  without  marrying.  We 
have  dissolved  trusts,  but  seldom  prevented  the  concerted 
action  at  which  we  aimed.  So  we  may  prohibit  treaties  and 
alliances  within  the  league  of  nations,  but  we  can  not  pre- 
vent concerted  action  or  gentlemen's  agreements  where  senti- 
ment and  interest  favor  such  action.  The  chief  result  of  any 
such  prohibition  would  be  to  substitute  the  informal  for  the 
formal,  the  clandestine  for  the  open.  A  closer  view  of  actual 
conditions  in  our  day  will  disclose  the  fact  that  even  now, 
without  the  desired  prohibition,  treaties  and  alliances  play 
a  minor  part  in  the  concerted  action  of  nations.  Most  of 
the  actual  correlation  is  informal  and  unofficial.  It  is  the 
ententes  (the  understandings)  that  hold  and  the  alliances 
that  break  down  in  the  present  war. 

We  thus  see  two  serious  obstacles  in  the  way  of  eliminating 
the  clique  in  the  community  of  nations,  first,  the  impossibility 
of  detecting  and  punishing  the  agreements  in  question,  and 
second  the  possibility  of  maintaining  the  clique  without  such 
agreements,  by  means  of  perfectly  informal  and  intangible 
understandings.  It  is  not  meant  to  imply  that  legal  action 
can  do  nothing  to  limit  practices  of  this  kind,  but  that  the 
clique  spirit  is  peculiarly  difficult  to  control,  quite  as  diffi- 
cult in  the  community  of  nations  as  in  the  community  of  men. 
[No  repressive  action  of  this  sort  will  contribute  much  to  the 
solution  of  our  problem. 

The  abolition  of  secret  diplomacy  is  the  reform  most 
prominently  urged  in  this  connection.  This  demand  comes 
from  the  most  varied  quarters.  The  representatives  of  that 
school  of  democracy  who  essentially  reject  the  principle  of 
representation  in  democratic  government  and  who  would  re- 
fer all  issues  directly  to  popular  vote,  quite  consistently  ap- 
ply the  same  principle  to  the  regulation  of  foreign  relations. 


DIPLOMACY  AND  TKEATIES  131 

The  demand  for  open  diplomacy  is  essentially  a  demand  for 
referendum  diplomacy.  It  is  chiefly  from  these  more  radical 
elements  that  come  the  caustic  references  to  "  traditional  and 
musty  diplomacy "  and  the  often  expressed  fear  lest  the 
forthcoming  settlement  should  be  another  diplomats'  peace, 
another  plot  around  the  table,  a  new  deal  at  the  old  game. 
There  is  in  such  criticisms  a  certain  assumption  that  diplo- 
matic negotiations  are  essentially  machinations,  deals  made 
by  persons  who  are  irresponsible  and  unrepresentative,  and 
on  a  low  moral  plane.  The  moral  straightforwardness  of 
the  people  is  thus  invoked  to  save  the  world  from  diplomatic 
chicane. 

But  the  criticism  of  traditional  diplomacy  comes  from  other 
quarters  which  represent  very  different  political  assumptions. 
Thus,  ex-President  Eliot  of  Harvard  University  has  ex- 
pressed regret  at  the  secret  conduct  of  the  negotiations  of 
1914  by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  while  paying  a  high  tribute  to  his 
ability  and  disinterestedness.  He  objects,  not  to  the  deci- 
sions or  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations,  but  to  the  principle 
on  which  they  were  conducted.  In  view  of  the  very  consid- 
erable openness  which  has  always  characterized  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  diplomacy,  and  his  insistence  upon  the  publication  of 
treaties,  such  an  objection  is  a  serious  one. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  a  considerable  ground  exists 
for  these  criticisms.  The  history  of  diplomacy  offers  num- 
erous examples  of  chicanery  which  were  made  possible  only 
by  secrecy.  The  well  known  case  in  which  Bismarck  en- 
tered into  a  secret  agreement  with  Russia  in  a  sense  dia- 
metrically opposed  to  the  known  agreement  with  Austria  is 
a  characteristic  case.  In  this  case  Austria  was  depending 
on  her  understanding  with  Germany,  all  unconscious  that 
she  was  being  betrayed  by  her  ally.  If  the  agreement  with 
Russia  had  been  open  and  known,  the  agreement  with  Austria 
would  have  lapsed  automatically.     Such  cases  of  extreme  dis- 


132  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

ingenuousness  are  uncommon,  but  secret  agreements  against 
some  third  power  that  was  an  object  of  legitimate  fear  or 
illegitimate  aggression,  have  been  exceedingly  frequent. 
There  can  be  no  question  that  secrecy  has  enabled  nations  to 
combine  against  other  nations,  for  purposes  either  of  war 
or  peace,  as  they  otherwise  could  not  have  done.  At  a  time 
when  we  are  seeking  to  prevent  hostilities,  the  prohibition  of 
secrecy  is  a  form  of  disarmament. 

Another  and  quite  different  objection  which  is  urged  with 
a  certain  justice  is  that  secrecy  lessens  the  accountability  of 
the  diplomat  and  enables  him  to  adopt  a  policy  not  sanc- 
tioned by  the  people.  It  is  undemocratic.  As  regards 
formal  ratification,  this  is  undoubtedly  true.  The  people 
can  not  be  directly  consulted  as  to  agreements  reached  and 
may  even  continue  for  years  unconscious  of  the  obligations 
which  have  been  entered  into  on  their  behalf.  This  is  ab- 
horrent to  the  theory  of  direct  democracy,  that  is,  democracy 
in  which  the  people  do  not  delegate  their  powers  but  decide 
questions  directly  by  popular  vote.  It  is  this  school  of  de- 
mocracy which  most  loudly  voices  its  protest. 

But  if  we  concede  the  necessity  of  delegating  the  people's 
powers, —  a  necessity  nowhere  so  obvious  as  in  the  field  of 
foreign  relations  which  lies  farthest  from  the  familiar  facts 
of  daily  life, —  the  objection  loses  much  of  its  force.  The 
transactions  of  diplomacy  may  be  secret,  but  its  policy  is  un- 
mistakably determined  by  popular  will,  so  far  as  that  will 
finds  expression  in  government,  and  the  people  are  by  no 
means  without  the  power  of  holding  the  diplomat  to  account. 
The  mandate  of  the  people  to  its  agent  would  then  be  some- 
thing like  this :  "  We  do  not  know  what  steps  are  necessary 
to  accomplish  our  ends,  but  we  wish  cooperation  with  this 
power,  protection  against  that  power,  etc."  Such  a  mandate 
is  not  more  difficult  to  enforce  or  more  liable  to  abuse  than 
any  other,  save  in  so  far  as  international  interests  are  farther 


DIPLOMACY  AND  TEEATIES  133 

beyond  the  people's  ken  than  matters  of  domestic  concern. 
For  this  difficulty  no  form  of  procedure  offers  an  adequate 
remedy. 

It  may  as  well  be  stated  at  the  outset  that  the  writer  has 
but  limited  faith  in  plebiscite  democracy.  There  is  a  place 
for  the  plebiscite,  and  the  possibility  of  a  referendum  as  an 
emergency  measure,  to  break  a  deadlock  or  to  punish  mal- 
feasance may  be  freely  granted.  But  the  wholesale  adoption 
of  plebiscite  methods  means  the  rejection  of  the  expert  in 
the  whole  business  of  government.  For  centuries  the  ex- 
pert has  been  the  ever  increasing  dependence  of  modern  so- 
ciety. The  field  of  knowledge  so  immeasurably  transcends 
the  capacity  of  the  individual  mind,  that  the  individual  can 
appropriate  its  advantages  only  through  the  intermediary 
of  specialists  of  many  kinds.  Government  is  no  exception. 
If  self-government  is  held  to  mean  popular  mastery  of  the 
expert  problems  of  which  modern  government  consists,  then 
self-government  is  an  iridescent  dream.  The  theory  that 
we  must  have  direct  personal  expression  of  opinion  on  prob- 
lems of  governmental  detail  as  a  means  of  making  the  people 
intelligent  is  an  absurd  misconception.  We  do  not  study 
medicine  in  order  that  we  may  intelligently  employ  a  phy- 
sician, still  less  in  order  that  we  may  dispense  with  his  serv- 
ices. Our  intelligence, —  the  only  intelligence  that  is  fea- 
sible or  relevant, —  consists  in  the  ability  shrewdly  to  esti- 
mate the  results  of  his  ministrations. 

Nowhere  is  the  difference  between  this  intelligence  which 
shrewdly  estimates  results  and  the  specialized  intelligence 
of  the  expert  more  marked  or  more  important  than  in  govern- 
ment. The  enactment  of  wise  corrective  legislation  is  as 
delicate  a  task  as  a  piece  of  corrective  surgery.  It  is  for  the 
people  to  note  their  malaise,  to  choose  their  surgeon,  and  to 
order  the  operation.  For  all  of  that  they  may  be  competent. 
It  is  not  for  them  to  perform  the  operation.     The  referen- 


134  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

dum  movement,  whatever  local  correction  of  abuses  it  may 
have  effected,  has  everywhere  developed  its  inevitable  weak- 
nesses. It  has  gathered  its  whole  force,  not  from  the  superior- 
ity of  popular  decisions,  but  from  the  incompetency  of  former 
intermediaries.  The  only  advantage  of  the  intermediary 
is  the  advantage  of  expert  knowledge.  Our  intermediaries 
have  not  been  specialized  experts.  The  fact  that  they  knew 
no  more  than  we  did,  has  not  unnaturally  suggested  the  pos- 
sibility of  dispensing  with  their  services.  Some  of  the 
democracies  that  are  being  born  in  these  days  of  travail  bid 
fair  to  revolutionize  both  the  theory  and  practice  of  self-gov- 
ernment as  we  know  it.  The  evolution  now  observable  in 
certain  states  toward  a  parliament  whose  lower  house  repre- 
sents individuals  and  the  upper  house  the  specialized  organs, 
industrial,  commercial,  and  cultural,  which  make  the  modern 
state,  is  distinctly  a  truer  application  of  the  representative 
principle  and  a  higher  type  of  democracy.  Society  is  not 
made  of  individuals  alone,  but  of  individuals  and  specialized 
organs  of  which  the  non-participant  individual  knows  almost 
nothing.  To  represent  the  former  only  is  not  democracy 
as  regards  our  great,  modern,  specialized  societies,  whatever 
it  may  have  been  in  the  days  of  simpler  things.  It  is  this 
radically  unrepresentative  character  of  our  representative  in- 
stitutions which  has  discredited  them  and  made  them  the 
prey  of  the  lobby,  that  illegitimate  and  extra-constitutional 
third  house  through  which  alone  the  organs  of  society  find 
expression.  This  explains  the  revolt  against  representative 
government,  but  it  does  not  justify  it.  This  is  the  age  of 
the  specialist,  and  despite  all  its  dangers,  the  specialist  must 
be  our  hope  and  must  have  our  confidence. 

This  may  seem  something  of  a  digression,  but  it  is  in  fact 
an  indispensable  preliminary  to  our  main  conclusion.  No 
plea  for  referendum  diplomacy  is  to  be  admitted  under  the 
disguise  of  open  negotiation.     We  need  the  expert  in  every 


DIPLOMACY  AJSTD  TREATIES  135 

department  of  government,  and  nowhere  so  much  as  in  the 
management  of  foreign  relations,  the  matters  which  lie 
farthest  from  our  ordinary  knowledge.  Especially  do  these 
considerations  need  to  be  brought  home  to  the  American  peo- 
ple. It  is  from  them  that  this  demand  for  plebiscite  diplo- 
macy chiefly  comes.  It  is  not  our  superior  democracy  but 
our  superior  ignorance,  that  motives  this  demand.  It  is 
hardly  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  we,  as  a  people,  do  not 
even  know  the  existence  of  those  great  material  interests  the 
careful  adjustment  of  which  is  vital  to  the  problem  of  peace. 
Hence  we  soar  in  the  untrammeled  ether  of  pure  generaliza- 
tion and  caustically  refer  to  those  who  sit  around  the  table  and 
make  "  new  deals  at  the  old  game."  The  peoples  of  Europe 
that  live  in  physical  contact  with  those  material  factors  that 
make  or  mar  their  destiny,  have  this  immense  advantage  over 
us  that  they  know  their  incompetency.  The  basic  assumption 
of  our  further  discussion  must  be  the  frank  acceptance  of  the 
expert  in  this,  the  most  specialized  of  all  functions  of  gov- 
ernment. The  recent  assertion  of  an  American  scholar  that 
there  were  not  more  than  four  Americans  living  who  had  the 
knowledge  and  skill  necessary  to  represent  America  at  the 
peace  table  may  be  an  exaggeration,  but  it  emphasizes  an 
important  truth. 

Accepting,  therefore,  the  expert,  what  are  the  conditions 
under  which  he  can  Work  successfully  to  accomplish  the  just 
ends  of  negotiation?  There  can  not  be  a  moment's  hesita- 
tion in  answering  this  question.  The  preliminary  stages  of 
negotiation  must  have  the  benefit  of  privacy.  There  are 
delicate  stages  in  almost  every  diplomatic  transaction,  sharp 
disagreements  and  unreasonable  arguments  which  if  published 
would  rouse  resentments  and  jealousies  that  would  make 
further  negotiation  impossible.  The  notion  that  the  people 
are  calm,  and  judicial,  and  peace  loving,  and  that  it  is  diplo- 
matic scheming  which  engenders  strife  is  utterly  erroneous. 


136  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

It  is  a  part  of  the  art  of  the  diplomat  to  keep  his  temper,  to 
marshal  many  and  unfamiliar  forces,  to  win  by  nice  align- 
ment and  organization,  as  the  great  general  wins  by  strategy. 
Of  all  this  recondite  science  the  people  know  nothing.  But 
they  seek  their  objectives  none  the  less  relentlessly,  and  when 
balked,  tend  necessarily  to  grasp  at  the  weapon  of  violence 
which  passion  is  prompt  to  put  in  their  hands.  It  is  some- 
times assumed  that  the  expert  moves  of  diplomacy  have 
something  sinister  about  them,  which  tends  ever  to  embroil 
peoples  in  war.  The  fact  is  that  diplomacy  is  averse  to  war 
in  its  inmost  nature.  When  diplomacy  proves  unequal  to 
the  task  and  war  comes  in  to  cut  the  Gordian  knot,  it  is  a  con- 
fession that  diplomacy  has  failed.  The  diplomat  himself  is 
almost  invariably  sacrificed  and  finds  in  the  rupture  the  end 
of  a  hard  earned  career. 

It  is  true  that  diplomacy  sometimes  deliberately  precipi- 
tates war,  but  only  when  war  is  judged  to  be  inevitable  and 
the  choice  of  time  and  circumstance  seems  of  advantage. 
For  every  war  thus  precipitated  there  are  a  dozen  that  diplo- 
macy labors  hard  to  avert  and  which  could  not  be  averted 
without  its  aid.  Merely  as  an  abstract  proposition,  the  peo- 
ple do  not  want  war,  but  their  passions  and  jealousies  render 
them  exceedingly  prone  to  violence.  It  is  these  passions 
and  jealousies  which  are  the  great  problem  of  diplomacy  and 
the  sufficient  occasion  for  diplomatic  secrecy. 

This  secrecy  can  be  and  often  has  been  abused.  The  con- 
fidence reposed  in  the  expert  may  always  be  abused.  But  in 
the  last  resort  we  remain  judges  of  the  expert's  work.  Even 
when  no  sufficient  measures  are  adopted  for  the  public  discus- 
sion and  ratification  of  treaties, —  measures  certainly  not 
lacking  in  our  own  country, —  successful  diplomacy  must  and 
does  keep  in  touch  with  the  will  of  the  people.  The  concep- 
tion of  the  diplomat  as  one  whose  machinations  flout  the 
popular  will  is  ludicrously  false.     He  is  normally  in  an  at- 


DIPLOMACY  AND  TKEATIES  137 

titude  of  studied  subserviency,  even  while  reserving  at  times 
the  right  to  "  appeal  from  Philip  drunk  to  Philip  sober." 

Our  conclusion  is  that  secret  diplomacy,  in  the  sense  of 
confidential  negotiations,  is  not  an  abuse  but  a  necessity,  a 
permanent  condition  of  the  successful  performance  of  the 
diplomat's  necessary  functions.  For  such  abuses  as  occa- 
sionally occur  the  remedy  is  to  be  found  in  the  choice  of  bet- 
ter diplomats  and  the  development  of  a  higher  standard  of 
professional  honor.     There  is  no  short  cut  or  royal  road.1 

Passing  from  negotiations  to  agreements,  there  can  be  no 
question  as  to  the  desirability  of  publicity  as  a  general  prin- 
ciple. This  is  not  a  new  conclusion.  It  has  been  the  steadily 
increasing  practice  of  the  more  enlightened  nations  in  recent 
years.  That  remarkable  document,  the  memorandum  of 
Prince  Lichnowski,  late  German  ambassador  to  England,  at- 
tests the  stand  of  Britain  on  this  point  in  an  unusual  manner. 
The  much  desired  treaty  concerning  the  Bagdad  railway 
which  Germany  at  last  succeeded  in  obtaining,  was  held  up 
for  many  months  and  finally  lost  because  Britain  insisted 
upon  its  publication  when  signed,  a  step  to  which  Germany 
refused  to  consent.  In  our  own  case  the  publication  of 
treaties  is  practically  inevitable  owing  to  the  requirement 
of  ratification  by  the  Senate,  a  procedure  which  insures 
publicity,  intentional  or  otherwise.  There  can  be  little  doubt 
that  this  practice  will  become  more  general. 

But  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that  there  are  certain  treaties 
of  a  perfectly  legitimate  character  which  would  be  vitiated 
by  publicity.  Such  are  treaties  of  military  alliance  which 
contain  specifications  as  to  military  procedure  in  the  event 

i  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  when  Mr.  Wilson's  unqualified  endorse- 
ment of  open  diplomacy  seemed  about  to  become  embodied  in  a  binding 
enactment,  he  hastened  to  explain  that  he  approved  of  publicity  only 
for  the  treaties  as  finally  negotiated,  secrecy  being  indispensable  for 
the  negotiations  themselves.  He  has,  in  practice,  quite  frankly  availed 
himself  of  at  least  this  much  of  the  privilege  of  secrecy. 


138  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

of  war.  A  mere  pledge  of  alliance  may  be  published, —  in- 
deed its  publication  may  be  just  the  means  of  accomplishing 
its  purpose.  But  treaties  specifying  the  extent  and  manner 
of  military  cooperation  and  the  objectives  aimed  at  have 
the  same  occasion  for  secrecy  as  a  general's  plan  of  campaign. 
Such  treaties  have  been  frequent  and  necessary  in  Europe. 
If  we  have  not  resorted  to  them,  it  is  because  our  isolation 
has  hitherto  made  military  alliances  unnecessary.  The  re- 
sult is  that  in  one  more  important  particular  we  are  dis- 
qualified for  judging  Europe.  Meanwhile  our  isolation 
seems  gone  forever  and  it  may  well  be  our  procedure  rather 
than  that  of  Europe  that  will  require  revision. 

Once  more  we  shall  be  adjured  to  form  a  league  of  nations 
and  abolish  forever  the  danger  of  war  and  the  odious  safe- 
guards which  it  seems  to  necessitate.  So  be  it, —  if  so  it  may 
be.  In  the  preceding  chapter  we  have  given  reasons  for 
moderating  our  expectations  as  to  the  immediate  immunities 
to  be  hoped  from  such  a  league, —  more  exactly,  perhaps,  as 
to  the  possibility  of  forming  such  a  league  to  include  the  na- 
tions with  which  we  are  now  at  war.  And  until  they  are  in- 
cluded, be  it  noted,  the  league  must  be  in  a  measure  a  league 
of  offense  and  defense  having  something  of  the  character 
above  noted.  Not  till  the  league  becomes  both  inclusive  and 
stable  beyond  the  possibility  of  collapse  or  even  serious  dis- 
turbance can  the  conditions  of  ideal  publicity  in  treaty  agree- 
ments be  attained.  Such  a  condition  is  to  be  sought  by  every 
means  in  our  power,  but  not  assumed  as  a  fact  while  it  is  as 
yet  but  an  aspiration. 

Meanwhile  it  is  reassuring  to  note  that  the  element  of 
secrecy  in  treaties  is  much  less  than  is  supposed.  Secret 
treaties  are  after  all  not  very  secret.  Details  are  withheld, 
but  the  general  tenor  of  such  agreements  is  always  discovered 
and  usually  frankly  avowed.  The  Bolshevik  publication  of 
the  secret  treaties  of  the  Allies  brought  no  surprising  revela- 


DIPLOMACY  AND  TEEATIES  139 

tions.  If  the  reasoning  of  the  foregoing  pages  is  correct,  it 
is  only  this  general  purport  of  treaty  agreements  of  which 
the  public  can  take  profitable  account.  As  regards  this  gen- 
eral purport,  the  diplomat  is  now  held  to  a  very  real  account 
by  peoples  capable  of  so  doing,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether 
publicity  in  matters  of  detail  would  make  public  control  more 
effectual.  The  treaties  of  the  last  hundred  years  have  pretty 
effectually  reflected  the  will  of  the  peoples  who  permitted 
themselves  to  be  bound  by  them. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  allude  again  in  this  connection 
to  the  unenforceability  of  a  provision  against  secret  treaties. 
Let  us  forbid  all  we  like,  and  yet  if  Germany  and  Austria 
make  such  a  treaty,  what  are  we  going  to  do  about  it  ?  We 
might  never  find  it  out.  If  we  did,  we  could  only  declare 
it  invalid,  and  if  they  still  chose  to  be  bound  by  it,  what 
then  ?     Would  we  use  war  or  boycott  to  force  them  to  desist  I 

Openness  and  straightforwardness  are  qualities  greatly  to 
be  desired  in  all  human  relations,  great  and  small,  but  they 
are  the  spontaneous  product  of  confidence  and  goodwill,  not 
matters  of  contract  and  treaty  stipulation.  Publicity  in  pub- 
lic affairs,  never  useful  in  matters  of  technical  detail,  is  to 
be  desired  and  expected  as  rapidly  as  the  conditions  of  fel- 
lowship are  realized.  To  most  if  not  all  of  the  nations  the 
great  war  has  brought  as  its  chief  compensation  an  enlarged 
sense  of  fellowship  and  a  greater  appreciation  of  the  interests 
and  needs  of  other  peoples.  May  frankness  and  candour  ap- 
pear as  a  pervasive  spirit  rather  than  as  a  futile  stipulation 
in  the  Great  Peace. 


PART  II 
THE  NATIONS 


CHAPTER  X 

GERMANY 

In  peace  as  in  war,  Germany  is  everything.  "No  doubt 
her  allies  have  been  very  important  factors  in  prolonging  the 
war,  contributing  both  by  their  military  power  and  still 
more  by  their  strategic  position  to  the  difficulties  of  the 
Allies.  Correspondingly  they  will  present  their  full  share  of 
difficulty  to  the  peace  conference.  But  in  the  one  case  as 
in  the  other  Germany  is  the  key  to  the  situation.  As  it  is 
useless  to  defeat  her  allies  unless  we  can  defeat  her,  so  it 
is  useless  to  settle  their  problems  until  we  have  settled  hers. 
Every  question,  territorial,  racial,  commercial,  connected 
with  the  various  countries  now  at  war,  turns  sooner  or 
later  on  the  supreme  question,  what  about  Germany?  We 
must  try  at  the  outset,  therefore,  to  get  a  clear  idea  of 
what  we  wish  to  accomplish  with  regard  to  our  arch  antago- 
nist. As  regards  the  war  we  have  answered  the  question 
with  fortunate  positiveness.  "  Unconditional  surrender " 
is  the  plain  demand  of  the  American  people.  "  War  to  the 
end,  to  the  very  end  of  the  end,"  is  the  stern  declaration 
with  which  the  powerful  Clemenceau  voices  the  undoubted 
determination  of  all  the  Allies.  If  there  have  been  mo- 
ments when  this  determination  seemed  to  be  called  in  ques- 
tion, they  have  but  given  opportunity  for  its  reaffirmation 
by  statesmen  and  peoples.  We  are  determined  to  see  it 
through,  to  make  the  power  that  sought  the  decision  of  force, 
accept  the  decision  of  force,  "  force  without  stint  or  limit." 
But  what  then?  For  as  regards  our  present  inquiry,  this 
iC  end  of  the  end  "  is  but  a  beginning,  and  our  war  formula 
carries  us  no  farther.     It  is  true  that  we  hear  suggestions 

143 


144  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

about  wiping  Germany  off  the  map,  and  Germany  is  doing 
much,  and  ever  more  and  more,  to  reconcile  us  to  some  such 
procedure.  But  what  does  this  wiping  off  the  map  mean? 
Does  it  mean  the  annihilation  of  the  German  race,  or  their 
expulsion  from  their  land,  or  even  the  carving  up  of  their 
country  and  its  distribution  among  neighboring  nations? 
It  is  plain  that  we  have  neither  the  temper  nor  the  oppor- 
tunity for  any  of  these  things.  Nobody  wants  German 
exiles  or  German  territory.  All  such  proposals  are  there- 
fore mere  expressions  of  war  passion  which  contribute  noth- 
ing to  the  solution  of  our  problem.  Whatever  our  senti- 
ment toward  Germany,  we  can  not  get  away  from  the  fact 
that  there  is  to  be  a  Germany  after  the  war,  a  Germany 
that  we  must  live  with  and  that  can  make  us  an  infinity  of 
trouble,  no  matter  how  badly  she  is  beaten  now.  The  problem 
of  adjustment  will  be  almost  inconceivably  difficult  at  best. 
It  will  help  us  little  to  get  Germany  where  we  can  dictate 
terms  to  her  if  we  do  not  know  what  terms  we  wish  to  dic- 
tate. What  then  should  be  the  position  of  the  German  peo- 
ple in  the  future  community  of  nations  ? 

The  writer,  for  one,  is  utterly  opposed  to  any  policy  of 
soft  heartedness  or  leniency  toward  the  German  nation. 
The  world  can  not  for  a  moment  tolerate  its  pretensions  or 
its  temper,  and  any  harshness  that  may  be  required  to  com- 
pel their  abandonment  is  a  harshness  which  we  must  be 
prepared -to  exercise.  Despite  our  wartime  fulminations, 
it  is  a  matter  for  grave  concern  whether  at  the  critical  mo- 
ment we  can  be  hard  enough  for  the  hard  task.  The  Allied 
nations  are  not  brutal,  not  even  under  German  provocation. 
If  they  prove  equal  to  the  difficult  task  before  them,  it  will 
be  because  that  task  presents  itself  as  reasonable  and  neces- 
sary to  their  minds.     What  must  that  task  be  ? 

There  are  two  ways  of  answering  this  question.  The 
first  we  may  call  retrospective.     It  recalls  Germany's  deeds 


GEKMASTY  145 

in  recent  years  and  attempts  to  estimate  her  moral  guilt 
with  a  view  to  retributive  action.  The  account  is  appalling 
and  any  attempt  to  calculate  her  debt  overwhelms  the  mind 
and  swamps  all  kindlier  feelings  in  a  tempest  of  moral  indig- 
nation. It  is  hardly  to  be  doubted  that  the  sober  verdict  of 
history  and  ultimately  of  the  German  people  itself,  will  be 
that  this  war,  in  its  unprovoked  aggression  and  its  unpar- 
alleled brutality,  is  the  most  criminal  in  history.  With  these 
facts  in  mind  it  is  easy  to  conclude  that  no  penalty  is  too 
severe  for  Germany's  guilt,  and  no  status  too  low  for  her  in 
the  future  family  of  nations.  But  unfortunately  such  a  con- 
clusion brings  us  to  no  practical  solution  of  our  problem. 
Eetributive  justice  calls  for  a  payment  that  would  condemn 
the  German  people  to  perpetual  bondage,  a  relation  impossible 
for  us,  even  if  thinkable  for  them.  The  debt  as  thus  assessed 
leaves  her  hopelessly  bankrupt.  As  in  the  case  of  other  bank- 
rupts, some  fraction  of  the  debt  must  be  accepted  in  lieu 
of  full  payment.     What  shall  that  fraction  be  ? 

There  is  but  one  practicable  way  of  settling  bankrupt 
accounts,  the  way  adopted  by  all  rational  societies.  That 
is  to  let  the  past  be  past,  to  cancel  the  hopeless  debt,  and 
let  the  bankrupt  whom  we  can  not  get  rid  of,  start  again 
in  life  under  such  restrictions  as  may  be  required  for  the 
safety  of  his  fellows.  In  a  word,  protection  of  the  com- 
munity of  nations  rather  than  retribution  must  be  the  guid- 
ing principle  in  our  settlement.  We  are  fighting  to  make 
the  world  a  decent  place  to  live  in,  and  it  is  much  to  be  de- 
sired that  we  direct  our  efforts  solely  to  that  end. 

Why  are  we  in  this  war  ?  Not  because  Germany  sank  the 
Lusitania,  or  butchered  babies,  or  attacked  neutral  com- 
merce, or  otherwise  violated  international  law.  ISTot  that 
there  is  the  least  doubt  about  her  having  done  these  things, 
or  about  our  judgment  of  them.  But  whatever  justification 
these  facts  give  to  the  war,  they  are  not  the  issue, —  the 


146  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

great  issue, —  in  the  struggle.  That  issue  is  between  two 
.  principles  of  organization,  the  principles  of  freedom  and 
coercion.  Both  sides  look  forward  to  a  united  humanity. 
The  one  side  believes  that  that  union  must  be  effected  under 
the  leadership,  the  direction,  and  the  authority  of  a  single 
superior  people,  a  people  that  has  more  energy,  more  mental 
power,  and  more  organizing  ability  than  any  other  and  that 
is  therefore  privileged, —  nay,  divinely  commanded, —  to  im- 
pose its  will  and  its  wisdom  upon  the  world's  less  favored 
peoples. 

It  is  perfectly  consonant  with  this  doctrine  that  this  people 
recognizes  the  superior  right,  the  divine  authority,  of  a 
single  individual  or  a  limited  class  among  themselves,  but 
that  of  itself  does  not  concern  us  who  are  outsiders  to  this 
relation.  We  have  paid  altogether  too  much  attention  to 
this  figure  in  shining  armor  who  rather  symbolizes  than  em- 
bodies the  principle  at  issue.  It  will  be  the  gravest  of  mis- 
takes if  we  challenge  the  right  of  the  German  people  to 
have  such  leadership  and  such  organization  as  they  choose, 
or  question  the  actuality  of  their  choice,  even  though  we  be- 
lieve their  choice  has  a  certain  bearing  upon  our  problem. 
The  result  of  such  a  choice  can  hardly  be  other  than  to 
rally  German  patriotism  to  the  support  of  the  system  thus 
attacked,  and  to  fix  upon  the  free  institutions  whose  tri- 
umph we  desire,  the  stigma  of  foreign  intervention.  Nor  can 
we  regard  lightly  the  possibility  that  the  destruction  of  so- 
cial institutions  by  outside  agencies  before  the  people  has 
become  matured  to  the  change  carries  with  it  the  menace 
of  bloody  revolution  and  social  disintegration.  The  ex- 
ample of  Eussia  is  before  us,  and  the  responsibility  for 
German  plotting  in  this  desolating  terror  is  not  the  least  of 
the  counts  in  Germany's  terrible  indictment.  Our  pres- 
sure would  doubtless  be  less  clandestine,  but  if  really  exer- 
cised against  the  def acto  institutions  of  a  neighbor  state,  we 


GEKMASTY  147 

can  hardly  fail  to  incur  like  odium  and  with  greater  jus- 
tice, for  it  would  be  for  us  a  violation  of  our  most  cher- 
ished principle. 

No,  ours  is  no  feud  with  domestic  autocracy.  It  is  a 
larger  issue.  It  is  what  we  may  call  the  race  autocracy  of 
the  German  people,  their  belief  in  the  superiority  of  a 
single  race,  and  in  the  right  of  that  race  by  reason  of  its 
superiority,  not  merely  to  lead,  but  to  dominate  all  other 
races.  When  the  leaders  of  German  industry,  the  great 
men  who  do  things  in  Germany,  some  time  ago  memorialized 
their  government  regarding  the  necessary  objectives  of  the 
war,  they  specified  numerous  territories  which  must  be 
annexed, —  Poland,  Courland,  Belgium,  a  part  of  Trance, 
etc., —  and  then  added  that  these  territories  must  never,  on 
any  account,  be  allowed  a  voice  in  determining  the  destiny 
of  the  German  Empire.  In  other  words  Germany  must 
subject  to  her  authority  large  populations  of  advanced  civi- 
lization, but  must  not  allow  them,  either  now  or  at  any 
future  time,  to  share  the  privileges  that  belonged  exclusively 
to  the  superior  German  people. 

It  matters  very  little  how  much  Germany  intended  to 
take  as  the  result  of  the  present  war.  It  has  suited  her 
purpose,  at  various  stages  of  the  conflict,  to  disclaim  in  larger 
or  lesser  measure,  the  vast  objectives  attributed  to  her  by 
her  critics  and  by  her  authoritative  spokesmen.  This  is 
small  matter.  In  these  great  schemes  of  world  conquest,  as 
in  the  offensive  of  a  single  campaign,  the  prudent  commander 
sternly  limits  the  objectives  which  are  then  and  there  to  be 
attained.  Germany  did  not  mean  to  conquer  the  world  now. 
She  could  not  have  organized  such  enormous  gains  without 
a  vast  development  of  resources  and  personnel.  It  is  even 
possible  as  the  Kaiser  has  stoutly  affirmed,  that  he  had  never 
planned  world  dominion.  Sufficient  unto  the  day  is  the  evil 
thereof.     General  Eoch   is  probably  not  yet  planning  his 


148  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

entry  into  Berlin.1  But  it  is  perfectly  plain  that  if  Germany 
had  realized  her  limited  objectives  in  the  present  war,  she 
would  not  have  stopped  permanently  with  them,  but  new 
designs  would  have  followed  to  be  attained  at  her  convenience. 
All  discussion  of  the  extent  of  her  proposed  present  aggres- 
sion is  beside  the  mark.  The  question  is  as  to  the  principle 
on  which  she  was  proceeding.  And  when  we  learn  that  she 
was  already  parceling  out  Australia  among  her  supporters, 
we  may  assume  that  even  her  immediate  objectives  were  not 
over  modest. 

It  is  but  fair  to  recognize  that  there  is  an  enormous 
amount  of  historic  precedent  for  Germany's  plan.  Most 
of  the  organization  of  mankind  has  hitherto  been  of  this 
kind.  She  can  cite  the  awe  inspiring  example  of  Home 
in  her  favor.  Nor  can  it  be  doubted  that  there  is  some 
ground  for  her  assumption  of  superiority.  Without  con- 
ceding for  a  moment  her  claim  to  a  unique  position  among 
the  races  of  the  world,  we  must  recognize  her  wonderful 
power  of  organization,  her  integrity  of  administration,  her 
energy  in  the  development  of  natural  resources,  her  genius 
for  applied  science,  all  as  entitling  her  to  a  very  high  place 
among  civilized  peoples.  She  is  no  doubt  in  a  position  to 
confer  very  great  blessings,  as  regards  these  important  mat- 
ters, upon  some  of  the  less  developed  peoples  to  the  east  and 
south  over  which  she  has  sought  to  extend  her  authority.  All 
this  and  more  we  may  admit,  but  the  one  great  issue  re- 
mains. She  believes  in  the  right  of  a  superior  race  to  dom- 
inate the  rest  of  the  world  by  force  and  to  make  other  peoples 
its  servants  in  perpetuity,2 

i  Written  about  October  first. 

2  The  writer  has  quoted  elsewhere  the  allusion  by  Professor  Rudolph 
Huch  to  the  British  and  French  as  races  which  are  M  incapable  of  attain 
ing  a  high  humanity,  incapable  of  influencing  the  world.  Such  nations 
are  destined  to  hew  wood  and  draw  water  for  the  dominant  nations. 
If  they  can  not  fill  this  inferior  office  they  must  perish."  "America 
Among  the  Nations,"  p.  357. 


GERMANY  149 

And  what  do  we,  the  Allies,  stand  for  ?  Or,  to  make  our 
inquiry  a  little  more  concrete,  since  the  Anglo-Saxons  are 
the  most  numerous  and  prominent  of  Germany's  antagonists, 
and  since  both  writer  and  readers  of  these  pages  are  Anglo- 
Saxons,  let  us  ask  what  the  Anglo-Saxons  stand  for.  We 
have  little  reason  to  fear  that  our  French  or  other  Allies  will 
seriously  dissent  from  our  conclusion. 

The  slogan,  as  we  know,  is  liberty.  It  is  liberty  bonds 
that  we  are  buying  and  liberty  bread  that  we  are  eating. 
The  French  motto  consecrated  by  the  Revolution  and  now  in- 
scribed on  every  public  building  in  France,  is  Liberty, 
Equality,  Fraternity.  This  may  seem  more  comprehensive, 
but  it  is  in  fact  only  a  more  elaborate  statement  of  the  great 
Anglo-Saxon  principle  which  in  practice  works  out  into  the 
same  trinity.  Not  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  believes  at  all  in 
the  mere  removal  of  restraint.  He  has  found  by  sad  ex- 
perience that  this  does  not  result  in  liberty  but  in  disorder 
and  in  all  manner  of  interference  with  the  legitimate  func- 
tions of  life.  If  there  is  anything  that  the  Anglo-Saxon 
hates,  it  is  disorder,  and  he  knows  that  order  does  not  result 
spontaneously  from  the  removal  of  restraints,  but  from  a 
carefully  adjusted  balance  between  restraint  and  privilege. 
The  Anglo-Saxons  are  a  strong  governing  race.  They  have 
never  hesitated  to  lay  a  heavy  hand  on  disturbers  of  the  peace, 
whether  individuals  or  nations. 

Nor  do  the  Anglo-Saxons  cherish  the  foolish  notion  that 
the  races  of  men  are  equal.  They  have  lived  too  much  in 
contact  with  all  sorts  and  conditions  of  men  not  to  know 
that  races  like  individuals,  whatever  they  were  meant  to  be 
or  may  sometime  become,  are  at  present  in  their  capacity 
for  government  or  anything  else,  very  far  from  equal.  And 
they  believe  quite  as  much  as  the  Germans  in  their  own  su- 
periority as  a  race.  It  would  be  the  sheerest  affectation  not 
to  do  so.     They  have  measured  themselves  with  every  race 


150  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

in  the  world  in  almost  every  capacity,  and  without  settling 
the  question  of  absolute  rank,  they  have  the  evidence  of 
their  senses  that  many  of  the  races  of  men  are  immensely 
their  inferiors.  There  is  no  mawkish  self  disparagement  in 
their  bearing  toward  these  peoples.  Such  of  them  as  are 
unable  to  maintain  the  decencies  of  national  life,  they  do 
not  hesitate  to  constrain,  as  need  may  require,  in  the  inter- 
est of  that  order  which  they  believe  to  be  necessary  to  the 
peace  of  the  world,  even  compelling  them  in  appropriate 
connections  to  recognize  the  superiority  which  is  the  war- 
rant of  their  authority.  The  Indian  sentinel  that  stands 
guard  at  so  many  of  Britain's  doorways,  must  present  arms 
whenever  the  white  man  passes.  That  is  not  a  gratuitous 
obeisance,  but  the  very  means  best  suited  to  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  white  man's  necessary  task.  All  of  this  is  but  a 
way  of  saying  that  the  Anglo-Saxons  are  a  practical  people. 
They  do  not  believe  in  liberty  or  anything  else  beyond  the 
point  where  experience  proves  it  to  be  serviceable  to  human 
interests. 

But  in  this  very  practical  way  and  within  these  proven 
limits  the  Anglo-Saxons  do  believe  in  liberty  and  equality 
as  the  Germans  do  not.  Though  both  would  assert  their  be- 
lief in  liberty  within  practical  limits,  their  judgment  of  what 
those  practical  limits  are  is  so  different  that  it  works  out  in 
a  diametrically  opposed  political  policy  and  an  opposite  view 
of  how  the  unity  of  mankind  is  to  be  brought  about. 

This  belief  in  liberty  and  equality  appears  in  two  ways. 
First,  the  Anglo-Saxons  recognize  the  civilized  nations  as 
equals.  This  does  not  mean  that  they  think  Italians,  Span- 
iards, French,  and  English  are  equal  in  all  respects,  but  they 
are  alike  in  this  that  they  have  all  learned  to  maintain  or- 
der and  live  decently  with  other  nations.  That  is  the  test 
of  competent  nationhood.  Possibly  some  one  of  these  peo- 
ples is  more  competent  to  manage  national  interests  than 


GERMANY  151 

the  others,  but  that  does  not  seem  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  a 
reason  why  that  people  should  seize  their  territories  and  as- 
sume the  management  of  their  affairs.1  Such  a  notion  has 
become  distasteful  to  them,  just  as  it  becomes  distasteful  to 
well  bred  men,  even  if  hungry,  to  grab  food  from  one  an- 
other's plates  or  raid  one  another's  larders.  It  is  the  live- 
and-let-live  temper,  the  sportsmanship  and  good  breeding 
of  the  civilized  nations. 

But  there  is  a  second  development  of  this  temper,  this 
instinct  of  liberty  and  equality  which  is  more  remarkable. 
Britain  has  gotten  together  an  extraordinary  and  heterogene- 
ous aggregate  of  peoples  all  of  whom  have  at  one  time 
recognized  her  authority.  Some  were  originally  colonies 
peopled  by  emigrants  from  her  own  race.  Others  were 
colonies  acquired  by  conquest  from  other  strong  races  which 
became  involved  in  conflict  with  Britain.  Still  others  were 
backward  peoples  that  were  unable  of  themselves  to  provide 
the  peace  and  order  required  for  nationhood  and  so  passed 
into  trusteeship.  This  great  aggregate  was  formed  in  defer- 
ence to  no  special  theory  and  was  at  first  subjected  to  author- 
ity of  quite  the  traditional  kind. 

But  as  the  strenuous  period  of  consolidation  passed,  the 
Anglo-Saxon  instinct  showed  itself.  Little  by  little  Britain 
has  relaxed  her  hold  upon  the  more  capable  parts  of  this 
vast  domain,  trusting  only  to  the  spirit  of  friendliness  and 
fair  play  to  maintain  the  necessary  accord.  Canada,  Aus- 
tralia, and  New  Zealand,  being  obviously  competent  to  man- 

i  In  the  early  days  of  the  war  when  Germany  was  carrying  on  a 
propaganda  in  neutral  countries,  her  emissary  to  Sweden,  in  a  public 
address  in  Stockholm,  developed  the  familiar  German  thesis  that  the 
superior  organizing  ability  of  the  German  people  gave  them  a  right  to 
organize  the  world.  An  auditor  interrupted  him  with  the  question 
whether  that  gave  Germany  the  right  to  organize  Sweden.  With  per- 
fect candour  and  characteristic  German  tact,  he  is  said  to  have  replied 
that  he  thought  it  did.  Can  we  imagine  an  Anglo-Saxon  saying,  or 
even  thinking,  such  a  thing? 


152  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

age  their  own  affairs  and  maintain  peace  and  order  within 
their  borders,  and  under  the  bonds  of  good  breeding  to  live 
at  peace  with  one  another,  it  became  repugnant  to  Anglo- 
Saxon  instincts  to  exercise  authority  over  them.  With  the 
Boers  whose  unwilling  pledge  to  keep  the  peace  was  less 
reassuring,  the  case  was  not  so  clear,  but  the  aversion  of  the 
Anglo-Saxons  to  holding  competent  peoples  in  tutelage  made 
the  subjection  of  South  Africa  impossible.  India  and  Egypt 
are  not  able  as  yet  to  guarantee  the  essentials  of  peace  and 
order,  but  they  are  being  hurried  on  toward  self  management. 
Hence  comes  the  paradox  of  British  development,  that  while 
Britain  has  been  consolidating  a  quarter  of  the  world  under 
her  control,  she  has  at  the  same  time  been  relaxing  her  con- 
trol and  leaving  these  peoples  free  again,  so  that  now  they 
take  their  place,  to  the  full  measure  of  their  capacity,  along- 
side of  France,  Italy,  and  the  rest,  nations  that  have  never 
known  Britain's  control,  as  free  peoples,  managing  their 
own  affairs  and  at  liberty  to  do  anything  they  choose  except 
injure  one  another. 

This  is  race  democracy,  the  recognition  of  liberty  and 
equality  as  the  working  basis  of  nations  in  their  relations  to 
one  another  and  the  ultimate  principle  of  human  unity.  It 
is  a  thing  that  can  not  exist  until  nations  learn  good  breed- 

I  ing,  that  is,  until  they  learn  to  dislike  lording  it  over  other 
nations  that  are  able  to  manage  their  own  affairs  and  keep 
the  public  peace. 

I  The  Germans  have  noticed  this  relaxing  of  British  con- 
trol and  have  quite  misunderstood  it.  They  can  not  under- 
stand how  a  strong  race  should  willingly  relinquish  control 
over  other  races.  They  have  often  extolled  the  excellence  of 
British  colonial  administration,  but  have  noted  this  relaxa- 
tion of  authority  as  a  weakness.  This  and  the  consequent 
slight  development  of  British  military  power,  are  the  grounds 
for  the  oft  repeated  charge  that  the  British  are  a  decadent 


GERMANY  153 

race.  This  aversion  to  the  exercise  of  authority  has  seemed 
to  them  nothing  less  than  a  degeneration  of  their  moral 
fiber.  Heinrich  von  Treitschke,  the  most  representative  of 
German  writers  on  these  subjects,  declared  that  the  British 
Empire  was  a  sham  which  would  fall  to  pieces  at  a  touch, 
all  because  it  lacked  that  overlordship  which  seems  to  the 
German  the  only  possible  way  of  uniting  men. 

The  other  nations  now  associated  with  Britain  have  less 
extensive  but  similar  records.  Our  own  history  is  a  con-  i 
spicuous  example  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  principle.  Our  sev- 
eral states,  though  more  dependent  upon  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment since  the  great  nation-wide  interests  of  railroads 
and  the  like  have  developed  such  proportions,  are  none  the 
less  free,  and  there  is  little  disposition  to  curtail  their  free- 
dom. We  put  an  end  to  Spanish  rule  in  Cuba,  but  we 
refused  to  establish  our  own  in  its  stead,  as  the  Germans 
were  sure  we  would  do.  In  our  trusteeship  of  the  Philip- 
pines we  have  rivaled  Britain's  liberality  to  the  Boers  and 
with  even  less  guaranty.  The  record  of  Erance  is  hardly 
less  liberal,  though  perhaps  less  judicious  and  successful  in 
certain  cases. 

It  may  be  noted  in  passing  that  the  nations  that  have  at- 
tained to  this  race  democracy  have,  with  practical  unanimity, 
adopted  the  democratic  principle  in  the  management  of  their 
home  affairs.  They  do  not  recognize  any  authority  as  di- 
vinely established  over  them,  but  establish  their  own  author- 
ity and  the  rules  for  its  exercise.  This,  of  course,  is  quite 
natural,  for  the  spirit  that  recognizes  liberty  and  equality 
among  competent  nations,  would  naturally  recognize  liberty 
and  equality  among  the  men  of  their  own  nation.  But  we 
must  not  confound  the  one  democracy  with  the  other.  Above 
all  we  must  not  assume  that  the  mere  adoption  of  demo- 
cratic forms  of  government  by  the  German  people,  especially 
if  done  under  pressure  or  in  times  of  great  national  distress, 


154  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

would  insure  the  spirit  of  live-and-let-live  in  the  larger  rela- 
tion between  the  nations.1  The  matter  goes  very  much 
deeper.  We  are  dealing  with  the  character  of  a  race,  or 
more  exactly,  with  a  certain  stage  in  the  development  of  a 
race  that  has  not  yet  become  sensitive  to  the  higher  forces 
that  regulate  the  relations  between  men  and  nations. 

One  more  fact  must  be  noted  before  we  are  ready  to 
draw  our  conclusion.  Eace  autocracy  and  race  democracy 
can  not  permanently  get  along  in  the  world  together.  It 
is  hard  for  those  who  are  democratically  minded  to  realize 
this.  Why,  it  may  be  asked,  should  we  not  keep  our  way 
and  let  Germany  keep  hers  until  she  is  tired  of  it?  Why 
must  we  fight  her  because  she  lacks  good  breeding?  The 
answer  is  that  she  insists  upon  fighting  us,  and  that  quite 
consistently.  She  believes  that  the  superior  race, —  which 
is  of  course  her  own, —  not  only  may  but  must  establish 
its  authority  over  all  the  rest.  As  it  is  her  duty  to  confer 
this  higher  organization  upon  a  stubborn  and  misguided 
world,  she  can  not  consistently  rest  from  her  labors  until 
her  task  is  accomplished.  There  is  no  live-and-let-live  in 
the  creed  of  autocracy. 

This,  then,  is  that  hated  thing  that  we  must  put  out  of 
the  world,  race  autocracy,  the  arrogant  assertion  of  race 
superiority  and  the  assumption  that  race  superiority  carries 
with  it  the  right  and  the  duty  to  subjugate  and  control 
all  other  races.  This  is  what  we  have  called  militarism,  a 
name  which  suggests  rather  one  of  its  outer  manifestations 
than  its  inner  spirit.  That  spirit  has  been  just  as  manifest 
in  German  industrial  aggression  as  in  recent  military  cam- 
paigns.    It  is  this  that  we  have  declared  must  be  destroyed. 

i  This  seems  to  be  exactly  what  is  now  happening.  The  morning 
paper  announces:  "The  Germans  are  hastening  their  constitutional 
and  electoral  reforms  in  the  hope  of  presenting  a  government  with 
which  the  United  States  and  the  Allies  will  deal  in  restoring  permanent 
peace."    Such  a  structure  would  be  built  upon  sand. 


GEKMANY  155 

It  is  an  exceedingly  difficult  thing  to  accomplish,  for  this 
militarism  or  race  autocracy  is  not  so  much  a  thing  as  the 
absence  of  a  thing,  the  absence  of  good  breeding,  of  the  sen- 
sitiveness to  others'  feelings  and  the  sympathy  for  others' 
ideals  which  makes  us  averse  to  coercing  those  who  have 
learned  the  art  of  decent  living.  We  must  trust  to  the  slow 
influences  of  peace  to  develop  this  restraining  instinct. 
Meanwhile  we  must  repress  this  pious  hoodlumism  as  best 
we  may,  and  in  our  settlement  take  stern  measures  to  "  stop 
this  swashbuckling  through  the  streets  of  Europe,"  as  Lloyd 
George  has  so  admirably  called  it.  We  must  not  hesitate  at 
any  measure  necessary  to  that  end. 

Just  what  practical  measures  does  this  require  of  us?  / 
This  above  all  else.  German  authority  over  every  race  or 
people  other  than  their  own,  must  cease.1  If  the  Germans 
wish  to  be  governed  in  the  German  way,  we  shall  make  a  great 
mistake  to  interfere,  but  knowing  as  we  do  that  Germany 
believes  in  dominating  other  peoples,  and  that  without  limit, 
with  no  intention  ever  to  make  them  free  or  self  sufficient,  it 
is  the  plainest  of  duties  to  ourselves,  to  the  principle  that  we 
stand  for,  and  to  the  peoples  that  are  helplessly  concerned, 
to  see  that  our  settlement  does  not  sanction  at  any  point  or  in 
any  degree  the  triumph  of  this  German  principle. 

Do  we  realize  what  this  means  ?  It  means  that  when  we 
release  Germany  from  the  grip  of  our  armies,  there  must  be 
no  German  dependencies,  no  alien  provinces,  no  overshadow- 
ing alliances,  no  strangling  agreements.  Germany  must  be 
nothing  but  Germany,  and  that  limited  to  those  peoples  that 
unmistakably  choose  to  cast  in  their  lot  with  her.     Eor  the 

i  Recent  reports  of  German  barbarities  in  the  administration  of  the 
African  colonies, —  barbarities  for  which  even  the  present  war  had  not 
prepared  us, —  have  added  emphasis  to  this  conclusion,  if  emphasis 
were  needed.  It  can  not  be  too  strongly  insisted,  however,  that  this  is 
not  the  issue.  If  Germany's  treatment  of  her  wards  had  been  free  from 
cruelty,  it  would  still  be  open  to  the  graver  condemnation  here  noted 
of  condemning  them  to  perpetual  servitude. 


156  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

trusteeship  of  backward  peoples,  the  guidance  of  weaker 
allies,  and  the  exploitation  of  others'  territories  her  avowed 
principle  of  political  organization  as  jet  disqualifies  her. 
There  is  another  aspect  of  the  case  which  is  more  imme- 
diately our  own.  Germany  is  situated  between  the  two 
greatest  peoples  in  the  world.  On  the  one  side  is  the  Slav 
with  territories  forty  times  the  size  of  Germany,  and  on 
the  other  side  the  Anglo-Saxon  with  territories  seventy  times 
that  of  Germany.  Wedged  in  between  these  two  mighty 
races,  Germany  fears  extinction,  politically  from  the  one, 
culturally  from  the  other.  Hence  the  frantic  effort  to  be- 
come also  a  great  empire  by  the  annexation  of  territories  at 
hand  and  overseas,  the  seizure  of  capital,  the  acquisition  of 
natural  resources,  and  the  conquest  of  world  markets  and 
commercial  privileges.  Aside,  therefore,  from  her  divinely 
appointed  mission  of  world  organizer,  Germany  has  a  very 
concrete  and  local  reason  for  counterbalancing  her  huge  riv- 
als by  a  prompt  and  strenuous  expansion.  Whatever  the 
legitimacy  of  such  an  expansion  in  the  abstract,  a  study  of 
the  concrete  situation  shows  it  to  be  impossible.  There  are 
no  more  colonies  to  annex  and  no  suitable  neighbor  lands  to 
assimilate.  The  only  alternative,  and  one  which  Germany 
clearly  sees  and  frankly  accepts,  is  to  destroy  the  British 
Empire  to  get  materials  to  build  her  own.     Germany  doubt- 

!less  argues  that  turn  about  is  fair  play  in  the  highly  gratify- 
ing occupation  of  empire  building,  but  the  British  Empire 
and  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  whose  future  is  thus  menaced,  can 
hardly  so  regard  it.  More  cogently,  the  world  whose  peo- 
ples are  concerned  primarily  for  the  maintenance  of  peace 
and  the  privilege  of  undisturbed  development,  may  take  ex- 
ception to  this  theory  of  rotation.  For  Germany  makes  no 
charge  that  these  trusts  are  mismanaged.  Her  plea  is  solely 
that  of  privileged  exploitation. 

Both  the  empires  that  Germany  menaces  and  the  world  at 


GEKMANY  157 

large  whose  interests  quite  transcend  her  claim  to  rotation  of 
privilege,  must  unite  in  telling  Germany  that  her  dream  of 
empire  is  gone  forever.  Present  trusts  are  too  firmly  estab- 
lished, present  overseas  colonies  too  far  developed,  and  pres- 
ent order  too  nearly  assured  to  permit  of  violent  readjust- 
ment in  her  supposed  interest.  This  is  no  wrong  or  in-  i 
justice.  Not  every  people  can  have  imperial  opportunity. 
It  is  the  exceptional  privilege  of  the  few  whom  coincidence 
and  the  world's  need  requisition  for  the  work.  Austria  has 
no  dependencies  and  expects  none.  Japan  must  shape  her 
plans  with  reference  to  other  forms  of  national  achievement. 
Germany  came  too  late  and  went  at  it  wrong.  She  must 
frankly  recognize  and  we  must  recognize  that  her  opportunity 
has  passed  by.  Our  settlement  must  be  based  above  all  on 
the  recognition  of  this  principle  that  there  can  be  no  im-  { 
perial  future  for  Germany.  That  is  the  stake  for  which  she 
threw  the  dice  in  this  war,  and  she  has  thrown  and  lost. 
Any  lingering  notion  that  some  measure  of  imperial  privi- 
lege, some  portion  of  imperial  domain,  are  hers  by  right 
on  the  score  of  nationhood,  a  right  to  be  conceded  now  or 
on  the  occasion  of  some  future  rehabilitation,  is  fatal  to  the 
cause  for  which  we  have  fought. 

But  if  Germany  may  not  wear  the  purple,  she  must  still 
be  clothed  and  fed.  We  may  as  well  recognize  that  it  is  a 
sheer  impossibility  for  the  civilized  world  to  keep  the  Ger- 
man people  permanently  in  repressive  custody.  We  have 
the  strength  to  do  it,  but  we  have  not  the  stomach  to  do  it. 
It  is  repugnant  to  the  whole  principle  on  which  our  lives 
are  ordered,  to  the  whole  philosophy  on  which  our  claim  is 
based.  Germany  must  have  opportunity,  if  not  the  oppor- 
tunity that  she  seeks.  The  change  of  temper  in  the  German 
people  on  which  the  permanent  solution  of  the  problem  must 
depend,  will  not  be  brought  about  solely  by  repressive  meas- 
ures.    No  doubt  a  crushing  defeat  will  have  a  powerful 


158  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

effect  in  diminishing  their  arrogance  and  dampening  their 
world  conquering  ardor,  but  if  we  leave  them  nothing  worth 
doing  except  world  conquest,  that  ardor  will  revive.  Let  us 
stop  and  ask  ourselves,  what  do  we  wish  Germany  to  do? 
Would  we  not  have  her  devote  herself  to  honest  industry, 
(  to  the  development  of  her  natural  resources  and  to  the  gen- 
tle arts  of  civilization?  If  so,  then  we  must  see  to  it  that 
she  has  every  opportunity,  every  inducement,  to  expend  her 
great  energies  along  these  lines.  No  churlish  policy  of  hit- 
ting Germany  wherever  she  shows  herself  will  accomplish  our 
purpose.  If  we  want  her  to  be  decent,  we  must  give  her 
the  privilege  of  being  so. 

It  must  be  recognized,  however,  that  Germany  has  her- 
self made  this  liberal  policy  exceedingly  difficult.  Quite 
aside  from  the  passions  engendered  by  the  war  and  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  monstrous  wrongs  that  Germany  has  com- 
mitted against  civilization,  her  industrial  and  commercial 
policy  for  many  years  preceding  the  war  has  had  a  predatory 
character  and  an  imperialist  purpose  which  have  stamped  it 
with  illegitimacy.  If  we  must  suppress  German  imperial- 
ism and  encourage  German  industrialism,  then  we  must  be 
quite  sure  that  German  industrialism  is  not  German  im- 
perialism in  disguise,  as  it  has  been  in  the  past.  We  can 
not  open  the  world's  markets  to  German  industry  and  Ger- 
man commerce  if  they  continue  to  take  orders  from  the  Gen- 
eral Staff. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  what  guaranties  the  Allies  can  ask  or 
Germany  can  give  as  security  against  this  danger.  It  is 
probable  that  for  a  time  precautions  must  be  taken  of  an 
onerous  character,  especially  as  regards  the  apportioning  of 
certain  raw  materials  which  are  to  be  much  in  demand  fol- 
lowing the  war.  Difficult  as  these  adjustments  must  be, 
they  are  not  beyond  the  wisdom  of  modern  statesmanship  if 
the  principle  governing  the  settlement  is  kept  clearly  in  mind. 


GEKMANY  159 

We  want  Germany  to  be  transformed  from  a  bullying  mili- 
tary power  into  a  constructive  industrial  nation.  We  must 
not  block  the  road  to  that  transformation.  Any  notion  that 
the  world  can  prosper  by  the  suppression  of  Germany's  indus- 
trial competition  and  by  the  manacling  of  Germany's  great 
power  of  world  service  is  a  profound  mistake.  Our  busi- 
ness men  know,  if  the  rest  of  us  do  not,  that  the  German 
market  is  one  that  they  can  not  afford  to  lose.  It  is  the  glory 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  to  have  learned,  as  he  has  pushed  his 
trade  among  the  remotest  peoples,  that  these  peoples  can  be 
profitable  to  him  only  as  he  makes  them  rich.  That  is  the 
lesson  of  British  trade  in  India  and  in  Egypt.  Can  we 
have  the  steadiness  of  vision  to  perceive,  in  these  passionate 
times,  that  the  principle  is  of  universal  application  ? 

Undoubtedly  the  suggestion  that  Germany  desist  from  her 
dreams  of  empire  and  become  an  honest  industrial  nation 
like  "  the  nation  of  shopkeepers "  that  she  has  so  often 
mocked,  will  be  rejected  with  scorn  by  certain  elements  which 
have  been  dominant  in  German  higher  circles  in  recent  years. 
There  is  none  the  less  reason  to  believe  that  Germany  may 
reconcile  herself  to  the  now  unwelcome  alternative.  The 
case  of  Holland  is  closely  analogous,  though  on  a  smaller 
scale.  Holland  once  was  among  the  foremost  of  the  great 
imperial  powers.  She  lost  her  primacy  in  conflict  with  a 
rival  that  was  at  that  time  far  less  considerate  than  those  with 
which  Germany  now  has  to  deal.  It  is  doubtful,  however, 
if  Holland  now  regrets  her  loss  of  empire  and  its  burden- 
some responsibilities.  Doubtless  she  feels  keenly  her  help- 
lessness in  the  presence  of  the  great  swashbuckler,  but  she 
probably  does  not  envy  him  his  role.  It  is  not  beyond  hope 
that  Germany  should  some  day  come  to  think  and  to  feel 
in  the  same  way.  When  that  time  comes  she  will  find  her- 
self quite  automatically  one  of  the  group  of  free,  world  serv- 
ing nations,  sharing  to  the  full  the  privileges  which  they 


160  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

are  at  present  forced  to  deny  her.  For  in  the  end,  it  is  the 
free,  world  serving  nations  who  will  guard  the  backward 
peoples  and  fill  the  empty  places  and  share  the  earth's  in- 
crease. Whoever  performs  these  tasks  of  empire  will  per- 
form them  at  the  bidding  of  the  free  nations  and  to  them 
will  render  account. 

In  the  following  chapters  we  shall  have  occasion  to  take 
up  the  case  of  the  several  territories,  adjacent  and  overseas, 
and  the  problems  of  international  interests  and  relations 
which  call  for  special  consideration  under  the  principles 
herein  set  forth. 


CHAPTEE  XI 

BELGIUM 

Among  the  victims  of  German  aggression,  Belgium  unques- 
tionably claims  first  attention.  Her  complete  innocence  of 
any  part  in  provoking  the  war,  her  helplessness,  her  claim 
to  German  protection  by  virtue  of  treaty  guaranty,  her  heroic 
resistance,  and  finally,  her  fearful  sufferings,  have  made  her 
the  sacrificial  offering  for  the  world  and  won  for  her  the 
world's  compassion.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  recall  the 
treaty  agreement  of  1838  by  which  Prussia,  France,  and 
Britain  pledged  themselves  to  guarantee  the  independence 
of  the  little  nation,  pledging  her,  meanwhile,  to  form  no 
alliances  and  to  refrain  from  other  usual  precautions  against 
aggression.  Nor  need  we  recall  the  momentary  candour 
with  which  the  German  Chancellor  recognized  the  wrong 
of  the  invasion  and  pledged  reparation,  or  the  later  disgrace- 
ful attempt  to  prove  the  helpless  little  state  the  aggressor. 
The  main  issue  as  regards  Belgium  has  fortunately  never  been 
doubtful.  Whatever  else  may  have  been  in  doubt,  the  res- 
toration of  Belgium  is  a  point  regarding  which  the  Allies 
have  never  faltered. 

For  this  restoration  there  are  two  reasons.  The  first  and 
sufficient  reason  is  the  mere  fact  that  Belgium  existed  and 
was  minded  to  continue  as  she  was.  Failing  some  flagrant 
wrong  against  the  peace  of  Europe,  of  which  she  has  never 
been  guilty,  it  is  fundamental  to  the  principle  of  liberty  and 
equality  which  is  the  common  faith  of  the  Allies,  that  that 
existence  should  continue.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  Germany 
wanted  Belgium  and  that  in  a  thoroughly  peaceable  Europe, 
the  closest  possible  relation  between  the  two  countries  is  to 

161 


162  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

be  expected  and  desired.  But  in  view  of  the  conclusion  al- 
ready reached  that  no  extension  of  German  territories  is  ad- 
missible under  present  conditions,  the  re-establishment  of 
Belgian  nationality  follows  as  a  matter  of  course. 

But  this  argument  is  quite  overshadowed  in  the  present 
instance  by  the  fact  that  Belgium  is  strategic  ground,  the 
one  natural  gateway  between  France  and  Germany  as  be- 
tween Germany  and  Britain.  Through  this  gateway  have 
poured  the  conquering  or  marauding  hosts  that  from  time  im- 
memorial have  passed  eastward  or  westward  in  the  struggle 
between  the  two  great  peoples  that  are  separated  by  the 
Rhine.  Here  too  have  landed  the  British  armies  like  that 
which  conquered  Napoleon  at  Waterloo,  and  from  here  as 
from  no  other  point  an  invasion  of  England  might  be  un- 
dertaken with  hope  of  success.  The  strategic  character  of 
Belgium  was  never  so  well  illustrated  as  in  the  present  war. 
Everyone  knows  how  the  unexpected  resistance  of  Belgium 
held  up  the  German  advance  for  days  and  thus  gave  to  France 
the  time  to  mobilize  the  troops  that  stopped  the  German  ad- 
vance at  the  Marne.  Suppose  Germany  had  held  Belgium 
and  that  her  advance  on  that  fateful  first  of  August  had 
started  from  the  western  Belgian  frontier  ?  It  is  as  certain 
as  things  human  can  be  that  the  Germans  would  have  occu- 
pied Paris  and  Calais  and  that  the  whole  result  of  the  war 
would  have  been  different.  So  far  as  we  can  now  foresee, 
that  must  always  be  true.  The  possession  of  Belgium  by 
Germany  would  put  both  France  and  England  in  her  power. 

Conversely,  though  to  a  far  less  degree,  the  possession  of 
Belgium  by  England  or  France  would  give  them  a  strong 
position  as  regards  Germany.  It  would  advance  their  front 
line  and  bring  them  that  much  nearer  to  the  heart  of  Ger- 
many, wherever  that  may  be.  But  the  advantage  would  be 
inherently  defensive  rather  than  offensive.  The  Belgo-Ger- 
man  frontier  is  short  and  correspondingly  easy  for  Germany 


T' 

BELGIUM 

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BELGIUM  165 

to  defend.  Moreover  there  lies  close  behind  it  the  immense 
natural  barrier  of  the  Rhine  which  can  be  strengthened  in- 
definitely. The  chief  industrial  centers  of  Germany,  to 
say  nothing  of  her  remotely  located  capital,  all  lie  to  the 
east  of  this  barrier.  Germany's  affectation  of  terror  lest  her 
enemies  should  get  possession  of  Belgium  need  not  be  taken 
very  seriously.  She  did,  indeed,  greatly  fear  such  a  move  on 
their  part,  but  only  because  it  would  checkmate  her  in  her 
long  cherished  plans  of  aggression. 

The  reasons,  therefore,  which  led  the  three  nations,  in  a 
loyal  endeavor  to  preserve  the  balance  of  power,  to  neutral- 
ize Belgium  and  to  pledge  their  support  of  her  neutrality, 
were  very  serious  reasons  and  have  lost  none  of  their  validity. 
Belgium  is  a  natural  neutral  ground,  important  to  all  and 
a  matter  of  life  and  death  to  England  and  France.  Her 
maintenance  as  a  neutral  nation  is  indispensable  so  long  as 
these  three  nations  remain  enemies,  really  or  potentially,  and 
this  they  plainly  must  remain  so  long  as  Germany  believes 
herself  divinely  commissioned  to  control  the  destinies  of 
civilized  men. 

But  what  is  involved  in  the  restoration  of  Belgium  ?  First 
of  all  the  restoration  of  Belgian  territory  to  the  sovereignty 
of  its  own  people.  As  regards  internal  affairs  this  covers 
the  requirements,  for  the  Belgian  people  are  amply  capable 
of  providing  for  the  needs  of  civilized  government.  But  as 
regards  their  place  in  the  family  of  nations,  Belgium  will  be 
as  helpless  as  before.  Her  people  are  too  few  and  her  fron- 
tiers too  open  to  enable  her  to  defend  herself  against  her 
powerful  neighbors  who  can  never  be  indifferent  to  her  politi- 
cal status.  Will  the  restoration  of  Belgium  automatically 
restore  the  guaranties  which  have  hitherto  determined  her 
status  ?  Obviously  not.  For  three  powers,  emerging  from  a 
prolonged  and  bitter  war  as  conquerors  and  conquered,  to 
assume  a  joint  trusteeship  would  certainly  be  a  dubious  pro- 


166  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

eeeding,  but  when  the  very  cause  of  conflict  was  the  viola- 
tion of  this  same  trusteeship,  to  resume  it  would  be  absolutely 
farcical.  An  orphan  ward,  in  the  care  of  three  trustees,  is 
kidnapped  by  one  of  them,  her  person  outraged  and  her 
property  squandered.  When  apprehended  the  miscreant 
gives  as  his  excuse  that  he  but  anticipated  what  he  believed 
to  be  the  intended  action  of  his  co-trustees.  He  is  com- 
pelled to  give  up  his  victim  and  to  make  such  restitution  as 
is  possible.  So  far,  so  good.  But  how  about  the  guardian- 
ship ?     Shall  the  kidnapper  retain  his  position  ? 

The  mere  mention  of  restorin  the  joint  guaranty  of  Bel- 
gium reveals  the  incongruity,  thv  impossibility  of  such  a 
proceeding.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  original 
tripartite  agreement  was  made  in  good  faith.  Prussia  had 
at  that  time  and  for  many  years  after,  no  imperialist  aims 
which  menaced  the  independence  of  Belgium.  If  threat- 
ened at  all  in  the  earlier  years,  it  was  by  the  jingoistic  policy 
of  France  under  the  second  Empire.  But  following  the  Ger- 
man victory  of  "TO-^l  and  more  particularly  following  the 
accession  of  William  II,  the  temper  and  policy  of  Germany 
gradually  underwent  a  radical  change.  The  policy  of  a 
balance  of  power  gave  way  to  that  of  German  supremacy 
which  has  been  characterized  in  the  preceding  chapter.  With 
this  new  policy  Germany  inevitably  became  disloyal  to  the 
spirit  of  her  earlier  guaranty,  and  its  violation  was  only  a 
question  of  opportunity.  That  violation  did  not  begin  with 
the  crossing  of  the  frontier  on  August  first.  Long  before 
that  Germany  had  built  her  network  of  double  tracked 
strategic  railways  up  to  the  Belgian  frontier  with  their  huge 
terminals  that  no  possible  peace  requirements  could  justify, 
thus  completely  altering  the  physical  situation.  Meanwhile 
she  had  long  made  it  plain  to  France  that  the  building  of 
strong  defenses  on  the  Franco-Belgian  frontier  would  be  re- 


BELGIUM  167 

garded  as  a  hostile  act.  It  is  plain  that  she  had  long  marked 
Belgium  for  her  own. 

With  this  plainly  declared  change  of  policy  on  Germany's 
part,  the  compulsory  renewal  of  her  guaranty  could  not  be 
sincere,  and  an  effort  to  secure  it  would  be  but  an  incite- 
ment to  hypocrisy.  If  the  world  entrusts  the  vital  interests 
involved  in  Belgian  neutrality  ever  so  little  to  German 
guaranty,  it  will  do  so  to  its  grave  peril. 

What  then  ?  There  is  but  one  practical  alternative.  Ger- 
many's railways  have  destroyed  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
and  made  it  a  spearhead  on  the  German  shaft  pointed  al- 
ways toward  the  west.  We  can  not  destroy  these  railways. 
The  destruction  of  railways  is  a  familiar  incident  of  war, 
but  an  impossible  condition  of  peace.  Any  such  crippling 
of  Germany  in  her  legitimate  peace  interests  would  be  justly 
criticised  as  vandalistic  and  would  rankle  long  in  the  hearts 
of  the  German  people.  The  German  breach  of  neutrality  is 
permanent.  The  menace  must  be  met  in  kind.  Belgium  is 
to  be  reconstituted  by  the  Allies.  She  must  remain  their 
ally.  They  must  be  her  permanent  guaranty  against  Ger- 
many, the  only  power  from  which  she  fears  or  has  occa- 
sion to  fear  aggression.  And  since  in  any  future  war  she 
is  certain  again  to  be  the  first  to  feel  the  blow,  she  must  be 
prepared  to  parry  it.  The  narrow  frontier  between  Belgium 
and  Germany  must  be  the  first  line  defense  of  Western 
Europe  against  the  German.  Moreover  Belgium  must  be 
prepared  to  man  these  defenses.  Whether  the  armament  of 
the  future  be  much  or  little,  Belgium  must  henceforth  bear 
her  share.  She  must  never  again  be  disarmed  and  exposed 
with  naked  breast  to  the  enemy  under  the  fiction  of  neu- 
trality. It  is  a  great  change  from  a  shielded  neutral  to  a 
frontier  guard,  but  one  imperiously  dictated  by  the  logic  of 
events.     More  exactly  it  is  not  a  new  situation,  but  a  new 


168  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

recognition  of  a  situation  long  existing  and  revealed  by  the 
tragedy  of  the  invasion.  There  is  no  occasion,  as  there  cer- 
tainly is  no  disposition,  on  the  part  of  England  and  France 
to  interfere  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  well  managed  little 
kingdom,  but  in  their  one  great  international  concern  the 
three  powers  are  necessarily  a  unit,  and  to  affect  independence 
or  separate  action  would  be  merely  disingenuous.  Whether 
the  short  frontier  in  question  is  the  strategic  one,  the  one 
most  capable  of  defense,  is  a  question  for  experts  to  deter- 
mine. If  it  is  not  it  should  be  made  so.  No  marked  dif- 
ference of  race  hinders  the  rectification.  If  Germany  should 
protest  and  seek  the  reason  for  the  possible  encroachment,  she 
should  not  have  far  to  go  to  find  it.1 

It  will  doubtless  be  urged  here  that  Belgium  should  have 
the  benefit  of  international  guaranty.  Beyond  a  doubt, 
but  once  more  we  must  remind  ourselves  of  what  is  meant 
by  guaranty.  It  is  merely  a  pledge  of  all  the  nations  in- 
volved to  use  their  force  as  needed  to  secure  the  end  guar- 
anteed. International  guaranties  are  too  often  conceived  as 
substitutes  for  force.  On  the  contrary  they  are  always  force, 
actual  or  potential.  And  international  force  like  national 
force,  has  need  of  strong  positions  and  efficient  instruments. 
If  Germany  sees  that  the  frontier  is  open  and  that  by  a  quick 
move  she  can  seize  a  dominating  position,  the  mere  pro- 
nouncement of  any  number  of  nations  will  not  deter  her.  By 
all  means  let  the  nations  of  the  civilized  world  guarantee 
Belgian  neutrality,  but  it  will  be  a  guarded  frontier  that 
will  enforce  their  guaranty. 

But  the  worst  of  our  problem  is  yet  to  come.  The  Allied 
demand  for  "  restoration,  restitution,  and  guaranty  "  has  be- 
come associated  in  the  public  mind  especially  with  Belgium. 
We  have  considered  briefly  the  question  of  restoration  and 

i  For  the  possibility  of  extending  Belgian  territory  on  the  east  see 
note  at  the  end  of  Chapter  XII. 


BELGIUM  169 

guaranties.  It  remains  for  us  to  consider  the  question  of 
restitution. 

The  material  losses  sustained  by  Belgium  in  the  destruc- 
tion of  property,  the  interruption  of  industry,  and  war  con- 
tributions are  probably  the  heaviest  in  proportion  to  her  re- 
sources, of  any  of  the  belligerents.  Even  such  occupied 
countries  as  Serbia  have  suffered  less  in  material  wealth 
since  they  possessed  little  except  their  soil.  Belgium  on  the 
contrary,  being  primarily  an  industrial  state  and  the  most 
densely  peopled  in  Europe,  had  accumulated  vast  wealth  and 
that  in  a  form  peculiarly  subject  to  injury.  Being  almost 
wholly  in  enemy  possession  and  stiff  necked  in  her  opposition 
to  his  purposes,  she  has  felt  the  full  force  of  his  fury.  By 
common  consent  all  the  Allies,  even  those  that,  like  Erance, 
have  suffered  immense  injury,  concede  that  Belgium  has  a 
preferred  claim.  Before  examining  the  question  how  far 
Germany  may  be  expected  to  discharge  this  obligation  it  may 
be  well  to  call  attention  to  one  aspect  of  restitution  that  has 
been  too  little  discussed,  namely  restitution  in  kind. 

The  immense  destruction  which  the  war  has  wrought  has 
created  a  dearth  in  many  lines,  notably  in  many  kinds  of 
mechanical  and  industrial  appliances,  which  will  be  felt  long 
after  the  war  is  over.  Thus,  the  writer  inquired  recently  the 
price  of  an  automobile.  The  dealer  mentioned  a  certain 
sum, —  the  price  fixed  by  the  manufacturer, —  but  could  not 
fill  an  order.  Pointing  to  a  car  that  was  passing  he  re- 
marked :  "  If  I  had  that  car  I  could  sell  it  for  twenty  per 
cent,  more  than  that.  The  price  of  the  new  car  is  fixed  at 
the  factory,  but  on  a  used  car  I  can  set  my  own  price,  and 
the  demand  is  so  great  that  I  can  get  more  than  the  price 
of  new."  Obviously  under  such  circumstances  the  owner  of 
a  car  would  not  feel  indemnified  for  its  loss  by  getting  back 
its  cost.  He  wants  his  car  because  he  needs  it  and  can  not 
replace  it.     Ships  furnish  a  well  known  example.     Holland 


170  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

has  refused  to  put  her  ships  at  the  disposal  of  the  Allies,  even 
if  fully  insured.  She  does  not  want  the  insurance.  She 
wants  the  ships  ready  to  earn  the  enormous  profits  which  will 
come  with  peace.  If  the  ships  are  lost,  it  will  be  years  be- 
fore she  can  replace  them. 

This  is  the  situation  of  Belgium  as  regards  much  of  the  loot 
that  has  been  carried  off  by  the  invaders.  Aside  from  works 
of  art  and  like  objects  which  have  been  removed  with  Ger- 
man thoroughness,  a  process  in  which  certain  persons  of 
exalted  rank  have  distinguished  themselves,  and  the  return  of 
which  should  be  enforced  with  pitiless  rigor,  Belgium  has 
been  subject  to  another  form  of  pillage  for  which  there  is 
hardly  a  precedent.  As  has  already  been  said,  Belgium  is 
primarily  an  industrial  state,  and  as  such,  one  of  Germany's 
great  competitors.  When  first  occupied  by  Germany,  there 
was  an  obvious  attempt  to  preserve  the  industrial  plant, 
and  every  inducement  was  offered  to  employers  to  resume 
operations  and  continue  to  give  the  population  employment. 
Belgium  was  at  that  time  regarded  as  a  German  province 
and  was  protected  in  its  industrial  interests  like  any  other 
section  of  the  Empire.  But  when  later  it  became  apparent 
that  Belgium  could  not  be  retained,  the  policy  of  the  invader 
changed.  A  systematic  removal  of  all  valuable  machinery, 
raw  materials,  and  industrial  movables  of  every  sort  was 
undertaken  and  Belgium  was  stripped  bare.  Doubtless  the 
intention  is  to  destroy  buildings  and  other  immovables  if 
the  evacuation  actually  takes  place,  the  complete  destruction 
of  Antwerp  and  Brussels  being  contemplated,  it  is  said,  in 
that  event.  The  object  is,  of  course,  to  destroy  Belgian  com- 
petition after  the  war.  If  Belgium  will  not  work  for  Ger- 
many, she  shall  not  be  allowed  to  work  against  her. 

We  are  too  apt  to  confine  our  thought  to  the  money  loss 
involved  in  such  a  program.  The  time  loss  is  here  even 
more  important.     We  are  so  accustomed  to  having  access  to 


BELGIUM  171 

a  plethoric  market  where  you  can  buy  anything  and  in 
any  quantity  if  you  have  money  enough,  that  a  compounding 
of  injuries  in  terms  of  money  is  too  readily  accepted  as 
satisfactory.  But  after  the  war  no  such  market  will  exist 
for  years  to  come.  There  will  be  no  end  of  things,  and 
among  them  chiefly  these  great  requisites  of  industrial  recon- 
struction, which  will  not  be  purchasable  for  love  or  money. 
Germany  is  perfectly  aware  of  this  and  is  taking  every  pre- 
caution that  her  factories  shall  be  equipped  and  stocked  ready 
to  start  the  moment  peace  is  declared,  while  her  victorious 
rivals  are  confronted  with  the  painful  task  of  rebuilding. 
Even  if  Belgium  received  an  adequate  money  indemnity, 
she  would  have  to  stand  as  a  petitioner, —  in  part  at  least  be- 
fore German  purveyors, —  and  wait  their  pleasure  for  the 
necessary  equipment. 

The  remedy  in  this  case  is  obviously  restitution  in  hind. 
Not  necessarily  the  identical  machines,  for  their  present 
availability  is  doubtful,  but  equivalent  articles  from  Ger- 
man factories  or  German  stocks  sufficient  to  reinstate  Belgian 
industry  in  the  shortest  possible  time.  Both  in  purchasable 
equipment  and  in  raw  materials,  Belgium  should  be  supplied 
before  Germany  receives  her  allotment.  Failing  these  pre- 
cautions, Germany  whose  factories  are  essentially  intact,  will 
make  a  rush  for  world  markets  from  which  Belgium  will 
long  remain  excluded,  and  into  which  she  will  later  have  to 
force  her  way  against  an  intrenched  and  determined  enemy. 

No  doubt  Germany  will  protest  against  this  on  all  manner 
of  grounds,  equity,  humanity,  and  the  like.  Consistency  is 
not  a  German  characteristic.  But  however  inconsistent,  such 
pleas  are  likely  to  have  their  weight  with  the  Allies,  With 
an  unsubdued  Germany  we  can  deal  sternly,  but  with  a 
beaten  Germany  there  is  danger  that  we  shall  be  soft  hearted. 
It  will  perhaps  be  well  for  us  at  that  time  to  recall  that  Ger- 
many has  pursued  this  policy  of  weakening  her  enemies  in- 


172  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

dustrially  with  a  view  to  their  ultimate  subjection,  all  with 
a  thoroughness  that  we  hardly  yet  appreciate.  Thus  in  the 
famous  Hindenburg  retreat  in  the  spring  of  1917,  not  only 
were  buildings,  railways,  roads,  and  bridges  utterly  destroyed, 
but  fruit  trees  were  sawed  down  or  girdled  and  even  the 
soil,  in  some  cases,  treated  with  chemicals  so  as  to  destroy 
its  fertility.  This  was  not  spite  but  war,  war  projected  far 
beyond  the  present  struggle  into  the  days  of  peace,  to  prevent 
the  little  savings  of  the  French  peasant,  destroy  the  produc- 
tivity of  the  soil,  and  lessen  to  as  great  an  extent  as  possible, 
the  number  of  Frenchmen  who  should  be  born  into  the  world. 
The  forces  thus  launched  will,  to  a  large  extent,  continue 
after  peace, —  a  war  after  the  war.  If  it  was  our  right  and 
our  duty  to  combat  German  aggression  in  its  military  form, 
it  is  equally  our  right  and  our  duty  to  combat  it  in  this  half 
military  form  whose  consequences  are  equally  to  be  feared. 
The  writer  makes  no  plea  for  mere  destructive  retaliation. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that  no  German  factory  will  be  destroyed 
except  as  an  incident  to  legitimate  military  operations.  But 
it  is  equally  to  be  hoped  that  Germany  will  not  be  allowed  to 
profit  by  this  deliberate  spoliation  of  an  industrial  rival. 

But  no  restitution  in  kind  that  is  within  Germany's  power 
can  liquidate  her  debt  to  Belgium.  For  every  article  recov- 
erable a  score  have  been  destroyed,  not  to  speak  of  the  markets 
lost,  the  years  of  labor  wasted,  the  lives  sacrificed,  the  famil- 
ies disrupted,  the  shame  endured,  injuries  for  which  money 
indemnification  is  a  mockery.  Even  the  direct  property 
losses  which  can  be  measurably  expressed  in  terms  of  money, 
attain  a  figure  which,  without  our  recent  experiences,  would 
have  seemed  fabulous.  The  loss  to  industry  during  the 
first  year  of  the  war,  in  buildings  destroyed  and  machinery 
destroyed  or  removed,  is  estimated  at  a  billion  dollars,  while 
agriculture  lost  in  buildings,  implements,  and  crops,  seven 
hundred  and  eighty  millions  more.     Meanwhile  war  con- 


BELGIUM  173 

tributions,  systematically  exacted  throughout  the  period  of 
occupation,  from  cities,  provinces,  individuals,  corporations, 
from  anything,  in  short,  from  which  money  might  be  ex- 
torted, attain  a  staggering  total  for  which  as  yet  no  reliable 
estimates  are  available.  Meanwhile  Belgium  has  borrowed 
from  the  United  States  alone  in  the  short  space  of  eighteen 
months,  the  sum  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  seven  million 
dollars  to  feed  her  starving  people,  while  similar  obligations 
have  been  incurred  toward  other  governments, —  all  this  in 
addition  to  some  three  hundred  millions  spent  for  like  pur- 
pose in  charity.  The  direct  property  loss  alone  amounts  to 
several  billions. 

This,  of  course  is  but  the  beginning  of  injuries  suffered. 
German  authorities  state  that  in  a  single  year  there  were  a 
hundred  thousand  convictions  in  Belgium  by  military 
tribunal.  We  may  safely  assume  that  most  of  these  were 
incident  to  the  invasion  and  that  they  constituted  in  the 
aggregate  merely  a  colossal  injury  to  the  Belgian  people. 
The  nameless  injuries  unofficially  inflicted  and  above  all  the 
ruin  of  Belgian  industry  with  its  resulting  demoralization 
of  the  people  swell  the  account  beyond  the  limits  of  the  im- 
agination. 

Any  proposal  that  Germany  should  fully  indemnify  Bel- 
gium for  these  losses  breaks  down  from  sheer,  demonstrable 
impossibility.  To  exact  the  full  toll  would  be  to  sell  her 
land  under  the  hammer  and  her  people  into  bondage.  There 
is  a  limit  to  what  Germany  can  do,  and  a  much  narrower 
limit  to  what  it  is  expedient  to  compel  her  to  do.  We  must 
beware  of  settling  such  a  question  in  a  spasm  of  moral  in- 
dignation. Not  only  would  such  a  payment  ruin  Germany 
utterly,  but  it  would  ruin  Belgium.  We  have  considered 
elsewhere  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  such  adjustments. 

But  impossible  as  it  is  thus  to  square  the  account,  this  is  a 
connection  in  which  the  conscience  of  the  world  simply  will 


174  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

not  be  placated  without  a  measure  of  reparation.  Not  only 
have  the  Allies  been  a  unit  in  demanding  it  from  the  first, 
but  German  voices  have  been  heard  from  time  to  time  de- 
manding reparation  to  Belgium  in  the  interest  of  the  na- 
tional honor.  Doubtless  such  voices  are  rare,  but  the  fact 
that  they  are  heard  at  all  from  a  people  which  could  com- 
placently hear  from  its  prophet  of  world  dominion  the  in- 
junction to  "  leave  to  the  conquered  nothing  but  their  eyes 
to  weep  with  "  is  an  indication  of  the  enormity  of  Germany's 
crime  in  the  eyes  of  all  men. 

Aside,  therefore,  from  the  restitution  in  kind  which  has 
been  urged,  a  reasonable, —  that  is  to  say,  a  practicable, — 
indemnity  may  be  —  must  be, —  exacted.  It  would  be  well 
that  this  should  cover  certain  specific  losses  the  nature  of 
which  leaves  least  reason  to  fear  a  demoralizing  reaction 
upon  the  people.  Such  would  be  the  payment  of  loans  made 
by  the  Allies  which  must  otherwise  become  a  burden  upon 
the  Belgian  taxpayer,  the  return  of  war  contributions  which 
have  been  largely  taken  from  the  active  industrial  capital 
of  the  country  and  again  are  largely  represented  at  pres- 
ent by  loans  for  which  tax  payers  are  responsible,  and  the 
restoration  of  buildings  required  for  industrial  purposes. 
From  Germany,  too,  might  be  secured  the  equipment  or  the 
funds,  one  or  both,  for  fortifying  the  eastern  frontier  against 
her  future  aggression.  Possibly  the  object  lesson  would 
have  its  value.  How  much  this  indemnity  can  or  should 
be  made,  having  regard  always  to  the  danger  of  general  de- 
moralization, it  is  impossible  for  the  writer  to  form  any  idea. 
There  are  other  claimants  to  be  heard, —  none  quite  so  de- 
serving as  Belgium,  but  still  entitled  to  a  hearing  before 
Belgium  is  fully  recompensed.  When  the  utmost  has  been 
exacted  that  it  is  safe  or  even  possible  to  demand,  Belgium 
will  still  be  compelled  to  begin  life  anew  under  conditions 
closely  approximating  to  economic  ruin, 


CHAPTEE  XII 

FRANCE 

The  reasons  which  induced  France  to  enter  the  war,  or 
more  exactly,  the  reasons  which  induced  Germany  to  at- 
tack her,  were  many  and  varied.  To  the  popular  mind  the 
issue  was,  for  France,  the  recovery  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and 
for  Germany  its  defense  and  retention.  There  can  be  no 
question  that  this  is  a  completely  erroneous  conception  of 
the  situation.  France  had  long  since  decided  never  to  go 
to  war  to  recover  Alsace-Lorraine  and  Germany  knew  that 
the  issue  was  dead  unless  she  revived  it.  On  the  other  hand, 
France  had  prospered  greatly  in  the  field  of  colonial  enter- 
prise, and  in  company  with  Britain,  by  the  simple  fact  of 
anticipating  Germany's  tardy  ambition,  effectually  blocked 
the  way  to  the  realization  of  Germany's  vast  designs.  More- 
over France  had  accumulated, —  thanks  in  part  to  Germany's 
earlier  indemnity  exactions, —  a  huge  capital,  the  power  of 
which  Germany  had  more  than  once  been  taught  to  fear. 
Germany,  balked  in  her  expansionist  designs  by  French  oc- 
cupancy and  by  French  finance,  boldly  determined  to  ap- 
propriate both  her  colonies  and  her  capital.  The  funda- 
mental fact  which  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  is  that  it  was 
Germany  that  had  the  grievance  and  Germany  that  was  the 
aggressor.  For  France  more  than  for  any  other  of  the  great 
powers,  this  is  a  war  of  defense.  We  need  not  rest  this 
conclusion  on  French  assertions  or  on  any  estimate  of  French 
character.  It  inhered  in  the  situation.  The  claim  of  Ger- 
many that  Britain  and  France  we're  the  aggressors  is  pal- 
pably absurd.  They  were  the  possessors  and  Germany  the 
dispossessed.     They  were  creditor  nations  and  Germany  a 

175 


176  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

debtor  nation.  A  successful  war  would  have  given  them 
little  that  they  did  not  already  possess,  unless  it  be  immun- 
ity from  the  menace  of  German  attack,  while  a  successful 
war  for  Germany  would  have  won  her  an  imperial  domain 
and  an  enormous  loot  The  nations  that  have  much  to  lose 
and  little  to  gain  by  war,  have  given  hostages  to  keep  the 
peace.  Those  who  are  familiar  with  recent  European  his- 
tory will  not  forget  that  the  French  general  election,  held 
but  a  few  weeks  before  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war, 
returned  a  distinctly  pacifist  majority  to  Parliament  and 
virtually  assured  a  policy  of  semi-disarmament,  the  peril  of 
which  was  averted  only  by  the  heroic  extra-constitutional  in- 
sistence of  President  Poincare.  The  forcible  recovery  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  was  certainly  farthest  from  the  thought  of 
this  prosperous  and  pacific  people. 

But  the  war  came  and  not  only  revived  the  old  passion 
but  furnished  new  and  compelling  reasons  for  the  recovery 
of  the  lost  provinces.  If  France  could  live  at  peace  with 
Germany,  she  could  spare  them,  though  not  without  loss. 
If  she  must  fight  Germany,  they  were  indispensable.  What 
then  is  the  problem  of  Alsace-Lorraine  ? 

The  population  comes  first  to  mind.  To  the  novice,  in- 
deed, it  is  the  only  consideration.  What  is  their  race,  their 
nationality,  their  affiliation,  their  history?  The  answer  to 
these  questions  will  illustrate  the  difficulty  of  these  easily 
proposed  ethnic  solutions. 

In  race,  these  provinces  have  the  normal  border  character 
of  a  no-man's  land.  The  predominant  racial  stock  is  neither 
French  nor  German,  but  belongs  to  an  earlier  race.  This, 
however,  counts  for  little,  as  we  have  seen.  In  language  there 
is  much  mixture.  Alsace  is  and  always  has  been  predomi- 
nantly German  in  speech,  though  French  is  spoken  in  certain 
frontier  districts.  But  this  German  is  a  most  extraordinary 
dialect,  entirely  unintelligible  to  one  who  understands  only 


FRANCE  177 

high  German.  In  Lorraine  a  little  less  than  half  the  terri- 
tory is  French.  Taking  the  two  provinces  together,  a  little 
less  than  one-tenth  of  the  population  are  accounted  as  French 
speaking  and  the  area  in  which  French  predominates  is  not 
much  greater. 

But  these  figures  are  most  deceptive.  In  the  first  place 
Germany  easily  manipulates  these  figures  by  recording  as 
German  all  who  speak  German,  regardless  of  whether  they 
speak  French  also,  a  procedure  of  immense  importance  in  a 
border  province  where  a  knowledge  of  both  languages  is  com- 
mon. When  we  remember  that  throughout  the  period  of 
German  occupation,  the  German  language  has  been  employed 
in  the  schools  to  the  exclusion  of  French,  and  that  by  the 
above  procedure  Germany  has  succeeded  in  reducing  her 
Polish  population  to  negligible  proportions,1  we  may  assume 
that  these  statistics  hardly  correspond  to  fact,  or  if  they 
do,  the  fact  loses  its  usual  racial  significance.  It  is  doubt- 
less true,  however,  that  the  population  is  predominantly  Ger- 
man, and  in  Alsace  almost  wholly  so,  the  more  so  as  France 
during  her  control  of  these  territories,  made  no  effort  to 
force  the  French  language  upon  them. 

But  whatever  the  proportion,  the  dividing  line  loses  most 
of  its  significance  from  the  fact  that  it  is  not  a  line  at  all. 
Throughout  practically  the  entire  area  the  two  languages 
are  intermingled,  especially  in  Lorraine.  There  is  very  lit- 
tle advantage  in  assigning  an  area  of  mixed  speech  to  one 
side  or  the  other. 

A  farther  fact  which  greatly  modifies  the  significance  of 
these  data  is  the  enormous  displacement  of  population  which 
followed  German  occupation  and  which  would  undoubtedly 
attend  another  transfer.  When  Germany  took  possession 
she  substituted  for  the  tolerant  policy  of  France,  a  program 
of  strenuous  Germanization.     This  and  other  features  of 

1  Her  stock  assertion  now  is  that  "  there  is  no  German  Poland." 


178  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

German  rule  were  displeasing  to  the  population,  Germanic 
though  it  was,  and  all  who  could  feasibly  leave  the  country, 
did  so.  The  nearby  French  city  of  Nancy  promptly  received 
an  addition  of  a  third  to  its  population.  It  was  one  of  the 
suggestive  results  of  the  war  that  the  German  dialect  of 
Alsace  dominated  whole  quarters  of  this  French  city  be- 
cause the  Alsatians  objected  to  being  Germanized.  Alto- 
gether it  is  claimed  that  a  full  quarter  of  the  population 
left  the  provinces,  despite  the  great  industrial  development 
which  offered  them  such  inducements  to  remain.  Their 
places  were  of  course  taken  by  German  immigrants.  During 
the  present  war,  as  the  possibility  of  reference  of  the  ques- 
tion to  popular  vote  has  forced  itself  upon  German  atten- 
tion, this  displacement  of  population  is  said  to  have  been 
systematically  continued,  unsympathetic  proprietors  being 
expropriated  and  their  holdings  disposed  of  to  loyal  Ger- 
mans. Germany  probably  has  little  reason  to  fear  the  re- 
sults of  a  plebiscite.  All  this  raises  the  question,  however,  as 
to  the  validity  of  such  a  plebiscite,  even  if  the  principle  were 
conceded.  If  we  are  to  consult  the  wishes  of  the  Alsatians, 
it  is  pertinent  to  inquire,  who  are  the  Alsatians  ?  Have  the 
exiles  no  rights?  Have  the  immigrants  full  rights,  espe- 
cially those  so  lately  rushed  in  to  stuff  the  ballot  box  ?  It  is 
impossible  to  give  a  sweeping  answer  either  way.  The  ex- 
iles are  hopelessly  lost;  the  immigrants  for  the  most  part 
there  to  stay.  There  is  nothing  to  do  but  accept  the  situa- 
tion. Yet  Germany  would  ask  nothing  better  in  the  case  of 
Belgium  or  the  Baltic  Provinces  than  to  refer  their  case  to 
a  vote  if  she  is  given  the  privilege  of  preliminary  seizure  and 
forty  years  of  forcible  preparation.1 

i  It  i8  well  to  recall  that  the  dominant  Pan-German  party  demand  not 
only  the  annexation  of  Belgium,  but  the  expropriation  and  German 
ownership  of  its  essential  industries.  The  very  monstrousness  of  Ger- 
man demands  serves  in  no  small  degree  to  camouflage  them  from  their 
victims.    The  decent  world  has  simply  lost  the  power  to  believe  things 


FRANCE  179 

To  the  claim  that  Alsace-Lorraine  is  historically  a  part 
of  France,  Germany  replies  that  it  is  also  historically  a  part 
of  Germany,  and  that  that  connection  is  older  and  of  longer 
standing.  This  is  true,  especially  as  regards  Alsace,  which 
belonged  to  Germany  from  925  to  1681,  or  between  seven  and 
eight  centuries,  while  the  connection  with  France  was  only 
from  1681  to  1871  or  less  than  two  hundred  years.  But  the 
German  is  careful  not  to  recall  what  we  are  all  too  prone  to 
forget,  namely,  that  there  was  no  Germany  at  that  time. 
There  was  a  German  people  existing  in  the  shape  of  numer- 
ous petty  states  of  which  Alsace  was  one,  but  there  was  no 
German  nation  and  consequently  no  conscious  German  na- 
tionality. Alsace  during  these  early  centuries  developed 
a  nationality  of  her  own,  but  no  other.  Not  till  she  became 
a  part  of  France  in  1681  did  she  have  any  chance  to  develop 
the  sentiment  of  allegiance  to  a  great  modern  nation.  She 
came  to  France,  therefore,  racially  but  not  politically,  Ger- 
man. It  is  a  surprising  attestation  of  the  liberality  of 
French  character,  that  though  her  government  was  at  that 
time  wholly  autocratic,  the  policy  adopted  toward  the  new 
province  was  one  of  extreme  tolerance  and  moderation.  It 
was  completely  successful,  with  the  curious  result  that  Alsace 
became  as  loyal  as  any  French  province,  while  retaining  its 
essentially  German  character,  thus  hopelessly  complicating 
the  ethnic-political  problem.  We  have  seen  that  race  at  the  5 
best  is  not  a  sufficient  determinant  of  nationality.     In  such 

that  Germany  coolly  professes.  Yet  Germany  has  been  doing  these 
things  for  decades.  One  reason  why  "  there  is  no  German  Poland  "  is 
that  Germany  has  long  been  expropriating  the  intractable  Poles  Many 
years  ago  when  the  writer  was  a  student  in  the  University  of  Berlin,  a 
distinguished  professor  created  a  sensation  there  by  denouncing  this 
policy  of  forcible  displacement  as  too  drastic.  He  urged  that  Germany 
had  only  to  leave  the  Pole  without  education,  save  of  a  rudimentary 
character,  and  the  better-educated  German  would  soon  displace  him  by 
natural  means.  This  amazing  proposition  in  governmental  circles 
was  regarded  as  almost  treasonably  lenient,  and  the  professor  was  for 
a  time  in  marked  disfavor. 


180  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

a  confused  and  contradictory  form  as  this  it  becomes  well- 
nigh  negligible. 

Turning  to  the  physical  or  strategic  problem,  the  data  are 
still  conflicting.  Lorraine  is  physically  a  part  of  France, 
though  the  dividing  line  is  not  sharp.  There  is  no  serrated 
ridge  or  commanding  stream  plainly  destined  by  nature  as  a 
boundary, —  unless  we  regard  the  Rhine  as  such,  which  has 
its  difficulties.  The  whole  district  is  rather  the  barrier, 
which  of  course  makes  it  debatable  ground.  Turning  far- 
ther south,  there  are  two  natural  and  rather  pronounced  par- 
allel barriers,  the  Rhine  and  the  Vosges  Mountains  with  a 
broad  valley  between  them.  This  valley  is  Alsace  and  the 
mountains  or  the  river  became  the  international  boundary 
according  as  the  one  people  or  the  other  proved  the  stronger. 
On  the  whole  the  mountains  have  had  the  advantage,  as  is 
indicated  by  the  fact  that  during  the  period  of  linguistic  de- 
termination, German  was  established  in  the  valley.  But 
during  the  period  of  political  determination,  France  had 
the  advantage,  and  established,  as  we  have  seen,  her  na- 
tionality in  the  valley.  It  is  still  something  of  a  draw 
game,  but  with  this  reflection  that  the  whole  territory  is  a 
region  of  tremendous  strength,  giving  its  possessor  a  power 
of  offense  or  defense  which  the  other  can  not  match.  Those 
concerned  for  the  world's  peace  may  well  be  interested  in 
the  character  and  designs  of  the  holder. 

We  come  finally  to  the  most  important  consideration  of  all, 
the  natural  resources  of  the  district.  These  consist  chiefly 
of  that  great  determinant  of  national  destiny,  iron,  together 
with  a  large  deposit  of  potash  of  which  Germany  has  otherwise 
a  practical  monopoly.  We  here  approach  what  is  beyond 
question  the  most  important  problem  of  the  entire  peace  set- 
tlement. It  is  a  sad  fact  that  the  supreme  factor  in  the  deter- 
mination of  national  destinies  is  one  of  which  the  American 
people  in  its  discussion  of  this  question,  has  seemed  as  yet 


FKANCE  183 

almost  wholly  unconscious.  It  is  a  familiar  truth  that  in  war 
the  victory  always  inclines  to  the  side  that  has  the  most  men 
and  the  amplest  equipment.  Leadership  of  course  counts  for 
much  and  may,  in  a  given  war,  decide  the  issue.  But  leader- 
ship is  a  short-lived  thing.  If  a  Napoleon  gives  the  victory  to 
France,  it  is  only  for  a  short  time.  Napoleon  passes,  and  a 
Moltke  appears  on  the  other  side  and  turns  the  scale.  The 
personal  factor  is  but  a  ripple  on  the  surface.  It  is  the  great 
undercurrent  of  men  and  resources  that  determines  the 
result. 

But  even  here  we  have  not  reached  the  final  term.  We 
have  seen  that  resources  develop  population.  In  1750  it  was 
generally  assumed  that  England  had  reached  her  limit  of 
population  at  the  long  stationary  figure  of  eight  millions. 
Then  came  the  discovery  of  coal  and  the  development  of  her 
great  industries,  and  her  population  rose  to  thirty-eight  mil- 
lions. It  was  coal  and  iron  that  made  the  extra  thirty  mil- 
lions. 

Exactly  the  same  thing  is  happening  in  Germany  today. 
Her  population  has  gained  about  thirty  millions  in  forty 
years,  and  it  is  iron  and  coal  that  have  produced  the  extra 
thirty  millions.  Meanwhile  France  has  not  increased,  and 
it  is  at  bottom  primarily  for  this  reason,  that  she  lacks  the 
iron  and  coal.  It  is  iron  and  coal  that  produce  the  men  and 
it  is  iron  and  coal  that  arm  and  equip  the  men.  Hence  we 
come  to  the  farther  truth, —  the  almost  appalling  truth.  It 
is  natural  resources  that  determine  the  strength  and  the 
ultimate  destiny  of  nations. 

The  question  naturally  arises,  whether  there  is  any  limit 
to  this  principle.  If  a  country  like  Germany  or  France  were 
one  vast  coal  and  iron  mine  with  absolutely  limitless  sup- 
plies, would  it  have  limitless  power?  Would  it  not  have, 
after  all,  other  limitations  of  space  or  food  which  would 
affect  the  result?    Yes,  undoubtedly,  if  it  remained  in  its 


184  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

original  boundaries.  But  that  is  exactly  what  it  would  not 
do.  Such  a  country  would  develop  and  equip  a  very  large 
population,  all  that  it  could  raise  or  buy  food  for,  and  with 
this  population  it  would  conquer  additional  territories  in 
which  it  could  raise  more  food  and  develop  more  population, 
and  so  on  to  the  end.  If  its  supplies  of  iron  and  coal  were 
far  superior  to  those  of  other  powers  and  if  they  were  not 
early  taken,  before  the  nation  had  time  to  grow  to  them,  there 
could  be  but  one  result.  That  nation  would  dominate  the 
rest. 

This  is  almost  the  exact  situation  in  Europe  today.  It  is 
of  course  impossible  to  tell  with  exactness  how  much  of  these 
minerals  lies  buried  in  the  earth,  but  estimates  have  been 
made  in  Europe  with  great  care,  especially  in  the  matter  of 
coal.  According  to  these  estimates  Belgium  has  a  coal  re- 
serve of  11  billion  tons,  France  17  billion  tons,  England  189 
billion  tons,  Russia  233  billion  tons,  and  Germany  409  bil- 
lion tons.  A  billion  is  a  very  large  number  and  even  the 
smallest  of  these  reserves  may  give  us  a  reassuring  sense  of 
sufficiency.  But  in  a  matter  in  which  annual  consumption 
rises  into  the  hundreds  of  millions  and  in  an  age  when  a 
single  steamship  burns  a  thousand  tons  a  day,  these  figures 
become  distinctly  finite.  The  important  thing  to  note  is  that 
Germany  has  today  substantially  half  the  coal  reserves  of 
Europe,  while  France  has  next  to  none.  These  two  countries 
are  nearly  equal  in  size,  but  one  has  about  twenty-five  times 
as  much  coal  as  the  other.  That  difference  is  already  ex- 
pressing itself  in  the  normal  way.  The  two  countries  had 
fifty  years  ago  about  the  same  population.  Today  Germany 
has  thirty  millions  more  than  France  because  they  entered 
the  industrial  era,  the  one  with  coal  and  the  other  without. 
That  difference  in  coal  supply  has  only  begun  to  express 
itself  in  population.  France  can  not  hope  to  redress  the 
balance  unless  she  can  get  larger  supplies  of  coal.     In  that 


FKANCE  185 

industrial  development  which  is  preeminently  the  measure 
of  modern  national  power,  France  is  a  case  of  arrested  de- 
velopment.1 

In  the  matter  of  iron  the  balance  is  less  unequal  and  Ger- 
many is  certainly  in  a  less  fortunate  position.  By  far  the 
largest  of  her  ore  beds  is  in  the  extreme  west,  a  huge  deposit 
lying  right  astride  the  present  Franco-German  frontier. 
This  ore  bed  was  carefully  examined  by  German  experts  at 
the  time  the  frontier  was  drawn,  but  with  imperfect  results. 
They  reported  that  only  the  eastern  portion  of  the  field  was 
valuable  and  so  the  western  part  was  graciously  left  to 
France.  Improved  methods,  however,  quickly  invalidated 
their  decision  and  left  Germany  to  mourn  the  loss  of  a  splen- 
did prize  which  had  been  within  her  grasp.  It  is  significant 
that  one  of  the  first  objectives  of  the  German  army  was  this 
iron  mine,  the  seizure  of  which  robbed  France  at  the  very 
outset  of  practically  all  her  material  for  war  and  compelled 
her  to  depend  on  imports  from  America.  The  seizure  of  her 
slight  remaining  coal  fields  completed  her  helplessness.  It 
is  for  that  reason  that  the  French  people  were  doomed  to  pass 
the  past  winter  in  unwarmed  houses. 

Viewed  in  the  light  of  these  facts,  the  disposal  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  acquires  an  entirely  new  significance.  Germany 
will  cling  with  the  utmost  desperation,  to  this  great  ore  bed, 
not  only  to  the  eastern  portion  which  has  been  the  source  of 
three  quarters  of  her  supply  in  the  last  few  decades,  but 
to  the  French  portion  as  well  which  it  was  her  first  care  to 
acquire  and  which  has  been  exploited  with  feverish  activity 
throughout  the  war.     It  is  this  iron  mine  of  Briey  that  the 

i "  Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves.  It  is  not  common  language,  litera- 
ture, or  traditions  alone,  nor  yet  clearly  defined  or  strategic  frontiers, 
that  will  in  the  future  give  stability  to  the  boundary  lines  of  Europe, 
but  rather  such  distribution  of  its  supplies  of  coal  and  iron  as  will 
prevent  any  one  of  the  great  nations  of  Europe  from  becoming  strong 
enough  to  dominate  or  absorb  all  the  others."  Macfarlane,  "  The  Eco- 
nomic Basis  of  an  Enduring  Peace." 


186  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

Germans  have  in  mind  when  they  talk  about  a  "  slight  rectifi- 
cation of  the  western  frontier."  To  possess  this  ore  bed 
would  not  only  disarm  France  completely  and  make  her  de- 
pendent upon  distant  allies,  but  it  would  limit  her  popula- 
tion, prevent  her  industrial  development,  and  in  the  long 
run  make  her  a  ward  of  Germany.  Germany  will  not 
relinquish  without  the  most  desperate  of  struggles  what  is 
virtually  a  guaranty  of  her  eventual  domination.  She  now 
has  the  coal ;  with  a  "  slightly  rectified  "  Alsace-Lorraine, 
she  would  have  the  coal  and  iron  both  necessary  for  the  task. 
Not  willingly  will  Germany  let  such  a  prize  slip  from  her 
grasp.  There  is  reason  to  fear  as  Maximillian  Harden  has 
declared,  that  "  if  necessity  compels  us  to  sign  such  a  peace 
(surrendering  Alsace-Lorraine),  seventy  million  Germans 
will  tear  it  up."  And  for  all  these  reasons  the  French  peo- 
ple, to  whom  the  experiences  of  the  war  have  brought  home 
these  truths  with  new  force,  will  cling  with  the  tenacity  of 
despair  to  this  condition  of  their  safety  and  their  independent 
existence. 

It  is  one  of  the  curious  caprices  of  nature  that  these  vital 
conditions  of  power  and  growth  to  modern  nations  should 
be  located  in  spots  that  were  predestined  to  be  the  frontiers 
between  great  peoples.  If  the  German  coal  and  iron  de- 
posits were  in  Hanover  and  the  French  in  Touraine  with 
only  innocent  farming  land  between  the  two  nations,  the 
problem  would  be  immensely  simplified.  As  it  is,  forty  per 
cent,  of  Germany's  coal  reserves  are  in  Silesia,  an  eastern  and 
essentially  Polish  province  which  would  be  lost  to  Germany 
if  the  more  radical  plans  for  the  reconstitution  of  Poland 
should  be  carried  out, —  which  helps  to  explain  Germany's 
insistence  that  there  is  no  German  Poland.  The  rest  of  her 
coal  is  on  the  western  frontier,  most  of  it  west  of  the  Rhine. 
All  that  France  possesses  lies  in  the  same  uncertain  region. 
The  iron  is  held  in  even  more  dangerous  equipoise.     Nature 


FRANCE  187 

could  hardly  have  better  contrived  to  keep  these  races  at 
odds,  or  shall  we  say, —  to  force  their  ultimate  union  ? 

Returning  now  to  Alsace-Lorraine,  we  have  to  note  the 
important  fact  that  their  restitution  to  France  would  give 
her  the  iron,  but  it  would  give  her  no  coal.  Only  one  of  the 
great  western  coal  fields,  that  of  Saarbrueck,  extends  slightly 
into  the  territory  of  Lorraine.  All  the  rest  that  lies  to  the 
west  of  the  Ehine  is  located  in  the  Ehine  Province,  as  the 
territory  is  called  which  lies  between  Lorraine,  Luxembourg, 
and  Belgium  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Rhine  on  the  other. 
The  restoration  of  these  provinces  would  therefore  have  this 
extraordinary  and  highly  unsatisfactory  result,  that  it  would 
give  about  all  the  iron  of  central  Europe  to  France  and  all 
the  coal  to  Germany,  a  most  doubtful  guaranty  of  peace.  It 
would  be  like  making  peace  between  two  blood  feudists  by 
giving  to  each  hostages  out  of  the  family  of  the  other. 

The  fate  of  Alsace-Lorraine  is  as  nearly  determined  as 
anything  can  be  by  the  present  war.  Elsewhere  everything 
is  still  in  a  state  of  nebulous  generality,  but  here  the  frontiers 
of  our  purpose  are  definite  and  concrete.  France  is  to  have 
Alsace-Lorraine.  It  would  indeed  be  a  neglect  of  the  most 
elemental  precautions  if  the  decision  had  been  otherwise. 
But  in  the  light  of  the  facts  here  set  forth,  it  may  well  be 
asked  whether  this  promises  peace  or  a  renewal  of  the  con- 
flict. Against  that  frontier, —  which  is  henceforth  our 
frontier, —  the  Teutonic  storm  will  beat  with  redoubled  fury. 
Germany  will  not  purr  peacefully  with  such  an  appeal  to  her 
predatory  instincts  constantly  before  her  eyes.  She  will  not 
be  deterred  by  any  international  warnings  to  "  keep  off  the 
grass."  It  will  be  force,  not  mere  international  agreement, 
that  maintains  that  frontier,  force  not  potential  merely,  but 
in  large  part  actual,  equipped  and  ready  for  its  strenuous 
task.  All  the  awful  mandates  of  the  powers  will  avail  noth- 
ing if  Germany  finds  the  frontier  unguarded  and  rushes  the 


188  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

iron  and  coal  mines  and  a  few  strategic  points  from  the  too 
trustful  powers. 

Why  has  the  world  decided  on  just  this  territory  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  ?  Is  it  so  clear  that  this  is  the  measure  of  nature's 
equity,  the  sufficient  guaranty  of  the  world's  peace  ?  Noth- 
ing of  these.  Alsace-Lorraine  is  to  be  returned  because 
Alsace-Lorraine  was  taken  away.  The  Europe  of  yesterday 
was  a  hodge-podge  of  accident,  but  in  this  world  of  new 
forces  and  changed  conditions,  it  is  still  yesterday  that  gives 
the  law  to  today.1  With  all  our  talk  of  destroying  Prussian 
militarism,  we  can  not  bring  ourselves  to  disarm  the  mon- 
ster, because,  forsooth,  the  arms  were  his  of  old.  The  writer 
has  small  hope  that  his  suggestion  will  commend  itself  to  a 
world  obsessed  with  the  idea  that  the  surface  facts  of  local 
prejudice  and  habit  are  the  legitimate  determinants  of  na- 
tionality. Yet  human  progress  has  been  a  continual  struggle 
against  these  surface  accidents,  a  continual  yielding  on  their 
part  to  the  inexorable  forces  of  environment.  But  however 
hopeless  the  suggestion,  there  is  but  one  suggestion  possible 
as  the  result  of  this  reasoning.  The  Rhine  Province  and  the 
|  Palatinate  should  go  with  Alsace-Lorraine.  That  territory 
cuts  a  huge  notch  out  of  the  natural  unity  of  the  west  Khine 
territory,  with  no  other  result  than  to  take  from  the  western 
peoples  practically  all  their  coal  and  make  their  frontier  in- 
defensible. Its  cession  to  Prance  would  restore  the  boundary 
of  Caesar,  the  boundary  of  nature.  It  would  still  leave  Ger- 
many twice  as  much  coal  as  it  would  give  to  Belgium  and 
France.  It  would  be,  under  modern  conditions,  a  bourdary 
virtually  immune  from  aggression  as  between  peoples  measur- 
ably equal  in  equipment  for  defense.  Finally,  it  would  give 
to  France  the  possibility  of  that  industrial  development  that  is 
now  so  unrighteously  denied  her,   a  development  without 

i"Das  ewig  Gestrige  das  immer  war  und  immer  wiederkehrt, 
Und  heute  gilt  weil's  gestern  hat  gegolten." 

—  Schiixeb,  "  Wallenstein." 


FRANCE  189 

which  she  has  no  future  and  German  domination  of  the  con- 
tinent with  all  its  illimitable  possibilities  becomes  assured. 
It  is  the  irreducible  minimum  of  concession  if  we  are  to  have 
peace  on  this  border  which  is  the  Armageddon  of  the  nations. 

It  will  of  course  be  objected  that  this  leaves  Germany  t 
insufficiently  supplied  with  iron.  There  is  truth  in  this. 
Importations  from  Sweden  and  from  the  recently  discovered 
deposits  of  Lapland,  a  pretty  safe  supply  even  in  war, 
and  possibly  from  imperfectly  explored  southern  sources, 
must  less  conveniently  eke  out  her  supply  from  other  home  i 
sources.  Possibly  we  might  reconcile  ourselves  just  now  to 
seeing  a  nation  that  is  equally  predatory  with  steel  billets 
and  steel  cannon,  a  little  straitened  for  the  present  in  her 
supply.  But  after  all  this  question  is  irrelevant.  There 
is  no  iron  in  the  Rhine  Province.  If  Germany  is  to  get 
her  iron  in  the  west,  she  must  have  Alsace-Lorraine  and 
perhaps  some  "  rectifications."  That  we  do  not  propose  to 
give  her.  But  the  Rhine  Province  has  coal,  our  coal,  and  it 
is  on  our  side  the  river. 

But  here  comes  the  stubborn  fact.  It  was  not  so  from 
the  olden  time.  These  people  are  Germans.  Yes,  and  so 
are  the  Alsatians.  France  won  them  by  fairness  and  toler- 
ance. She  can  win  the  others  by  the  same.  Doubtless  a 
transfer  would  mean  an  exodus  of  the  irreconcilable  among 
this  German  population.  But  it  is  an  open  question  whether 
there  would  not  be  as  many  who  would  welcome  the  transfer. 
The  people  of  the  Rhine  Province  do  not  love  the  Prussian.  I 
In  any  case,  the  people  that  has  solemnly  proposed  that  all 
non-Germanic  population  in  America  and  Australia  should 
be  transported  to  Africa  can  hardly  complain  of  a  transfer 
that  exiles  and  oppresses  no  one,  even  if  it  should  result  in 
something  of  voluntary  exodus  to  congenial  lands  across  the 
river. 

France,  like  Belgium,  has  a  vast  claim  against  Germany 


190  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

on  the  score  of  property  destroyed  and  injuries  of  every  sort 
inflicted.  As  already  indicated,  however,  these  claims  rest 
on  a  technically  different  basis.  France  is  a  great  power,  a 
long  standing  and  recognized  rival  of  Germany,  and  not 
under  German  guaranty.  It  is  not  claimed  that  this  differ- 
ence is  more  than  technical.  France  was  peaceable  and  her 
warfare  against  Germany  was  of  that  legitimate  sort  which 
can  not  be  held  to  justify  military  reprisals.  Still,  techni- 
cal though  it  be,  the  difference  is  such  as  to  give  Belgium 
a  prior  claim.  If  it  be  practicable  to  indemnify  both  with- 
out injurious  reactions  upon  themselves  and  upon  the  world, 
by  all  means  let  it  be  done,  but  on  this  point  the  writer 
has  already  expressed  his  doubts. 

The  great  question  of  colonial  possessions,  a  question  in 
which  France  is  deeply  interested,  may  be  reserved  for  sep- 
arate consideration. 

Note.  A  glance  at  the  map  on  page  181  will  disclose  the  fact  that 
the  Rhine  Province  lies  in  part  between  Belgium  and  the  Rhine.  The 
annexation  of  this  part  to  France  would  be  highly  unnatural.  It  would 
therefore  be  the  natural  thing  to  make  Belgium  rather  than  France  the 
beneficiary  in  this  region.  This  would  have  the  farther  advantage  that 
adjacent  Belgium  is  Flemish,  that  is,  low  German,  in  speech,  essentially 
the  same  as  the  Rhine  Province.  The  writer  has  made  no  effort  to  decide 
this  question  of  local  convenience.  The  Allies  in  this  region  are 
considered  as  a  unit  and  the  transfer  here  proposed  is  urged  on  behalf 
of  the  group  rather  than  of  any  particular  member.  An  extension  of 
Belgium  and  possibly  a  modification  of  the  Dutch  frontier  might  well  be 
necessary  in  case  of  this  transfer. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

ITALY 

The  entry  of  Italy  into  the  war  was  in  a  sense  unlike  that 
of  the  other  Allies.  It  had  no  immediate  connection  with 
the  crisis  which  seemed  to  determine  the  action  of  the  others. 
Indeed,  Italy  had  seemed  to  share  the  apprehensions  of 
Austria  at  the  rising  power  of  Serbia.  This  previous  atti- 
tude together  with  her  alliance  with  the  Central  Powers 
and  her  long  hesitation  before  taking  the  decisive  step,  made 
her  action  seem  peculiarly  deliberate  and  calculating.  Prob- 
ably the  difference  was  mostly  seeming,  for  the  action  of 
those  powers  that  made  most  of  the  Serbian  and  Belgian 
episodes  was  really  determined  by  very  serious  considerations 
of  self-preservation.  It  was  no  burst  of  moral  indignation 
at  violated  pledges  or  impudent  demands  that  swept  Prance 
and  Britain  off  their  feet,  though  that  indignation  was  tre- 
mendous and  sincere.  This  wave  of  emotion  greatly  aided 
those  governments  in  quickly  marshalling  their  people  to  pro- 
tect their  vital  interests,  but  it  was  those  interests  which  the 
statesmen  of  those  powers  believed  to  be  jeopardized,  that 
were  the  real  ground  of  their  action.  The  emotional  out- 
burst in  those  countries  served,  therefore,  to  somewhat  screen 
the  deeper  movement  of  the  nation. 

In  Italy  this  screen  was  lacking.  The  psychological  mo- 
ment for  moral  protest  had  passed  when  Italy,  after  pro- 
longed parley  with  both  camps,  finally  took  the  decisive 
step.  It  is  true  that  ardent  protagonists  of  the  Italian  cause 
have  attempted  to  claim  for  Italy  a  share  in  this  moral 
spontaneity  so  honored  in  popular  judgment.     We  are  told 

that  the  Italian  people  forced  a  cautious  and  reluctant  gov- 

191 


192  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

eminent  to  enter  the  war  in  vindication  of  its  honor  and 
on  behalf  of  the  sacred  rights  of  humanity.  There  was  un- 
doubtedly pressure  from  a  certain  section  of  the  Italian  pub- 
lic, and  no  doubt  these  sentiments  were  urged  and  sincerely 
entertained,  but  they  have  impressed  the  world  less  than 
similar  sentiments  in  other  countries.  This  seemingly  calcu- 
lated pursuit  of  self  interest  is  noted,  not  by  way  of  criticism 
of  the  Italian  people,  with  whom  the  writer  claims  a  personal 
relation  of  friendship  of  more  than  thirty  years  standing, 
but  rather  in  their  defense.  Their  case  is  quite  as  strong 
as  that  of  the  others,  but  it  does  not  look  so  and  has  in  fact 
made  less  appeal. 

Italy  entered  the  war  chiefly  for  two  reasons,  antagonism 
to  Austria, —  one  of  the  deepest  antagonisms  in  Europe, — 
and  desire  to  better  her  very  unsatisfactory  strategic  position. 
The  first  reason,  antagonism,  was  the  popular  motive  because 
it  rested  on  facts  that  were  within  popular  memory.  It 
had,  of  course,  its  generous  counterpart  or  aspect  in  irredent- 
ism,  the  desire  to  redeem  their  kinsmen  from  the  hated 
Austrian  rule.  The  second  or  strategic  argument  was  the 
one  that  actuated  the  Italian  statesmen  and  military  leaders. 
It  was  abundantly  justified  by  the  situation.  To  a  consider- 
able extent  the  strategic  and  ethnic  demands  coincided.  To 
a  much  greater  extent  they  were  made  to  seem  to  do  so. 

The  antagonism  to  Austria  is  based  on  very  substantial 
grounds.  Her  rule  over  the  once  highly  civilized  independ- 
ent states  of  northern  Italy,  was  both  unnatural  and  unen- 
lightened. The  friction  engendered  by  it  increased  steadily 
to  its  close  in  1866.  To  this  was  added  another  source  of 
friction  when  in  1870  Italy  broke  with  the  Vatican,  a  rup- 
ture seemingly  unavoidable  if  Italy  was  to  be  consolidated. 
During  this  long  period  of  struggle,  Austria  remained  the 
one  uncompromisingly  Catholic  power,  upholding  not  merely 
the  Catholic  faith,  but  the  Catholic  claims  to  temporal  rule. 


ITALY  193 

Indeed,  throughout  the  earlier  struggle  for  independence  and 
nationality,  Austria  appears,  not  only  as  claimant  for  Italian 
territories  on  her  own  behalf,  but  always  as  the  staunch  up- 
holder of  Papal  claims.  As  the  feud  between  the  Quirinal 
and  the  Vatican  has  never  been  settled,  so  the  feud  between 
Italy  and  Austria  has  necessarily  continued.  It  is  difficult 
for  one  not  familiar  with  internal  conditions  in  the  two  coun- 
tries to  appreciate  the  inevitableness  of  all  this.  Austria 
is  a  group  of  alien  and  even  antagonistic  nationalities  united 
almost  solely  by  fealty  to  their  personal  sovereign  and  their 
loyalty  to  the  Catholic  faith.  For  these  states,  if  their  union 
is  to  be  preserved,  the  Catholic  faith  is  an  indispensable 
political  factor.  In  Italy,  on  the  other  hand,  we  are  dealing 
with  a  single  race  whose  natural  political  union  was  long 
blocked  by  the  Catholic  church  as  ruler  of  the  centrally  sit- 
uated Papal  States.  For  Italy,  therefore,  it  was  absolutely 
essential  that  the  Catholic  church  should  disappear  as  a 
political  factor.  These  two  nations  were  therefore  squarely 
opposed  in  a  matter  that  was  vital  to  each.  The  result  was 
antagonism,  deep  and  long  standing,  which  has  become  an 
instinct  of  their  people.  Nor  can  we  escape  the  conclusion 
that  this  antagonism  is  a  living  one,  not  merely  a  memory. 
The  forces  that  produced  it  are  in  part  still  active  and  con- 
tributing to  its  maintenance.  Austrian  rule  over  northern 
Italy  has  greatly  diminished,  but  it  has  not  wholly  disap- 
peared, while  the  fundamental  conflict  regarding  Catholic 
claims,  though  perhaps  less  keenly  felt  than  formerly,  is 
still  present.  This  antagonism  is  therefore  one  of  the  great 
factors  to  be  reckoned  with  in  the  approaching  settlement. 
Resting  as  it  does  upon  Italian  unity,  Austrian  diversity, 
and  Catholic  claims,  it  must  apparently  continue  as  long  as 
these  continue.  The  dissolution  of  Austria  might  remove 
it,  for  it  apparently  does  not  hold  against  the  component 
parts  of  the  Austrian  state,  but  only  against  the  government 


194  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

which  represents  their  union.  The  renunciation  of  the  claim 
of  the  church  to  territorial  sovereignty  might  also  remove  it, 
would  certainly  reduce  it.  The  disappearance  of  Italian 
unity  is  a  contingency  which  we  seemingly  need  not  consider. 
Turning  to  the  problem  of  Italy's  strategic  frontier,  her 
grievance  is  plain.  The  Austro-Italian  boundary  was  deter- 
mined in  1866  under  peculiar  conditions.  France  and  Italy 
had  just  fought  an  indecisive  war  against  Austria.  Success- 
ful on  land,  they  had  met  decisive  defeat  in  the  Adriatic, 
and  it  is  doubtful  what  the  result  would  have  been  had 
Austria  not  been  overwhelmingly  defeated  at  the  same  mo- 
ment by  Prussia.  This  defeat  of  Austria  by  a  power  which 
was  anything  but  an  ally  of  France,  alarmed  the  latter  and 
made  her  come  to  terms  with  Austria  on  her  own  account 
and  with  little  reference  to  the  interests  or  wishes  of  Italy, 
thus  relinquishing  what  seemingly  was  within  their  grasp 
as  the  result  of  Austria's  embarrassment.  Most  of  Austria's 
Italian  territories  were  ceded, —  not  to  Italy,  but  to  France, 
who  thereupon  exchanged  them  for  Savoy,  an  Italian  ter- 
ritory on  her  own  frontier.  This  peculiar  transaction 
definitely  foreseen  by  France,  is  perhaps  responsible  for  the 
establishment  of  a  frontier  which  France  would  hardly  have 
accepted  had  she  been  the  one  to  guard  it.  Its  most  glaring 
defect  was  the  retention  by  Austria  of  the  Trentino,  a  purely 
Italian  district  of  immense  strategic  strength.  The  Trentino 
is  doubly  Italian,  for  not  only  do  the  people  speak  Italian, 
but  the  district  is  on  the  southern  slope  of  the  Tyrolese  Alps, 
whose  summits  are  the  natural  boundary  between  the  Italian 
and  German  peoples.  The  retention  of  the  Trentino  de- 
prived Italy  of  her  natural  defenses  against  her  age  long 
rival  and  enemy,  while  it  gave  to  the  latter  the  best  possible 
opportunity  to  attack  her  neighbor  for  the  recovery  of  the 
territories  that  she  had  unwillingly  parted  with.  To  these 
natural  advantages  have  been  added  some  of  the  most  power- 


ITALY  197 

ful  fortifications  in  the  world,  the  building  of  thirty-five 
powerful  forts  having  converted  the  whole  region  into  one 
vast  fortress. 

Even  this  is  not  the  whole  story.  The  Trentino  thrusts  it- 
self like  a  blunt  wedge  into  the  great  plain  of  northern  Italy. 
It  is  from  the  northeastern  corner  of  this  plain,  far  beyond 
the  Trentino,  that  Italy  must  operate  if  she  is  to  fight  Austria. 
The  Trentino  in  Austrian  hands  thus  becomes  a  frowning 
bastion  threatening  the  flank  of  any  army  that  passes  and 
the  communications  of  any  army  that  has  passed.  It  would 
be  difficult  to  find  a  parallel  for  this  extraordinary  defense. 
It  is  plain  that  Austria  established  this  frontier  in  expecta- 
tion of  trouble  and  with  the  intention  of  holding  the  whip 
hand. 

A  somewhat  similar  though  less  striking  situation  holds 
in  the  east.  Here  the  Isonzo  River  is  the  natural  boundary 
though  not  quite  the  linguistic  boundary  between  the  two 
peoples,  the  Italian  speech  extending  somewhat  beyond  it. 
But  once  again  Austria  established  the  border  somewhat  to 
the  west  of  the  river  in  order  that  her  own  front  might  be 
impregnable  and  the  Italian  front  exposed. 

We  need  not  waste  any  anathemas  on  Austria.  All  the 
powers  involved  were  manoeuvering  for  position,  and  neither 
Cavour  nor  Napoleon  III  would  have  scrupled  to  take  advan- 
tage of  such  a  situation  if  they  had  been  able  to  do  so.  But 
looking  at  it  from  the  standpoint  of  European  or  world 
peace,  it  is  clear  that  the  arrangement  is  a  vicious  one. 
Eo  war  sentiment  should  pervert  our  judgment  and  induce 
us  to  reverse  the  situation  giving  to  Italy  the  chance  to  over- 
awe her  antagonist.  But  a  boundary  based  so  far  as  possible 
on  natural  features  and  separating  the  antagonists  on  fairly 
even  terms  is  desirable  in  the  interest  of  general  peace, 
especially  since  ethnic  boundaries  so  nearly  coincide.  The 
cession  of  the  Trentino  to  Italy  and  the  rectification  of  the 


198  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

Isonzo  frontier  in  conformity  with  natural  boundaries  and 
so  far  as  may  be  with  race  limits,  are  the  most  indisputable 
of  Italy's  claims.  It  will  be  noted  that  precedence  is  here 
given  to  natural  over  ethnic  frontiers.  This  is  the  sound 
principle  in  all  cases  where  the  two  are  fairly  identical.  An 
ethnic  frontier  is  never  sharp  edged.  Language  boundaries 
are  both  vague  and  shifting,  while  natural  boundaries  in 
a  region  like  this  are  often  inexorable.  To  make  the  crest 
of  a  mountain  range  or  the  summit  of  a  pass  a  national  boun- 
dary is  reasonable,  even  if  a  few  persons  have  carried  their 
language  over  the  divide.  The  proper  drawing  of  the  polit- 
ical boundary  usually  effects  the  rectification  of  the  ethnic 
frontier  speedily  and  without  hardship,  whereas  the  ethnic 
factor  has  no  such  power  over  nature.  The  two  rectifications 
noted  would  each  require  slight  ethnic  adjustments.  A 
proper  mountain  frontier  in  the  north  would  require  the  in- 
clusion of  a  portion  of  the  Tyrol  with  a  few  German  speaking 
inhabitants,  while  a  strategic  boundary  in  the  east  would 
leave  a  few  Italians  under  Austrian  rule. 

But  unfortunately  neither  Italy's  demands  nor  Italy's  prob- 
lems end  here.  The  great  Austro-Italian  frontier  is  the 
Adriatic.  It  may  seem  extravagant  to  characterize  a  body 
of  water  a  hundred  miles  wide  as  a  boundary,  but  all  the 
problems  of  a  frontier  exist  here  in  their  most  acute  form. 
Unfortunately  here  too  we  find  Austria  holding  the  same  whip 
hand  over  Italy,  this  time  through  a  caprice  of  nature.  The 
Italian  side  of  the  Adriatic  is  featureless  and  indefensible, 
a  low  unbroken  coast  line  without  a  single  harbor  suitable 
for  modern  commerce  or  for  a  naval  base,  except  possibly 
at  the  extreme  south  where  Brindisi  has  been  constrained 
into  the  service  of  the  Orient  mail  and  Taranto  does  duty  as 
an  indifferent  naval  station.  Briefly,  Italy,  of  necessity  a 
maritime  and  naval  power,  has  on  her  east  coast  no  facilities 
for  either  commerce  or  defense.     The  east  coast  of  the 


ITALY  199 

Adriatic,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  perfect  maze  of  rocky  islets, 
deep  fjords,  and  ample  harbors,  while  at  the  northern  end 
lies  Trieste,  one  of  the  finest  harbors  in  Europe,  and  at  the 
other  an  embarrassment  of  riches  in  the  way  of  natural 
refuges  for  a  navy.  Such  is  Cattaro,  a  fjord  whose  narrow 
but  perfectly  practicable  entrance  between  towering  cliffs  is 
scarcely  visible  from  the  sea,  but  this  once  passed,  it  opens 
into  a  great  inner  lake  resembling  in  size,  shape,  and  environ- 
ment the  famous  Lake  of  Lucerne.  The  conquest  of  Mon- 
tenegro by  Austria  was  effected  primarily  to  give  her  posses- 
sion of  the  mountain  dominating  this  naval  stronghold. 
Another  is  Avlona,  a  deep  bay,  its  entrance  protected  by  an 
island,  in  the  inner  recesses  of  which  ships  of  war  could  lie  in 
perfect  security.  Still  another  is  the  channel  of  Corfu,  a 
body  of  water  between  the  island  and  the  mainland  almost 
entirely  surrounded  by  towering  mountains.  Here  are  har- 
bors and  islands  and  naval  bases  in  plenty  for  both  coasts,  but 
all  piled  up  on  one,  a  most  inequitable  caprice  of  nature. 
Here  again,  precisely  as  in  the  mountains  to  the  north,  the 
power  holding  the  east  coast  is  perfectly  secure  from  attack 
and  the  power  holding  the  west  coast  absolutely  defenseless. 
This  disparity  of  position  results  in  a  further  disparity,  in 
that  Austria  finds  it  unnecessary  to  maintain  a  great  navy 
and  is  thus  free  to  devote  her  resources  to  her  army,  while 
Italy  is  compelled  to  maintain  both,  and  that  of  course  to 
the  disadvantage  of  both. 

Italy  covets  this  coast.  It  is  clearly  a  strained  and  un- 
natural territorial  program  but  one  to  which  she  is  forced 
by  the  exigencies  of  her  position.  These  exigencies  are  her 
real  and  comprehensible  motive,  but  they  are  not  her  chief 
argument,  for  the  simple  reason  that  Austria  can  advance 
even  more  compelling  ones.  To  give  the  eastern  coast  of  the 
Adriatic  to  Italy  would  obviously  be  an  advantage  to  Italy, 
but  it  would  even  more  obviously  be  ruin  for  Austria.     It 


200  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

would  take  all  of  her  sea  coast  and  leave  her  an  interned 
nation  like  Serbia.  Worst  of  all,  it  would  not  find  a  natural 
frontier,  no  matter  where  the  line  might  be  drawn.  The 
interned  Balkan  states  would  never  be  reconciled  and  would 
make  endless  wars  of  protest.  If  Italy  held  her  ground,  she 
would  find  in  these  protests  and  the  constant  menace  from  the 
rear  a  continual  incentive  to  extend  her  borders.  We  should 
have  introduced  one  more  formidable  factor  into  the  trouble- 
making  Balkan  situation. 

Considerations  like  these  would  hardly  deter  Italy,  con- 
tinually menaced  by  her  position  and  confronted  with  a  power 
so  hated  as  is  Austria,  but  Italy  is  not  unconscious  that  to 
the  world  and  to  those  allied  powers  whose  cooperation  can 
alone  realize  her  ambition,  these  are  very  serious  objections. 
To  her  own  people,  too,  as  to  every  other,  strategic  considera- 
tions make  but  a  feeble  appeal.  She  has  therefore  turned  to 
another  argument  which  everywhere  in  our  day  enjoys  pos- 
sibly exaggerated  popularity  and  an  argument  which  in  this 
case  she  has  certainly  abused, —  the  argument  of  race.  Italia 
irredenta,  unredeemed  Italy,  is  the  slogan  by  which  Italy 
has  roused  the  enthusiasm  of  her  people  and  appealed  to  the 
sympathy  of  mankind. 

We  have  seen  that  as  regards  the  mountain  frontier  this 
argument  coincides  fairly  if  not  exactly  with  the  argument 
of  natural  defense.  It  there  reinforces  an  argument  already 
conclusive.  It  may  also  be  urged  fairly  for  the  city  of 
Trieste  and  part  of  the  Istrian  Peninsula  at  the  tip  of  which 
lies  the  city  of  Pola  of  ancient  Roman  importance  and  now 
the  chief  naval  base  of  Austria.  Beyond  this,  all  the  way 
down  the  eastern  coast,  Italian  is  more  or  less  in  use  on 
account  of  the  constant  intercourse  with  Italy,  but  it  is  clearly 
an  exotic.  The  traveler  along  this  coast,  familiar  in  a 
degree  as  he  is  sure  to  be  with  the  sound  of  Italian  and 
wholly  unacquainted  with  Serb,  is  apt  to  get  an  exaggerated 


ITALY  201 

impression  of  the  Italian  character  of  the  region.  Statistics, 
even  if  imperfect,  are  a  much  safer  guide.  According  to  the 
census,  Dalmatia,  the  narrow  coast  state  including  the  islands, 
which  is  most  under  debate,  contains  more  than  600,000 
Serbs  and  but  18,000  Italians.  The  latter  form  but  three  per 
cent,  of  the  population  as  against  ninety-six  per  cent,  of 
Serbs.  Italian  irredentists  will  say  that  the  census  is  unfair, 
all  the  bi-linguists  being  counted  as  Serbs.  It  is  safe  to 
assume  that  Austria  has  not  erred  in  favor  of  Italy.  Still, 
it  would  be  a  very  extravagant  irredentist  who  would  claim 
ten  per  cent,  of  Italians  for  Dalmatia.  If  it  be  argued, 
as  it  justly  may,  that  under  Italian  rule  in  this  bi-lingual 
country,  assimilation  would  be  rapid,  it  must  not  be  over- 
looked that  this  quite  gives  away  the  irredentist  case.  Italy 
can  not  claim  these  people  as  her  unredeemed  brothers,  and 
then  shift  her  ground  and  say  that  though  they  are  not 
Italians,  she  could  speedily  make  them  so.  The  claim  of 
race  has  absolutely  no  validity  as  regards  Dalmatia,  and 
not  a  wholly  satisfactory  one  as  regards  Trieste  and  Istria, 
for  even  here  there  are  far  more  Slavs  than  there  are  Italians 
in  Dalmatia.  Yet  the  secret  treaties  published  by  the  Bol- 
sheviki  show  that  an  agreement  existed  between  Italy  and 
her  Allies  to  the  effect  that  she  was  to  receive  the  Trentino, 
the  Isonzo  district,  Trieste,  Dalmatia  and  Avlona.  We  have 
briefly  to  consider  the  wisdom  of  this  arrangement.  As 
regards  the  Trentino  and  the  Isonzo  district,  the  case  is 
and  always  has  been  clear.  The  Allies  have  always  and 
openly  stood  for  this  accession,  and  even  Austria  offered  the 
most  of  the  disputed  territory  in  a  vain  effort  to  secure  Italian 
neutrality.  That  is  one  of  the  settled  things  in  a  program 
of  Allied  victory. 

The  other  claims  fall  into  three  groups ;  —  the  Italian 
speaking  district  of  Trieste  and  Istria,  the  coast  strip  and 
islands  of  Dalmatia,  and  the  naval  base  of  Avlona.    Of  these 


202  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

Dalmatia  is  the  weakest.  Foreign  in  population  and  indis- 
putably foreign  in  location  and  strategic  and  economic  de- 
pendence, its  transfer  to  Italy  could  be  contemplated  only  as 
a  part  of  the  program  of  complete  Austrian  dismemberment, 
and  even  so  would  be  hazardous  and  unnatural  in  the  extreme. 
The  defeat  of  Italy  in  the  north  is  not  too  dearly  paid  if  it 
has  saved  Europe, —  as  it  seems  to  have  done, —  from  this 
unnatural  bargain,  a  bargain  to  which  the  Allies  undoubtedly 
gave  their  consent  purely  and  simply  because  of  their  desper- 
ate need  and  because  Italy  would  not  take  the  risks  of  war 
for  a  less  price.  No  friend  of  Italy  can  fail  to  share  her 
extreme  solicitude  for  the  danger  that  ever  menaces  her 
from  this  sinister  coast,  but  equally,  no  thoughtful  friend 
can  fail  to  recognize  the  risk  attending  this  too  ambitious  solu- 
tion of  the  age  long  problem. 

The  case  of  Avlona  is  wholly  different.  That,  as  has  been 
explained,  is  purely  an  isolated  naval  base,  used  only  by  the 
fleet,  and  approached  only  from  the  sea.  There  is  as  little 
temptation  to  expand  such  a  possession  as  there  is  to  expand 
Gibraltar.  The  position  is  of  all  those  available  for  the  pur- 
pose, the  one  nearest  to  Italy  and  the  one  best  adapted  to  her 
purpose.  It  completely  commands  the  entrance  to  the  Adri- 
atic, subject  only  to  the  check  of  other  like  bases, —  Cattaro, 
Corfu,  or  Durazzo, —  which  may  be  held  by  other  powers. 
There  is  but  one  excuse  for  Italy's  possession  of  such  a  post, 
namely  her  lack  of  a  suitable  base  on  her  own  coast.  That 
excuse  is  apparently  sufficient.  It  is  further  to  be  noted  that 
Avlona  is  not  a  part  of  Slavic  territory,  but  of  Albania,  a 
district  almost  certainly  incapable  of  nationality,  its  popula- 
tion being  divided  in  language,  religion  and  sympathies  and 
predatory  in  the  extreme.  With  the  inevitable  division  of 
Albania,  Italy  may  occupy  Avlona  without  injury  or  risk  to 
Serbia. 

There  remains  the  district  of  Trieste-Istria,  more  or  less. 


ITALY  203 

Here,  as  we  have  seen,  the  fact  of  Italian  race,  that  is,*  Italian 
speech, —  for  the  basic  blood  is  probably  Slavic, —  makes  its 
strong  appeal.  The  Italian  people,  little  moved  by  consid- 
erations of  national  function,  see  in  this  fact  of  language  a 
sufficient  reason  for  the  union  of  this  district  to  the  Italian 
kingdom.  Whether  the  inhabitants  of  the  district  share  this 
desire  is  not  easy  to  determine.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
they  are  strongly  attached  to  their  language  and  desire  to 
retain  their  Italian  character,  and  it  is  quite  possible  that 
they  see  in  such  a  union  the  natural  if  not  the  only  means  of 
doing  so.  So  much  may  undoubtedly  be  conceded  for  that 
portion  of  both  populations  which  lives  its  life  compara- 
tively unthinkingly  as  regards  the  larger  problems  of  the 
national  destiny. 

But  it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  the  few  who  are  more 
immediately  concerned  with  these  larger  interests  are  aware 
of  other  factors  which  seriously  complicate  the  problem. 
Trieste  is  a  splendid  harbor,  just  such  a  one  as  Italy  would 
wish  to  possess,  but  it  could  not  under  any  possible  arrange- 
ment, be  made  to  serve  Italian  purposes.  Even  if  Italy's 
maximum  purpose  should  be  realized  and  Trieste,  Istria,  and 
Dalmatia  should  be  annexed,  scarcely  a  square  mile  of  Italian 
territory  would  be  served  by  Trieste.  On  the  other  hand, 
Trieste  is  the  only  harbor  which  serves  the  great  Austrian 
hinterland,  and  as  such,  Austria's  sole  communication  with 
the  sea.  It  is  true  that  Dalmatia  is  Austrian  territory  and 
that  it  has  numerous  minor  harbors,  but  Dalmatia  is  a  de- 
tached coastal  strip  completely  separated  from  Austria  proper. 
Moreover,  the  mountainous  character  of  this  coast  gives  these 
harbors  no  satisfactory  access  to  the  regions  farther  inland. 
Dalmatia  is  essentially  a  detached  interest,  enormously  val- 
uable to  Austria  as  a  defensive  outpost,  but  commercially 
capable  only  of  serving  itself.  For  serious  access  to  the  sea 
both  Austria  and  Hungary  are  limited  to  a  single  port. 


204  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

Trieste  is  the  terminus  of  the  great  railroad  line  leading  to 
Vienna,  while  Fiume,  just  across  the  narrow  neck  of  the 
Istrian  Peninsula,  serves  as  the  unique  outlet  for  the  great 
plain  of  Hungary.  If  Trieste  were  annexed  to  Italy,  there- 
fore, Italy  could  not  use  it  and  Austria  would  have  to  use 
it.  In  its  actual  function,  Trieste  will  remain  Austrian, 
no  matter  what  flag  may  fly  over  her  harbor.  It  is  most 
unfortunate  to  have  political  arrangements  thus  squarely  at 
odds  with  economic  function.  It  is  true  that  Austrian  rule 
over  people  of  Italian  speech  has  produced  friction,  but  that 
is  due  primarily  to  a  suspicious  and  repressive  policy  on  the 
part  of  Austria,  motived,  no  doubt,  by  fear  of  this  same 
annexationist  movement.  Indeed  this  fear  and  this  policy 
have  gone  far  to  create  the  danger  which  Austrians  dread. 
There  are  Italian  writers  who  claim  that  irredentism  is  an 
Austrian  invention.  The  policy  of  Austria  in  1866  was 
conspicuously  unfair  to  Italy,  and  the  consciousness  that 
Italians  so  regarded  it,  has  made  Austria  fearful  of  the 
Italian  attitude  everywhere.  A  repressive  policy  on  her 
part  toward  Italian  speech  and  national  aspirations  generally 
was  the  natural  but  unfortunate  result.  If  instead  of  this, 
Austria  had  adopted  a  policy  like  that  of  France  in  Alsace, 
it  seems  not  improbable  that  the  Italians  in  this  small  and 
practically  detached  district  would  have  contentedly  accepted 
her  rule,  as  the  Alsatians  accepted  that  of  France,  the  reason 
for  race  separation  being  much  more  obvious  in  the  former 
case  than  in  the  latter.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the 
changes  which  this  war  will  effect  in  Austria,  undoubtedly 
the  most  considerable  which  will  be  anywhere  effected,  will 
quite  change  the  conditions  of  Austrian  rule.  In  any  case, 
this  is  one  of  the  clearest  cases  in  which  other  than  race  con- 
siderations are  the  paramount  interest.  The  proposal  that 
Trieste  be  given  to  Italy  to  be  held  as  a  toll  gate  on  Austria's 
main  route  to  the  sea  merely  because  three  quarters  of  her 


ITALY  205 

people  speak  the  Italian  language,  is  not  one  to  be  seriously 
entertained. 

Italy,  too,  has  her  colonial  problems.  She  is  deeply  in- 
terested in  the  possible  dismemberment  of  Turkey  and  is  an 
eager  claimant  for  a  share  in  the  spoils.  In  1911,  as  a  result 
of  her  seizure  of  Tripoli,  she  found  herself  in  an  inconclusive 
war  with  that  power  whom  she  could  not  force  to  make  a  peace 
recognizing  her  occupation  of  Tripoli.  Debarred  by  the 
powers  from  attacking  Turkish  possessions  on  the  Adriatic 
coast,  she  finally  seized  a  group  of  islands, —  the  so-called 
Dodecanese, —  to  bring  Turkey  to  terms.  Still  Turkey  re- 
fused, and  the  occupation  was  continued  until  the  inevitable 
popular  sentiment  made  withdrawal  difficult.  The  peace 
which  ultimately  followed  provided  for  a  farther, —  though 
still  provisional, —  occupation  of  the  islands,  but  the  ensuing 
Balkan  wars  prevented  Turkey  from  complying  with  the  con- 
ditions stipulated  for  their  restitution.  Thus  temporary 
occupancy  hardened  into  permanency,  a  typical  case  of  the 
way  such  things  go.  Now  Italy  wishes  to  be  confirmed  in 
the  possession  of  the  islands,  a  very  strategic  group,  and  also 
to  be  assigned  a  territory  on  the  mainland  adjacent.  The 
feasibility  of  such  an  assignment  naturally  depends  on  the 
settlement  of  the  Turkish  problem  to  be  discussed  elsewhere. 
It  involves  the  most  vital  questions  of  European  policy  and 
the  policing  of  the  world's  trade  routes  in  the  interest  of 
peace.  But  the  question  of  Italy's  interests  is  a  different 
matter.  It  is  impossible  for  a  disinterested  outsider  to  avoid 
misgivings  as  to  the  results  of  such  ventures  on  the  part  of  a 
country  inherently  poor, —  for  no  country  without  iron  and 
coal  can  ever  be  largely  populous  or  rich, —  and  a  country 
already  burdened  with  heavy  responsibilities  of  this  kind. 
Italy  already  has  Tripoli  and  Eritrea.  The  proper  adminis- 
tration of  dependencies  is  not  a  money  making  thing.  Their 
development  implies  large  investments  of  capital.     Italy  had 


206  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

little  disposable  capital  before  the  war,  and  she  will  have 
less  after  it.  There  is  grave  danger  that  her  colonies  will 
become  starveling  affairs,  or  that  the  necessities  of  the  admin- 
istrator will  draw  her  into  a  policy  of  predatory  exploitation 
such  as  has  clouded  the  memory  of  Spain  and  blighted  the 
lands  committed  to  her  keeping.  Trusteeship  is  something 
that  Italy  can  not  afford,  and  predatory  exploitation  is  some- 
thing that  the  world  can  not  afford.  Italy  may  well  be 
cautious. 

These  considerations  apply  with  even  greater  force  to  the 
project,  also  endorsed  by  the  Allies  in  their  hour  of  need, 
that  in  the  event  that  the  German  colonies  were  acquired 
by  the  Allies,  Italy  should  also  receive  additional  African 
territory.  It  is  to  be  hoped,  in  the  interest  of  Italy  herself, 
that  this  promise,  like  that  regarding  Trieste  and  Dalmatia, 
will  lapse  with  changed  conditions.  The  trusteeship  of  back- 
ward races  is  a  stern  necessity, —  not  a  privilege  to  be  grasped 
at.  Eagerness  to  acquire  under  such  circumstances  implies  a 
false  conception  of  the  relation  involved. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

AUSTRIA 

This  term, —  here  briefly  used  for  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, —  undoubtedly  covers  the  most  serious  problems  of 
the  war  and  of  the  modern  political  world.  It  was  in  the 
necessities  of  this  strangely  assorted  group  that  the  war  origi- 
nated, and  it  is  here  that  are  to  be  encountered  the  most 
stubborn  difficulties  in  the  way  of  settlement.  The  Austrian 
Empire  sets  every  precept  of  political  experience  at  defiance. 
It  is  not  based  on  unity  of  race,  or  on  the  supremacy  of  a 
dominant  race.  It  was  formed  by  outside  pressure,  con- 
tinued by  fraud,  and  is  maintained  by  balanced  antipathies. 
It  has  been  described  as  "  a  political  abortion,  the  petrified 
residuum  of  a  confusion  of  Babylonian  languages."  Yet  it 
is  one  of  the  most  dangerous  of  all  governments  to  meddle 
with,  because  the  antagonisms  which  characterize  it  inhere, 
not  in  the  government,  but  in  the  elements  of  which  the 
nation  is  composed.  Eew  suggestions  are  more  popular  for 
the  forthcoming  political  reconstruction  of  Europe  than  that 
of  abolishing  this  incongruous  combination.  It  is  not  al- 
ways remembered  that  to  abolish  the  combination  might  not 
remove  the  incongruity. 

The  main  features  of  this  combination  are  familiar.  The 
Empire  consists  of  two  essentially  independent  states  which 
are  united  only  in  their  sovereign  and  in  what  amounts  to  a 
defensive  league  against  other  powers.  They  have  their 
army  and  their  representatives  with  foreign  powers  together, 
but  are  otherwise  as  independent  as  any  other  nations.  Each 
of  these  partner  nations  consists  of  a  number  of  distinct 
races,  most  of  them  having  historic  or  racial  affinities  with 

207 


208  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

outside  peoples.  These  racial  units  in  some  cases  lie  partly 
in  Austria  and  partly  in  Hungary.  Finally,  some  of  these 
races,  notably  the  Germans  and  the  Magyars,  have  thrown 
out  colonies  which  lie  like  scattered  islands  in  the  territory 
of  the  other  races.  There  is  of  course  the  usual  number 
of  foot-loose  individuals  who  have  scattered  themselves 
throughout  the  whole  empire. 

Of  these  various  races,  the  Germans,  Bohemians,  Mora- 
vians, Italians,  Galicians,  Slovenes  and  Dalmatians  are  under 
the  sway  of  Austria.  They  lie,  in  the  most  awkward  imag- 
inable arrangement,  like  a  wide  open  lobster's  claw,  the  big 
and  little  fingers  enclosing  the  more  compact  Hungary  which 
includes  in  its  turn  the  Magyars,  Slovaks,  Eumanians,  Slavo- 
nians, and  Croats.  Attached  to  both  these  countries  but  not 
belonging  to  either  are  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  which  are 
administered  by  a  special  bureau  under  the  war  department. 
Certain  peculiarities  of  the  various  units  must  be  noted  in 
connection  with  their  aspirations  and  the  proposals  made  with 
regard  to  them.  For  we  are  confronted  with  the  momentous 
proposal,  a  proposal  already  far  advanced  toward  accom- 
plishment, that  this  historic  empire,  so  long  one  of  the  pillars 
of  the  political  structure  of  Europe  and  ruled  by  the  oldest 
European  dynasty,  is  to  be  dissolved.  Such  a  dissolution 
would  of  course  only  liberate  forces  long  held  in  uneasy 
equilibrium,  forces  which  must  necessarily  react  in  new  and 
unknown  ways  upon  the  equilibrium  of  nations  and  perhaps 
in  turn  form  new  combinations.  It  is  of  the  utmost  import- 
ance that  we  understand  the  nature  of  the  forces  thus  liberated 
and  that  we  forecast,  so  far  as  possible,  their  several  reactions. 

The  two  chief  elements  in  the  dual  empire  and  the  nuclei 
of  their  respective  groups,  are  the  Germans  and  the  Magyars. 
There  are  about  ten  millions  of  each  and  both  are  situated 
in  the  valley  of  the  Danube.     The  Germans  are  located  in 


Y  (Polish)  K  ¥ 

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(Italian)    \ 


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AUSTRIA-HUNGARY      ;^C 

(ETHNIG)  A] 

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AUSTKIA  211 

a  compact  mass  in  the  western  or  npper  Danube  valley, 
with  a  comparatively  narrow  southwestward  extension  in  the 
Alps, —  the  Tyrol.  It  is  important  to  note,  however,  that 
they  are  solidly  united  along  their  whole  western  and  north- 
western front  to  the  Germans  of  Germany  from  whom  they 
are  but  accidentally  and  artificially  separated.  This  terri- 
torial unity  with  the  larger  German  body  is  the  all  important 
fact.  The  founders  of  the  German  Empire  did  not  wish  to 
include  the  Austrians,  both  because  of  their  ancient  pre- 
tensions to  leadership  which  militated  against  the  supremacy 
of  Prussia,  and  because  Germany  hoped,  through  their 
ascendency  in  the  Austrian  combination,  to  bring  the  whole 
motley  group  under  her  control,  a  very  shrewd  and  success- 
ful calculation.  But  if  the  dual  empire  is  dismembered  and 
the  Austrian  Germans  are  thrown  on  their  own  resources,  they 
could  not  do  otherwise  than  join  their  kinsmen.  This  union 
is  everywhere  recognized  as  inevitable  and  one  to  which  the 
Allies  could  not  consistently  take  exception.  While  consist- 
ency is  not  quite  inevitable  in  international  action  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  in  this  case  the  union  would  take  place 
without  protest.  This  would  extend  German  territory  from 
the  Baltic  to  the  Adriatic  and  give  to  Germany  her  much 
coveted  base  on  the  southern  sea,  for  no  thin  screen  of ''Italian 
littoral  would  hold  back  such  a  power  from  so  necessary 
and  natural  a  consummation.  The  possible  consequences  of 
such  an  extension  of  German  territory  will  be  reserved  for 
later  consideration.     It  is  sufficient  now  to  note  the  fact. 

It  is  farther  to  be  noted  that  the  Germans  have  their  islands 
of  settlement  more  widely  scattered  through  the  Empire  than 
those  of  any  other  race, —  some  of  them  extending  even 
beyond  the  eastern  border  to  the  vicinity  of  Odessa.  The 
significance  of  these  settlements  should  not  be  overlooked 
when  they  become  centers,  not  of  Austrian,  but  of  imperial 


212  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

German  influence.  Finally  it  should  be  added  that  the 
German  unattached  man  of  business  is  more  ubiquitous  and 
correspondingly  more  influential  than  any  other. 

The  Magyars  are  located  compactly  almost  in  the  center 
of  the  empire,  though  a  very  large  island  of  Magyar  popula- 
tion is  situated  right  in  the  elbow  of  Rumania  where  it  is 
entirely  surrounded  by  Rumanians,  and  other  smaller  settle- 
ments are  scattered  throughout  Transylvania.  Unlike  the 
Germans,  the  Magyars  have  no  racial  kin  in  Europe  except 
the  Turks  from  whom  they  have  become  widely  differentiated 
and  who  can  give  them  no  backing.  The  proposed  dismem- 
berment would  leave  the  Magyars  an  inland  nation  of  about 
ten  million  inhabitants.  Despite  the  utmost  deference  to  eth- 
nic considerations,  the  population  would  still  be  sadly  mixed. 
Numerous  German  communities  are  scattered  through 
the  territory,  while  a  large  Magyar  population  would  be 
excluded  from  it,  a  constant  incitement  to  eastward  expan- 
sion across  a  wholly  arbitrary  frontier  and  at  the  expense  of 
a  woefully  mixed  population.  The  only  natural  frontier 
would  be  the  Carpathians  on  the  north,  and  even  to  attain 
this  inevitable  barrier,  it  would  be  necessary  to  include  a 
considerable  area  of  Russian  population  x  with  consequent 
temptation  to  Russian  irridentism.  The  Magyars  could 
hardly  feel  that  the  lines  had  fallen  unto  them  in  pleasant 
places. 

To  the  north  of  the  German  Austrians  and  the  Magyars 
are  three  bodies  of  Slavs,  the  Czechs  or  Bohemians,  the 
Moravians,  and  the  Slovaks.  The  first  two  are  under  Aus- 
trian and  the  third  under  Hungarian  rule.  Altogether  they 
number  slightly  more  than  eight  millions.  The  distinction 
between  these  groups  is  historical  rather  than  racial,  but  not 
the  less  considerable  for  purposes  of  practical  cooperation. 
Nevertheless  they  seem  able  to  act  together  at  least  for  pur- 

i  The  so-called  Ruthenians,  a  name  adopted  by  Austria  to  conceal  the 
fact  that  these  people  really  belonged  in  the  Empire  of  the  Czar. 


AUSTRIA  215 

poses  of  opposition,  and  the  recent  extraordinary  achieve- 
ments of  their  troops  in  Bussia  has  given  the  combination 
an  unexpected  interest  in  the  eyes  of  the  world.  For  mili- 
tary purposes  they  have  already  been  recognized  as  an  inde- 
pendent national  unit,  a  recognition  which  seems  to  pre- 
figure their  later  recognition  as  a  nation.  This  has  long  been 
the  aspiration  of  the  Bohemians  who  constitute  about  one 
half  their  number.  The  union  of  the  three  elements  for 
political  purposes  seems  to  be  recent,  and  the  program  of  the 
others,  especially  of  the  Slovaks,  is  probably  less  matured. 
Of  all  the  subject  nationalities  of  the  dual  empire  none  are 
so  likely  to  insist  upon  independence  and  none  so  likely  to 
attain  it  as  this  group.  It  is  therefore  most  important  to 
consider  the  difficulties  and  the  possibilities  of  the  proposed 
arrangement. 

First,  the  territory,  no  matter  how  carefully  delimited, 
would  still  have  a  mixed  population.  A  large  part  of  his- 
toric Bohemia,  for  instance,  the  part  devastated  during  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  was  resettled  by  Germans  and  is  now  Ger- 
man in  population.  It  is  all  but  certain,  however,  that  the 
Bohemians  would  insist  upon  having  this  territory  on  his- 
toric grounds,1  and  since  the  alternative  would  be  to  give 
it  to  Germany,  we  may  assume  that  the  Allies  at  the  present 
juncture  would  acquiesce  in  their  demand,  the  more  so  as  the 
whole  territory  has  long  been  accustomed  under  Austrian 
rule  to  a  unit  administration.  This  is  merely  one  of  the 
numerous  limitations  which  are  forced  upon  the  ethnic  prin- 
ciple the  moment  we  begin  to  make  a  practical  application 
of  it.  Yet  it  is  a  very  serious  limitation,  for  it  insures  the 
perpetuation  of  the  race  struggle  between  Czechs  and  Ger- 
mans, a  struggle  which  has  been  characterized  by  a  bitterness 

iAs  this  goes  to  press  it  is  reported  that  the  Bohemians  (doubtless 
German  Bohemians)  have  asked  Germany  to  take  over  this  German 
territory.  Another  report  says  that  the  new  Bohemian  government 
offers  food  to  Austria  on  condition  that  this  territory  is  guaranteed  to 
Boliemia. 


216  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

and  a  purely  provocative  obstructiveness  unparalleled  in 
parliamentary  annals.  The  only  difference  would  be  that 
the  Germans  would  now  be  the  under  dog  and  the  Czechs 
would  now  avenge  themselves  for  centuries  of  real  or  fancied 
oppression.  It  is  easy  to  understand  how  the  cry  of  these 
Germans  would  go  across  the  border,  and  how  willingly,  in 
certain  eventualities,  the  big  brother  would  lend  a  listening 
ear.  It  is  to  be  noted  further  that  large  German  settlements 
nearly  cut  the  Slovak  territory  in  two,  and  other  settlements 
are  sandwiched  in  between  Bohemia  and  Moravia.  In  addi- 
tion there  is  a  large  percentage  of  German  population  in 
the  districts  accounted  Bohemian  and  Moravian.  The  pros- 
pect is  not  bright  for  a  happy  family  in  the  new  Czecho- 
slovak state. 

Turning  now  to  the  internal  character  of  the  country, 
we  again  face  troublesome  conditions.  Bohemia  is  largely 
industrial,  more  than  half  the  industries  of  the  Empire 
being  located  within  this  territory.  The  Slovaks,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  an  agricultural  people.  There  is  in  every 
country, —  as  notably  in  our  own, —  a  tendency  to  jealousy 
between  industrial  and  agricultural  districts.  When  it  is 
remembered  that  the  connection  between  the  Czechs  and 
the  Slovaks  is  recent  and  untried  and  that  most  of  the 
industries  of  Bohemia  are  owned  by  Germans,  it  is  safe  to 
predict  that  the  course  of  true  love  will  not  run  smooth 
between  these  newlyweds. 

If  we  turn  to  the  territorial  arrangement,  it  will  be  at 
once  apparent  that  it  is  very  little  suited  to  purposes  of 
defense  or  administrative  convenience.  It  is  long,  straggling, 
and  irregular.  Its  frontier,  enormous  in  extent  and  for 
the  most  part  based  on  no  commanding  natural  features, 
would  be  the  despair  of  a  strategist.  Bohemia  and  Moravia 
constitute  a  sort  of  peninsula  thrust  into  German  territory, 
one  of  the  most  isolated  racial  habitats  in  the  world.     Once 


AUSTRIA  219 

the  Germans  are  united  and  in  possession  of  their  entire 
racial  habitat,  this  peninsula  could  be  pinched  off  by  an  easy 
drive  across  the  narrow  neck.  International  guaranties  will 
be  invoked  to  prevent  this  and  to  guarantee  the  integrity 
of  the  exposed  nation.  Conceding  the  efficacy  of  this  guar- 
anty, it  may  still  be  doubted  whether  territorial  integrity 
would  secure  independence.  To  control  a  state  so  situated, 
Germany  would  not  need  to  occupy  the  border  fortresses. 
Her  railroads  with  their  constant  economic  argument,  would 
give  her  every  facility.  It  is  precisely  in  this  way  that 
Prussia  controls  certain  minor  German  states  in  imperial 
questions,  they  being  unable  to  vote  against  her  on  account 
of  their  situation  and  economic  dependence.  The  necessity 
for  access  to  the  sea  which  could  only  be  secured  on  Ger- 
many^ terms,  would  assure  that  domination  in  the  present 
case,  no  matter  what  the  agreements  or  the  guaranties  of  the 
nations. 

Still  to  the  north  and  stretching  farther  east  lies  Galicia 
or  Austrian  Poland.  Most  of  the  southern  boundary  is 
marked  by  the  mighty  range  of  the  Carpathians,  though 
annoyingly  enough,  this  happens  not  to  be  the  true  ethnic 
boundary.  The  dominant  race  of  eastern  Galicia  has  crossed 
the  Carpathians  and  occupied  a  considerable  territory  on 
the  southern  slope.  This  territory,  under  the  present 
partnership  arrangement,  is  very  properly  assigned  to  Hun- 
gary, while  Galicia  historically  limited  by  the  Carpathians, 
belongs  to  Austria.  There  can  be  no  question  that,  if  we  are 
to  dismember  the  Empire,  the  Carpathians  must  continue 
to  be  the  line  of  division,  the  overflow  of  the  northern  race  be- 
ing left  to  take  the  consequences  of  its  venturesome  trespass. 

Since  Galicia  once  belonged  to  Poland,  the  easy  popular 
disposition  of  it  is  to  restore  it  to  a  reconstituted  Poland. 
But  this  is  a  superficial  proposal  and  one  quite  inconsistent 
with  the  ethnic  principle.     About  two  thirds  of  Galicia  is 


220  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

Russian  in  race  and  in  certain  of  its  historic  antecedents. 
If  race  is  to  be  the  criterion,  this  part  of  Galicia  should  be  re- 
stored to  Russia,  a  proceeding  which  may  have  its  embarrass- 
ments at  the  present  juncture.  This  problem  need  not  detain 
us,  however,  at  present.  It  is  sufficient  to  recognize  that  the 
natural  disposition  of  this  fragment  would  be  to  restore  it  to 
its  northern  kinsmen,  whoever  they  may  be.  That,  the 
Galicians  may  perhaps  be  left  to  determine,  though  this  is 
a  case  where  even  their  choice  may  not  insure  harmony. 
Curiously  enough,  the  Galicians  are  reputed  to  be  compara- 
tively content  with  their  present  allegiance.  The  Austrians, 
themselves  in  minority  in  Austria,  have  needed  the  support 
of  some  other  race  element  to  insure  their  control,  and  it 
has  usually  been  their  policy  to  win  the  Galicians  by  special 
concessions.  Hence  the  almost  unique  phenomenon  in  this 
part  of  the  world  of  a  comparatively  contented  people.  This 
content  is  of  course  only  relative. 

To  the  east  of  the  Magyars  lies  the  much  more  extended 
domain  of  the  Rumanians.  The  Rumanian  problem  is 
ethnically  the  simplest  of  all  the  problems  of  the  Balkans, 
yet  even  so  it  presents  almost  insoluble  difficulties.  The 
key  to  its  solution  is  found  in  the  fact  that  an  independent 
Rumanian  kingdom  already  exists.  This,  however,  includes 
less  than  half  the  Rumanian  area.  To  the  east  of  independ- 
ent Rumania  lies  Bessarabia,  a  well  defined  area  between 
the  Pruth  and  Dniester  rivers.  This  is  solidly  Rumanian 
in  population  except  in  the  coastal  region  where  a  patchwork 
of  German,  Bulgarian,  Turkish,  Russian,  and  Rumanian 
settlements  are  an  effectual  bar  to  any  ethnic  claim.  The 
claim  of  Rumania  to  this  coastal  strip,  however,  is  as  good  as 
any  other,  and  since  it  necessarily  goes  with  the  hinterland 
of  Bessarabia  to  which  her  ethnic  claim  is  indisputable, 
there  can  be  no  ground  for  hesitation.  The  only  excuse  for 
Russian  occupation  has  been  the  great  plan  of  Russian  ad- 


AUSTRIA  223 

vance  to  Constantinople,  a  plan  which  if  realized  along  this 
route  would  wipe  out  Rumania  altogether.  It  was  perhaps 
to  Russia's  interest  to  keep  Rumania  small  and  weak,  but 
such  interests  will  hardly  prevail  under  present  conditions. 
The  annexation  of  Bessarabia  to  Rumania,  though  effected 
in  the  first  instance  by  Germany  and  for  her  own  ends,  is 
perhaps  the  most  obvious  and  feasible  act  of  ethnic  justice 
which  this  region  permits.  It  is  a  recognition  of  race  unity 
and  at  the  same  time  it  is  opposed  by  no  other  consideration. 
Rivers  are  not  ideal  boundaries,  but  the  Dniester  is  as  good 
as  the  Pruth.  Bessarabia  is  not  vital  to  Russia  in  any  sense. 
It  includes  no  great  city,  no  necessary  seaport,  no  important 
trade  route.  Its  transfer  would  break  no  fond  ties,  inter- 
rupt no  long  standing  tradition.  It  is  one  of  the  few  one- 
sided questions. 

To  the  west  of  Rumania  and  in  the  angle  of  its  bent  contour 
lies  Transylvania,  now  a  part  of  the  Magyar  kingdom.  A 
very  large  area  is  here  predominantly  Rumanian,  an  area 
nearly  as  large  as  that  occupied  by  the  Magyars  themselves. 
It  is  upon  this  that  the  Rumanians  have  especially  set  their 
heart,  and  this  that  would  undoubtedly  fall  to  their  lot  in 
the  event  of  the  dismemberment  of  the  Dual  Empire.  The 
addition  of  this  large  tract  would  not  only  greatly  extend  the 
Rumanian  domain  and  unite  the  Rumanian  race,  but  it  would 
round  out  the  country  very  handsomely,  giving  it  a  compact 
form,  a  splendid  river  waterway,  and  a  very  satisfactory  sea 
coast. 

But  closer  examination  discloses  serious  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  this  attractive  plan.  The  first  of  these  obstacles  is 
political.  Transylvania  is  united  to  Rumania  by  race,  but 
not  by  political  tradition.  This  is  a  superficial  fact,  but  one 
often  more  potent  at  a  given  moment  than  the  more  per- 
manent facts  of  nature.  It  is  difficult  to  know  what  the 
aspirations  of  the  Transylvanians  are,  but  it  is  safe  to 


224  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

assume  that  in  case  of  internal  strain,  there  would  be  a 
tendency  to  cleavage  along  this  line. 

This  tendency  would  be  accentuated  by  the  physical  fea- 
tures which  here  assume  such  immense  importance  as  seriously 
to  offset  if  not  altogether  to  outweigh  the  claims  of  race. 
Sweeping  around  the  deeply  indented  curve  which  marks 
the  present  western  boundary  of  Rumania  runs  the  great 
chain  of  the  Carpathian  Mountains,  one  of  the  most  consid- 
erable as  well  as  one  of  the  best  denned  natural  boundaries 
in  Europe.  This  divides  Transylvania  from  Rumania 
proper  in  a  way  that  no  political  union  can  ever  efface.  Not 
that  this  is  a  bar  to  political  union,  but  it  is  an  obstacle,  and 
one  which,  in  a  complex  of  conflicting  forces,  may  assume 
large  importance. 

On  the  other  hand,  Rumania  by  this  extension  would 
acquire  a  perfectly  arbitrary  western  border  with  no  natural 
defenses  whatever.  So  lacking  is  this  ethnic  frontier  in 
natural  feature  and  so  vague  in  its  own  nature, —  for  language 
areas  fade  into  each  other  unless  separated  by  very  pro- 
nounced barriers, —  that  when  the  recent  Rumanian  cam- 
paign was  decided  upon  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  annexing 
Transylvania,  it  was  announced  that  the  River  Theiss  was 
the  Rumanian  objective,  this  being  the  first  natural  feature 
which  it  was  feasible  to  recognize  as  a  national  boundary. 
But  such  a  boundary  would  give  nearly  a  third  of  the  Magyar 
territory  to  Rumania  and  would  repeat  within  her  borders 
the  race  feuds  which  have  made  the  dismemberment  of  Austria 
seem  necessary.  The  only  difference  would  be  that  while  the 
Magyars  have  hitherto  oppressed  the  Rumanians,  the  Ru- 
manians could  now  oppress  the  Magyars.  It  is  of  course 
possible  that  the  controlling  powers  would  not  sanction  these 
extreme  ambitions  of  Rumania  and  would  restrict  her  to  the 
true  ethnic  limits,  but  in  that  case  the  limitation  of  a  com- 
pletely artificial  frontier  would  be  inevitable. 


AUSTEIA  225 

Kestricted  within  these  narrower  but  still  unnatural  limits, 
the  ethnic  problem  becomes  simpler,  but  it  is  still  embarrass- 
ing. Unlike  the  hinterland  of  Bessarabia,  Transylvania  is 
not  solidly  Rumanian  in  population.  There  are  numerous 
islands  of  Magyar  and  German  dotted  all  over  it.  Worst 
of  all,  there  is  in  the  angle  of  the  Carpathians  and  thus  in 
the  very  center  of  the  Rumanian  oval,  a  very  large  district 
which  is  decisively  Magyar.  The  completed  Rumania,  there- 
fore, is  shaped  much  like  a  doughnut  with  the  hole  full  of 
Magyars.  It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a  worse  situation. 
The  small  scattered  settlements  of  Germans  or  Magyars  might 
be  gradually  assimilated  in  a  country  otherwise  Rumanian, 
but  so  large  a  district  as  this  will  almost  of  necessity  persist, 
compelling  recognition  of  its  language  in  schools,  courts,  and 
administration,  and  bringing  its  inevitable  feuds.  The  fact, 
too,  that  the  kingdom  of  the  Magyars  on  the  west  is  but  a 
hundred  and  fifty  miles  away,  and  that  traditions  of  Magyar 
supremacy  many  centuries  old  would  make  the  Rumanian 
yoke  doubly  onerous,  would  provide  almost  ideal  conditions 
for  political  restiveness  and  instability.  Only  the  most 
extraordinary  race  tolerance,  a  tolerance  to  which  not  one  of 
these  races  has  approximated  as  yet,  could  prevent  the  re- 
emergence  of  all  the  traditional  Balkan  troubles. 

The  Dobrudja  is  a  coastal  strip  lying  between  the  lower 
Danube  and  the  sea.  Its  population  is  extremely  mixed, — 
Russians,  Bulgarians,  Rumanians,  and  Turks, —  but  with 
Rumanians  fairly  in  the  ascendant,  especially  in  the  north. 
But  even  were  the  Rumanian  ascendency  less  assured,  it  would 
be  preposterous  to  assign  it  to  any  other  power.  It  gives 
Rumania  her  only  sea  coast,  while  it  would  give  to  Bulgaria, 
—  the  other  possible  claimant, —  nothing,  except  the  power 
to  injure  Rumania.  Nothing  more  absurd  has  emanated 
from  war  passions  than  the  suggestion  emanating  from  Ger- 
man sources,  that  the  whole  of  the  Dobrudja  be  given  to  Bui- 


226  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

garia.  But  while  the  allegiance  of  the  Dobrudja  is  not  open 
to  question,  its  southern  limit  which  is  necessarily  arbitrary, 
is  not  so  easily  settled.  As  the  result  of  Rumania's  bloodless 
intervention  in  the  second  Balkan  war,  the  boundary  was 
moved  some  distance  to  the  south.  The  district  thus  annexed 
has  virtually  no  Rumanian  population,  while  the  Bulgarian 
population  is  considerable.  So  far  as  the  writer  is  aware, 
no  important  strategic  advantage  was  secured.  At  this  dis- 
tance it  looks  very  much  like  one  of  those  impulsive  and 
unthinking  assertions  of  race  cupidity  which  it  is  the  function 
of  race  breeding  to  restrain.  If  Rumania  loses  this  ill  gotten 
gain  in  the  redrawing  of  the  map  of  Europe,  she  need  not 
be  an  object  of  commiseration.  To  the  north  of  Rumania, 
wedged  in  between  her  notched  northern  border  and  Galicia 
is  the  little  crown  land  of  Bukowina.  The  southern  portion, 
—  about  enough  to  fill  the  notch, —  is  Rumanian  in  popula- 
tion, the  remainder  Russian.  A  reapportionment  would  cer- 
tainly give  the  Rumanian  portion  to  Rumania.  It  is  possible 
that  political  tradition,  natural  features,  or  other  considera- 
tion would  dictate  the  transfer  entire.  It  can  not  be  too 
strongly  insisted  that  mere  race, —  that  is,  speech, —  in  this 
Babel  of  the  world,  is  not  a  sufficient  criterion  for  our  pur- 
pose. These  people  care  often  more  for  their  church  than 
for  their  language,  and  then  again,  more  for  their  political 
tradition  than  for  either.  It  is  of  interest  to  indicate  ethnic 
arguments,  but  altogether  inadmissible  to  dogmatically  assert 
their  complete  validity.  It  is  equally  preposterous  to  assume 
that  the  people  themselves  can  solve  these  world  problems  by 
an  expression  of  preference  based  on  provincial  prejudice 
and  local  faction.  The  settlement  should  be  based  on  the 
fullest  deference  to  their  interests  and  on  a  very  considerable 
deference  to  their  present  preferences,  but  there  are  times 
when  their  preferences  may  well  be  sacrificed  to  their  in- 
terests, and  their  interests  to  the  interests  of  humanity. 


AUSTRIA  227 

It  should  perhaps  be  added  that  the  Rumanian  habitat  ex- 
tends across  the  Danube  into  the  northeastern  corner  of 
Serbia,  and  small  Rumanian  settlements  are  also  found  south 
of  the  Danube  in  Bulgarian  territory.  It  would  be  the  height 
of  unwisdom  to  include  any  of  these  in  a  Rumanian  king- 
dom. There  is  even  a  considerable  Rumanian  district  in 
northern  Greece,  hundreds  of  miles  from  the  home  of  the 
race.  These  people  plainly  have  no  alternative  but  to  accept 
the  consequences  of  their  adventurous  migration. 

In  conclusion,  the  Rumanian  kingdom  should  undoubtedly 
be  extended  by  the  inclusion  of  Bessarabia.  If  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire  is  to  be  dissolved,  it  must  plainly  be  ex- 
tended to  include  Transylvania  also,  not,  however,  as  far 
as  the  river  Theiss.  Bad  as  this  arbitrary  boundary  of  the 
larger  Rumania  would  be,  it  would  certainly  be  preferable, 
in  a  readjustment  based  ostensibly  on  race,  to  an  arrange- 
ment which  outraged  Magyar  unity  and  guaranteed  the  per- 
petuation of  race  conflicts.  But  at  the  best  the  greater 
Rumania  would  be  an  uneasy  state  and  a  sorry  compromise. 
It  would  have  nothing  of  the  homogeneity  of  the  mature  na- 
tions of  western  Europe,  not  even  the  homogeneity  which  the 
smaller  Rumania  possesses,  nor  would  it  have  a  territory  in 
which  that  homogeneity  could  be  easily  achieved. 

To  the  southwest  of  the  countries  we  have  considered  and 
with  a  long  frontage  on  the  Adriatic,  lies  the  territory  of  the 
group  of  peoples  known  as  Jugo  *  Slavs.  This  is  again  a 
territory  lying  partly  within  and  partly  without  the  Empire. 
Outside  are  Serbia  and  Montenegro ;  inside  are  Slavonia  and 
Croatia  which  belong  to  Hungary,  Dalmatia  which  belongs 
to  Austria,  and  Bosnia-Herzegovina  which  belong  to  both. 
Adjoining  this  territory  on  the  northwest  is  the  small  moun- 
tainous country  of  the  Slovenes  occupying  a  very  strategic 

i  Jugo  is  a  Slavic  word  meaning  southern.  It  is  pronounced  Yugo  and 
is  sometimes  so  written  for  the  benefit  of  those  who  are  accustomed 
only  to  the  English  sound  of  J. 


228  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

site  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic,  for  it  is  in  the  country  of  the 
Slovenes  that  the  important  little  Italian  district  of  Trieste 
is  located.  It  is  also  the  Slovenes  who  confront  the  Italians 
on  the  Isonzo  border.  It  is  very  doubtful  whether  the 
Slovenes  will  be  grouped  with  the  Jugo  Slavs  in  the  forth- 
coming settlement,  not  so  much  because  of  their  racial  dis- 
tinctness, which  is  considerable,  but  because  of  their  location 
which  will  almost  necessitate  a  separate  destination.  We 
will  therefore  omit  them  from  the  group  for  the  present. 

As  thus  limited,  the  territory  of  the  Jugo  Slavs  presents 
the  most  compact,  unified,  and  workable  unity  in  all  this 
region.  It  has  a  remarkably  unified  population  except 
along  the  edges  where,  of  course,  something  of  the  inevitable 
racial  mixture  is  found.  It  has  few  of  the  islands  of  foreign 
population  scattered  about,  such  as  are  so  perplexingly  com- 
mon in  Magyar  and  Rumanian  territory.  It  has  an  exten- 
sive sea  coast  suitable  for  both  commerce  and  defense.  The 
proposal  to  combine  this  territory  into  a  single  independent 
kingdom,  considerable  enough  in  territory,  population,  and 
resources  to  be  self-respecting  and  self-supporting,  is  an  ex- 
ceedingly attractive  proposition. 

But  again,  closer  inspection  somewhat  dampens  our  en- 
thusiasm. Down  in  this  part  of  the  world  race  takes  on  a 
new  character.  It  is  no  longer  primarily  a  question  of  lan- 
guage. Religion  is  the  all  important  consideration.  And 
religion  is  not  a  matter  of  spiritual  experience  nor  yet  of  the- 
ological belief,  but  of  allegiance  to  an  ecclesiastical  organiza- 
tion. These  organizations  are  not  merely  state  churches  in 
our  western  sense  of  the  word,  but  as  the  result  of  peculiari- 
ties in  the  former  Turkish  administration  they  acquired  and 
in  a  measure  still  retain  an  altogether  extraordinary  political 
importance.  So  important  is  this  factor  that  when  Bulgaria 
found  herself  in  competition  with  Serbia  and  Greece  in  the 
attempt  to  win  the  Macedonians,  she  found  it  impossible  to 


.<■  j  Prague  \  \ 


/     /     s     h). • 

R       ..-I...: 


X 


AUSTRIA  231 

do  so  while  she  recognized  the  same  church  authority.  The 
Macedonians  could  not  understand  what  it  meant  to  join  the 
Bulgarian  cause  unless  there  was  a  Bulgarian  church.  So 
Bulgaria  renounced  the  authority  of  the  venerable  Patriarch 
of  Constantinople  and  appointed  an  Exarch  as  the  head  of  her 
own  church.  It  was  now  possible  to  win  Macedonians  to  her 
cause  because  there  was  something  tangible  to  lay  hold  of. 
Serbia  and  Greece  were  not  bold  enough  to  take  so  daring  a 
step,  and  so  they  lost  out  in  the  propaganda  which  eventually 
made  Macedonia  predominantly  Bulgarian.  One  curious 
result,  however,  was  often  manifest,  where  two  brothers  would 
announce  themselves  to  the  census  taker,  the  one  as  Bulgarian 
and  the  other  as  Serbian  or  Greek,  the  fact  being  that  one 
had  recognized  the  authority  of  the  Bulgarian  Exarch,  and 
the  other  retained  the  old  allegiance. 

We  have  gone  somewhat  afield  for  our  illustration,  but  the 
conditions  are  essentially  those  with  which  we  have  to  deal. 
Beligion  is  everywhere  in  the  Balkans,  and  for  that  matter, 
throughout  the  whole  Austrp-Hungarian  domain,  the  essen- 
tial basis  of  nationality.  The  Macedonian  peasant  hardly 
feels  it  more  than  the  Austrian  or  Hungarian  nobility.  The 
question  of  Jugo  Slav  unity  therefore  resolves  itself  very 
largely  into  a  question  of  religious  unity.  This  unity  is  un- 
fortunately conspicuously  lacking.  The  Croats,  Slavonians, 
and  Dalmatians  are  Catholics,  the  Serbians  and  Montenegrins 
Orthodox  (Greek  church),  and  the  Bosnians,  strange  to  relate, 
are  largely  Mohammedan  and  reactionary  Mohammedans  at 
that.  It  was  they  who  fought  the  sincere  attempts  of  Turkey 
at  political  reform  in  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury. It  would  be  difficult  to  get  more  irreconcilable  groups. 
Of  course  our  American  suggestion  is  at  once  that  we  found 
the  new  state  on  a  basis  of  religious  tolerance,  and  such  a  law 
would  undoubtedly  be  passed.  But  there  is  not  the  least 
likelihood  that  real  tolerance  would  result.     Such  laws  exist 


232  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

in  both  Austria  and  Hungary,  but  they  are  notoriously  and 
ostentatiously  violated,  even  officially.  Yet  the  Catholic  ele- 
ment which  rules  in  Austro-Hungary  is  undoubtedly  the  most 
liberal  and  tolerant  of  the  three.  To  propose  tolerance  to 
these  people  is  like  proposing  free  love  to  us.  It  was  this 
difference  of  religion  quite  as  much  as  anything  that  made 
Serbia  absolutely  deaf  to  all  the  wooings  of  Austria.  It  was 
this  that  compelled  Austria  to  employ  two  hundred  thou- 
sand men  for  three  years  to  bring  Bosnia  under  her  admin- 
istrative control  when  it  was  assigned  to  her  by  the  powers. 
It  was  religion  which  led  to  the  murder  of  Archduke  Ferdi- 
nand by  one  of  his  Bosnian  subjects.  Curiously  enough, 
this  prospective  emperor  was  strongly  Slavophile.  He  was 
committed  to  the  policy, —  detested  by  Germans  and  Mag- 
yars alike, —  of  reconstituting  the  Empire  on  the  basis  of  a 
triple  partnership  instead  of  a  dual  partnership  as  at  pres- 
ent, the  Slavs  being  the  third  partner.  Yet  it  was  a  Slav 
who  shot  him.  The  reason  was  that  with  all  his  liberality 
toward  the  Slavs,  Ferdinand  was  a  staunch  Catholic,  uncom- 
promisingly committed  to  the  maintenance  of  the  Catholic 
unity  of  the  Empire.  His  murderer  was  an  Orthodox  Slav, 
to  whom  Slavic  influence  in  the  Empire  was  as  nothing  to  the 
maintenance  of  the  Orthodox  church.  The  Mohammedans 
will  hardly  prove  more  concessive.  When  it  is  recalled  that 
this  local  tenacity  will  be  backed  up  by  all  the  millions  of  their 
fellow  believers,  the  prospects  for  assimilation  or  tolerance 
are  not  flattering.  One  can  imagine  how  the  Roman  Propa- 
ganda Fide  would  bestir  itself  if  there  were  any  chance  of 
the  Croats  and  Dalmatians  going  over  to  the  Orthodox  faith. 
Would  the  millions  of  Orthodox  Russia  do  less  if  they  saw 
a  like  menace  to  the  faith  of  the  Serbians  and  Montenegrins  ? 
It  is  possible  that  all  these  difficulties  may  be  overcome,  but 
the  problem  is  not  one  of  language  or  blood. 

A  seemingly  trivial  incident  of  this  religious  difference 


AUSTRIA  233 

has  after  all  serious  consequences.  The  Catholic  countries 
use  the  Roman  alphabet  while  the  Orthodox  countries  use  the 
much  superior  Cyrillic  alphabet  which  is  in  use  by  the  Rus- 
sians. While  it  is  a  comparatively  easy  task  to  learn  both 
alphabets,  practically  very  few  do  so,  and  religious  prejudice 
increases  the  difficulty.  We  are  therefore  confronted  with 
the  curious  fact  that  peoples  that  speak  the  same  language 
cannot  read  each  other's  books  and  newspapers.  A  more  per- 
fect device  for  perpetuating  provincialism  could  scarcely  be 
devised.1 

Leaving  the  Slovenes  for  the  time  being  alone, —  though 
they  cannot  possibly  remain  alone, —  let  us  now  take  a  wider 
look  over  the  group  of  nations  thus  reconstituted.  We  have 
at  the  north  an  almost  impossible  Czecho-Slovakia  (we  will 
call  it  Bohemia  for  short),  a  small  Hungary  wholly  inland,  a 
large  but  uneasy  Rumania,  and  a  well  situated  but  poorly 
united  Jugo-Slavia.  In  addition  we  have  extended  Ger- 
many and  brought  her  down  to  the  Adriatic,  and  have  given 
to  Poland  or  Russia,  one  or  both,  territories  which  bring  them 
to  the  Carpathians.  What  are  the  prospects  for  harmony 
within  this  group  ? 

The  one  power  that  has  most  conspicuously  gained  is  Ger- 
many, for  the  extension  of  her  territory  through  to  the  south- 
ern sea  is  of  immense  significance.  But  in  reality  Germany 
would  have  lost,  for  she  would  be  getting  the  small  territory 
of  German  Austria  in  exchange  for  the  whole  Austrian  Em- 
pire which  she  had  brought  into  close  alliance  and  which,  by 
the  recently  concluded  agreement  between  the  two  emperors 
she  had  virtually  annexed.  Doubtless  German  Austria  would 
be  more  dependable  than  the  larger  and  less  sympathetic 

i  It  is  but  fair  to  note  that  these  peoples,  meeting  in  representative 
convention  in  Corfu,  have  frankly  recognized  the  difficulties  here  noted 
and  have  notwithstanding  reached  the  conclusion  that  a  working  union 
is  possible.  This  augurs  well  for  the  success  of  the  attempt,  though  it 
can  hardly  be  said  to  guarantee  it. 


234  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

combination, —  though  such  an  addition  to  the  South  Ger- 
mans would  justly  give  Prussia  some  cause  for  anxiety, —  but 
most  if  not  all  the  new  states  formed  would  at  present  be 
anti-German  and  would  oppose  stout  resistance  to  a  German 
advance  in  this  direction.  This,  indeed,  is  the  very  pur- 
pose of  the  proposed  dismemberment,  the  only  purpose  that 
can  justify  Allied  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  the  Empire. 
Germany  will  not  willingly  accept  such  a  situation.  Yet  it 
is  by  no  means  clear  that  she  would  lose  or  that  we  would  gain 
by  it.  Germany  could  count  on  her  Austrians  absolutely, 
but  could  we  count  on  these  raw  new  states  to  resist  her 
blandishments  and  ward  off  her  intrigues  ?  With  the  example 
of  Bulgaria  before  us,  it  is  hard  to  feel  confident  in  their 
unchanging  loyalty  to  this  or  any  other  cause.  And  when 
we  recall  the  German  settlements  scattered  through  these 
states  all  the  way  from  Vienna  to  Odessa,  and  the  farther  fact 
of  race  dissensions  which  afford  so  admirable  an  opportunity 
for  Germany  to  breach  the  phalanx,  we  have  still  occasion  for 
misgivings  about  the  reconstituted  Balkans. 

Two  of  the  states  thus  formed  would  have  no  access  to 
the  sea.  This  is  simply  indispensable  for  a  modern  nation. 
Hungary  could,  and  probably  would,  be  accommodated 
through  the  country  of  the  Slovenes,  though  Croatia  would 
have  to  give  up  a  little  of  her  territory  if  Hungary  is  to  re- 
tain her  present  port  of  Fiume,  the  only  one  available  for  her 
purpose.  The  bulk  of  the  Slovenes,  however,  would  go  to 
Germany  as  a  condition  of  her  having  access  to  the  Adriatic, 
an  irreducible  minimum.  If  this  is  not  given  her,  she  will 
take  it,  or  will  keep  the  world  on  the  anxious  seat  by  her 
obvious  intention  to  do  so. 

But  Bohemia  could  not  be  accommodated  in  this  essential 
matter  by  any  accession  of  territory.  Her  path  to  the  sea 
must  always  be  across  German  territory,  the  dismemberment 
of  which  by  a  Bohemian  strip  is  too  outrageous  a  violation  of 


AUSTRIA  235 

ethnic  proprieties  to  be  discussed.  For  this  indispensable 
condition  of  modern  life  an  independent  Bohemia  would  al- 
ways be  dependent  upon  Germany,  the  relation  which  now 
irks  her. 

Rumania  would  be  a  large  and  well  situated,  but  physically 
divided,  ill-guarded,  and  heterogeneous  state.  Of  the  lesser 
states  thus  formed,  Rumania  would  be  the  largest,  the  best 
equipped,  and  the  most  workable.  She  would  have  no  irk- 
some dependence  and  no  extraordinary  needs.  Her  difficul- 
ties would  be  internal,  but  these  considerable. 

The  same  would  be  true  in  ever  greater  degree  of  Jugo- 
slavia or  greater  Serbia.  Her  position  would  be  excellent 
and  her  access  to  the  sea  ample, —  much  better  than  that  of 
Rumania.  Her  troubles  would  come  from  within.  Nature 
speaks  strongly  for  this  combination, —  more  than  for  that 
of  greater  Rumania,  but  man  demurs.  Not  much  can  be 
done  till  man  consents,  but  in  such  a  case  we  need  not  hesi- 
tate to  pay  our  respects  to  nature  rather  than  to  man. 

A  liberated  Austria  would  not  make  a  happy  family.  In- 
dependent governments  do  not  make  independent  peoples. 
Bohemia  mistakes  the  nature  of  the  bonds  which  gall  her. 
The  antagonisms,  the  conflicts  of  interest,  and  the  relations 
of  dependence  that  are  so  conspicuous  within  the  Austrian 
Empire,  would  mostly  be  there  if  there  were  no  empire, — 
would  mostly  be  there  and  some  beside.  There  must  be  some- 
thing to  coordinate  these  jarring  elements,  at  least  to  the 
point  of  livableness.  To  the  Hapsburgs  falls  the  unlovely 
task.  When  the  din  becomes  intolerable  and  the  public  ser- 
vice waits,  and  the  Parliament  becomes  a  babel,  and  the 
Czechs  refuse  to  speak  or  to  hear  the  German  that  all  know, 
and  insist  on  speaking  the  Bohemian  that  nobody  else  under- 
stands, and  chaos  ends  in  deadlock,  then  Hapsburg  speaks, 
the  ruler  of  a  thousand  years,  and  people  in  all  the  troubled 
realm  draw  a  sigh  of  relief  and  say :     "  Thank  God,  we  have 


236  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

an  Emperor  to  save  ns  from  ourselves."  Nowhere  is  mon- 
archy so  unlovely,  because  nowhere  has  it  so  unlovely  a  task. 
The  monarchy  may  be  abolished,  but  not  the  task. 

The  writer  doubts  the  feasibility  of  a  complete  dismember- 
ment of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  Autonomy  based 
on  national,  that  is,  approximately  racial,  units  is  obviously 
desirable,  though  even  that  will  prove  difficult  in  almost  every 
unit  for  the  various  reasons  above  detailed.  But  complete 
independence,  followed  as  it  inevitably  would  be,  by  tariff 
barriers  and  all  manner  of  commercial  and  industrial  handi- 
cap, with  oppressive  treatment  of  minority  elements  and 
echoes  across  the  border,  would  cripple  the  development  of  all 
these  peoples  and  ruin  some  of  those  most  eager  for  the  experi- 
ment. The  crude  and  unsatisfactory  union  of  these  peoples 
which  history  has  bequeathed  to  us  is  better,  far  better,  than 
disunion.  Its  bonds,  which  are  so  largely  nature's  bonds, 
are  less  galling  than  would  be  those  same  bonds  under  mere 
imputed  freedom. 

A  much  more  reasonable  alternative  is  federation,  but  even 
this  as  Americans  conceive  it,  is  of  doubtful  applicability. 
Such  a  federation  would  necessarily  imply  federal  functions, 
federal  organs,  and  federal  authority.  It  is  much  to  be 
feared  that  the  states  to  be  included  in  such  a  scheme  have  not 
yet  learned  the  deference  and  the  concessive  spirit  necessary 
to  the  success  of  federal  action.  We  have  seen  something  of 
obstruction  in  our  own  Congress,  but  it  is  as  nothing  to  what 
is  habitual  in  the  Austrian  Parliament.  This  Parliament 
(Austrian,  not  Austro-Hungarian)  was  reconstituted  in  1907 
on  an  absolutely  democratic  basis,  election  being  by  manhood 
suffrage.  A  man  can  vote  for  representative  in  Austria  who 
could  not  vote  in  Massachusetts.  The  membership  elected  at 
that  time  was  thoroughly  representative  of  those  classes  and 
interests  that  are  characteristic  of  our  time.  There  was  in- 
exhaustible work  for  them  to  do,  reforms  long  agitated  and  to 


AUSTRIA  237 

which  they  stood  pledged.  Yet  when,  after  four  years  of  ses- 
sion, they  were  prorogued,  they  had  earned  no  gratitude  and 
accomplished  nothing.  Eace  antagonisms  dominated  every- 
thing from  the  first.  The  Czechs  would  vote  for  nothing  that 
the  Germans  wanted,  and  the  Germans  reciprocated.  They 
would  not  even  speak  the  hated  language  of  their  opponents. 
Each  manoeuvred  for  the  support  of  other  race  elements. 
When  the  present  war  began,  Parliament  was  dismissed,  not 
as  a  tyrannical  muzzling  of  democracy,  as  we  have  too  hastily 
assumed,  but  to  suppress  the  interminable  race  struggle  in  the 
interest  of  public  safety.  It  may  be  urged,  and  with  much 
justice,  that  present  race  relations  in  Austria  are  unjust  and 
that  a  juster  arrangement  would  lessen  these  antipathies. 
Undoubtedly,  and  too  much  insistence  can  not  be  placed  on 
the  necessity  for  these  juster  arrangements.  But  it  is  a  far 
cry  from  present  conditions  to  successful  federation.  For 
after  all  no  government  can  work  that  can  not  govern, —  that 
can  not  break  deadlocks  and  bring  about  decisions  and  secure 
acquiescence  and  get  necessary  things  done.  There  are  few 
groups  of  men  that  have  reached  the  point  where  federation 
can  be  sure  of  accomplishing  these  necessary  ends.  Most 
democracies,  so-called,  have  their  autocrat  in  reserve  to  break 
the  deadlock  which  they  can  create  but  can  not  undo, —  an  au- 
tocrat known,  of  course,  by  less  opprobrious  names.  Xo  place 
could  be  found  among  civilized  men  where  federation  would 
oftener  require  such  a  service  than  in  Austria.  Perhaps  a 
better  could  be  found  than  the  Hapsburg,  but  scarcely  an- 
other whose  decisions  would  be  so  restrained  and  whose 
authority  would  be  so  enforced  by  the  tradition  of  the  cen- 
turies. 

And  here  some  one  will  suggest  the  Hague  tribunal  as  the 
proper  successor  of  the  Hapsburg.  It  is  difficult  for  the 
writer  to  suppress,  or  yet  to  express,  the  emotions  with  which 
he  hears  such  a  proposal.     It  betrays  such  an  utter  lack  of 


238  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

feeling  for  reality,  such  an  unconsciousness  of  the  forces  that 
really  sway  the  minds  of  men,  such  a  disregard  of  the  need 
of  that  daily,  sympathetic,  living  touch  with  the  conditions 
to  be  dealt  with,  that  the  very  suggestion  makes  argument 
hopeless.  The  Hapsburg  may  be  an  autocrat,  but  his  au- 
tocracy is  beneficence  itself  compared  with  the  autocracy  of 
an  alien  absentee  tribunal.  The  Hapsburg  seems  to  us 
only  an  autocrat.  He  is  in  fact, —  he  must  be, —  and  for 
many  a  long  year  has  been,  little  else  than  a  conciliator.  To 
a  knowledge  which  no  be-lawyered  tribunal  could  ever  ac- 
quire, a  knowledge  which  is  less  an  acquisition  than  an  inher- 
itance, is  joined  a  reverence  and  a  love  on  the  part  of  his 
people  which  no  personal  faults  ever  suffice  to  destroy  or  to 
make  inoperative  for  the  performance  of  his  indispensable 
function. 

The  writer  holds  no  brief  for  the  Hapsburgs,  but  he 
has  too  much  respect  for  the  democracy  which  such  pro- 
cedure would  violate,  too  much  regard  for  the  Hague  Tribunal 
which  such  functions  would  imperil,  and  too  much  faith  in 
liberty  to  which  even  Austria  is  entitled,  to  see  hope  in  this 
destructive  and  reactionary  proposal.  The  Hapsburg  has  a 
task  for  which  he  is  responsible  to  his  own  people.  There  is 
another  task  for  which  he  and  they  are  responsible  to  the 
world,  the  maintenance  of  the  world's  peace  and  of  justice 
toward  other  nations.  For  that  he  and  thev  must  be  held, — 
are  being  held  —  to  a  stern  accountability.  Let  us  not  con- 
found the  two  tasks.  We  shall  not  help  Bohemia  as  we  shall 
not  help  Ireland,  by  recognizing  a  jurisdiction  over  their 
case  which  we  can  not  helpfully  exercise. 

This  brings  us  to  the  great  transgression,  the  world's  griev- 
ance against  Austria.  She  made  herself  a  bridge  over  which 
the  great  marauder  crossed  to  Armageddon.  The  offense 
was  grievous  and  grievous  must  be  the  expiation.  That  thing 
must  stop  forever.     Hence  all  these  proposals.     If  there  were 


AUSTKIA  239 

no  Austria,  there  could  be  no  bridge.  Nay,  more.  An  inde- 
pendent Bohemia,  an  independent  Kumania,  an  independent 
Serbia,  all  of  them  anti-German,  would  automatically  block 
the  way.  But  would  they?  Might  not  a  helplessly  depen- 
dent Bohemia  barter  her  aid,  wittingly  or  unwittingly,  for 
the  indispensable  that  only  Germany  could  furnish?  Is  it 
so  certain  that  a  Serbia,  rent  with  religious  feuds,  might  not 
offer  through  faction  the  door  through  which  so  many  a  con- 
queror has  marched  to  victory  ?  Is  it  certain  that  Rumania 
with  her  Hohenzollern  dynasty  and  her  opportunist  policy 
might  not  play  the  role  of  Bulgaria?  It  is  a  short-sighted 
statesmanship  that  sees  hope  in  dissension  and  helplessness, 
rather  than  in  union  and  slowly  evolved  adjustment.  Much 
more  surely  the  anti-German  forces  of  the  Austrian  Empire 
will  block  German  aggression  if  united  than  if  separated  and 
weak. 

What  then  do  we  wish  as  Austria's  pledge  to  keep  the 
peace?  First  of  all,  we  should  demand  liberty  within  the 
Empire.  There  is  no  sufficient  reason  why  Austria, —  vast 
complex  that  she  is, —  should  be  ruled  by  a  German-Magyar 
partnership.  Granting  that  these  races  are  better  qualified 
for  the  task  than  the  others, —  as  they  almost  certainly  are, — 
their  rule  is  oppressive,  repressive,  and  obsolete.  In  refusing 
autonomy  to  the  other  race  elements,  they  have  made  that 
autonomy  inevitable.  That  autonomy  for  the  Rumanians 
and  the  Jugo-Slavs  unfortunately  can  not  be  effected  within 
the  Empire.  The  war  has  made  that  impossible.  It  will 
be  difficult  in  the  extreme  to  effect  it  outside  the  Empire,  yet 
in  the  measure  of  the  possible  the  attempt  must  be  made. 
Rumania  must  remain  independent  and  must  be  extended  to 
the  Dniester.  Whether  the  safe  bulwark  of  the  Carpathians 
should  be  abandoned  for  an  arbitrary  line  and  the  Transyl- 
vanians  and  imprisoned  Magyars  included  in  free  Rumania 
is  not  so  clear.     A  satisfactory  status  for  the  Transylvanians 


240  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

within  the  Empire  would  seem  more  practicable.  But  if 
they  are  still  to  be  the  serfs  of  the  Magyars,  then  their  union 
with  Rumania  is  inevitable. 

The  Greater  Serbia  is  again  difficult  but  seemingly  inev- 
itable. Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  and  Dalmatia  are  not  vital 
to  Austria  unless  as  potential  factors  in  national  defense. 
They  are  vital  to  Serbia,  and  if  a  union  can  be  effected  with 
full  consciousness  of  the  delicacy  of  the  religious  problem 
and  adequate  provision  for  it,  the  combination  is  a  natural 
and  hopeful  one.  Since  Austria  has  made  their  union  within 
the  Empire  impossible,  she  may  justly  be  asked  to  consent  to 
their  union  outside  it.  But  this  union  would  not  be  an  inclu- 
sive one.  Slavonia  and  Croatia  would  still  be  within  the 
Empire  and  in  part  at  least  must  there  remain.  They  give 
Hungary  her  only  access  to  the  sea,  an  access  of  which  it 
would  be  folly  to  deprive  her  if  we  hope  for  enduring  peace. 
Their  religious  union  with  the  Empire  and  their  doubtful 
friendship  for  the  Orthodox  Serbians  would  facilitate  if  it 
did  not  in  itself  necessitate  this  seemingly  unnatural  arrange- 
ment. 

On  the  south,  too,  the  union  would  be  incomplete.  The 
Montenegrins,  always  independent  and  holding  a  vitally 
strategic  position,  are  said  to  be  irreconcilable.  Xo  Greater 
Serbia  for  them,  but  the  unrestricted  freedom  of  their  moun- 
tains. Their  aloofness  is  certainly  not  in  the  interest  of  the 
larger  human  order,  but  it  may  prove  unalterable.1 

The  preposterous  kingdom  of  Albania,  based  on  no  unity 
either  of  religion  or  speech  or  history,  and  created  at  the  be- 
hest of  the  Central  Powers  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  give 
a  pretext  for  intervention,  should  be  abolished.  The  south- 
ern portion  speaks  Greek  and  should  be  annexed  to  Greece,  as 
in  effect  it  has  been.     Austria's  former  objection  to  this  on 

i  Later  reports  are  to  the  effect  that  their  king  consents  to  enter  the 
union.    His  consent  practically  insures  the  consent  of  his  people. 


AUSTKIA  241 

the  ground  that  it  would  give  Greece  control  of  the  Corfu 
channel  and  so  of  the  Adriatic,  may  now  be  ignored.  Italy's 
objection  on  similar  grounds  is  now  offset  by  her  own  occupa- 
tion of  Avlona.  The  northern  portion  can  go  nowhere  else 
than  to  Greater  Serbia. 

Galicia,  too,  may  perhaps  reasonably  go  to  her  own  if  there 
is  any  own  for  her  to  go  to, —  and  if  she  really  wishes  to  go, — 
but  there  would  be  little  objection  to  her  willing  continuance 
in  the  Empire.  For  Bohemia  and  her  kindred  there  can  be 
no  better  wish  than  partnership  in  the  Empire.  Nor  need 
the  Allies  greatly  trouble  themselves  to  urge  a  reformation 
which  at  best  would  have  come  in  the  not  distant  future,  and 
which  the  war  must  hasten  unless  our  indiscretion  interferes 
with  the  course  of  nature. 

The  Hapsburg  autocracy  will  disappear  as  soon  as  Austria 
can  dispense  with  autocracy.  Meanwhile  the  accumulated 
prestige  of  a  thousand  years  of  service  is  a  thing  not  lightly 
to  be  squandered.  Much  to  be  envied  are  they  who,  like  the 
English  people,  know  how  gradually  to  emancipate  them- 
selves from  autocracy,  and  yet  preserve  its  prestige,  its  dig- 
nity, and  its  personal  organ  for  the  useful  purposes  of  de- 
mocracy. In  Austria  that  transformation  is  exceptionally 
difficult,  but  it  is  possible  and  it  has  long  been  under  way. 


Note.  As  these  pages  go  to  press,  the  destruction  of  the  Empire 
seems  complete.  The  Czech  Republic  has  acquired  sufficient  being  to 
call  a  president  from  America,  with  what  degree  of  popular  warrant 
remains  to  be  seen.  Jugo-Slovia,  too,  has  found  a  spokesman  if  not  a 
popular  voice,  and  begins  its  national  life  by  showing  its  teeth  to  the 
Italians  in  Fiume,  thus  necessitating  American  intervention.  German 
Austria  looks  toward  Germany  and  Hungary  is  abandoned  to  solitude 
and  uncongenial  republican  thoughts.  There  is  nothing  yet  to  prove 
that  the  Empire  can  be  dispensed  with, —  nothing  to  prove,  for  that 
matter,  that  it  has  been  dispensed  with. 


CHAPTER  XV 

TURKEY 

The  problem  of  the  Turkish  Empire  has  been  for  a  cen- 
tury the  clearest  and  the  most  obscure  in  Europe, —  the  clear- 
est in  that  there  has  long  ceased  to  be  any  doubt  as  to  the 
necessity  of  some  sort  of  receivership  for  the  helpless  realm, 
and  the  most  obscure  in  that  it  has  seemed  impossible  to  de- 
cide what  that  receivership  should  be.  Turkey  has  borne  a 
charmed  life,  protected  by  her  very  incompetency  from  the 
consequences  which  that  incompetency  entails.  Time  and 
again  she  has  seemed  about  to  pay  the  penalty  of  her  inef- 
ficiency and  her  crimes,  but  each  time  she  has  escaped  with 
trifling  penalty,  escaped  to  continue  and  even  to  exceed  her 
former  blunders  and  misdoings.  Will  she  escape  this  time  ? 
The  great  settlement  hardly  involves  a  more  important  ques- 
tion. So  long  as  Turkey  is  allowed  to  do  that  which  is  every- 
where else  forbidden  and  to  omit  that  which  is  everywhere 
else  required,  there  will  be  small  chance  of  establishing  in 
the  world  that  better  order  and  health  for  which  we  are  sac- 
rificing so  much.  Turkey  festers  in  the  world's  flesh.  Is 
the  newer  surgery  able  and  ready  to  effect  a  cure  ? 

It  is  no  part  of  the  writer's  purpose  to  inveigh  against  the 
Turkish  people  as  criminal  and  depraved.  Still  less  does 
this  charge  lie  against  the  individual  Turk.  All  evidence 
points  to  the  conclusion  that  he  is  a  man  of  many  virtues, 
patient,  peaceable,  hocpi table,  industrious,  and  kind,  virtues 
invaluable  in  individual  relations,  but  quite  incapable  of 
forming  a  state.  Even  in  his  organic  capacity  in  which  he 
is  guilty  of  such  incredible  crimes  as  the  Macedonian  atroci- 
ties and  the  Armenian  massacres,  it  is  rather  his  helpless 

242 


TURKEY  243 

incompetency  than  his  criminal  instincts  with  which  we  have 
to  deal.  The  Armenian  massacres  have  no  such  moral  sig- 
nificance on  the  part  of  the  Turk  as  they  would  have  on  the 
part  of  a  competent  western  nation, —  as  they  do  have  on  the 
part  of  the  nation  that  incited  them.  It  is  easy  to  extenuate 
the  crimes  of  the  Turk.  But  that  does  not  in  the  least  lessen 
the  misery  resulting  from  his  deeds  or  the  responsibility  of 
the  civilized  world  for  their  continuance.  In  a  sense  it  in- 
creases it.  If  the  Turk  is  irresponsible,  the  world  becomes 
by  so  much  more  responsible  for  allowing  him  to  exercise 
privileges  with  which  he  can  not  be  trusted.  Refraining, 
therefore,  from  moral  denunciation,  we  have  to  note  what 
it  is  in  the  Turkish  Empire  that  is  incompatible  with  modern 
civilization. 

The  Empire  is  based  on  religion.  That  religion  asserts  not 
only  its  own  superiority  but  its  own  exclusive  right.  The 
unbeliever  has  no  right  to  live.  If  allowed  to  do  so,  it  is  by 
the  grace  of  the  conqueror  and  on  any  terms  that  may  seem 
good  to  him.  Of  rights  there  can  be  no  question  to  a  non- 
Moslem  population.  This  is  fundamentally  at  variance  with 
the  whole  concept  of  the  western  world.  The  fact  that  the 
Turk  has  been,  from  the  standpoint  of  this  fundamental  prin- 
ciple, an  easy  master,  does  not  in  the  least  change  the  prin- 
ciple. He  has  in  fact  pretty  generally  spared  the  conquered. 
He  has  first  offered  them  the  privilege  of  embracing  Islam, 
in  which  case  they  at  once  become  entitled  to  all  the  rights  and 
privileges  of  the  conquering  race.  This  was  a  corollary  of 
his  principle,  but  it  is  not  the  less  worthy  of  note  that  it  made 
the  Turk  the  most  liberal  of  conquerors.  As  this  privilege 
has  remained  open  to  the  conquered,  it  has  attracted  certain 
subject  peoples,  not  always  from  the  highest  motives,  to  the 
standard  of  Islam.  The  Albanians  and  the  Bosnians  are 
examples.  But  religious  allegiance,  nowhere  more  tenacious 
than  in  the  Turkish  east,  has  generally  led  to  the  rejection 


244  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

of  the  conqueror's  offer.  In  that  case  the  conquered  was 
allowed  to  live  on  condition  that  he  paid  an  annual  poll  tax. 
He  was  not  allowed  to  serve  in  the  army,  could  have  no  arms, 
and  was  deprived  of  all  civil  rights.  This  was  slavery  in 
principle,  though  carelessly  enforced  for  the  most  part.  All 
such  subjects  were  deprived  of  the  benefits  of  Moslem  law, 
but  were  assumed  to  have  a  religious  law  and  a  religious  head 
of  their  own  whom  the  Turkish  government  held  responsible 
for  their  behaviour.  The  person  not  registered  as  belonging 
to  one  of  these  religions  simply  had  no  law,  no  political  or 
civil  status  whatever,  for  the  idea  of  a  civil  state  and  of 
statute  law  independent  of  religion,  the  Turk  simply  can  not 
conceive. 

This  characteristic  of  Turkish  rule  is  in  a  double  sense 
a  bar  to  progress.  In  the  first  place  it  denies  in  principle 
the  argument  of  human  rights  as  regards  all  non-Mosleins. 
The  plea  that  they  should  be  elevated  and  developed  falls 
flat  in  the  face  of  this  fundamental  assumption.  They  are 
in  essence  disloyal.  Their  very  lives  are  forfeit.  What  they 
possess  is  just  so  much  more  than  they  deserve.  If  they 
want  more,  let  them  join  the  faithful.  The  door  is  always 
open.     Such  reasoning  seems  very  satisfactory  to  a  Moslem. 

In  the  second  place,  religious  law  is  wholly  unmodifiable 
in  theory  and  largely  unmodifiable  in  fact.  Men  did  not 
make  it,  and  how  should  men  change  it  ?  Such  is  the  argu- 
ment. Slow  change  is  always  going  on,  to  be  sure,  but  this 
is  smuggled  in  under  the  plea  of  returning  to  an  earlier  purity 
from  which  men  have  unconsciously  dropped  away,  or  it  is 
itself  challenged  as  a  departure  from  the  true  standards.  A 
religious  state  is  therefore  necessarily  a  conservative  state. 
This  is  suitable  for  an  early  stage  of  political  development 
in  which  stability  rather  than  progress  is  the  desideratum, 
but  it  is  utterly  out  of  harmony  with  modern  requirements. 

The  second  great  characteristic  of  Turkish  political  organ- 


TUKKEY  245 

ization  is  autocracy.  This  exists  in  its  most  unapologized 
form.  The  sultan  is  held  amenable  to  the  sacred  law  of  the 
Koran,  but  to  no  other  law  whatever.  The  liberty  claimed 
for  him  is  somewhat  startling  to  western  ears.  Thus,  it  is 
regarded  as  wholly  inadmissible  that  he  should  be  bound  by 
his  own  plighted  word,  for  this  would  destroy  his  freedom  of 
action.  Such  autocracy  is  always  limited,  of  course,  by  many 
prudential  considerations,  but  the  theory  is  none  the  less  po- 
tent and  incompatible  with  modern  ideas. 

The  Moslem  religion  is  military  as  is  well  known.  In 
practice  Christianity  has  been  hardly  less  so,  but  the  western 
civilization  has  unmistakably  come  to  look  upon  war  as  an 
abnormal  condition,  a  means  of  maintaining  order.  The 
Moslem  assigns  it  a  I  very  different  function,  and  his  different 
conception  beyond  a  doubt  retards  the  realization  of  western 
peace  ideals.  The  Turkish  Empire  was  built  by  military 
organization,  the  most  efficient  in  the  world  in  its  day.  For 
three  centuries  it  held  the  first  place,  yielding  it  only  when 
the  art  of  war  was  transformed  by  an  alliance  with  a  science 
and  an  industry  of  which  the  Turk  was  incapable.  With  the 
extermination  of  the  terrible  Janissaries  in  1826  by  a  Sultan 
who  had  come  to  fear  their  power,  Turkey  lapsed  into  rela- 
tive impotence  as  a  military  power  until  revived  in  modern 
days  by  German  organizing  genius.  During  this  period  of 
relative  impotence  Turkey  has  no  doubt  lost  much  of  her 
maitial  spirit  without  thereby  modifying  in  the  least  her 
fundamental  militarist  principles. 

But  it  can  not  be  too  strongly  insisted  that  abstract  prin- 
ciples offer  no  sufficient  basis  of  judgment  in  such  cases.  It 
is  the  soundest  of  Anglo-Saxon  principles  that  we  are  to  take 
no  account  of  men's  theories,  little  account  even  of  men's 
words,  and  that  we  are  to  judge  men  simply  by  what  they 
do  or  fail  to  do.  It  is  here  that  the  Turk  fails  most  miserably 
to  meet  the  test.     In  every  part  of  his  vast  empire  he  found  an 


246  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

advanced  civilization.  In  no  part  has  he  preserved  that  civi- 
lization, much  less  made  advance  upon  it.  The  writer  has 
traveled  some  thousands  of  miles  in  territories  now  or  recently 
under  the  rule  of  the  Turk.  In  every  square  mile  of  the 
territory  thus  visited  there  prevails  a  squalor  inconceivable 
to  a  dweller  in  the  western  world.  Evidences  of  the  earlier 
civilization  are  pathetically  abundant,  but  everything  is  ruin- 
ous and  decaying.  Great  regions,  some  of  them  among  the 
richest  in  the  world,  have  lapsed  into  absolute  wilderness 
through  the  neglect  of  irrigation,  a  necessity  in  a  very  large 
part  of  the  Empire.  Roman  highways,  bridges,  and  reser- 
voirs are  traceable  only  by  scanty  remains.  Hillsides  where 
the  cut-stone  wine  presses  attest  the  former  presence  of  vine- 
yards and  intensive  culture,  are  now  overgrown  with  weeds, 
and  goats  browse  where  once  was  careful  tillage.  If  the 
Turk  did  not  do  all  the  destroying,  he  at  least  has  been  un- 
able to  rebuild.  The  reason  is  perfectly  simple.  He  came 
into  this  civilized  land  a  conquering  barbarian  and  made  the 
land  and  its  civilized  peoples  his  servants.  He  could  not  and 
he  would  not  do  their  work  or  learn  their  arts.  Yet  as  slaves 
and  servants  to  a  selfish  and  unenlightened  master,  they 
could  not  maintain  their  arts  and  their  appliances.  The 
Turk  has  been  good  natured,  tolerant,  even  indulgent,  but 
these  are  not  the  qualities  that  develop  a  civilization. 

The  revolution  of  1908  attempted  to  change  the  funda- 
mental structure  of  the  Empire  and  eliminate  its  vices.  The 
power  of  the  Sultan  was  limited  by  a  constitution.  Provi- 
sion was  made  for  the  development  of  statute  law.  Races 
were  made  equal  before  the  law  and  liable  alike  to  military 
service.  In  short,  Turkey  was  to  become  a  modern  state. 
But  such  things  do  not  go  thus  easily.  The  impulse  had 
come  from  without,  and  the  old  conditions  remained  within. 
Above  all  the  new  Turkey  was  officially  Mohammedan,  and 
Mohammedanism  retained  necessarily  its  old  connotations. 


TURKEY  247 

It  was  with  astonishment  and  intense  indignation  that  Mo- 
hammedans were  told  in  those  first  days  of  hectic  modernism 
that  they  must  surrender  loot  taken,  in  accordance  with  im- 
memorial custom,  from  the  patient  unbelievers.  What  the 
outcome  might  have  been  under  ideal  conditions  we  can  only 
guess.  The  conditions  were  not  ideal.  The  war  with  Italy, 
the  Balkan  wars,  and  now  the  world  war  have  swept  away 
the  feeble  exotic  and  established  the  more  normal  military 
despotism  with  which  we  now  have  to  deal.  !Never  since  the 
days  of  Othman  has  the  government  been  more  oppressive,  its 
procedure  more  arbitrary,  its  autocracy  more  absolute.  And 
to  all  this  is  now  added  the  most  appalling  massacre  in  Turk- 
ish history. 

The  Armenian  massacre  reveals  better  than  anything  can 
well  do  the  fundamental  weakness  of  the  Turkish  government. 
We  are  shocked  by  its  incredible  brutality,  but  in  fact  it  is 
incompetency  rather  than  brutality  which  is  its  chief  lesson. 
The  Armenians  occupied  strategic  ground.  Their  country 
is  an  elevated  mountainous  region  sloping  downward  from 
the  Caucasus  to  the  plain  of  Asia  Minor.  Part  of  the  Ar- 
menians had  already  passed  under  Eussian  rule.  A  Russian 
attack  from  this  quarter  was  inevitable,  and  the  presence  of 
a  disaffected  people  in  this  highland  outpost  on  the  route 
which  the  Russian  must  take  was  a  very  obvious  danger. 
The  German-trained  dictators  of  Turkev,  aided,  no  doubt,  by 
the  General  Staff  at  Berlin,  realized  the  necessity  of  taking 
precautions.  A  strong  and  efficient  administrative  organiza- 
tion could  have  taken  precautions  of  a  humane  character. 
Turkey  possessed  no  such  organization.  Hence  it  was 
agreed  that  the  Armenians  must  be  deported,  a  natural  con- 
clusion, however  barbarous.  But  for  this  deportation  Turkey 
was  as  incompetent  as  for  anything  else.  She  had  no  rail- 
roads, no  commissariat,  no  shelters  along  the  way.  She  had 
no  place  to  deport  these  Armenians  where  they  would  not  fall 


248  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  except  the  desert  region  to  the 
south  and  east.  Without  roads,  without  shelter,  without  sup- 
plies, and  without  time  or  means  or  skill  to  create  any  of  these 
things,  she  yet  had  to  accomplish  the  task  which  was  imposed 
upon  her  by  the  conditions  and  by  a  merciless  ally.  Is  it  so 
surprising  that  she  made  short  work  of  an  impossible  task  by 
massacre  ? 

This  is  not  said  to  excuse  Turkey  but  rather  to  condemn 
her.  If  there  were  no  roads,  shelters,  or  supplies,  there 
should  have  been  these  things.  If  there  was  no  administra- 
tion in  Armenia  that  could  make  deportation  unnecessary, 
there  should  have  been  such  an  administration.  Nay,  more, 
there  should  have  been  such  a  rule  that  the  Armenians,  who 
have  known  no  independence  for  two  thousand  years  and  have 
ceased  to  feel  the  need  of  it,  would  have  guarded  the  fron- 
tier themselves.  The  condemning  fact  may  not  be  Turkish 
malevolence,  but  the  condemnation  is  not  therefore  the  less 
complete. 

If  there  is  any  moral  animus  to  the  Allied  cause,  there  can 
be  but  one  attitude  toward  Turkey.  The  rule  of  Mohamme- 
dans over  non-Mohammedan  peoples  must  cease.  That  rule 
is  vicious  in  principle,  for  Mohammedanism  is  the  negation  of 
all  rights  on  the  part  of  non-Mohammedans.  It  is  far  more 
vicious  in  fact,  for  the  Turk  is  mentally  and  culturally  the 
inferior  of  the  peoples  he  rules.  Mohammedan  rule  in  the 
Caliphate  of  Bagdad  or  Cordova  was  better  than  its  creed. 
In  Turkey  it  has  no  such  amelioration.  'Nor  does  the  mon- 
strous character  of  Turkish  rule  end  with  the  subject  Chris- 
tian. The  Turk  is  the  conqueror  not  only  of  Christian  races, 
but  of  earlier  and  better  Mohammedan  powers.  The  Arab 
race,  with  which  Mohammedanism  began,  has  long  been  sub- 
ject to  a  race  which  is  a  Mohammedan  parvenu,  a  race  alien 
in  spirit  to  that  with  which  Mohammedanism  began  and  a 
ruthless  marauder  upon  its  domain.     By  the  law  of  the  Koran 


TUEKEY  249 

only  an  Arab  and  a  descendant  of  Mohammed  can  hold  the 
position  of  Caliph.  The  Sultan,  who  is  neither  a  descendant 
nor  an  Arab,  has  long  held  it  by  sheer  right  of  conquest. 
The  Arab  is  neither  unmindful  of  these  facts  nor  reconciled 
to  them.  Absolutely  loyal  to  his  religion,  he  is  not  loyal  to 
his  upstart  barbarian  master. 

All  this  is  familiar  and  has  long  made  the  dissolution  of  the 
Turkish  Empire  inevitable.  Yet  at  every  crisis  when  that 
dissolution  seemed  inevitable,  insuperable  obstacles  have  pre- 
sented themselves.  These  have  been,  first,  the  immense  im- 
portance of  the  several  territories  of  the  Empire,  especially  of 
Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles,  and  the  jealousy  of  the 
great  powers  regarding  them;  second,  the  fear  of  the  great 
Mohammedan  powers,  England  and  France,  as  to  the  conse- 
quences to  their  populations  of  an  attack  on  the  one  great 
Mohammedan  state ;  and,  third,  the  reluctance  of  the  western 
nations  to  extinguish  a  fellow  nation  that  did  not  directly 
threaten  their  own  existence.  This  last  was  especially  mani- 
fest when,  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  Czar 
of  Russia  deliberately  proposed  to  England  and  France  that 
the  three  powers  unite  to  dismember  Turkey,  "  the  sick  man 
of  the  East,"  and  appropriate  his  territories.  ~No  doubt  Eng- 
land and  France  had  misgivings  as  to  the  possibility  of  a 
satisfactory  division  and  were  actuated  in  part  by  prudential 
considerations  in  that  refusal  which  brought  on  the  Crimean 
War.  But  it  is  equally  certain  that  quite  aside  from  these 
considerations,  the  Czar's  proposal  would  have  encountered 
unconquerable  repugnance  on  the  part  of  these  peoples. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  all  of  these  obstacles  have  now 
disappeared.  Russia  no  longer  claims  the  Dardanelles  and 
is  not  likely  for  many  a  decade  to  be  in  a  position  to  claim  it 
effectively.  Even  if  she  did,  England  and  France,  now  in 
league  and  in  possession  of  Egypt,  would  no  longer  fear  her 
control  of  the  straits.     Germany  is  the  new  claimant  and 


250  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

Germany  must  be  denied.  But  Germany  seeks  to  control  by 
controlling  Turkey.  The  maintenance  of  Turkey  is  there- 
fore in  the  interest  of  Germany's  designs,  as  it  was  formerly 
in  the  interest  of  her  present  enemies. 

The  fear  of  molesting  the  political  and  religious  head  of 
the  Mohammedan  world  has  passed.  The  Sultan  no  longer 
occupies  that  important  position.  Arabia  is  again  independ- 
ent of  Turkey  and  her  king,  this  time  an  Arab  and  a  descend- 
ant of  the  Prophet,  now  rules  as  Caliph  in  the  sacred  capital 
of  Mecca,  while  his  soldiers  are  fighting  the  Turk  on  the 
plains  of  Moab.  The  Turk  is  thus  branded  as  an  usurper  by 
the  authority  of  the  Prophet's  legitimate  representative.1 

Finally,  it  must  be  said  that  our  reluctance  to  extinguish 
the  Turkish  nation  has  disappeared.  The  knowledge  of  what 
Turkish  rule  is  like,  the  utter  failure  of  all  attempts  at  re- 
form, both  those  of  internal  and  those  of  foreign  initiative, 
and  the  repeated  massacres  of  tens  of  thousands  of  peaceable 
subjects  for  no  other  reason  than  suspected  dissatisfaction 
with  intolerable  political  and  economic  conditions,  these  have 
deepened  the  conviction  that  that  government  has  no  right  to 
exist.  Meanwhile  the  active  alliance  of  Turkey  with  the  arch 
enemy  has  given  the  necessary  occasion  for  the  long  needed 
action.  If  this  war  does  not  end  with  a  radical  solution  of 
this  perennial  problem,  it  will  convict  the  Allies  in  their  turn 
of  incompetency  and  will  render  futile  all  other  attempts  to 
establish  permanent  peace. 

But  our  problem,  like  all  such  problems,  is  a  concrete  one 
and  one  bristling  with  practical  difficulties.  What  are  the 
component  parts  of  the  Turkish  Empire  with  which  we  have 
to  deal,  and  what  is  the  problem  presented  by  each  ?  The  list 
has  noticeably  diminished  since  the  Crimean  War.     The  war 

i  The  complete  failure  of  Mohammedans  the  world  over  to  respond  to 
the  Sultan's  summons  to  a  Jihad  or  holy  war  when  Turkey  joined  the 
Central  Powers  in  the  present  conflict  is  another  indication  of  his  loss  of 
prestige  as  Caliph. 


TUKKEY  251 

of  1877-8  saw  the  loss  of  Rumania,  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  Bosnia, 
and  Herzegovina  in  the  Balkans,  the  fastnesses  of  upper 
Armenia  in  the  Caucasus,  and  the  Island  of  Cyprus.  Egypt 
and  Tunis  slipped  away  soon  after.  The  war  with  Italy  took 
Tripoli,  Rhodes  and  eleven  other  islands.  The  Balkan  War 
resulted  in  the  loss  of  Albania,  Macedonia,  part  of  Thrace, 
Crete,  Samos,  Chios,  Thasos,  and  other  islands.  Turkey  in 
Europe  is  reduced  to  Constantinople  and  the  few  square  miles 
necessary  for  its  incomparable  defenses,  a  mere  defensive 
outpost  to  the  real  Turkey  lying  beyond  the  narrow  straits. 

It  is  to  this  Turkey  in  Asia,  the  real  Turkey,  that  we  now 
turn.  It  is  here  that  the  task  of  the  present  war  lies  and 
here  that  the  work  of  dismemberment  and  rearrangement  is 
already  far  advanced.  Looking  at  the  map  of  Turkey  in 
Asia,  we  notice  certain  well  defined  areas  which  are  more 
separable  and  definitely  set  off  by  nature  than  is  usual  in  such 
cases.  At  the  top  and  running  horizontally  on  the  map  is  a 
band  of  territory  about  a  thousand  miles  long  and  four  hun- 
dred miles  wide.  Some  six  hundred  miles  of  this  zone  on  the 
left  is  unsupported  on  the  south,  a  huge  projection  running 
westward  from  the  mainland,  commonly  known  as  Asia 
Minor,  or  in  discussions  of  Turkish  affairs,  Anatolia.  But 
this  zone  continues  with  little  change  right  on  to  the  Persian 
border,  four  hundred  miles  farther,  or  perhaps  we  should  say, 
to  the  Caspian  Sea,  two  hundred  miles  farther  still,  though 
this  last  is  not  under  Turkish  but  under  Russian  and  Persian 
rule.  This  twelve  hundred  mile  zone  is  unusually  well  de- 
fined, having  the  Black  Sea  and  its  straits  and  the  Caucasus 
on  the  north,  a  sea  at  either  end,  and  a  sea  half  the  way  on 
the  south.  And  as  if  this  last  were  not  enough,  there  is  a 
mighty  mountain  range  running  along  this  southern  coast  and 
on  past  the  Syrian  corner  into  the  mainland  itself.  But 
shortly  after  passing  this  corner  the  mountains  seem  to  lose 
their  bearings.     The  chain  swerves  to  the  northeast  and  then, 


252  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

after  a  while,  turns  southeast  again,  thus  cutting  a  broad, 
shallow  notch  out  of  the  eastern  part  of  our  broad  zone.  And 
since  the  mountains  are  thus  crowded  to  the  north  in  this 
region,  they  pile  up  and  fill  the  whole  narrowed  eastern  part 
of  the  zone,  which  thus  becomes  a  wild,  rugged  plateau  which 
culminates  in  the  great  Ararat  of  Bible  story,  a  mountain 
17,000  feet  high.  In  this  eastern  mountainous  part  of  the 
zone  is  situated, —  though  very  vaguely  defined  and  not  all 
in  Turkish  territory, —  the  sore  tried  Armenia. 

Turning  now  to  the  notch  on  the  southern  side  of  our  zone, 
we  find  two  rivers  rising  at  its  very  point  and  almost  together, 
the  Tigris  and  the  Euphrates.  The  former  flows  southeast- 
ward following  the  right  hand  side  of  the  notch,  and  heads 
straight  for  the  Persian  Gulf,  which  it  reaches  in  due  time 
by  a  tolerably  direct  course.  The  latter  flows  southwest,  fol- 
lowing the  left  hand  side  of  the  notch  and  makes  directly  for 
the  Mediterranean  at  the  corner  above  referred  to.  But 
some  time  before  reaching  the  coast  it  seems  to  encounter  im- 
passable barriers.  It  therefore  changes  its  direction,  heading 
also  for  the  Persian  Gulf,  which  it  reaches  soon  after  joining 
with  the  Tigris.  The  two  rivers  thus  enclose  an  immense 
tract  of  comparatively  level  country,  Mesopotamia, —  between 
the  rivers, —  which  with  adjacent  river  lands  on  the  east  and 
west,  stretches  from  the  summit  of  the  notch  to  the  Persian 
Gulf. 

The  mountains  which  run  along  the  southern  coast  of  Asia 
Minor  and  which  seem  to  become  confused  as  they  strike  the 
solid  mass  of  the  mainland,  send  a  branch  due  south  the  whole 
length  of  the  coast.  It  was  these  mountains,  of  course,  that 
prevented  the  Euphrates  getting  through  to  the  corner  of  the 
Mediterranean.  To  the  east  of  these  mountains  all  is  barren 
and  desert  till  we  get  to  the  territory  of  the  great  rivers  which 
retreats  rapidly  to  the  southeast.  But  on  the  western  or  sea- 
ward slope  is  a  narrow  strip  of  habitable  country  beautiful 


TURKEY  255 

and  rich  toward  the  north,  then  leaner  to  the  south,  until  it 
vanishes  in  yellow  sand  just  where  the  great  continent  links 
up  with  Africa.  This  narrow  strip  is  perhaps  the  most  fa- 
mous in  the  world,  partly  because  it  is  the  home  of  the  religion 
of  the  western  world,  but  partly  also  because  it  has  always 
been  the  narrow  causeway  by  which  alone  the  great  peoples 
of  Egypt  and  Mesopotamia  could  get  access  to  each  other. 
It  is  thus  the  bridge  between  Asia  and  Africa.  Looking 
again  at  the  map,  the  broad  horizontal  zone  which  is  the  heart 
of  Turkey  seems  to  be  perched  on  two  legs,  the  one  a  very 
slender  one  and  quite  perpendicular,  the  other  a  very  broad 
and  long  one  thrown  far  to  the  rear.  Between  these  two  is 
thrust  the  vast  bulk  of  the  Arabian  desert,  one  of  the  most 
impassable  barriers  in  the  world.  This  desert  extends  far  to 
the  south  in  the  mighty  Arabian  Peninsula,  an  enormous  ter- 
ritory green  about  the  edges  but  desert  or  semi-desert  within. 
These  green  edges  form  still  another  area,  or  rather,  a  series 
of  areas,  which  must  be  considered.  Economically  they  are 
of  little  importance,  though  famous  as  the  breeding  ground 
of  the  finest  horses  and  the  hardiest  of  men.  This  narrow 
border  is  too  long,  too  narrow,  and  too  broken  to  form  a 
political  unity.  It  has  in  fact  recognized  the  sway  of  the 
Turk  only  fitfully  and  in  part.  But  it  has  a  political  im- 
portance quite  without  parallel  from  possessing  the  holy 
cities  of  the  Mohammedans,  Mecca  and  Medina,  situated  on 
the  western  borders  of  the  peninsula. 

The  point  to  be  emphasized  in  connection  with  these  sev- 
eral areas  is  their  almost  complete  distinctness,  the  one  from 
the  other.  The  great  horizontal  zone,  to  be  sure,  is  essen- 
tially a  unit  in  spite  of  its  more  mountainous  character  and 
greater  general  elevation  in  the  east.  There  is  no  sharp 
dividing  line  physically,  ethnically,  or  historically,  and  the 
much  mooted  project  of  dividing  this  area  has  its  warrant 
rather  in  recent  political  events  than  in  nature  or  history. 


256  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

But  all  other  demarcations  are  sharp.  The  Mesopotamian 
plain  is  as  definitely  distinguished  from  the  Armenian  high- 
lands into  which  its  head  is  thrust  as  plains  usually  are  from 
the  mountains  they  adjoin.  Historically  the  two  regions  have 
been  largely  distinct.  The  western  coast  strip  communicates 
with  the  broader  land  to  the  north  only  by  a  narrow  pass 
across  the  Taurus  Mountains,  the  Cilician  Gates,  while  it  is 
separated  both  from  Mesopotamia  and  the  Arabian  coastland 
by  broad  stretches  of  desert.  Habitable  Arabia  is  completely 
isolated  and  is  indeed  broken  into  several  portions,  all  more 
or  less  distinct  physically  and  politically. 

Ethnically  the  problem  is  even  more  confusing.  Arabia, 
Mesopotamia,  and  the  coast  strip  of  Palestine  and  Syria  speak 
Arabic,  but  in  this  part  of  the  world  language  is  not  the  bond 
of  race  but  religion.  Arabia  and  Mesopotamia  are  Moham- 
medan, but  the  coast  strip  is  hopelessly  divided  between  Mo- 
hammedans, Christians,  and  Jews,  these  last  being  histori- 
cally rather  than  numerically  predominant  in  Palestine  and 
the  Christians,  perhaps,  in  Syria,  though  in  all  this  coastal 
strip,  the  meeting  place  of  the  world's  religions,  we  find  a 
bewildering  complexity  of  sects  and  hybrid  faiths. 

In  the  great  Anatolian-Armenian  zone  the  Turkish  lan- 
guage and  the  Turkish  religion  predominate  in  all  but  a  few 
coast  cities  and  isolated  countrv  districts.  This  and  this 
only  is  religiously,  linguistically,  and  in  some  approximate 
sense  ethnically,  Turkey.  Toward  the  east,  however,  the  Ar- 
menian element  becomes  more  pronounced,  while  in  the  ex- 
treme west  the  Greek  is  much  in  evidence,  being  occasionally 
in  the  majority,  notably  in  Smyrna,  the  metropolis  of  the 
entire  territory.  But  Greeks  and,  even  more,  Armenians  are 
scattered  through  the  entire  territory.  To  further  complicate 
the  situation  certain  bodies  of  Greeks  speak  only  Turkish,  but 
write  it  with  Greek  characters.  There  are  various  other 
anomalies. 


TURKEY  257 

We  have  now  to  consider  the  problem  of  these  several  units. 

The  Iledjaz,  the  Arabia  of  the  holy  places,  a  region  of  un- 
certain extent,  has  become  independent  under  British  suzer- 
ainty during  the  war,  a  result  that  no  peace  conference  is 
likely  to  challenge  and  that  Britain  is  still  less  likely  to  sur- 
render in  view  of  the  fact  that  three  quarters  of  the  Moslems 
of  the  world  are  under  her  rule  and  that  the  control  of  the 
holy  places  by  a  power  working  in  harmony  with  her  policy  is 
essential  to  the  very  existence  of  her  empire.  Moreover  there 
is  every  reason  to  believe  that  British  suzerainty  is  the  choice 
of  the  Arabians.  In  spite  of  the  much  fomented  and  exag- 
gerated Turkish  discontent  in  Egypt,  it  has  long  been  a  well 
known  fact  that  Moslem  interests  as  such^  long  convinced  of 
the  necessity  of  suzerainty,  have  shown  an  unmistakable  pref- 
erence for  that  of  Britain.  The  writer  has  been  personally 
cognizant  of  two  pretty  thorough  canvasses  of  Palestine  and 
Syria,  both  by  non-British  parties,  in  which  these  two  ques- 
tions were  put  to  all  sorts  of  men :  "Do  you  think  there  will 
be  a  change  of  rule  here?  If  so,  what  government  would 
you  prefer  ?  "  The  answer  to  the  first  question  was  every- 
where in  the  affirmative.  The  Turk  was  doomed.  As  to  his 
successor  all  the  Moslems  and  most  of  the  others  hoped  for 
British  rule.  British  impartiality  in  the  administration  of 
justice  and  in  protecting  Moslems  in  the  exercise  of  their  re- 
ligion had  deeply  impressed  the  Moslem  mind.  There  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  these  sentiments,  so  common  in 
liberal  Mohammedan  centers  everywhere,  are  shared  by  the 
Arabians.  If  so,  British  suzerainty  in  the  Hedjaz  and  the 
holy  places  may  be  regarded  as  firmly  established  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  self-determination  so  dear  to  the  western  mind. 
Other  parts  of  the  Arabian  littoral  like  Oman  have  long  been 
independent  under  the  watchful  eye  if  not  the  official  suzer- 
ainty of  Britain.  She  respects  their  independence  and  does 
not  interfere  with  their  prejudices  or  their  doings.     Mean- 


258  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

while  she  renders  them  the  great  service  of  seeing  that  ro  one 
else  shall  interfere  with  them.  This  is  suzerainty  reduced  to 
its  lowest  terms,  but  a  suzerainty  that  is  invaluable.  In  this 
most  limited  sense  Arabia  is  British, —  a  necessary  condition 
of  its  being  Arabian. 

The  case  of  Mesopotamia  is  very  different.  Arabia  is  free 
to  be  as  exclusive  as  it  chooses,  for  none  but  the  devotee  has 
occasion  to  set  foot  on  its  soil.  Mesopotamia  is  a  highway, 
the  one  practicable  short  cut  between  Europe  and  India. 
From  time  immemorial  it  has  been  a  busy  trade  route  be- 
tween the  Mediterranean  and  the  Persian  Gulf.  Nothing 
can  long  prevent  its  becoming  so  again  in  the  infinitely  larger 
sense  that  modern  facilities  make  possible.  The  Bagdad 
Railway  is  one  of  the  world  transforming  projects  comparable 
to  the  Suez  and  Panama  Canals.  It  would  not  only  become 
one  of  the  great  through  traffic  routes  between  the  two  busiest 
human  centers  on  the  globe,  but  it  would  develop  in  Meso- 
potamia itself  one  of  the  richest  regions  in  the  world,  a  region 
now  utterly  dormant,  but  capable  of  responding  in  an  almost 
unparalleled  degree  to  the  science,  industry,  and  capital  of 
the  west.  What  Mesopotamia  needs,  therefore,  is  not  merely 
the  negative  guaranties  of  Arabia,  but  the  most  intensive  de- 
velopment and  scientific  administration.  There  must  be  im- 
mense investments  of  capital  in  railroads  and  above  all  in 
scientific  irrigation  on  which  the  prosperity  of  the  country 
depends,  now  as  in  the  days  of  Nebuchadnezzar.  There  must 
be  protection  and  guaranties  that  the  highway  thus  opened 
shall  not  be  used  for  armed  forays  destructive  alike  to  the 
country  itself  and  to  the  great  countries  to  which  it  offers 
access.  Finally  there  must  be  deference  to  the  religious  insti- 
tutions of  the  country  whose  people,  though  not  Turkish  or 
pro-Turkish,  are  devoutly  Mohammedan. 

There  are  the  most  obvious  reasons  why  this  task  should  de- 
volve upon  Britain.     Her  proven  deference  for  native  insti- 


TURKEY  259 

tutions  which  has  become  almost  an  instinct  of  British  char- 
acter, her  immense  aptitude  for  development  of  the  kind  here 
required  *  and  her  experience  in  handling  the  very  similar 
problem  of  Egypt,  all  put  her  at  the  head  of  the  list  of  eligible 
candidates.  But  the  overwhelming  consideration  is  the  prox- 
imity of  India,  which  is  exposed  to  attack  through  Mesopo- 
tamia alone.  If  we  recognize  her  responsibility  for  the  three 
hundred  millions  of  India,  we  can  not  but  recognize  her  right 
to  control  the  only  gateway  by  which  their  safety  is  menaced. 
The  British  Mesopotamia  campaign  has  practically  assured 
British  occupation  of  the  country.  The  capture  of  Bagdad, 
glorious  with  the  memories  of  the  Moslem's  saturnian  days 
and  the  great  caliphate  of  Haroun-al-Kaschid,  was  the  sign 
to  the  Moslems  of  the  new  and  not  unwelcome  order.  Thence 
the  advance  was  continued  in  two  directions,  one  to  the  north- 
ward toward  Armenia,  where  a  junction  was  contemplated 
with  the  Russian  forces  operating  from  the  Caucasus,  and 
one  to  the  northwest  toward  Aleppo,  where  a  junction  was 
apparently  contemplated  with  British  forces  operating  north- 
ward from  Egypt  along  the  coast  strip.  With  the  collapse 
of  Russia  the  former  movement  lost  its  chief  significance,  and 
save  for  a  recent  abortive  dash  for  the  oil  wells  of  Baku  it 
has  long  been  lost  to  view.  The  advance  toward  Aleppo  has 
also  been  long  unreported,  but  in  view  of  the  splendid  suc- 
cess of  the  advance  from  Egypt,  there  is  every  reason  to  expect 
the  junction  in  the  near  future.  Assuming  this  to  be  accom- 
plished, it  is  important  to  note  just  what  such  a  completion 
of  this  plan  implies.  It  is  nothing  less  than  the  severance 
of  the  Arab  speaking  areas  from  the  Turkish  zone  to  the 
north.2     The  Arabic  domain,  the  true  home  of  Mohamme- 

i  Her  engineers  are  said  to  have  planned  irrigation  works  for  Meso- 
potamia before  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 

2  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Arabic  and  Turkish  languages  have 
nothing  in  common  save  their  written  characters.  They  do  not  even 
belong  to  the  same  linguistic  family. 


260  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

danism,  the  real  cherisher  of  its  traditions  and  the  possessor 
of  its  holy  places,  is  thus  lost  to  the  Turk,  to  whom  it  has 
never  owned  willing  allegiance.  As  these  lines  are  written, 
all  this  is  no  longer  prospect,  but  essentially  accomplished 
fact,  a  fact  which  no  tribunal  can  or  should  reverse.  Meso- 
potamia will  become  another  and  a  greater  Egypt  under  the 
same  patiently  creative  and  considerate  administration  as 
that  which,  in  a  single  generation  lifted  Egypt  from  her  low- 
est abasement  to  a  prosperity  such  as  the  Pharaohs  never 
knew. 

The  coast  strip  on  the  eastern  Mediterranean  offers  us 
essentially  a  problem  of  sentiment.  It  is  mountainous 
throughout,  but  with  the  usual  broad  valleys  and  fertile  slopes 
which  this  implies.  Toward  the  south  it  becomes  arid  and 
merges  into  desert.  The  southern  half  of  the  strip  is  Pales- 
tine, whose  interest  to  the  western  world  requires  no  com- 
ment. It  is  the  only  region  in  the  world  which  is  sacred  to 
three  great  religions,  Jewish,  Christian,  and  Mohammedan, 
for  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  Mohammedan  finds  a 
place  in  his  system  for  the  worthies  of  Jew  and  Christian 
precisely  as  the  Christian  does  for  those  of  the  Jew.  The  sup- 
posed tomb  of  Abraham  is  guarded  by  the  Moslem  with  a  zeal 
almost  as  fanatical  as  that  which  he  displays  at  the  tomb  of 
Mohammed.  But  both  Moslem  and  Christian  recognize  in  a 
sense  the  prior  claim  of  the  Jew.  For  him  Palestine  is  not 
merely  a  shrine  but  a  fatherland.  It  is  therefore  with  some- 
thing like  general  consent  that  the  liberated  land  becomes 
again  the  home  of  a  Jewish  nation. 

But  those  who  know  the  modern  Jew  will  not  fail  to  note 
the  utterly  artificial  character  of  the  nation  thus  established. 
The  Jews  as  a  whole  have  immense  wealth  and  power,  but  no 
one  expects  that  wealth  and  power  to  be  transferred  to  Pales- 
tine. That  country,  trifling  in  extent,  meager  in  its  agricul- 
tural possibilities,  and  devoid  of  minerals,  can  never  have 


TURKEY  261 

army,  navy,  industries,  or  extensive  population.  In  itself, 
therefore,  it  must  be  utterly  helpless,  nor  can  any  amount  of 
Jewish  wealth  in  foreign  lands  lend  it  effective  support  in  an 
emergency.  Yet  it  remains  much  as  of  old,  immensely  stra- 
tegic as  an  approach  to  Egypt  and  as  sharing  with  that  coun- 
try the  control  of  the  Suez  Canal.  What,  then,  are  to  be  its 
political  affiliations?  Who  is  to  be  its  sponsor?  The  an- 
swer can  hardly  be  doubtful,  in  view  of  the  interests  above 
suggested.  No  doubt  the  new  Palestine  will  be  nominally 
independent,  and  the  fact  that  the  modern  Jew  can  provide 
administrative  talent  of  the  highest  competency  should  make 
that  independence  a  reality,  if,  as  may  be  expected,  the  Jews 
of  the  world  and  not  those  of  Palestine  alone,  are  charged 
with  the  administration  of  the  little  state.  This  too  will  in- 
sure the  broadest  tolerance  toward  the  multifarious  devotees 
who  swarm  to  this  shrine  of  the  nations,  for  the  great  Jew 
who  rules  in  Wall  Street  and  in  the  council  halls  of  modern 
empires  is  no  narrow  fanatic.  So  far  all  should  go  well. 
But  for  protection  against  great  states,  a  great  state  is  neces- 
sary. That  state  must  be  Britain.  Britain  would  tolerate 
no  other.  The  Jew  would  accept  no  other.  No  doubt  all 
outward  appearance  of  such  protection  will  be  avoided.  Ab- 
solute independence  will  be  the  fiction,  or  if  avowed  protec- 
tion be  deemed  necessary,  then  perhaps  a  form  of  internation- 
alism, but  in  that  Britain  must  needs  be  the  animating  spirit, 
the  really  operating  agent. 

Let  us  not  imagine  for  a  moment  that  Britain  covets  these 
responsibilities.  She  is  already  seriously  burdened.  But 
this  is  the  fatality  of  empire.  To  safeguard  lands  held  in 
trust,  approaches  which  control  these  lands  must  be  con- 
trolled, and  then  other  approaches,  and  so  on  indefinitely. 
Britain  would  welcome  partners  and  sharers  in  the  task,  if 
partners  of  assured  trustworthiness  could  be  found.  But 
imagine  her  sentiments  if  a  Jewish  Palestine  should  throw 


262  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

itself  into  the  arms  of  a  Germany  like  the  Germany  of  today. 
Fortunately  that  is  little  to  be  feared.  The  Anglo-Saxon, 
alone  among  great  peoples,  has  given  the  Jew  a  fair  chance, 
and  the  Jew  knows  his  friends. 

The  northern  part  of  the  coast  strip  is  Syria,  richer  and 
more  beautiful  than  Palestine,  but  lacking  its  unique  historic 
attractions.  It  is  broader  and  more  productive  than  Pales- 
tine, and  in  particular  it  has  numerous  and  excellent  harbors, 
especially  Beyrout  in  the  south  and  Alexandretta  in  the  ex- 
treme north  at  the  corner  of  the  sea,  an  advantage  which 
Palestine  lacks.  The  prosperity  of  Tyre  and  Sidon  in  an- 
cient times  and  the  incomparable  ruins  of  Roman  Baalbek 
attest  the  larger  possibilities  of  this  region,  which  is  in  process 
of  occupation  by  the  Allies  as  this  is  written.  It  has  long 
been  recognized  that  Syria  was  to  become  a  French  protec- 
torate in  the  event  of  the  partition  of  Turkey.  This  was  pre- 
figured by  the  building  of  French  railways,  this  being  recog- 
nized as  a  French  sphere  of  influence  and  investment.  It  is 
suggested  by  the  French  capture  of  Beyrout  in  recent  days, 
though  the  conquest  of  the  country  is  being  effected  by  a  Brit- 
ish force.  All  considerations  of  propriety  and  prudence 
speak  for  it  in  the  present  juncture.  Not  only  is  France 
the  traditional  protector  of  all  Christians  in  the  Levant  by 
an  ancient  agreement  whose  value  consists  in  its  long  standing 
recognition, —  a  fact  of  importance  in  this  strongly  Christian 
district, —  but  the  present  complete  understanding  between 
France  and  Britain  makes  the  presence  of  these  two  nations 
on  this  causeway  of  the  nations  a  double  guaranty  against  its 
use  by  a  marauder.  It  can  not  be  too  strongly  insisted  that 
no  part  of  this  Arab  world  is  able  to  protect  itself,  and  the 
only  alternative  to  occupation  by  the  powers  we  now  fear,  is 
its  occupation  by  powers  we  can  trust.  The  ever  ready  sug- 
gestion of  internationalization  can  be  in  practice  nothing  but 
this  same  occupation  in  disguise. 


TURKEY  263 

Turkey  south  of  the  Taurus  Mountains,  the  whole  domain 
of  the  Arab  tongue  and  the  Arab  culture,  is  thus  disposed  of, 
not  prospectively  but  actually.  We  have  but  to  record,  as  the 
peace  conference  will  have  but  to  ratify,  the  inevitable  and 
only  reasonable  decision.  There  remains  for  consideration 
the  broad  zone  stretching  from  the  iEgean  to  the  Caspian, 
the  true  home  of  the  Turkish  language  and  the  Turkish  cul- 
ture. This  has  not  been  occupied  by  the  Allies,  nor  are  their 
intentions  clear  regarding  it.  Omitting  for  the  time  being 
Constantinople  and  such  territory  as  may  be  necessary  to 
control  the  straits,  we  have  first  to  consider  whether  this  ter- 
ritory can  be  advantageously  divided,  and  second,  what  dis- 
position can  be  made  of  it,  whole  or  in  parts. 

The  outrages  committed  upon  the  Armenians  have  not 
unnaturally  elicited  the  sympathy  of  the  civilized  world  and 
led  to  the  conviction  that  the  Armenians  must  be  rescued  from 
Turkish  rule.  Quite  naturally  we  have  jumped  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  way  to  do  this  is  to  sever  Armenia  from 
Anatolia  and  put  it  under  the  government  of  its  own  people. 
The  Allied  peoples  seem  to  have  settled  down  rather  content- 
edly to  the  idea  of  an  independent  Armenia.  But  inquiry 
reveals  the  amazing  fact  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a 
modern  Armenia.  There  is  a  district  in  which  Armenians 
once  predominated  and  in  which  existed  some  two  thousand 
years  ago  a  somewhat  fluctuating  Armenian  kingdom.  But 
today  there  is  neither  kingdom  nor  predominant  Armenian 
population.  Keliable  statistics,  of  course,  do  not  exist,  but 
careful  estimates  have  been  repeatedly  made  and  there  is 
sufficient  agreement  among  independent  estimates  to  give  them 
a  fair  reliability.  Taking  the  best  accredited  of  these  esti- 
mates, we  reach  the  amazing  conclusion  that  Armenia  as 
usually  defined  has  but  fifteen  per  cent,  of  Armenians  in  its 
population,  while  Turks,  that  is,  Moslems  who  speak  the 
Turkish  language,  number  seventy-four  per  cent.     There  are, 


264  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

therefore,  even  in  Armenia  itself,  five  Turks  to  one  Armenian. 
Nor  is  there  any  appreciable  part  of  the  country  in  which 
these  figures  are  reversed.  Only  in  nine  out  of  the  hundred 
and  fifty-nine  subdistricts  into  which  the  country  is  divided, 
are  the  Armenians  in  the  majority,  and  then  the  majority  no- 
where exceeds  sixty-five  per  cent.  These  nine  subdistricts 
are  trivial  in  area  and  are  not  all  contiguous.  All  told,  the 
Armenians  living  in  Armenia  have  been  estimated  at  slightly 
less  than  a  million.  And  all  these  figures,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, were  for  the  period  before  the  war.  According  to  the 
most  conservative  estimates  of  the  deportations  and  massa- 
cres, these  numbers  and  percentages  must  now  be  reduced  to 
a  half  or  a  third.  Such  a  population  becomes  almost  negli- 
gible in  deciding  the  political  destiny  of  a  people.  Conceding 
that  Armenia  may  be  separated  from  Turkey  without  com- 
punction, what  are  we  going  to  do  with  it?  If  we  merely 
make  it  independent  and  leave  it  to  the  management  of  its 
inhabitants,  the  Armenians  would  still  be  at  the  mercy  of  a 
Turkish  population  five  or  ten  times  their  number.  It  is  true 
that  the  outrages  from  which  they  have  suffered  so  much  have 
not  originated  with  this  local  Turkish  population,  and  com- 
plete separation  from  the  baneful  control  of  Constantinople 
with  its  big  schemes  of  world  politics  and  its  strategic  re- 
quirements would  promise  decided  amelioration  of  their  lot. 
But  it  would  still  leave  the  root  evil,  the  rule  of  non-Moslems 
by  Moslems,  with  their  denial  of  all  rights  to  the  subject 
population.  This  must  cease.  If  the  victorious  civilized 
powers  do  not  realize  this,  then  nothing  like  final  results  are 
to  be  expected  from  their  present  victory. 

But  recognizing  this  necessity,  it  may  well  be  asked  whether 
anything  is  to  be  gained  by  separating  Armenia  from  Ana- 
tolia. There  are  Armenians  in  both  and  in  both  they  are  a 
small  minority,  totally  unable  to  control  or  even  to  furnish 
valuable  initiative.     They  have  no  such  outside  backing  as 


TUKKEY  265 

the  Jews.  They  are  a  subject  people  of  two  thousand  years' 
standing,  timid  and  non-political  in  their  instincts.  Until 
recent  political  exigencies  made  them  the  target  for  Turkish 
outrage,  they  were  docile  and  passively  loyal.  Aside  from 
the  feeble  and  obsolete  fact  of  historic  tradition,  Armenia  does 
not  differ  appreciably  from  Anatolia  in  its  Armenian  or  gov- 
ernmental problem. 

The  Greeks  form  a  numerous  and  influential  element  on  the 
extreme  western  coast  and  noticeably  in  Smyrna,  the  com- 
mercial metropolis  of  Anatolia,  where  they  are  in  the  major- 
ity. The  existence  of  an  independent  Hellenic  kingdom  west 
of  the  JEgean  naturally  suggests  annexation  of  these  districts 
to  Greece.  This  has  been  made  the  more  plausible  by  the 
recent  annexation  of  Chios  and  Samos  to  Greece.  These 
large  islands  lie  on  the  Asiatic  side  of  the  iEgean  and  are 
essentially  a  part  of  the  mainland  from  which  they  are  sepa- 
rated by  only  the  narrowest  expanse  of  water.  To  step  from 
these  annexations  to  the  mainland  is  the  easiest  of  steps. 

But  nothing  could  be  less  suited  to  annexation  than  these 
Greek  settlements.  The  Greeks  do  not  form  a  normal  terri- 
torial population  performing  the  various  functions  of  com- 
munity life,  but  are  like  the  Jews  in  our  American  cities,  a 
specialized  commercial  class.  To  annex  Smyrna  to  Greece 
because  of  the  Greek  commercial  element  there,  would  be  a 
little  like  annexing  New  York  to  the  new  Palestine  because 
of  its  Jewish  merchants  and  financiers, —  an  extreme  compari- 
son, no  doubt,  but  one  not  the  less  illustrative.  There  is  no 
evidence  that  these  Greeks  desire  such  annexation, —  indeed 
they  almost  certainly  do  not.  They  have  seldom  been  mo- 
lested by  the  Turks  and  have  assumed  a  political  status  in  the 
Empire  similar  to  that  held  by  the  Jews  in  the  great  western 
nations.  Their  ambitions  are  not  political.  If  there  is  any 
demand  for  such  annexation,  it  comes  from  Greece,  whose 
people  have  acquired  imperial  aspirations.     Even  this  de- 


266  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

mand  is  doubtful.  Under  her  present  wise  leadership,  Greece 
is  notably  sane,  and  will  hesitate  to  assume  the  impossible  re- 
sponsibilities of  isolated  littoral  possessions  in  Asia  without 
the  possibility  of  an  effective  hinterland.  The  suggestion  is 
rather  the  impracticable  dream  of  western  enthusiasts. 

The  Anatoli  an-x\rmeni an  zone  therefore  remains  a  unity, 
or  if  not  a  unity,  its  division  contributes  little  to  the  solu- 
tion of  our  problem.  That  problem  is  simply  the  problem 
of  Turkish  government.  The  problem  is  embarrassing.  The 
population  is  overwhelmingly  Turkish,  and  by  our  much  her- 
alded right  of  self-determination  it  should  govern  itself.  The 
small  minority  of  alien  elements  should  take  their  chances  or 
seek  a  better  condition  elsewhere.  But  we  can  not  but  be 
appalled  by  the  consequences  of  our  own  reasoning.  Turkish 
misgovernment  is  so  abysmal  that  only  ignorance  can  make 
it  seem  tolerable.  To  one  who  has  seen  the  squalor  of  these 
lands  that  nature  has  made  rich  and  that  earlier  civilization 
has  made  glorious,  talk  about  self-determination  becomes  sac- 
rilege. Even  the  reading  of  such  a  book  as  Brailsford's  Mace- 
donia, so  compelling  in  its  dispassionateness  and  in  the  calm 
statement  of  the  facts  that  the  writer  knew  so  well,  simply 
leaves  no  alternative  to  the  conclusion  that  Turkish  rule  must 
cease  or  must  be  made  amenable  to  the  higher  requirements 
of  that  civilization  for  which  we  stand.  It  is  not  true  that 
we  believe  in  the  unqualified  right  of  self-determination. 
High  above  mundane  realities  and  in  the  pure  ether  of  ab- 
straction in  which  some  spirits  so  exasperatingly  love  to  soar 
while  practical  decisions  wait,  we  may  formulate  our  gener- 
alizations about  self-determination  and  government  by  con- 
sent, but  with  our  feet  on  the  earth  and  in  the  midst  of 
annoying  realities  we  have  never  hesitated  to  apply  the  needed 
corrective.  There  is  a  certain  minimum  of  decency  and  order 
that  the  civilized  world  will  not  forego.  If  a  people  can 
supply  that  minimum,  it  is  the  fixed  principle  of  free  peo- 


TUEKEY  267 

pies  to  let  them  do  it.  If  they  can  not  or  do  not  do  it,  it  is 
equally  our  principle  to  help  them  or  make  them  do  it. 
Doubtless  we  must  be  patient  and  give  a  people  time  to  learn 
the  difficult  art.  We  have  done  so  with  Turkey  and  the  time 
is  up. 

The  writer  sees  little  to  hope  in  the  division  of  this  zone 
unless  for  purposes  of  administrative  convenience.  There  is 
no  reason  for  intervention  in  Armenia  which  does  not  hold  in 
nearly  equal  degree  of  Anatolia.  Both  have  a  Turkish  ma- 
jority and  an  oppressed  non-Turkish  minority.  Both  have 
crying  need  of  capital,  organization,  and  development  along 
lines  which  presuppose  such  a  government  as  the  Turk  can 
not  give.  In  fact,  this  latter  need  is  greater  in  Anatolia 
than  in  Armenia.  Both  must  be  made  to  supply  or  helped 
to  supply  that  minimum  requirement  of  decency  and  order 
which  the  world  can  not  and  will  not  forego. 

Yet  the  Turks  are  neither  so  few  nor  so  weak  that  they  can 
be  taken  in  hand  like  savages  and  made  wards  of  a  civilized 
state.  The  Turk  must  be  made  the  instrument  of  his  own 
regeneration.  An  administration  actually  in  Turkish  hands 
but  under  the  supervision  and  control  of  civilized  powers,  able 
and  disposed  to  exact  compliance  with  modern  standards,  is 
perhaps  the  feasible  compromise.  It  is  extremely  doubtful 
whether  any  single  state  could  assume  this  responsibility,  con- 
sidering the  size  and  strategic  location  of  the  country  and  the 
military  training  and  capacity  of  its  inhabitants.  It  is  also 
much  to  be  feared  that  no  international  combination  formed 
for  this  or  similar  purposes  could  withstand  the  disintegrat- 
ing influences  of  intrigue  and  conflicting  interests  which 
would  be  used  so  assiduously  for  their  undoing.  But  in 
some  way  the  required  supervision  must  be  forthcoming.  If 
the  Allies  are  unable  to  provide  this  essential  in  their  mo- 
ment of  victory,  then  indeed  is  our  boasted  internationalism  a 
fiction.     The  international  commission  which  for  a  time  con- 


268  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

trolled  the  finances  of  Egypt  and  again  of  Greece  may  perhaps 
furnish  the  precedent  and  the  model,  perhaps  also  it  will  sug- 
gest to  some  the  ultimate  failure  and  the  inevitable  next  step. 
If  a  single  nation  can  be  found  willing  to  undertake  so 
heavy  a  responsibility  under  the  mandate  and  guaranty  of  a 
group  of  friendly  powers,  the  writer  for  one  would  look  more 
hopefully  upon  the  experiment.  Britain,  France,  Italy,  or 
America  would  do  honest  work  there  and  make  a  garden 
where  the  Turk  has  made  a  desert, —  yes,  and  make  the  Turk 
the  gardener  at  that, —  but  the  first  three  ought  not  to  increase 
their  responsibilities  and  the  last  would  certainly  be  reluctant 
to  do  so.  It  is  not  without  a  shudder  that  the  writer  makes 
the  suggestion. 

In  this  connection  reference  should  be  made  to  Italy's 
ambitions,  already  mentioned  in  an  earlier  chapter.  Italy 
aspires  to  retain  the  Dodecanese,  the  twelve  islands  off  the 
southwest  corner  of  Asia  Minor,  and  to  acquire  a  foothold  on 
the  mainland  on  the  southern  coast.  Doubt  has  already  been 
expressed  as  to  the  wisdom  of  expensive  colonial  ventures  for 
Italy  under  present  conditions.  We  have  here  to  consider  the 
wisdom  of  such  a  move  from  the  standpoint  of  the  country 
itself.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  proposed  district  is  in  Ana- 
tolia, not  in  the  Arabian  district.  Such  an  annexation  would 
therefore  impair  the  unity  of  the  Turkish  domain.  If  the 
whole  region  is  to  be  parceled  out  among  the  western  powers, 
this  is  a  legitimate  beginning.  If  not,  it  is  an  annoying 
enclave  thrust  into  a  unit  territory.  The  writer  has  a  strong 
aversion  against  needless  dismemberment  of  unit  territories. 
All  such  divisions  hinder  the  common  object  of  our  civiliza- 
tion. The  unity  of  Anatolia-Armenia  is  based  broadly  on 
unity  of  geography,  language,  and  religion.  The  proposed 
division  would  sin  against  all  three  of  these  unities.  It  is 
argued  that  such  an  arrangement  would  give  Italy  a  stake 
in  the  Levant  and  insure  her  cooperation  in  maintaining  the 


TUKKEY  269 

status  quo.  It  might  just  as  easily  work  the  other  way.  If 
it  left  Italy  with  no  other  thought  than  to  protect  what  she 
had,  such  might  be  the  result.  But  suppose  it  incited  her 
to  extend  her  holdings.  Might  she  not  conspire  with  an  ag- 
gressor,—  say  with  Germany, —  to  attain  her  ends,  and  with 
what  advantage  to  the  marauder  who  would  thus  find  his 
base  of  operations  prepared  for  him.  Doubtless  it  will  be 
hard  to  refuse  Italy's  request.  It  were  much  to  be  desired 
that  she  should  avoid  the  necessity  of  a  refusal. 

Note.  Since  these  lines  were  written  it  is  reported  that  a  definite 
movement  is  on  foot,  sponsored  by  no  less  influential  a  personality 
than  Viscount  Bryce,  to  place  America  in  charge  of  the  rehabilitation 
of  Turkey.  Conversely,  the  plea  comes  from  Turkish  sources  that  the 
great  powers  should  furnish  Turkey  with  trained  administrators. 
Neither  of  these  proposals  follows  the  lines  above  suggested.  Both 
presuppose  the  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  Turkey  and  her  restora- 
tion to  independence.  The  writer  believes  that  the  present  Turkish 
Empire  is  unnatural  and  doomed  to  failure.  The  Arabs  and  the  Turks 
differ  utterly  in  their  race,  character,  their  language,  their  civilization 
and  their  habitat.  There  is  no  likelihood  of  their  forming  a  helpful 
union.  Meanwhile  nothing  but  the  most  trustworthy  of  states  can 
safely  be  trusted  with  the  guardianship  of  these  crossroads  of  the  na- 
tions. With  the  divisions  above  suggested,  divisions  largely  dictated 
by  nature,  an  American  receivership  for  Anatolia  is  perhaps  a  reason- 
able suggestion, —  the  more  reasonable  because  unsought  and  unwel- 
come. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS 

The  well  known  assertion  of  Napoleon  that  "  Constanti- 
nople means  the  rule  of  the  world  "  hardly  exaggerates  its 
importance.1  It  is  not  only  the  most  important  strategic  site 
in  the  world,  but  in  certain  respects  it  is  quite  unlike  any 
other.  Constantinople,  or  more  exactly  the  waterway  which 
it  is  convenient  to  call  by  that  name,  serves  a  larger  territory 
than  any  other  port.  It  is  also  more  defensible,  being  per- 
haps the  only  impregnable  passage  in  the  world.  In  these 
respects  it  merely  surpasses  others  in  its  class.  %  But  in  other 
respects  it  is  altogether  unique,  having  no  similar.  It  is 
completely  inaccessible  to  attack  from  without,  being  situ- 
ated between  two  inland  seas,  yet  is  the  most  accessible  of  all 
harbors,  being  untrammeled  by  reef  or  bar.  No  other  har- 
bor is  so  situated.  It  is  unique  above  all  in  that  it  has  no 
substitute.  All  other  great  harbors  have  competitors  which 
could  assume  their  task,  were  they  closed  or  disabled.  Con- 
stantinople has  none. 

The  value  of  Constantinople  of  course  is  very  different  to 
different  powers,  even  to  those  in  its  vicinity.  To  Turkey  it 
is  merely  a  secure  capital  and  a  possession  coveted  by  greater 
powers.  It  does  not  guarantee  the  Empire  from  attack,  how- 
ever secure  in  itself.  Especially  as  the  Empire  has  now 
shrunken,  it  loses  all  large  functional  importance,  having  no 
considerable  tributary  in  Turkish  territory  in  Europe,  while 
Asiatic  Turkey  necessarily  makes  use  for  the  most  part  of 
other  ports.     The  city  itself  has  long  ceased  to  be  of  any 

i  For  a  more  complete  statement  of  the  significance  of  Constantinople 
see  "  The  Things  Men  Fight  For,"  by  the  author. 

270 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKAN'S     273 

importance,  now  that  there  is  no  occasion  for  transshipment 
en  route  and  customs  barriers  and  backsheesh  have  made  the 
passers  of  the  straits  shun  its  quays.  Its  value  to  the  Turk  is 
primarily  one  of  sentiment  and  prestige. 

But  to  a  great  power  occupying  the  vast  Black  Sea  basin 
it  is  not  only  a  necessary  ingress  and  egress,  an  indispensable 
condition  of  economic  and  commercial  existence,  but  it  is  a 
weapon  of  tremendous  power.  Such  a  power,  perfectly  se- 
cure in  the  possession  of  the  straits,  could  develop  its  vast 
resources  quite  at  its  ease  and  forge  its  thunderbolts  undis- 
turbed, only  to  launch  them  from  its  secure  retreat  when 
they  were  ready.  It  is  almost  certain  that  Bussia,  such  as 
she  was  and  seems  certain  again  to  be,  if  once  in  secure  pos- 
session of  Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles,  could  ulti- 
mately dictate  her  will  to  other  nations.  In  a  very  real  sense, 
therefore,  Napoleon's  assertion,  addressed  as  it  was  to  the 
Czar  and  with  reference  to  Russian  aspirations,  represents  the 
literal  truth.  The  world  has  ever  been  unwilling  to  see  the 
Dardanelles  in  Russian  possession,  for  that  would  make  the 
Black  Sea  a  Russian  lake  and  would  extend  her  control  to  all 
its  borders.  If  the  Allies  consented  to  this,  as  seems  to 
have  been  the  case,  it  was  under  duress  and  with  misgivings. 
It  is  no  small  compensation  for  the  disaster  which  the  defec- 
tion of  Russia  entailed,  that  this  unfortunate  pledge  was 
thereby  abrogated. 

To  Germany  in  her  Mitteleuropa  extension  Constantinople 
would  be  hardly  less  valuable,  though  chiefly  in  a  negative 
sense  as  enabling  her  to  put  Russia  under  lock  and  key  and  to 
menace  British  communications  in  the  Mediterranean.  It  is 
difficult  to  see  what  the  outcome  of  this  war  would  have  been 
if  Germany  had  been  solidly  established  in  Constanti- 
nople with  the  resources  of  the  tributary  territories  thoroughly 
developed.  The  Mediterranean  would  have  been  sealed  to  the 
Allies  with  consequences  that  it  is  difficult  to  imagine.     Con- 


274  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

versely,  if  the  Allies  had  early  acquired  possession  of  Con- 
stantinople and  been  free  to  operate  from  that  center  in  all 
ways,  it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  the  war  would  long  ago 
have  been  terminated  in  their  favor.  In  short,  though  Con- 
stantinople is  of  less  significance  to  other  powers  than  to  Rus- 
sia, it  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that  any  power  that  could 
retain  it  would  thereby  become  the  foremost  if  not  the  master 
of  all.  More  definitely,  if  Constantinople  falls  into  the  hands 
of  Germany  or  Russia, —  the  only  two  great  powers  that  are 
seriously  trying  to  get  it, —  that  possession  will  assure  the 
ascendancy  of  that  power. 

This  ascendancy  is  not  to  be  admitted  for  a  moment. 
Therefore  neither  of  these  nations  must  control  Constanti- 
nople. No  other  power  can  reasonably  aspire  to  such  control. 
Some  other  disposition  than  that  of  ordinary  national  annexa- 
tion must  therefore  be  made  of  this  unique  territory. 

Before  suggesting  what  this  disposition  shall  be,  it  is  well 
to  consider  what  we  wish  to  accomplish  by  it.  First,  the  pass- 
age should  be  kept  open.  The  Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus 
must  be  public  rather  than  private  property.  The  Crimean 
War  was  fought  to  establish  the  principle  that  they  were  the 
private  property  of  Turkey.  It  is  now  commonly  asserted 
that  the  Crimean  War  was  a  mistake.  That  is  not  so  clear. 
Situations  change,  and  the  necessities  of  the  nations  change 
with  them.  It  is  not  clear  that  it  would  have  been  better  for 
the  world  to  have  made  the  Dardanelles  public  property  at 
that  time.  But  be  that  as  it  may,  that  is  the  need  now.  It 
is  customary  to  recognize  the  jurisdiction  of  a  country  over 
three  miles  of  sea  off  from  its  coast.  This  principle  would 
give  Turkey  jurisdiction  over  the  Dardanelles  and  the  Bos- 
phorus. But  this  is  no  ordinary  case.  Such  jurisdiction 
would  give  her  in  effect  a  very  considerable  jurisdiction  over 
the  entire  Black  Sea  to  which  these  straits  are  the  only  access. 
But  Turkey  should  have  no  such  jurisdiction,  and  if  posses- 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS  275 

sion  of  the  coast  gives  jurisdiction  over  the  straits,  then  she 
must  not  have  possession  of  the  coasts.  This  indeed,  as  we 
shall  see,  is  the  inevitable  conclusion.  So  much  of  the  shores 
as  command  the  straits  must  share  the  fate  of  the  straits. 

It  follows  from  the  foregoing  that  Constantinople  should 
be  a  free  port.  There  should  be  no  customs  barriers,  but 
ships  should  unload  and  reload  freely,  making  it  once  more 
the  busiest  mart  in  Mediterranean  Europe.  Trifling  dues  of 
some  sort  would  of  course  be  necessary  to  defray  the  expenses 
of  administration  of  the  district,  but  the  writer  ventures  to 
suggest  that  the  charge  should  be  for  the  use  of  the  straits 
rather  than  for  the  use  of  the  port  as  such,  thus  facilitating 
to  the  utmost  the  performance  of  its  great  function  as  the 
gathering  and  distributing  point  for  the  traffic  that  branches 
inimitably  on  either  side. 

Finally,  it  is  chiefly  important  to  prevent  the  possibility 
of  seizure  and  monopoly  by  any  power.  This  is  the  most 
delicate  matter  of  all.  It  implies  on  the  one  hand  perfect 
competency  and  impartiality  of  administration,  and  on  the 
other,  the  possession  and  exercise  of  a  considerable  force.  It 
is  needless  to  say  that  Constantinople  itself,  even  with  the 
limited  territories  that  may  be  assigned  to  it,  can  not  main- 
tain itself  against  the  attack  of  a  modern  empire.  That 
maintenance  must  be  guaranteed  by  larger  resources.  But 
those  larger  resources  can  never  be  more  than  potential. 
They  can  not  be  ever  mobilized  and  on  the  ground  ready  for 
action.  If  the  district  is  entirely  unprotected  save  by  these 
unmobilized  reserves,  an  unscrupulous  power,  even  a  little 
one,  could  seize  the  city  and  the  straits  by  a  surprise  attack. 
It  can  not  be  too  strongly  urged  that  a  serious  power  strongly 
intrenched  in  Constantinople  and  the  Dardanelles  could  not 
easily  be  ousted.  Does  anyone  doubt  that  if  the  Dardanelles 
had  been  no  man's  land  and  undefended  at  the  beginning  of 
this  war,  the  Goeben  and  the  Breslau  would  have  rushed  the 


276  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

city  and  that  with  the  aid  of  Bulgaria  or  some  other  venal 
ally,  it  could  have  been  closed  as  it  has  been.  Public  prop- 
erty does  not  mean  unguarded  property,  especially  when  it  is 
property  that  all  passers  covet.  Whatever  the  disposition  of 
the  Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus,  they  must  be  powerfully 
fortified  and  strongly  held  so  long  as  men  use  force  and  craft 
to  accomplish  their  ends. 

There  are  several  possible  ways  of  attempting  this  settle- 
ment. It  is  conceivable  that  a  great  power  might  possess 
Constantinople  in  its  own  right,  and  yet  voluntarily  accept 
the  limitations  here  proposed.  This  seems  a  hazardous  guar- 
anty of  so  distinctive  a  world  interest,  yet  it  is  one  with  which 
the  world  is  well  and  favorably  familiar.  It  is  thus  that 
Gibraltar  is  held,  open  for  all  to  pass,  yet  completely  under 
the  control  of  a  single  power.  Hong  Kong  in  like  manner, 
is  a  free  port  to  all  the  world,  a  perfect  treasure  trove  to  the 
tariff  harassed  commerce  of  the  east.  It  is  not  contended 
that  such  a  custodianship  is  without  its  potential  evils,  but 
if  we  ask  what  in  the  actuality  we  would  have  different,  it  is 
difficult  to  suggest  a  change.  In  other  words,  Britain  man- 
ages these  vast  trusts  in  exactly  the  way  that  we  would  wish 
some  other  custodian  to  manage  them.  It  is  difficult  to  be- 
lieve that  the  peaceably  disposed  nations  of  the  world  are 
very  restive  under  her  management.  Probably  France  would 
manage  such  a  trust  in  much  the  same  way  if  its  character 
were  definitely  recognized.  Some  will  claim  as  much  for 
America.  Any  of  these  nations  would  have  the  great  advan- 
tage that  they  could  supply  the  large  potential  backing  of 
force  which  the  situation  requires  as  well  as  the  police  force 
constantly  needed.  Any  of  them  would  make  of  this  neg- 
lected and  bedraggled  relic  of  a  great  past  the  very  queen 
among  the  cities  of  the  world.  But  such  a  custodianship 
would  be  in  a  sense  irresponsible,  however  impartial  and  pub- 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS  277 

lie  spirited.  These  powers  would  have  only  this  advantage 
over  Germany  and  Russia  that  they  are  not  directely  inter- 
ested in  Constantinople,  a  very  great  advantage,  but  hardly 
enough  to  silence  the  objections  of  those  powers. 

Another  way  would  be  to  give  the  trust  to  an  insignificant 
power.  Several  such  could  be  named  who  would  administer 
the  trust  with  ability,  Holland,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Sweden, 
Norway,  perhaps  Greece.  The  advantage  of  such  an  arrange- 
ment would  be  that  the  world  would  have  little  to  fear  from 
so  small  a  power  and  one  whose  situation  did  not  tempt  her 
to  turn  the  trust  to  her  own  advantage.  Possibly,  too,  the 
police  force  could  be  provided.  But  such  a  nation  could  not 
furnish  the  larger  backing  of  force  required  and  must  there- 
fore have  a  sponsor.  That  sponsor  would  inevitably  be  a 
great  power,  and  perhaps  a  changing  and  even  a  clandestine 
one.  The  possibilities  are  disquieting.  Better  a  known 
great  power  than  an  unknown  one.  Thus,  Greece  was  before 
the  war  supposed  to  be  a  cat's-paw  of  Russia,  Sweden  of  Ger- 
many, etc.  It  would  be  the  most  slippery  of  all  guaranties. 
Incidentally,  it  may  be  noted  that  it  is  the  arrangement  that 
we  have  had  for  some  centuries  with  the  ascendancy  of  Ger- 
many as  the  result. 

Internationalization  in  some  form  would  seem  to  be  the 
only  alternative.  But  internationalization,  it  must  not  be 
forgotten,  is  a  concrete  thing,  not  a  mere  talismanic  ban.  It 
implies  agents,  laws,  force,  and  all  that  we  know  in  the  ordi- 
nary exercise  of  power.  From  whence  is  to  come  this  force, 
this  agent,  these  regulations?  We  will  not  embarrass  our 
argument  with  questions  of  detail.  But  in  principle  these 
questions  require  an  answer  before  the  proposal  can  claim 
validity.  It  may  be  assumed  that  some  concert  of  the  nations, 
some  form  of  international  organization,  perhaps  the  peace 
conference  itself,  will  appoint  some  reliable  person  to  act  as 


278  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

its  agent.1  Some  measure  of  citizen  government  could  doubt- 
less be  instituted,  though  it  is  clear  that  pure  democracy  and 
local  self  interest  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  secure  inter- 
national interests.  Then  a  police  force  amounting  to  a  large 
garrison  would  have  to  be  provided.  The  suggestion  of  an 
international  force, —  equal  numbers,  let  us  say,  from  Brit- 
ain, France,  Italy,  Germany,  Austria,  America,  and  other 
parties  to  the  compact, —  would  be  logical.  But  a  cautious 
inquirer  will  by  this  time  begin  to  have  misgivings.  What 
about  the  harmony  of  such  a  force  ?  Suppose  the  parties  to 
the  compact  went  to  war  with  one  another,  would  their  sev- 
eral contingents  be  at  peace  in  Constantinople  ?  Would  they 
not  manoeuvre  to  control  it  and  deliver  it  to  their  nation? 
What  a  time  their  commander  would  have !  And  even  he 
would  not  be  a  man  without  a  country.  Where  would  his 
sympathies  be?  And  who  would  be  the  governor?  Would 
he  hold  for  life  or  for  a  term  of  years  ?  And  if  the  latter, — 
or  even  the  former, —  would  not  something  like  rotation  be 
inevitable  ?  And  when  it  came  Germany's  turn  to  take  the 
lead,  what  of  the  possibilities  with  a  German  governor,  a 
German  consul,  a  German  merchant  community,  and  a  body 
of  German  troops  subject  to  his  orders  ?  What  would  guar- 
antee us  against  German  intrigue  and  the  recrudescence  of 
the  Mitteleuropa  dream  under  conditions  so  tempting?  All 
this  is  imagined,  it  is  true.  Other  arrangements  might  be 
made  and  unknown  safeguards  might  develop.  But  mere 
possibilities  are  not  enough.  And  then  too  it  is  equally  pos- 
sible that  unforeseen  dangers  might  develop.  We  can  not 
escape  the  conclusion  that,  in  any  such  form  as  this,  inter- 
nationalism would  not  be  a  safeguard  against  intrigue  and 
aggression,  but  an  opportunity  and  an  occasion  for  it. 

i  King  Albert  of  Belgium  has  been  suggested.  He  would  at  least  have 
the  advantage  of  experience  in  the  management  of  internationalized 
territories. 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS  279 

But  that  the  solution  of  the  problem  rests  with  the  associ- 
ated nations  and  not  with  any  single  nation  is  a  foregone 
conclusion.  No  single  nation  as  yet  commands  sufficiently 
the  confidence  of  its  fellow  nations  to  be  allowed  to  own  Con- 
stantinople. Conceding  that  its  administration  would  be  per- 
fect and  in  the  interest  of  all  alike,  the  mere  possession  of 
such  a  site  by  one  of  the  great  powers  of  Europe  would  give 
that  power  an  influence  which,  in  wholly  different  connec- 
tions, might  be  overwhelming.  The  power  that  possessed 
Constantinople  unchallenged,  would  speak  with  authority  no 
matter  upon  what  subject. 

Yet  so  far  as  efficiency  and  even  impartiality  of  manage- 
ment is  concerned,  the  chances  are  immeasurably  in  favor  of 
administration  by  a  single  experienced  and  trustworthy 
power.  Administration  by  an  international  committee  or  by 
any  arrangement  involving  the  actual  cooperation  of  persons 
representing  different  systems  and  different  national  habits 
would  be  a  guaranty  of  weakness  and  confusion.  Let  us 
take  the  most  favorable  supposition,  that  of  the  cooperation 
of  English  and  Americans.  Here  no  language  barrier  hin- 
ders cooperation.  National  systems  have  evolved  largely  in 
common,  and  national  sympathies  are  for  the  present  at  least 
wholly  favorable.  Yet  the  writer  prophesies  for  such  a 
cooperation,  certain  confusion,  friction,  and  inefficiency  if 
not  failure.  A  certain  acquaintance  with  American  admin- 
istration in  the  Philippines  and  with  British  administration 
in  India  and  Egypt  leaves  him  at  a  loss  to  know  which  to 
admire  most.  Yet  the  two  are  utterly  diverse  in  method  and 
even  in  their  fundamental  conception  of  the  race  problem. 
Either  would  be  successful  in  Constantinople,  but  certainly 
not  both  at  once,  nor  yet  any  composite  or  compromise  of  the 
two.  They  would  simply  emasculate  and  destroy  each  other. 
There  would  be  clash  in  the  methods  as  such,  but  there  would 
be  still  more  clash  between  the  personnels  of  the  two  differ- 


280  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

ently  evolved  systems.  Only  the  very  biggest  men  at  the  top 
would  be  able  to  bridge  the  chasm  with  their  broader  sym- 
pathies. 

All  this  would  be  still  more  true  as  between  other  races 
where  the  barrier  of  language  and  a  still  greater  divergence 
of  methods  would  add  to  the  complications.  The  net  result 
of  any  scheme  of  internationalism  which  involved  actual  co- 
operation of  dissimilar  peoples  and  methods,  would  he  to 
sacrifice  efficiency  to  a  purely  fanciful  equity. 

There  is  another  and  perhaps  graver  objection.  We  have 
been  considering  international  interests.  We  are  not  wholly 
at  liberty  to  ignore  the  interests  of  the  local  population. 
That  population  would  be  considerable.  It  has  approached 
the  million  mark  in  Constantinople  and  in  the  district  which 
would  necessarily  be  included,  it  would  be  much  more.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  making  Constantinople  a  free  port  would 
largely  increase  this  population.  The  interests  of  such  a 
population,  necessarily  largely  withdrawn  from  their  own  con- 
trol, must  be  a  matter  of  grave  concern  to  the  international 
body.  There  can  be  no  possible  question  that  the  influence 
of  a  single  culture,  consistent  in  itself  and  positive  in  charac- 
ter, would  be  far  more  salutary  than  that  of  a  confused  dis- 
cord in  which  each  national  element  tacitly  challenged  the 
most  cherished  principles  or  habits  of  the  rest.  The  cosmo- 
politan tendencies  in  such  a  place  would  be  dangerously 
strong  at  best.  They  could  have  no  better  corrective  than  the 
presence  of  a  positive,  resolute  race  culture  which  would 
command  respect  as  illustrating  the  value  of  consistent  race 
ideals. 

We  conclude  that  such  an  administration  should  be  inter- 
national in  its  authority  and  ultimate  sanctions  but  national 
in  its  actual  exercise,  a  difficult  combination,  but  not  impos- 
sible,—  perhaps,  too,  the  least  difficult  of  the  permissible 
alternatives.     This  is  not  the  place  to  suggest  by  exactly  what 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS  281 

means  this  may  be  accomplished.  It  is  for  practical  states- 
men and  experienced  administrators  to  devise  the  necessary 
machinery.  The  essence  of  the  suggestion  is  that  a  single 
trustworthy  nation  should  administer  Constantinople  under 
the  mandate  of  the  associated  powers.  The  chosen  nation 
must  needs  be  one  of  the  great  powers,  one  experienced  in  ad- 
ministration, and  one  not  tempted  by  contiguity  to  make  the 
trust  a  stepping  stone  to  annexation  and  monopoly.  These 
conditions  would  exclude  Russia,  Germany,  and  Austria,  even 
were  they  not  excluded  by  other  considerations.  There 
should  be  no  hesitation  whatever  at  such  a  juncture  as  this 
in  declaring  these  nations  disqualified.  We  have  learned 
nothing  from  the  war  if  we  have  not  learned  this.  The  list 
thus  reduces  to  Britain,  America,  France,  and  Italy.  The 
last  could  not  wisely  accept  the  trust.  There  is  no  serious 
reason  to  doubt  the  trustworthiness  or  the  competency  of  the 
other  three. 

The  question  naturally  arises  whether  such  an  adminis- 
tration should  be  combined  with  the  administration  of  Ana- 
tolia-Armenia suggested  in  the  preceding  chapter.  The  bal- 
ance of  advantage  would  seem  to  be  very  much  the  other  way. 
To  combine  them  would  come  dangerously  close  to  continuing 
the  Turkish  Empire  under  foreign  administration.  It  would 
pretty  effectually  prevent  the  isolation  of  Constantinople  and 
the  Dardanelles  and  their  administration  purely  as  an  inter- 
national trust,  a  facility  of  world  commerce.  The  fiscal  de- 
mands of  impoverished  Anatolia- Armenia  would  continually 
covet  the  possible  revenues  of  the  great  waterway  and  impede 
its  traffic  with  toll  exactions.  Political  and  religious  inter- 
ests and  prejudices,  easily  managed  in  cosmopolitan  Constan- 
tinople, would  acquire  irresistible  and  dictatorial  power  with 
the  backing  of  Turkish  Anatolia.  The  two  problems  are  not 
only  diverse  but  wholly  incompatible,  if  the  plan  of  a  truly 
open  waterway  and  free  port  is  to  be  adopted. 


282  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

Such  a  plan  naturally  raises  the  question  how  much  is  to 
be  included  in  the  internationalized  area.  Only  military 
and  administrative  experts  can  answer  this  question.  It  is 
clear,  however,  that  the  inclusion  should  be  based  on  mini- 
mum requirements  for  defense  and  administrative  conven- 
ience. We  do  not  wish  to  create  another  empire  here.  The 
Gallipoli  Peninsula,  marvellously  set  off  by  nature  for  its 
purpose,  must  obviously  be  included.  Also  the  territory  back 
of  Constantinople  at  least  as  far  as  the  Chatalja  lines. 
Whether  more  than  this  is  required, —  possibly  even  territory 
linking  Constantinople  with  Gallipoli, —  the  novice  can  not 
judge.  It  is  even  possible  that  the  present  slight  territory 
of  European  Turkey  may  prove  to  be  the  workable  unit, 
though  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  a  much  more  limited  defensive 
program  may  prove  practicable.  Probably  a  certain  inclu- 
sion on  the  Asiatic  side  will  also  prove  to  be  necessary,  though 
here  again  it  would  seem  to  simplify  the  problem  if  the  Euro- 
pean shore  proved  sufficient. 

Little  remains  to  be  said  regarding  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 
The  case  of  Serbia  has  been  considered  in  connection  with  the 
problem  of  Austria,  save  possibly  the  problem  of  its  southern 
and  southeastern  boundary  as  fixed  by  the  treaty  of  1912. 
There  seems  little  doubt  that  this  treaty  gave  to  Serbia  a 
certain  amount  of  territory  in  which  the  population  is  pre- 
dominantly Bulgarian.  This,  however,  must  be  understood 
in  the  light  of  the  well  known  definition  of  nationality  in 
this  region.  Language  has  little  to  do  with  it,  and  kinship 
still  less.  Church  allegiance  is  the  determining  fact,  and 
this  allegiance,  throughout  all  this  Macedonian  region,  is  a 
matter  of  comparatively  recent  propaganda.  LTnder  such  cir- 
cumstances national  boundaries  need  not  take  too  careful  note 
of  present  pseudo  race  alignments.  Moreover  these  race  ele- 
ments are  relatively  mobile  and  migrations  following  changes 
of  frontier  easily  effect  the  necessary   adjustments.     The 


CONSTANTINOPLE  AND  THE  BALKANS  283 

writer  was  a  witness  of  these  swarming  migrations  from  re- 
gion to  region  following  the  second  Balkan  war.  It  may 
safely  be  assumed,  therefore,  that  population  has  largely  ad- 
justed itself  to  the  lines  as  drawn  in  1912,  whether  they  were 
then  drawn  rightly  or  not.  To  correct  a  mistake  made  at  that 
time,  if  such  there  were,  would  therefore  necessitate  renewed 
migrations  and  further  readjustments.  Under  these  circum- 
stances the  thing  to  note  is  rather  the  topographical,  commer- 
cial, and  strategic  factors  than  the  elusive  and  artificial  fac- 
tor of  race.  Whether  these  factors  require  rectification  of 
the  frontier  is  a  question  for  the  expert.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  Serbian  and  Bulgarian  languages  differ  but 
slightly. 

The  question  of  Bulgaria  has  been  touched  upon  in  speak- 
ing of  Rumania.  Considerations  of  race  require  the  restora- 
tion of  the  earlier  frontier  between  Bulgaria  and  Rumania  in 
the  region  of  the  Dobrudja.  The  writer  is  unaware  of  any 
counter  considerations.  In  case  Constantinople  is  interna- 
tionalized and  the  present  Thraeian  territories  in  the  rear  are 
regarded  as  unnecessary,  their  relinquishment  to  Bulgaria  is 
seemingly  inevitable.  The  aggrandizement  of  Bulgaria  is 
about  the  last  thing  that  the  Allies  are  just  now  in  a  mood 
for,  but  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  present  moods  will  not  be  al- 
lowed to  stand  in  the  way  of  plainly  reasonable  arrangements. 
The  odium  which  Bulgaria  has  incurred  in  the  second  Balkan 
war  and  in  the  present  struggle  is  largely  to  be  charged  to  her 
unworthy  monarch,  and  while  her  standards  are  not  high,  her 
shame  and  her  disabilities  may  be  allowed  to  disappear  with 
him.  Greece,  of  course,  desires  these  territories,  but  to  ex- 
tend the  little  kingdom  to  the  gates  of  Constantinople  would 
do  her  no  good  unless  she  is  to  have  the  city  itself,  while  it 
would  be  both  an  affront  and  an  injury  to  Bulgaria  and  a 
new  source  of  trouble  in  this  troubled  region. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

RUSSIA  AND  POLAND 

It  is  significant  of  the  change  that  the  war  has  already 
wrought  that  Russia  and  Poland  must  now  be  mentioned  sepa- 
rately. The  greater  no  longer  includes  the  less.  Whether 
this  prefigures  a  separate  historical  destiny  from  this  time 
forth  is  not  so  clear,  but  it  is  the  possibility  and  the  pros- 
pect of  the  moment.  The  problem  is  distinctly  the  most  com- 
plex with  which  we  are  confronted.  The  problems  already 
discussed  present  grave  difficulties,  but  for  the  most  part  we 
can  see  what  we  would  like  to  accomplish.  In  the  great 
Slavic  East,  it  is  difficult  even  to  meet  this  preliminary  re- 
quirement. 

The  problem  must  be  approached  from  two  standpoints,  the 
needs  of  these  peoples  themselves  and  the  safety  of  the  family 
of  nations.  These  two  interests  may  ultimately  coincide,  but 
it  would  be  hazardous  to  assume  an  immediate  and  complete 
coincidence.  If  all  energies  are  devoted  to  the  upbuilding  of 
the  Slavic  peoples,  the  world  should  be  the  richer  for  their 
prosperity,  but  the  world  may  be  the  sufferer  from  their 
aggression.  Their  ultimate  power  is  almost  limitless.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  German  policy  of  holding  back  the  devel- 
opment of  these  peoples  and  keeping  them  divided  and  weak 
in  the  interest  of  outside  nations  is  one  so  monstrous,  when  we 
consider  the  magnitude  of  the  interests  thus  sacrificed,  that 
we  must  regard  it  as  both  futile  and  perilous.  It  is  ques- 
tionable whether  a  repressive  policy  toward  any  people  is 
legitimate  or  safe,  but  certainly  toward  the  largest  and  most 
virile  of  all  peoples  it  is  perilous  in  the  extreme.     Nothing 

could  better  assure  the  ultimate  deluge  than  to  keep  the  largest 

284 


KUSSIA  AND  POLAND  285 

of  the  energetic  races  in  perpetual  barbarism.  Underneath 
all  policies  that  we  consider  must  run  this  steady  current  of 
purpose,  to  promote  the  civilization  of  the  Slavic  peoples  and 
to  develop  in  them  as  rapidly  as  possible  those  inhibiting  in- 
stincts which  alone  can  protect  civilization  from  their  over- 
whelming power. 

The  Slavs  are  by  no  means  a  homogeneous  race,  yet  they  are 
all  obviously  related  and  are  conscious  of  and  influenced  by 
that  kinship.  Panslavism  is  the  only  one  of  the  pan-isms 
which  has  a  very  substantial  foundation.  It  seems  to  por- 
tend the  ultimate  union  of  all  the  Slavs  whose  habitats  are 
territorially  united  into  a  natural  unity.  This  means  all  of 
the  former  Russian  Empire  with  the  approximate  addition  of 
Austrian  Galicia  and  Prussian  Posen,  a  combination  not  quite 
equivalent  to  former  Russia  and  historic  Poland.  The 
Czecho-Slovak  area,  though  conterminous  with  the  great 
Slavic  domain,  is  not  a  natural  part  of  that  domain,  and  both 
history  and  nature  interpose  seemingly  insuperable  obstacles 
in  the  way  of  its  inclusion.  If  it  is  ever  to  become  a  part  of 
a  larger  whole,  that  whole  must  be  the  Teutonic  rather  than 
the  Slavic  unit,  a  result  which  is  suggested  by  the  steady 
German  encroachment,  industrial  and  cultural,  upon  this 
too  far  advanced  outpost  of  the  Slavic  race.  Present  tenden- 
cies, to  be  sure,  are  checking  this  encroachment,  and  until 
the  German  learns  better  manners  and  better  morals,  we  can 
but  welcome  the  divisive  influences.  But  it  is  perhaps  le- 
gitimate to  look  forward  to  a  very  far  future  when  the  needs 
of  commerce,  industry,  and  defense,  the  chief  things  for  which 
government  legitimately  stands,  may  be  provided  for  a  unit 
area  rather  than  for  fragments  based  on  linguistic  and  historic 
accident.  If  the  German  people  ever  get  over  feeling  that 
the  other  peoples  are  destined  to  be  "hewers  of  wood  and 
drawers  of  water  for  a  dominant  nation,"  they  will  have  a 
very  large  field  of  opportunity  open  to  them. 


286  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

Returning  now  to  the  normal  Slavic  domain,  we  have  to 
note  that  it  is  both  racially  and  naturally  ill  defined.  In  the 
extreme  southwest  it  is  separated  from  the  plain  of  Hungary 
by  the  Carpathian  Mountains,  a  very  good  natural  boundary, 
but  on  most  of  the  western  frontier  no  such  natural  barrier 
exists.  Vast  marshes  and  lake  systems  make  population 
sparse  and  intermittent,  but  tend  rather  to  confuse  than  to 
delimit  the  racial  frontiers.  Such  frontiers  are  seldom  sharp 
but  are  rather  of  the  nature  of  gradual  transitions.  Here 
they  are  even  worse.  In  the  early  days  of  race  mobility,  the 
rivalry  between  Teuton  and  Slav  took  the  form  of  establish- 
ing colonies  or  centers  of  population  of  each  race  against  the 
other.  These  colonies  slipped  past  each  other  far  into  each 
other's  domain.  Commercial  organizations  further  compli- 
cated the  situation,  and  the  location  of  the  Teutonic  Knfghts 
as  a  patrician  caste  far  to  the  east  of  the  Teutonic  domain, 
as  the  result  of  vicissitudes  in  the  Mediterranean  area,  added 
another  troublesome  factor.  There  are  Slavic  settlements, — 
strong  and  self  conscious, —  within  forty  miles  of  Berlin. 
There  are  similar  German  communities  not  so  very  far  from 
Petrograd.  For  many  hundreds  of  miles  the  country  is  one, 
—  not  of  mingled  population, —  but  of  mingled  settlements, 
a  far  more  tenacious  and  difficult  problem.  Nor  must  we 
forget  that  there  are  other  peoples  like  the  Letts,  mere  racial 
fragments  left  in  this  great  lateral  moraine  of  the  westward 
migrations,  which  own  neither  Slavic  nor  Teutonic  allegiance 
and  which  yet  can  have  no  profitable  future  as  distinct  na- 
tionalities. We  are  therefore  compelled  to  recognize  at  the 
outset  of  our  inquiry  that  any  line  drawn  between  these  two 
great  areas  will  be  arbitrary, —  very  arbitrary, —  as  compared 
with  other  race  frontiers.  A  region  of  interlacing  settle- 
ments can  not  be  divided  so  as  to  throw  all  settlements  of  one 
race  to  one  side  and  all  those  of  the  other  race  to  the  other. 

It  must  be  plain,  also,  that  such  an  area  is  peculiarly  un- 


RUSSIA  AND  POLAND  287 

suited  to  the  principle  of  self  determination.  If  race  lines 
are  followed,  the  result  must  necessarily  be  inconclusive. 
It  is  equally  impossible  for  the  people  of  such  a  district,  un- 
less they  are  exceptionally  developed,  which  these  people  cer- 
tainly are  not,  to  forecast  the  result  of  the  greater  trans- 
formations which  such  a  situation  invites.  Self  determina- 
tion is  a  delusion  and  a  snare  where  fair  coherence  and  finality 
of  national  character  has  not  been  attained. 

In  the  absence  of  fairly  clear  racial  or  natural  boundaries, 
the  tendency  is  strong  to  follow  historic  boundaries.  It  is 
noteworthy  that  here  as  in  the  case  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  there 
is  an  instinctive  groping  after  historic  boundaries  which  it 
is  assumed  have  some  presumptive  justification.  When  the 
appeal  to  history  is  made  to  correct  the  wrongs  of  history, 
we  are  again  in  confusion.  Thus,  the  restoration  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  is  demanded  on  historic  grounds,  in  oversight  of 
the  fact  that  history  can  be  cited  just  as  legitimately  in  favor 
of  Germany's  claim.  Why  is  the  history  of  the  last  fifty 
years  less  valid  than  the  history  of  the  preceding  period? 
On  general  principles  it  should  be  rather  more  valid  as 
representing  present  adjustments.  In  fact,  history  alone 
can  not  validate  either  claim.  The  indisputable  claim  of 
France  rests  on  other  grounds. 

Similarly,  in  our  effort  to  escape  from  the  confusion  of 
the  eastern  situation,  there  is  a  noticeable  groping  after  his- 
toric boundaries,  a  cry  for  the  restoration  of  Poland.  There 
is  no  apparent  consciousness  of  what  that  historic  Poland 
was,  whether  it  was  a  constant  or  a  variable,  a  fit  or  a  mis- 
fit, a  success  or  a  failure.  The  assumption  is  that  it  better 
expressed  the  equities  of  the  situation  than  the  present  (or 
recent)  arrangement.  The  yoke  galls  now, —  that  is  clear. 
It  must  be  that  the  old  one  fitted  better.  So  reasons  the 
present  victim,  so  reasons  the  sympathetic  onlooker,  each 
comparatively  ignorant  of  that  past  which  he  invokes. 


288  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

It  is  to  be  noted,  first  of  all,  that  the  historic  past  which 
is  thus  invoked  is  a  much  more  remote  past  than  that  of 
Alsace-Lorraine.  It  more  nearly  corresponds  to  that  remoter 
German  past  for  the  Rhine  region  which  we  have  rejected  as 
having  been  invalidated  by  later  history.  And  to  a  large 
extent  it  has  been  thus  invalidated  by  the  happenings  of  the 
relatively  long  period  since  the  partition  of  Poland.  The 
tendency  of  political  arrangements  to  validate  themselves  by 
effecting  the  necessary  adjustments,  has  been  quite  as  marked 
in  this  case  as  in  any  others.  Unity  of  language  and  race 
has  not  been  effected  but  it  had  not  been  effected  in  the  his- 
toric Poland  of  pre-partition  days  which  was  largely  Russian 
and  quite  as  unnatural  a  combination  as  any  which  has  fol- 
lowed it.  But  adjustments  of  a  very  vital  character  have 
none  the  less  been  effected  which  the  proposed  reunion  would 
disturb.  Galicia,  which  is  two  thirds  Russian,  is  probably 
the  most  contented  of  all  the  subject  races  in  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire.  Though  racially  Slavic  and  outside  the 
natural  boundary  of  the  Carpathians,  it  is  united  with  Austria 
in  religion  which, —  we  find  it  hard  to  remember, —  is  the 
most  important  of  political  determinants  in  this  part  of  the 
world.  German  Poland  has  been  forcibly  and  harshly  as- 
similated by  Prussia,  but  not  without  effect.  The  German 
assertion  that  there  is  no  German  Poland  is  false,  but  it  is 
not  without  a  basis  of  truth.  Germany  is  not  Catholic  like 
Austria,  but  its  large  Catholic  population  has  successfully 
established  its  claim  to  complete  liberty.  The  Poles  have 
been  an  irreconcilable  element  in  German  government  circles, 
but  it  is  more  than  doubtful  whether  any  considerable  Polish 
territory  in  the  German  Empire  would  vote  to  enter  a  re- 
constituted Poland. 

Russian  Poland  alone  has  remained  distinctively  Polish. 
Despite  the  official  Russification  which  has  been  so  brutally 
enforced,  the  Poles  have  remained  stubbornly  unreconciled, 


EUSSIA  ANT>  POLASTD  289 

though  it  is  noteworthy  that  no  such  wholesale  betrayal  of 
allegiance  took  place  in  Russian  Poland  as  that  which  Austria 
suffered  at  the  hands  of  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  and  the  efforts  of 
Germany  to  rally  to  her  cause  an  army  of  Poles  after  her 
conquest  of  Russian  Poland  seems  to  have  met  with  failure. 
But  while  a  century  of  Russian  rule  with  its  unmistakable 
harshness  and  tyranny,  has  not  won  the  sympathy  of  the 
Poles,  it  has  developed  bonds  that  are  none  the  less  vital 
to  Polish  prosperity.  A  very  large  part  of  the  industrial 
development  within  the  Russian  Empire  is  in  Poland.  Safe- 
guarded by  the  tariff  barriers  of  the  Empire,  the  immense 
Russian  market  has  been  theirs.  But  without  this  advantage 
these  Polish  industries  could  not  compete  for  a  moment  with 
the  much  more  developed  industries  of  Germany  and  Eng- 
land. An  independent  Poland  would  not  have  this  advan- 
tage but  would  be  outside  the  Russian  tariff  barrier,  com- 
pelled to  find  entrance  on  the  same  terms  as  these  more  ef- 
ficient nations.  This  she  could  not  do.  An  independent 
Poland  would  be  a  ruined  Poland,  as  far  as  manufacturing 
industries  go.  This  Germany  perfectly  understands.  The 
suggestion  has  been  made  that  the  independent  Poland  be  in- 
cluded within  a  Russian  customs  union,  but  this,  if  it  did 
not  wholly  imply  Russian  control,  would  almost  inevitably 
lead  to  a  reunion  of  the  two  countries,  as  Germany  again  is 
fully  aware.  By  every  means  in  her  power, —  not  direct  ap- 
peal, but  clandestine  propaganda,  appeals  to  the  theoretical 
democracy  of  the  Poles  and  their  sponsors,  Germany  will  en- 
deavor to  keep  the  Poles  theoretically  independent,  trusting 
to  the  prejudices  of  the  rural  population  and  to  the  misdi- 
rected economics  of  modern  nationalism  to  isolate  Poland 
by  tariff  barriers  which  she  will  help  to  build  and  then  in 
turn  to  make  her,  as  a  helpless  purveyor  of  raw  materials, 
dependent  upon  herself.  There  are  more  than  military  rea- 
sons for  Germany's  desire  to  erect  Poland  into  an  inde- 


290  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

pendent  buffer  state, —  of  course  with  a  trustworthy  German 
sovereign.  With  her  industries  ruined  she  would  become 
a  great  producer  of  food  for  industrial  Germany,  who  in 
turn  would  monopolize  the  privilege  of  providing  her  with 
the  necessary  manufactured  articles.  If  this  relation  of 
dependent  independence  could  be  properly  assured  and  sta- 
bilized, it  is  not  clear  that  Germany  would  object  to  the  re- 
union of  Posen  and  perhaps  of  other  parts  of  Prussian  Po- 
land. It  would  rid  the  Reichstag  of  a  pestiferous  and  in- 
tractable element  and  would  better  delimit  the  hewers  of 
wood  and  drawers  of  water  from  the  dominant  nation.  This 
economic  dependence  of  which  our  western  theoretic  de- 
mocracy is  utterly  unconscious,  is  in  fact  the  supreme  factor 
in  the  problem  of  the  Slavo-Teuton  border. 

There  are  other  embarrassments.  Poland  must  have  ac- 
cess to  the  sea  if  she  is  to  have  anything  approaching  real 
independence.  This  can  come  only  through  the  historic 
harbor  of  Danzig.  Unfortunately  this  harbor  does  not  lie, 
as  it  properly  should,  between  German  and  Russian  terri- 
tories, but  between  two  definitely  German  areas.  To  give 
Danzig  to  Poland  with  the  neck  of  Polish  territory  which 
connects  it  with  the  Polish  hinterland  would  cut  Prussia  in 
two.  Such  an  arrangement  is  not  inconceivable  or  without 
historic  precedent,  but  it  is  pretty  thoroughly  discredited  by 
history.  Nor  could  East  Prussia,  thus  severed  from  the 
main  German  body,  be  practicably  given  to  Poland  or  any 
other  power,  containing,  as  it  does,  "Konigsberg,  the  earlier 
Prussian  capital  and  the  center  of  Prussian  tradition. 

Finally,  we  can  not  overlook  the  fact  that  the  historic 
Poland  to  which  we  appeal  was  a  signal  failure.  No  gov- 
ernment in  Europe  during  the  last  thousand  years,  has  a 
record  for  more  marked  incompetency.  Under  the  leader- 
ship of  truly  great  sovereigns,  the  provincialism  and  local 
selfishness  of  the  people  proved  obdurate  to  every  appeal, 


POLAND 

SCALE   OF   MILES 
II  i)  I  I 

0  20 40  60         80 

Shaded  portion  indicates 

area  of  Polish  speech 


KUSSIA  AND  POLAND  293 

even  in  the  face  of  the  most  unmistakable  national  dangers. 
If  ever  a  nation  perished  because  it  was  unfit  to  live,  that  na- 
tion was  Poland.  This  is  not  saying  that  the  same  would 
be  true  today,  though  the  experiences  of  the  last  century  or 
two  have  not  been  of  a  nature,  seemingly,  to  develop  the 
needed  characteristics.  Still  less  is  this  meant  as  an  asper- 
sion upon  individual  Polish  character,  which  has  often 
enough  given  evidence  of  capacity  and  public  spirit.  But 
it  means  that  Polish  history  offers  an  inadequate  basis  for 
faith  in  Polish  future. 

The  writer  is  predisposed,  as  he  has  already  confessed,  to 
the  maintenance  of  unions  among  men,  even  when  those 
unions  are  unideal  and  but  imperfectly  established.  Such 
examination  as  he  has  been  able  to  make  of  the  irksome  unions 
among  peoples  convinces  him  that  the  irksomeness  usually 
inheres  in  something  else  than  the  formal  union  and  remains 
after  the  union  is  dissolved.  This  predisposition  should  be 
discounted  by  the  reader  in  the  measure  that  he  deems  neces- 
sary. With  this  confession,  he  ventures  to  express  his  strong 
feeling  that  the  ends  sought  by  Poland  can  be  better  secured 
by  autonomy  and  federation  with  Russia  than  by  a  nominal 
and  unreal  independence.  Nor  is  he  able  to  convince  him- 
self that  any  form  of  international  guaranty  for  a  Polish 
state  would  be  able  to  give  that  state  real  independence.  Con- 
ceding that  it  might  save  the  state  from  invasion  and  mili- 
tary subjugation  (a  very  doubtful  concession)  this  is  not  the 
danger  that  is  most  to  be  feared.  With  the  present  distribu- 
tion of  mineral  resources,  Germany  is  predestined  to  become 
an  industrial  state,  densely  peopled  and  wealthy,  while  Po- 
land is  as  certain  to  become  an  agricultural  state,  with  the 
moderate  population  and  the  moderate  wealth  which  such 
occupation  implies.  With  the  geographical  situation  as  it 
is,  that  means  vassalage  for  Poland.  To  a  large  degree  the 
same  fate  threatens  all  Slavdom,  but  the  danger  is  infinitely 


294  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

greater  to  isolated  fragments  and  most  of  all  to  fragments 
that  lie  next  to  Germany  herself.  Only  the  most  strenuous 
effort,  not  alone  on  the  part  of  the  Slavs,  but  on  the  part 
of  their  friends  as  well,  can  avert  this  vassalage  of  the  Slav 
to  the  Teuton,  a  vassalage  which  was  distinctly  prefigured  by 
the  commercial  treaty  of  1905  which  was  one  of  the  prominent 
reasons  for  the  war  and  which  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk 
re-imposes.  Such  a  vassalage  easily  leads  to  military  co- 
operation if  not  to  political  merger,  as  witness  Bulgaria's 
statement  on  entering  the  war.  It  behooves  the  powers  that 
are  interested  in  restraining  the  military  aggressions  of 
Germany  to  resist  by  every  means  in  their  power  that  policy 
of  disintegration  by  which  Germany,  invoking  our  cherished 
principle  of  self-determination,  is  pursuing  her  ends  of  Slav 
subjugation. 

It  need  hardly  be  said  that  the  objections  here  urged  against 
an  independent  Poland  hold  in  even  greater  degree  against 
the  other  fragments  of  Russia  which  it  pleases  Germany  to 
erect  into  puppet  kingdoms  and  decorate  with  her  surplus 
princelings.  They  are  smaller,  weaker,  and  less  historic  than 
Poland.  They  have  shown  no  evidence  of  national  spirit  or 
capacity.  Their  dependence  upon  Germany  is  not  remote 
and  potential  but  immediate  and  avowed.  Their  detachment 
and  alleged  independence  would  be  tantamount  to  annexa- 
tion. 

This  brings  us  to  the  all  important  conclusion.  Russia 
must  be  reconstituted,  reunited,  and  constructively  devel- 
oped. Long  dreaded  by  the  western  powers  as  the  moving 
glacier  whose  irresistible  advance  threatened  to  overwhelm 
them,  she  now  reveals  herself  as  a  necessary  counterweight 
to  a  nearer  and  a  deadlier  enemy.  If  Russia  could  remain 
out  of  the  game,  perhaps  all  would  draw  a  sigh  of  relief, 
but  this  is  impossible.  United  and  powerful,  she  is  the 
inevitable  check  upon  Germany  whose  leadership  she  resents 


KUSSIA  AND  POLAND  295 

as  much  as  we  do.  Divided  and  weak,  she  inevitably  be- 
comes a  vast  arsenal  of  resource  for  Germany's  use.  Ger- 
many entered  this  war  to  get  Belgium  and  the  Channel  ports 
from  which  she  could  overpower  Britain  at  her  convenience, 
to  overpower  France  and  take  her  money  and  her  navy,  to 
get  Constantinople  and  open  the  way  from  Berlin  to  Bag- 
dad. The  day  after  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  she  would 
have  yielded  Belgium  and  her  hope  of  the  Channel  ports, 
she  would  have  withdrawn  from  France,  she  would  have 
retired  from  the  Balkans  and  Constantinople,  she  would 
have  restored  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  would  have  renounced 
her  dreams  of  Berlin  to  Bagdad, —  all,  if  she  could  be 
left  free  in  her  new  and  undreamed-of  prospect  of  Berlin 
to  Vladivostok.  That  is  what  she  is  saying  through  her 
new  prince-chancellor  as  these  lines  are  written.  Autonomy, 
justice,  self-determination,  leagues  to  enforce  peace,  with  all 
these  she  is  agreed.  She  will  not  let  paper  principles  stand 
in  the  way  of  an  agreement  which  says  nothing  about  iron 
and  coal  and  interposes  nothing  but  verbal  barriers  between 
her  and  the  richest  prize  that  ever  fell  to  the  lot  of  a  con- 
queror. 

The  reconstitution  of  Russia  will  encounter  almost  in- 
superable obstacles.  The  underlying  unity  of  race  is  ob- 
scured by  provincialism  and  negatived, —  especially  as  re- 
gards Poland, —  by  the  intensest  religious  prejudice.  The 
country  is  inconceivably  poor  and  wretched,  and  too  ignorant 
to  know  the  occasion  of  its  misery.  The  wildest  economic 
and  political  theories  here  find  acceptance  and  work  their 
terrible  havoc.  Schooled  in  the  democracy  of  petty,  local  in- 
terests, no  people  is  so  utterly  without  knowledge  of  national 
interests  or  so  unskilled  in  international  problems.  It  is  the 
land  of  the  chimera  and  the  will-o'-the-wisp.  Yet  if  we  are 
to  escape  the  menace  of  a  Germany  that  would  extend  from 
the  Rhine  to  the  Pacific,  we  must  make  a  nation  out  of  Russia. 


296  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

It  will  be  the  supreme  test  of  our  power  to  survive.  No 
paper  guaranties  and  permessos  will  do  the  work.  Close 
knit  alliances,  huge  capital  investments,  constructive  states- 
manship, and  above  all  tolerance  for  political  necessities  un- 
like our  own  and  for  methods  and  mechanisms  which  would 
not  serve  our  ends,  will  be  needed  in  a  measure  surpassing 
our  utmost  imagination.  If  we  don't  do  this,  Germany  will, 
—  in  her  different  way  and  for  her  different  ends, —  and  will 
reap  the  benefit,  all  to  Eussia's  hurt  and  ours. 

One  exception  to  this  general  conclusion  should  perhaps 
be  noted.  Finland  is  not  Eussian,  nor  is  there  any  reason 
for  her  becoming  so  except  as  a  stepping  stone  to  the  absorp- 
tion of  the  Scandinavian  countries  by  the  great  Slav  power. 
This  is  obviously  no  longer  contemplated,  and  is  farthest  from 
that  ideal  which  now  animates  the  Allied  cause.  Finland 
is  essentially  Scandinavian  in  her  culture  and  in  all  her  af- 
finities. She  may  well  indulge  in  the  novel  pleasure  of 
independence  until  the  Scandinavian  powers  see  the  futility 
of  their  unnatural  separation  and  find  a  way  to  reconcile 
their  individuality  with  the  necessities  of  modern  larger 
organization.  A  customs  union  of  Denmark,  Norway, 
Sweden,  and  Finland  with  some  form  of  federal  union  for 
the  handling  of  their  common  interests,  would  seem  a  de- 
sirable thing  to  one  who  knows  nothing  of  the  petty  jeal- 
ousies, the  arbitrary  differences  of  custom  and  dialect  which 
have  motived  their  recent  centrifugal  policy.  Whether  the 
war  which  has  written  its  great  lessons  so  large  before  their 
eyes,  has  prepared  them  for  the  desirable,  the  seemingly 
inevitable,  step,  remains  to  be  seen.  The  issue  is  theirs, 
not  ours,  and  should  in  no  way  influence  the  deliberations 
of  the  peace  table  except  to  dictate  the  expulsion  of  the  Ger- 
man kinglet  and  leave  Finland  free  to  effect  the  desirable 
combination. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE  REMOTER  POWERS 

The  war  has  gradually  drawn  into  its  vortex  a  number 
powers  that  are  remote  from  the  conflict  both  geographically 
and  in  their  interests.  With  a  single  exception  these  are 
minor  powers  as  measured  by  wealth,  population,  or  military 
establishment.  Their  interests  are  unfamiliar  and  are  easily 
forgotten.  It  may  be  assumed,  however,  that  they  are  keenly 
alive  to  these  interests  and  that  they  look  forward  to  the 
peace  conference  as  an  opportunity  for  securing  national  ad- 
vantage. The  world  is  familiar  with  the  case  of  Italy  in  the 
Crimean  War.  The  struggling  little  kingdom  was  but  half 
formed  as  yet,  and  the  issue  of  the  war  concerned  her  but 
remotely.  Above  all  she  was  unprepared  for  war.  But  the 
far-seeing  Cavour  perceived  that  participation  in  the  war 
meant  participation  in  the  peace  conference  and  so  recogni- 
tion by  the  powers.  It  meant  farther  an  opportunity  to  bring 
the  cause  of  Italy  before  the  powers  of  Europe  in  council  as- 
sembled, an  opportunity  which  he  used  with  telling  effect. 
It  is  safe  to  say  that  these  remoter  countries  have  been  much 
influenced  by  similar  ulterior  considerations,  and  that  one 
of  the  most  delicate  tasks  of  the  conference  will  be  to  de- 
termine what  matters  are  relevant  to  the  discussion.  There 
will  be  the  strongest  pressure  to  make  the  peace  conference 
a  general  committee  pro  bono  publico,  with  the  result  that 
an  impossible  program  will  develop  and  a  multitude  of 
smouldering  animosities  will  break  into  flame.  Whether 
the  world  will  find  in  Venizelos  or  some  unknown  Brazilian 
or  Mongolian  its  new  Cavour,  we  can  only  speculate.  The 
situation  has  possibilities. 

297 


298  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

The  scope  of  the  present  work  does  not  admit  a  study  of 
these  remoter  national  problems  which  may  find  in  the  great 
war  an  occasion  for  demanding  our  attention.  Small  though 
they  may  seem  compared  with  the  great  issues  that  we  have 
considered,  they  are  numerous  and  involved,  and  require  for 
their  intelligent  settlement  a  vast  amount  of  patient  research. 
To  lay  this  burden  upon  the  peace  conference,  to  postpone  its 
decisions  and  jeopardize  its  agreements  by  the  animosities 
and  heart  burnings  which  these  minor  issues  involve,  would 
be  fatal  to  its  main  purpose.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
after  iive  years  of  literal  world  war  one  of  the  imperative  de- 
mands upon  such  a  conference  will  be  that  it  reach  its  de- 
cisions promptly  and  relieve  the  nations  at  the  earliest  pos- 
sible moment  of  their  intolerable  burdens.  To  reach  a 
settlement  that  is  just  in  its  main  lines  but  leave  all  details 
for  more  leisurely  consideration  under  conditions  of  peace 
is  the  plain  duty  of  the  conference.  Many  a  minor  issue 
might  better  wait  for  justice  than  to  have  a  suffering  world 
wait  for  peace. 

The  conclusion  is  that  the  irrelevant  or  feebly  relevant  is- 
sues affecting  remoter  nations, —  and  even  the  main  con- 
testants,—  should  be  rigorously  excluded  from  the  confer- 
ence. At  the  same  time  the  war  furnishes  an  occasion  not 
to  be  missed  for  the  settlement  of  these  matters.  The  Hague 
Tribunal,  less  ambitious  than  the  league  of  nations,  and 
therefore  more  hopeful,  has  machinery  ready  and  admirably 
suited  for  the  work.  The  peace  conference  may,  without 
undue  delay,  find  time  to  refer  such  issues,  properly  defined, 
to  the  Hague  Tribunal.  The  advantage  of  the  occasion  con- 
sists in  this  that  the  presentation  of  these  issues  to  the  council 
of  the  nations  gives  them  an  opportunity  to  recommend,  and 
virtually  to  compel,  the  submission  of  issues  to  rational  ad- 
judication, which  otherwise  would  wait  indefinitely  for  a 
suitable  initiative.     Nor  will  it  be  easy  for  one  of  these 


THE  EEMOTEE  POWEKS  299 

claimants  to  refuse  the  reference  of  its  claim  to  such  a 
tribunal  when  it  has  acquiesced  in  the  reference  of  similar 
claims  for  some  other  nation.  The  peace  conference  may, 
therefore,  become  the  occasion  for  an  extensive  world  house- 
cleaning  without  itself  delaying  for  the  completion  of  the 
work.  The  question  of  the  enforcement  of  these  judgments 
may  seem  to  offer  difficulties,  but  it  is  doubtful  if  enforce- 
ment will  be  necessary.  The  mere  reference  of  the  matter 
to  the  tribunal  by  the  council  of  the  powers  is  in  itself  a  pow- 
erful enforcement,  and  a  quiet  assumption  of  this  fact  with- 
out allusion  to  possible  coercion  would  facilitate  the  refer- 
ence without  seriously  impairing  the  sanction. 

One  of  these  remoter  nations,  however,  stands  in  a  class 
quite  by  itself.  Japan  is  one  of  the  great  powers  and  this 
fact,  together  with  her  early  entry  into  the  war,  quite  pre- 
cludes the  possibility  of  referring  her  claims  to  after  settle- 
ment. Possibly  some  will  demur  that  Japan  has  played  but 
a  secondary  part  in  the  war  and  that  she  is  entitled  to  cor- 
respondingly less  consideration.  This  criticism  is  without 
just  foundation.  Japan's  part  in  the  present  war  was  de- 
termined in  advance  by  treaty  and  by  nature.  That  part 
was  very  considerable  and  has  been  admirably  performed. 
It  was  primarily  the  policing  of  the  Pacific  and  Indian 
Oceans  against  sea  raiders,  the  protection  of  allied  commerce 
in  this  vast  area,  and  the  expulsion  of  Germany  from  all  her 
colonies  and  posts  in  the  east.  This  last  was  done  at  the 
very  outset  and  with  the  utmost  thoroughness.  The  police 
duty  has  been  performed  throughout  the  war  with  perfect 
success.  When  we  consider  the  extent  of  Allied  commerce, 
let  us  say  between  Hong  Kong  and  Aden  and  the  heavy  de- 
mand upon  Britain's  navy  in  the  west,  it  is  no  small  service 
to  have  made  this  largest  commercial  area  in  the  world  as 
safe  in  these  four  years  of  storm  as  in  time  of  peace.  But 
Japan  has  exceeded  her  pledge  in  this  respect.     When  the 


300  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

submarine  menace  was  at  its  height  and  the  Mediterranean 
became  almost  impassable,  Japan  joined  the  Allies  in  the 
protection  of  this  area,  contributing  materially  to  the  practical 
reclamation  of  this  vital  line  of  communications  from  which 
the  submarine  menace  long  ago  disappeared.  This  service 
has  been  both  costly  and  valuable,  but  it  has  not  been  dra- 
matic. It  easily  permits  the  conclusion  that  no  effort  is  be- 
ing made.  The  writer  has  repeatedly  been  asked  the  im- 
patient question  during  the  last  four  years:  "  Why  doesn't 
the  British  navy  do  something  ? "  The  questioner  seemed 
wholly  unconscious  of  the  fact  that  that  navy  was  performing 
incessantly  and  with  complete  success  the  most  titanic  and 
exhausting  task  ever  performed  by  any  fighting  force.  The 
task  of  Japan,  though  less  strenuous,  is  of  the  same  exacting 
but  unobtrusive  character. 

It  has  been  widely  urged  that  Japan  should  have  con- 
tributed to  the  struggle  on  land.  This  was  physically  im- 
possible. The  eastern  front  was  barred  both  by  the  long 
distance  and  poor  communications,  and  by  the  feeling  of 
the  Eussian  people  who  would  not  have  tolerated  the  pres- 
ence of  their  recent  enemy  in  strength  in  their  midst.  The 
western  front  was  twelve  thousand  miles  away,  accessible 
only  by  sea.  At  a  time  when  no  ships  could  be  spared  to 
bring  wheat  from  Australia  and  too  few  were  available  to 
transport  our  own  troops  three  thousand  miles,  the  trans- 
portation of  Japanese  troops  four  times  as  far  was  obviously 
not  to  be  considered.  Japan  has  done  what  she  could,  and 
so  far  as  can  be  seen,  has  done  it  cheerfully  and  whole- 
heartedly. The  question  has  continually  been  raised  whether 
Japan  might  not  betray  her  allies  and  suddenly  cast  in  her 
lot  with  Germany.  There  is  nothing  in  the  way  of  kinship 
or  accumulated  obligation  to  prevent  it.  Yet  Japan  has 
given  no  sign  of  defection.  The  writer  is  of  the  opinion  that 
no  government  is  more  constrained  by  its  plighted  word  than 


THE  EEMOTEE  POWEES  301 

this  government,  so  recently  the  inheritor  of  the  incomparable 
Samurai  tradition.  In  any  case  the  promise  has  been  kept, 
and  Japan  presents  herself  before  the  world  in  council  as 
an  extremely  strong  claimant  for  whatever  she  sees  fit  to 
claim. 

What  will  she  claim?  Eormally  she  will  perhaps  ask 
nothing, —  preferably  so  if  she  can  avoid  it.  She  will  be 
happy  if  her  claims  are  not  mentioned  in  the  conference, 
for  to  mention  them  will  be  to  challenge  them.  Japan  is 
the  one  great  power  that  has  realized  substantial  gains  during 
the  war  and  has  succeeded  in  confirming  herself  in  possession 
during  the  struggle.  These  gains  are  not  primarily  terri- 
torial, though  the  expulsion  of  Germany  from  her  holdings 
in  the  east  has  left  certain  territories  in  her  possession. 
Certain  of  these  whose  situation  made  their  ownership  a  mat- 
ter of  concern  to  Australia  and  Xew  Zealand,  have  been  re- 
linquished to  their  control.  Others,  and  notably  the  famous 
Tsingtao,  Germany's  Gibraltar  on  the  Shantung  Peninsula, 
remain  in  Japanese  possession.  But  these  territorial  prob- 
lems, even  so  strategic  a  one  as  the  last  mentioned,  are  of 
small  moment  compared  with  other  advantages  which  Japan 
has  been  able  to  secure  while  Europe  was  too  occupied  to  in- 
terfere. 

The  capture  of  Tsingtao  was  the  starting  point  for  this 
very  important  advance  of  Japanese  interests  as  also  for  a 
very  significant  and  rapid  evolution  of  policy  on  the  part  of 
the  Japanese  government  and  people.  The  announcement 
first  made  on  the  fall  of  Tsingtao  was  vaguely  to  the  effect 
that  Tsingtao  had  been  recovered  with  a  view  to  its  restora- 
tion to  the  Chinese  people,  and  lively  expectations  were  at 
once  aroused  among  the  latter.  These,  however,  were  soon 
disappointed.  A  more  explicit  announcement  soon  followed 
to  the  effect  that  Tsingtao  would  be  held  by  Japan  during 
the  continuance  of  the  war  after  which  the  question  of  its 


302  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

restitution  \vould  be  taken  up.  This  seemed  to  promise  the 
consideration  of  the  problem  at  the  peace  table,  a  recognition 
of  the  fact  that  questions  of  international  relation  between 
China  and  Japan  were  subject  to  its  jurisdiction,  or  at  least 
a  proper  subject  for  its  advice. 

But  it  could  not  fail  to  occur  to  the  Japanese  that  this 
was  a  peculiarly  favorable  moment  to  escape  from  the  tute- 
lage of  the  western  powers  who  had  seldom  shown  themselves 
disinterested  arbiters  of  Oriental  interests.  For  once  the 
long  enforced  deference  to  their  opinion  and  wish  might 
safely  be  laid  aside.  Hence  China  was  informed  that  Japan 
thought  it  desirable  to  reach  a  settlement  of  all  the  questions 
at  issue  between  the  two  nations.  These  questions, —  some 
of  them  hardly  living  issues  until  this  time, —  amounted  to 
a  remarkable  series  of  demands  made  by  Japan  upon  China, 
embracing,  among  other  things,  the  extension  and  prolonga- 
tion of  her  hold  upon  Manchuria,  the  exclusion  of  foreign 
powers  from  specified  parts  of  the  Chinese  coast,  the  transfer 
of  control  of  the  Chinese  steel  industry  to  Japanese  hands, 
freedom  of  Japanese  religious  propaganda  in  China,  and 
employment  of  Japanese  experts  in  preference  to  those  of 
other  nations  in  all  the  constructive  enterprises  of  the  develop- 
ing Chinese  government.  The  purpose  of  these  remarkable 
demands  was  to  check  the  economic  and  above  all  the  military 
power  of  the  western  nations  in  the  Orient  and  to  secure  that 
of  Japan  in  their  stead.  Despite  the  passionate  opposition  of 
the  Chinese,  the  effort  was  almost  completely  successful. 
China  was  helpless,  and  her  friends, —  more  exactly  Japan's 
rivals, —  were  powerless  to  interfere.  All  of  the  demands 
except  the  last  were  finally  conceded.1 

This  diplomatic  victory  was  not  won  without  much  com- 
motion in  the  world.     Germany  of  course  protested  but  in 

i  For  a  fuller  statement  of  these  demands  and  the  reasons  partly  justi- 
fying them,  see  M  The  Things  Men  Fight  For,"  pp.  312-319. 


THE  REMOTER  POWERS  303 

vain.  Russia  can  hardly  have  been  reconciled,  but  it  was 
not  the  moment  to  protest.  Britain  found  her  own  strong 
position  rather  strengthened  than  menaced  by  the  aggressive 
policy  of  Japan,  though  the  unspoken  animus  of  the  move- 
ment, the  Orient  for  the  Orientals,  had  its  disquieting  sug- 
gestions. But  Britain  was  plainly*  debarred  from  opposing 
an  ally  upon  whose  assistance  she  was  so  vitally  dependent. 
Japan  probably  consulted  her  ally  and  acted  with  her  ap- 
proval, but  that  does  not  mean  that  the  approval  was  will- 
ingly given.  Decidedly  Japan  was  in  a  strong  position  and 
she  made  the  most  of  it. 

But  Japanese  sagacity  was  never  better  shown  than  in  her 
prompt  adoption  of  a  conservative  and  conciliatory  policy 
following  her  victory.  Political  conditions  at  home  for- 
tunately enabled  her  to  do  this  the  more  effectually.  The 
retirement  of  the  aged  premier,  Okuma,  permitted  the  saga- 
cious elder  statesmen  to  dictate  the  appointment  of  a  con- 
ciliatory successor.  The  ambassador  to  China  whose  strong 
handed  action  had  made  him  hated  by  the  Chinese  was  con- 
veniently retired  and  Japan  for  three  years  has  practiced  to 
the  full  her  incomparable  art  of  ingratiation.  The  Chinese 
have  short  memories  in  matters  that  are  remote  from  their 
daily  thought,  and  there  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that  the 
nation  has  learned  to  accommodate  itself  to  the  virtual  su- 
zerainty of  Japan. 

Most  astonishing  of  all  is  the  triumph  of  Japan  in  securing 
the  recognition  of  outside  powers  and  notably  of  ourselves.1 
In  the  fullest  sense,  Japan  has  fortified  herself  for  the  later 
action  of  the  powers. 

This,  then,  is  Japan's  stake  in  the  settlement,  the  main- 
tenance of  her  position  of  paramountcy  in  the  Far  East  and 
particularly  in  China.  During  the  war  she  has  converted 
that  position  from  a  theory  into  a  fact  and  has  confirmed 

iSee  page  123.  , 


304  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

it  by  her  arts.  The  peace  conference  will  be  the  first  and 
presumably  the  last  ordeal  which  that  paramountcy  will  be 
called  upon  to  pass.  Best  of  all  for  her  purpose  would  it  be 
to  have  the  matter  unmentioned,  thus  tacitly  accepting  it  as  an 
accomplished  fact  like  the  other  historic  facts  upon  which 
the  governments  represented  depend.  This  is  the  probable 
attitude  which  the  conference  will  take.  There  will  be  living 
issues  enough  without  resurrecting  any  dead  ones.  Japan 
is  an  ally  and  has  done  her  part.  China  is  not  yet  a  going 
concern  and  rights  wrested  from  Japan  on  her  behalf  are 
a  doubtful  service  to  the  cause  of  civilization  and  peace. 
And  after  all  there  are  excellent  reasons  for  each  of  the  con- 
cessions obtained,  reasons  which  would  have  seemed  com- 
pelling had  we  been  in  the  place  of  Japan.  Above  all  it  is 
to  be  noted  that  the  paramount  position  which  China  has 
been  compelled  and  we  have  been  persuaded  to  recognize,  has 
long  been  a  concrete  fact.  A  highly  organized  military  and 
industrial  nation  situated  at  the  very  door  of  China,  inert, 
mediaeval,  and  effete,  necessarily  occupies  a  position  to  which 
neither  her  helpless  neighbor  nor  her  efficient  rivals  ten  thou- 
sand miles  away  can  lay  any  claim.  There  is  not  much  use 
in  blinking  facts  like  that  or  legislating  against  them. 

But  while  there  can  be, —  and  probably  should  be, —  no  re- 
view of  these  transactions  by  the  peace  conference,  despite 
the  cherished  hope  of  China  to  the  contrary,  there  are  in- 
terests that  are  menaced  by  the  arrangement  between  the  two 
powers  which  may  well  be  made  the  subject  of  consideration. 
The  policy  of  the  open  door,  or  equal  opportunity  for  all  na- 
tions in  the  trade  of  China  and  the  development  of  her 
enormous  resources,  is  a  policy  nominally  in  force  since 
1900.  To  this  policy  Japan,  along  with  other  powers,  has 
given  her  assent,  and  this  assent  is  said  to  have  been  renewed 
on  the  occasion  of  our  recent  approval  of  her  policy.  In  the 
interest  of  China,  in  the  interest  of  their  own  commerce,  and 


THE  KEMOTEE  POWEES  305 

in  the  interest  of  the  peace  of  the  world,  that  policy  should 
receive  affirmation  and,  if  possible,  definition  by  the  com- 
munity of  nations  at  this  time.  It  is  not  nearly  so  self- 
explanatory  a  policy  as  it  might  seem.  It  implies,  of  course, 
equal  tariffs,  equal  privileges,  etc.,  for  all  nations.  But  the 
easiest  thing  in  the  world  is  to  evade  the  spirit  of  such  an 
agreement.  Thus,  at  a  time  when  Eussia  had  guaranteed 
to  Japan  equal  commercial  privileges  in  Manchuria,  she  is 
said  to  have  evaded  her  agreement  by  making  it  impossible 
for  Japanese  consuls  to  find  office  or  domicile.  As  there 
could  be  no  consuls  without  domicile  and  no  commerce  with- 
out consuls,  the  guaranteed  equality  was  thus  effectually 
withheld,  but  in  a  way  difficult  to  make  the  ground  of  diplo- 
matic protest.  There  is  little  likelihood  that  Japan  will  re- 
sort to  such  contemptible  devices  as  this,  but  there  are  others. 
Particularly  in  the  matter  of  concessions  for  railways,  min- 
ing operations  and  the  like,  matters  dependent  upon  special 
negotiations  in  each  case,  impartiality  is  not  easy,  nor  is  it 
guaranteed  by  a  formula.  The  duty  of  the  peace  confer- 
ence, either  directly  or  through  some  delegated  procedure, 
is  to  set  definite  limits  to  Japanese  suzerainty  in  China. 
Properly  limited,  that  suzerainty  is  a  safeguard,  not  a  men- 
ace. It  assures  first  of  all  the  integrity  of  China  against 
the  rivalries  and  the  possible  domination  of  the  powers  whose 
peace  might  find  there  its  menace.  It  insures  also  the  de- 
velopment of  China  as  a  Japanese  asset.  On  the  other  hand 
the  permanent  domination  of  China  by  Japan  in  a  sense  which 
might  make  China  a  military  menace  to  the  western  nations 
is  most  improbable.  The  Chinese  are  neither  few  nor  weak. 
Japan  will  be  cautious  about  putting  the  sword  into  their 
hands.  With  the  development  of  modern  intelligence  and 
modern  methods  in  China,  a  certain  sense  of  opposition  is 
likely  to  be  felt  between  the  two  powers  sufficient  to  protect 
the  world  from  them  and  to  give  Japan  very  good  reason 


306  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

for  checking  militarism  on  China's  part.  In  other  words, 
the  much  heralded  yellow  peril  is  one  against  which  Japan 
must  be  on  her  guard,  for  if  she  ever  armed  China  to  fight 
her  battles,  China  would  inevitably  get  out  of  hand.  The 
world  has  reason  to  be  complacent  over  the  Japanese  hege- 
mony of  the  Orient. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  have  little  to  fear  from  the  hostility 
of  Japan.  Japan  is  and  must  be  a  naval  power.  No  re- 
sources in  her  possession  or  within  her  natural  sphere  of  in- 
fluence can  ever  give  her  world  mastery  of  the  seas.  Her 
present  allies  hold  that  mastery  and  have  every  opportunity 
to  retain  it.  If  we  can  conceive  of  our  own  country  ever 
having  the  folly  to  part  company  with  its  allied  kin,  a  com- 
bination of  Japan  and  Germany  would  be  possible  and  per- 
haps fatal  to  either  half  and  ultimately  to  both.  But  Japan 
will  "  cast  in  her  lot  with  the  English  speaking  peoples  "  if 
these  peoples  make  common  cause.  If  not,  she  will  not  and 
can  not. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

BRITAIN 

In  the  summer  of  1915  the  writer  had  opportunity  for  pro- 
longed conversations  with  an  Englishman  who  was  officially 
in  touch  with  inner  British  circles.  The  relation  became  in- 
timate and  confidential.  There  could  be  no  doubt  of  the 
sincerity  of  the  views  thus  expressed.  In  the  course  of  one 
of  the  conversations  on  the  war,  after  a  discussion  of  the 
aims  and  prospects  of  the  various  powers,  the  question  finally 
came  up :  "  And  what  do  you  want  ?  "  "  Not  a  thing. 
We  are  not  going  to  annex  a  single  square  mile."  "  But  you 
will  have  to.  You  siriplj  can't  let  Mesopotamia  and  Pales- 
tine with  their  strategic  situation  go  back  to  Turkey  or  to 
anybody  else  who  is  in  line  for  them.  You  must  link  up 
India  and  Egypt."  "Well, —  yes,  I  see  your  point,  but 
(after  hesitation),  no,  we  must  avoid  it.  We  didn't  go 
into  this  war  to  get  territory,  and  our  moral  position  as  fight- 
ing a  purely  defensive  war  will  be  so  much  stronger  if  we 
stick  to  that  program,  that  I  think  we  shall  find  some  way 
to  avoid  it." 

Though  speaking  for  himself,  this  man  certainly  reflected 
the  opinion  of  high  British  circles  at  that  time.  There  is 
no  reason  to  assume  that  the  preferences  or  judgments  of 
these  circles  or  of  the  British  people  have  changed  since  that 
time.  Yet  we  may  take  it  as  certain  that  this  war  will 
largely  increase  the  responsibilities  of  the  British  Empire. 
The  cynic  will  scoff  and  will  find  in  this  new  discrepancy  be- 
tween British  profession  and  British  deeds  one  more  occa- 
sion for  the  oft  alleged  British  hypocrisy.  We  can  antici- 
pate the  new  diatribes  of  German  critics  about  "  perfidious 
Albion  "  and  her  conspiracy  for  the  ruin  of  Germany  and  the 

307 


308  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

filching  of  her  possessions.  The  Englishman  was  not  in- 
sensible to  the  opportunity  thus  afforded. 

A  people  in  the  stage  of  development  in  which  the  German 
people  now  find  themselves  simply  can  not  understand  or 
credit  the  attitude  of  reluctance  to  assume  the  responsibilities 
of  empire.  With  a  crude  acquisitiveness  untempered  by 
scruple  or  experience,  and  conceiving  of  subject  peoples  not 
as  weaklings  claiming  their  toilsome  guidance  and  protec- 
tion, but  as  lower  beings  created  for  their  service,  empire 
for  them  means  not  burden  but  privilege.  They  do  not  ap- 
preciate that  with  the  full  acceptance  of  the  principle  of 
trusteeship  the  possibility  of  direct  profit  vanishes.  Colonies 
to  them  mean  prestige  and  profits,  not  burden  and  obligation. 
How  can  the  people  that  conceives  of  the  French  and  British 
as  destined  to  be  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water  for 
themselves  and  that  makes  war  upon  a  peaceable  neighbor 
with  the  express  purpose  of  appropriating  the  accumulated 
fruits  of  its  industry  and  toil, —  how  can  such  a  people  regard 
the  rule  of  negroes  or  Mongolians  as  entailing  burdensome 
obligations?  Colonies  to  them  are  assets  and  subject  peo- 
ples are  loot.  Their  colonies  may  be  models  of  administra- 
tion and  their  peoples  cared  for  like  stock  on  a  dairy  farm 
(neither  of  which  has  thus  far  been  true)  but  it  will  be  from 
motives  of  sagacious  exploitation,  not  of  human  obligation. 
They  can  not  conceive  of  true  reluctance  to  accept  such  per- 
quisites. 

Yet  nothing  is  more  certain  than  that  this  reluctance  char- 
acterizes those  who  have  truly  mastered  the  secret  of  empire 
as  a  great  human  trust.  There  may  be  no  hesitation,  no  lack 
of  resoluteness  in  undertaking  the  necessary  task,  but  the 
attitude  in  which  new  obligations  are  accepted  by  a  people 
that  has  given  hostages  to  humanity  is  as  different  from  the 
crass  selfishness  of  the  eager  novice  as  white  is  from  black. 
Empire  for  such  a  people  loses  its  glamour  and  presents  itself 


BKITAIN  309 

in  the  sober  gray  of  duty  and  poorly  requited  toil,  a  guise 
not  without  its  attractions,  but  attractions  incomprehensible 
to  the  uninitiated. 

There  are  still  all  kinds  of  people  in  the  British  Empire 
and  all  kinds  of  attitudes  toward  imperial  obligations.  There 
are  those  who  feel  the  primitive  impulse  to  acquire  with  little 
care  for  anything  beyond.  There  are  those  who  are  com- 
placent with  present  gratifying  achievments,  too  indolent  to 
think  beyond.  There  are  those  who  shudder  at  the  respon- 
sibilities that  impend,  and  still  others  that  would  throw  all 
over  in  disgust.  But  the  British  people  have  lost  their  crude 
eagerness  to  acquire.  Their  care  is  now  to  develop,  to  make 
self-sufficient,  to  lessen  responsibilities,  to  emancipate,  to  com- 
plete rather  than  to  extend  the  task  of  empire. 

Meanwhile  this  task  remains  an  ever  enlarging  fact.  The 
work  of  empire,  the  correlation  of  separated  but  kindred  peo- 
ples, the  guidance  of  backward  peoples,  the  protection  of  the 
weak,  this  work  remains  to  be  done  and  calls  aloud  for  those 
who  can  do  it.  This  is  no  fiction.  Not  long  since  certain 
petty  states  in  the  Malay  Peninsula  petitioned  King  George 
that  they  might  be  allowed  to  become  a  part  of  the  Federated 
Malay  States  whose  prosperity  and  superb  administration 
they  envied.  The  unanimous  preference  of  the  Syrian 
Moslems  for  English  administration  in  the  event  of  a  change 
in  Turkey,  has  already  been  noted  (page  257).  Nothing 
succeeds  like  success,  and  British  administration  is  a  success, 
its  enemies  themselves  being  witnesses. 

But  the  immediate  choice  of  the  people  is  not  the  only  nor 
the  most  compelling  reason  for  the  extension  of  these  no  longer 
alluring  responsibilities.  Little  by  little  in  all  empires  the 
fact  reveals  itself  that  the  world  refuses  to  divide  satisfac- 
torily. Wherever  the  lines  are  drawn,  there  are  weak  points 
that  can  only  be  strengthened  by  extension  of  control.  No 
responsible  empire  makes  these  extensions  wantonly,  but  at- 


310  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

tack  or  menace  compels  the  unwelcome  step.  The  imperial 
power  is  thus  ever  goaded  on  to  further  expansion.  Such 
is  the  history  of  every  healthy  empire.  Its  growth  is  un- 
willed, reluctant,  and  at  last  coerced.  The  imperialism  that 
is  deliberate  and  avid  is  a  disease. 

The  present  is  one  of  those  epochs  of  coerced  advance  of 
which  the  British  Empire  has  recorded  so  many.  This  neces- 
sity rests  on  several  facts.  Eirst,  upon  the  clear  necessity 
of  liquidating  the  imperial  operations  of  Germany.  As  an 
imperial  trust  she  must  go  out  of  business.  We  have  learned 
nothing  from  the  war  if  we  have  not  learned  that.  Mean- 
while her  trust  transactions  call  for  a  new  trustee.  Their 
location,  if  nothing  else,  prescribes  Britain  as  the  successor. 
The  Caroline  Islands,  the  Bismarck  Archipelago,  and  other 
scattered  holdings  in  Oceanica  are  in  the  great  British  area. 
To  assign  them  to  any  other  power  would  be  a  forced  and 
artificial  arrangement  which  could  have  nothing  but  jeal- 
ousies or  irrelevant  interests  to  recommend  it.  These  will 
not  go  to  England,  be  it  noted,  but  to  Australia,  the  nearby 
civilized  commonwealth  that  is  vitally  interested  in  their 
occupancy  by  a  possible  enemy.  There  is  abundant  guar- 
anty, however,  that  Australian  administration  will  be  guided 
by  the  invaluable  British  tradition. 

The  great  question,  however,  is  the  disposal  of  the  exten- 
sive German  colonies  of  Togo,  Cameroon,  Southwest  Africa, 
and  German  East  Africa.  The  first  two  are  tropical  colonies 
and  so  situated  that  they  link  up  with  French  possessions 
more  naturally  than  with  those  of  any  other  nation.  While 
Britain  has  not  surrendered  her  colonies  of  earlier  foundation 
in  this  part  of  Africa,  there  is  an  obvious  assumption  under- 
lying all  Anglo-French  relations  since  1904  that  this  part  of 
Africa  is  preeminently  a  French  field  of  development.  More- 
over a  large  part  of  the  German  colony  of  Cameroon  was 
French  until  recently,  having  been  ceded  to  Germany  in 


BKITAIN  313 

1911  under  compulsion  in  lieu  of  the  much  coveted  Morocco. 
It  is  fitting  and  probable,  therefore,  that  these  colonies  should 
be  assigned  to  France  and  united  with  the  adjacent  French 
territories  in  a  unit  development. 

German  East  Africa,  also  a  tropical  colony,  adjoins  Brit- 
ish, Belgian,  and  Portuguese  territories.  Of  these  three  there 
can  be  no  thought  of  its  union  with  any  but  the  British. 
Belgium  already  has  in  the  Belgian  Congo  a  territory  visibly 
in  excess  of  her  ability  to  manage.  It  owes  its  existence  to 
a  misguided  attempt  at  internationalization  which  resulted 
in  bankruptcy,  fearful  exploitation  of  the  natives,  and  finally 
in  assumption  by  Belgium  by  the  logic  of  accident.  No 
national  exploitation  of  Africa  can  begin  to  show  the  incom- 
petency and  abuse  which  has  characterized  this  great  experi- 
ment in  internationalism.  The  Portuguese  colonies,  on  the 
other  hand,  have  been  conspicuous  failures  and  their  partition 
among  other  European  powers  was  ope-uly  discussed  and 
practically  agreed  upon  before  the  war  without  protest  from 
Portugal  herself.  She  has  long  ago  been  weighed  in  the 
balances  and  found  wanting. 

Turning  to  the  remaining  colony  of  Southwest  Africa  we 
have  a  wholly  different  problem,  and  one  which  is  strangely 
misunderstood.  Southwest  Africa  was  for  Germany  a  de- 
pendency, a  possession,  a  source  of  materials  for  her  in- 
dustries and  of  men  for  the  armies  which,  as  she  boasted, 
were  to  keep  British  South  Africa  from  aiding  their  associate 
dominions.  It  was,  in  short,  the  estate  of  an  absentee  land- 
lord. But  Southwest  Africa  is  by  nature  a  part  of  the  great 
South  African  Commonwealth,  the  white  man's  Africa,  a 
white  man's  nation,  free  to  determine  its  own  destinies  as  is 
Australia  or  Canada  or  England  herself.  The  question  there- 
fore is  not  one  of  passing  over  a  chattel  from  one  power  to 
another,  but  of  emancipating  white  man's  land  and  uniting  it 
to  its  own.     It  is  a  question  of  Africa  irredenta,  of  freedom 


314  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

and  independence  as  contrasted  with  perpetual  subjection, 
for  Germany  never  contemplated  the  freeing  of  her  colonies. 

But  there  is  a  larger  question  than  this  and  one  that  has 
been  surprisingly  ignored.  Despite  all  our  striving  and  all 
our  protestations  we  still  continue  to  consider  these  questions 
rather  from  the  standpoint  of  suzerain  privilege  than  from 
that  of  colonial  welfare.  The  plea  is  continually  in  our 
ears  or  in  our  thoughts  as  to  whether  Germany  should  not 
have  "  her  share  "  of  colonies  and  the  like,  the  good  things 
of  earth.  Maddened  by  her  inhuman  acts  we  nerve  our- 
selves to  outlaw  the  great  offender  and  to  confiscate  her  col- 
onies, but  we  are  still  conscious  of  having  deprived  her  of 
something  normally  hers,  something  which  if  decent  she 
might  rightfully  claim.  We  divide  up  Africa  as  Jacob  and 
Esau  divided  the  herds. 

As  regards  tropical  races  and  peoples  destined  to  permanent 
or  prolonged  incapacity  for  self  management,  the  right  of 
the  civilized  world  to  impose  the  conditions  of  order  can  not 
reasonably  be  doubted,  though  it  is  a  question  whether  even 
upon  such  races  the  civilized  world  has  the  right  to  impose  its 
barriers  and  its  feuds.  But  in  a  country  like  South  Africa 
which  is  certain  to  be  the  home  of  white  men  and  the  seat  of 
a  great  civilized  independent  state,  this  question  becomes 
far  more  important.  Europe  is  hopelessly  divided  in  lan- 
guage and  from  this  difference  derive  others  which  taken 
in  the  aggregate  make  political  union  impossible  and  even 
peace  precarious.  The  present  awful  calamity  which  is  said 
already  to  have  cost  the  lives  of  eight  million  men  is  wholly 
due  to  diversities  of  race  which  in  last  analysis  are  matters 
of  speech  and  custom. 

But  awful  as  is  this  situation,  in  Europe  it  has  its  explana- 
tion, its  reason.  Europe  itself  is  divided  into  sharply  dif- 
ferentiated areas  fit  to  engender  race  peculiarities  but  offer- 
ing advantages  which  compensate  for  them.     The  seas  and 


BBITAIN  315 

straits  and  gulfs  that  divide  Europe  are  the  most  facile  of 
highways,  the  channels  through  which  move  the  stimulating 
and  vivifying  currents  of  life.  Europe  is  the  most  quarrel- 
some but  also  the  most  dynamic,  the  most  civilized,  part  of 
the  world.     Nature  is  responsible  for  both. 

But  South  Africa  is  not  made  that  way.  To  transfer  to 
that  unit  area  the  diversities  and  antipathies  of  Europe  would 
give  it  perfectly  gratuitous  disadvantages  with  no  possible 
compensation.  These  colonies  are  young  yet.  The  German 
colony  has  virtually  no  German  population  and  the  schism 
is  not  yet  born.  But  let  it  be  German  for  a  hundred  years, 
and  we  would  have  there  a  German  area  permanently  in- 
capable of  union  with  the  neighboring  English  speaking  dis- 
trict which  is,  and  forever  must  be,  the  dominant  white  ele- 
ment in  South  Africa.  We  should  have  gratuitously  created 
a  barrier  for  future  generations  to  balk  at,  perhaps  to  drench 
with  their  blood.  It  requires  a  profound  belief  in  the  merits 
of  German  culture  (a  culture  which  the  writer  by  no  means 
despises)  to  make  such  a  course  as  that  seem  worth  while. 

It  will  of  course  be  said  in  reply  that  a  similar  divergence 
exists  between  Erench  and  English.  Yes,  and  regrettably  so, 
but  the  cases  are  not  even  approximately  parallel.  The 
French  and  British  colonies  are  sandwiched  in  together  in 
some  parts  of  Africa  in  a  way  that  seems  at  this  distance 
unfortunate,  a  thing  perhaps  to  be  remedied  by  exchanges. 
But  these  are  tropical  colonies,  and  tropical  colonies  will  never 
become  white  man's  land.  The  population  will  always  be 
native  and  will  for  an  indefinite  period  retain  its  native 
language.  Whether  these  natives  in  addition  acquire  a  smat- 
tering of  Erench  or  English  is  irrelevant  as  regards  their 
political  or  cultural  future.  But  a  land  that  is  destined  to 
fill  up  with  white  men  should  avoid  the  white  men's  dissen- 
sions, especially  when  the  country  itself  speaks  unreservedly 
for  union.     The  problem  of  Southwest  Africa  is  not  a  prob- 


316  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

lem  of  the  rights  of  Germany  or  of  Britain.  It  is  a  problem 
of  developing  a  united  people  in  a  united  land.  If  German 
had  the  same  dominating  position  in  South  Africa  that  Eng- 
lish now  holds,  the  writer  for  one  would  unhesitatingly  vote 
for  a  German  unity. 

It  is  perhaps  worth  while  to  note  that  the  dissensions  thus 
forecast  are  by  no  means  speculative.  They  have  long  ex- 
isted and  Southwest  Africa  has  long  been  a  thorn  in  the  flesh 
of  the  neighboring  Commonwealth.  It  was  no  doubt  in  part 
due  to  this  that  the  Commonwealth  espoused  the  cause  of 
Britain  so  wholeheartedly  and  devoted  a  hundred  million 
dollars  and  a  considerable  army  to  the  expulsion  of  "  neigh- 
bor Hans  "  from  his  objectionable  point  of  vantage.  This 
hostility  was  not  merely  racial,  but  in  this  case  had  the  arti- 
ficial virulence  which  William  Hohenzollern  has  everywhere 
known  how  to  give  it.  But  artificial  or  not,  its  effect  was 
not  the  less  real.  In  German  Southwest  Africa  had  been 
planted  the  seeds  of  one  of  the  world's  great  antagonisms 
which  it  is  the  good  fortune  of  the  present  generation  to  pluck 
up  ere  it  was  grown. 

The  case  of  the  Portuguese  colonies  is  not  relevant  to  our 
discussion,  yet  intimately  associated  with  our  problem. 
Their  fate  has  long  been  determined.  Portugal  does  nothing, 
can  do  nothing,  to  develop  them.  It  is  due  to  them  and 
to  the  world  that  some  arrangement  should  be  made  to  bring 
them  under  more  favorable  conditions.  Britain's  control 
of  Portugal  should  make  that  possible.  Indeed  an  arrange- 
ment was  announced  before  the  war  dividing  them  between 
Britain  and  Germany.  The  eastern  colony  holds  the  same 
relation  to  the  South  African  Commonwealth  on  the  east  that 
the  German  colony  holds  on  the  west,  only  the  contact  is 
much  closer  and  more  vital.  It  should  be  united  to  that 
great  state  now,  before  alien  institutions  and  alien  culture 


BKITAIST  317 

make  the  union  unnecessarily  slow  and  difficult.  The  great 
western  colony  requires  different  treatment. 

The  cases  of  Arabia,  Palestine,  and  Mesopotamia  have  been 
sufficiently  considered  in  the  chapter  on  Turkey.  These 
districts  for  many  reasons  will  doubtless  pose  as  independent 
states,  but  in  varying  degrees  they  must  inevitably  be  British 
dependencies.  Arabia  will  be  an  isolated  shrine  in  which 
Britain  will  have  no  other  function  than  to  protect  its  isola- 
tion,—  and  insure  its  sanitation.  Palestine  will  be  a  com- 
petently administered  up-to-date  artificial  state,  which  will 
require  nothing  of  Britain  save  protection  from  foreign  ag- 
gression, and  will  repay  that  protection  with  perfect  loyalty. 
Mesopotamia  will  require  British  capital  and  British  ad- 
ministration and  can  hardly  escape  becoming  an  avowed 
British  protectorate.  As  such  it  will  again  become  the 
Garden  of  Eden.  Perhaps  Anatolia  and  Constantinople 
will  claim  the  healing  touch,  but  the  claim  may  well  be 
denied. 

The  problem  of  problems  in  connection  with  the  coming 
settlement  is  the  control  of  the  sea.  That  control  Britain  has 
maintained  against  all  comers  for  two  reasons  that  are  pe- 
culiar to  herself.  The  first  is  the  insular  position  and  dense 
industrial  population  of  England.  That  population  normally 
raises  but  thirty  per  cent,  of  its  food.  The  rest  is  imported 
by  sea.  If  the  sea  routes  are  closed,  England  starves.  No 
other  country  is  so  situated.  If  any  other  country  loses  the 
use  of  the  sea,  it  suffers  but  it  does  not  starve.  England 
alone  must  have  the  freedom  of  the  sea  or  her  present  popu- 
lation can  not  continue  to  live  there,  but  must  migrate  and 
ruin  her  industries,  her  everything. 

To  this  unique  necessity  is  added  another,  equally  impera- 
tive and  equally  unique.  England  is  but  the  European  head- 
quarters of  a  vast  aggregate  a  hundred  times  her  area  and 


318  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

with  ten  times  her  population.  This  group  of  nations,  falsely 
called  an  empire,  constitutes  the  greatest  power  in  the  world, 
solely  by  virtue  of  its  voluntary  cooperation.  But  this  co- 
operation is  rendered  possible  only  by  the  use  of  the  sea.  If 
this  use  were  denied  them,  no  amount  of  sympathy  or  desire 
to  help  one  another  would  be  of  any  avail.  The  great  power 
would  automatically  crumble  into  a  lot  of  scattered  little 
powers  helpless  to  achieve  any  worthy  work  for  the  world, 
helpless  even  to  maintain  their  own  existence. 

~No  more  pertinent  demand  can  therefore  be  made  of  a 
defeated  Germany  than  the  surrender  of  her  navy.  That 
navy  was  built  solely  to  destroy  the  navy  of  Britain,  that  is, 
to  destroy  the  British  Empire.  Even  when  Germany  had 
colonies,  her  navy  stood  in  no  relation  to  their  number  or 
needs.  With  the  loss  of  her  colonies,  she  loses  even  the  pre- 
text for  the  maintenance  of  a  vast  navy.  That  navy  neces- 
sitated the  expansion  of  every  other  naval  program  in  the 
world.  No  other  form  of  German  militarism  was  so  odious, 
so  burdensome  upon  the  entire  world,  so  utterly  gratuitous. 
!No  other  form  is  so  capable  of  suppression  by  international 
action.  To  propose  the  destruction  of  German  militarism 
and  yet  leave  Germany  in  possession  of  a  monster  navy  which 
exists,  not  as  the  condition  of  her  national  union,  nor  yet  for 
the  protection  of  her  commerce,  but  purely  for  the  purpose 
of  challenging  the  safety  and  the  existence  of  other  powers, 
is  a  proposal  which  would  invalidate  every  argument  by  which 
the  Allies  have  justified  their  action. 

A  logical  corollary  of  the  surrender  of  the  German  navy 
would  be  the  surrender  of  the  Kiel  Canal.  It  is  true  that 
this  Canal  serves  commercial  as  well  as  naval  purposes,  though 
the  latter  were  the  real  cause  of  its  construction.  Commer- 
cial purposes  it  would  of  course  continue  to  serve  in  any  case. 
But  the  Canal  must  in  any  case  continue  to  exist,  and  so  long 
as  it  exists  it  must  potentially  serve  Germany's  purpose.     The 


BKITAH5T  319 

idea  of  withholding  it  from  her  by  internationalization  in- 
volves the  usual  fallacy  of  assuming  that  such  arrangements 
are  self-enforcing.  If  the  Canal  would  serve  Germany's  pur- 
pose in  any  future  war,  she  would  take  it,  and  no  interna- 
tional precautions  would  prevent  it. 

Britain  controls  the  sea  that  she  may  use  the  sea,  for  she 
must  use  the  sea  or  perish.  Her  need  and  her  right  are  such 
as  no  other  nation  knows.  And  now  she  is  asked  to  surrender 
that  control  and  to  trust  the  freedom  of  the  seas  and  with  it 
her  own  existence  and  the  lives  of  her  people  to  an  interna- 
tional league,  a  league  having  as  yet  only  a  theoretical  exist- 
ence, a  league  of  whose  competence,  of  whose  justice,  of  whose 
sympathy,  even  of  whose  existence,  she  has  as  yet  had  no 
experience.  She  will  not  do  it.  The  world  can  not  afford 
to  have  her  do  it.  The  experiment  must  be  tried  with  some 
lesser  stake  than  the  existence  of  the  "  great  and  sacred  inter- 
national trust "  which,  more  than  any  other  power,  holds  the 
safety  of  the  world  in  its  keeping.  British  statesmen  and  the 
British  people  have  too  much  feeling  for  reality  to  trine  thus 
with  the  heritage  of  a  thousand  years. 

And  all  for  what  ?  What  do  we  wish  to  accomplish  by  this 
new  international  agency  that  we  summon  from  the  limbo  of 
the  imagination  to  take  over  the  task  of  this  veteran  of  the 
seas  ?  To  open  the  waterways  to  all  honest  folk  ?  To  light 
the  beacon  on  the  savage's  inhospitable  shores  ?  To  rid  the 
sea  of  the  marauder  ?  To  remove  the  barriers  and  the  toll- 
gates?  To  rescue  the  shipwrecked?  To  maintain  by  piti- 
less discipline  the  law  of  "  women  and  children  first  "  ?  In 
which  of  these  has  Britain  failed  ?  What  sea  has  she  closed  ? 
What  waterway  has  she  barred?  What  harbor  does  she 
monopolize?  Is  there  a  reef  that  she  has  not  charted,  a 
coast  that  she  has  left  unlighted,  a  pirate  that  she  has  not 
hunted  ?  Is  there  a  harbor  under  the  control  of  her  Parlia- 
ment that  she  does  not  open  to  the  ships  of  her  rivals  on  the 


320  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

same  terms  as  to  her  own  ?  Is  there  an  abuse  that  she  will- 
ingly tolerates,  a  possible  forbearance  that  she  does  not 
show  ?  What  is  the  world's  grievance  that  impels  it  to  dis- 
miss this  most  competent  of  unpaid  servitors  ? 

But  Britain  smites  her  enemies  upon  the  sea,  drives  them 
to  cover  and  shuts  them  in,  all  to  the  sore  discomfort  of  those 
who  were  trafficking  profitably  with  them.  Precisely,  just  as 
land  powers  pursue  their  enemies  upon  the  land  with  vastly 
greater  disturbance  and  devastation.  But  what  is  there  in 
recent  British  history  to  warrant  the  fear  that  her  power  will 
be  used  wantonly  or  tyrannously?  It  is  fatuous  to  expect 
peace  by  the  disarmament  of  the  conservative  and  forbear- 
ing. The  weapon  in  such  hands  is  rather  a  guaranty  of 
peace  than  its  menace.  We  have  read  the  story  of  the  wars 
that  the  British  navy  has  fought,  but  who  knows  the  story  of 
tho  wars  it  has  prevented  ? 

There  has  been  just  one  intelligible  protest  against  Brit- 
ain's control  of  the  sea,  that  of  the  power  that  wishes  to  de- 
stroy her.  That  control  is  the  condition  of  the  existence  of 
that  fellowship  of  free  nations  which  Germany  abhors,  and 
the  very  substance  of  its  power.  Withdraw  the  British  navy 
from  the  seas  and  nothing  will  effectually  hinder  Germany's 
ruthless  purpose.  Eliminate  that  purpose,  and  Britain  will 
withdraw  her  navy  without  a  mandate. 

This  protest  against  Britain's  control  of  the  sea  is  made  in 
the  name  of  internationalism,  but  in  the  interest  (con- 
sciously or  unconsciously)  of  the  crudest  and  most  illiberal 
nationalism.  The  seer  of  visions  as  usual  plays  into  the 
hands  of  the  seeker  of  gains.  Meanwhile  if  the  fondest  of 
visions  were  realized,  we  should  at  the  utmost  be  where  we 
are  now  as  regards  the  permanent  interests  of  the  safety  and 
freedom  of  the  seas.  The  thing  we  crave  is  as  like  the  thing 
we  have  as  tweedledum  like  tweedledee.  And  yet  it  is  not  the 
same,  for  the  thing  we  have  embodies  the  instincts  and  the 


BKITADT  321 

traditions  which  the  greatest  of  seafaring  peoples  has  slowly 
developed  during  fifteen  centuries. 

Note.  For  a  more  complete  study  of  the  problem  of  sea  control  see 
the  author's  earlier  work,  "The  Things  Men  Fight  For,"  Chapters  VI 
and  XIII. 

One  of  Germany's  fiercest  protagonists,  Count  Reventlow,  has  stated 
that  as  regards  the  use  of  the  seas  in  time  of  peace  Germany  has  no 
grievance.     Only  schemes  of  conquest  are  interfered  with. 

It  is  perhaps  a  mistake  to  take  seriously  the  newspaper  speculation 
which  runs  riot  at  a  time  like  this,  but  it  is  not  always  easy  to  ignore  it. 
Our  Secretary  of  the  Navy  recommends  an  enormous  increase  in  our 
navy.  So  be  it.  We  are  a  naval  power  with  extensive  coasts  to  pro- 
tect and  interests  exposed  to  the  covetousness  of  all  nations.  But  now 
comes  the  report  that  we  are  to  go  to  the  peace  conference  armed  with 
the  greatest  navy  in  the  world, —  larger  than  that  of  Britain, —  to  de- 
mand the  freedom  of  the  seas.  What  does  that  mean?  From  whom 
are  we  to  demand  it?  From  defeated  Germany?  From  allied  France? 
There  can  be  but  one  answer.  From  Britain.  It  is  difficult  to  say 
whether  such  a  demand  would  be  characterized  most  by  foolhardiness  or 
by  criminality.  Were  it  not  that  certain  official  pronouncements,  in- 
cluding the  famous  fourteen  points,  have  been  disquietingly  suggestive 
of  an  effort  to  coerce  Britain  to  adopt  measures  which  she  regards  as 
incompatible  with  her  safety  and  her  duty  to  the  world,  the  suggestion 
might  be  dismissed  as  too  preposterous  for  consideration. 


CHAPTER  XX 

AMERICA 

Among  the  great  powers  that  are  actively  engaged  in  the 
world  struggle,  the  position  of  America  seems  to  be  unique. 
The  interests  involved  did  not  at  first  seem  to  be  our  interests. 
In  the  territorial  sense  we  were  not  attacked,  nor  was  any 
attack  contemplated,  at  least  during  the  present  conflict.  In 
her  tactless  way,  too,  Germany  made  the  most  earnest  efforts 
to  win  our  friendship,  sacrificing  what  seemed  to  her  substan- 
tial interests  in  order  to  do  so.  We  accordingly  essayed  to 
be  neutral,  even  in  our  inmost  thoughts.  When  we  finally 
entered  the  contest,  it  was  still  with  no  sense  of  serious  danger. 
Even  the  submarine  warfare  which  amply  justified  our  course, 
did  not  seem  to  threaten  our  existence.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  so  far  as  the  popular  consciousness  is  concerned, 
we  entered  the  war  for  other  than  the  compelling  reasons  of 
national  safety  which  actuated  our  Allies.  We  quite  natu- 
rally conclude  that  our  action  was  on  a  higher  plane  and  our 
motives  more  disinterested  than  those  of  other  nations.  Quite 
possibly  this  was  the  case.  Our  motives  were  naturally  deter- 
mined by  our  appreciation  of  the  situation,  and  the  danger 
that  we  did  not  perceive  did  not  influence  our  action. 

It  is  perhaps  due  to  this  fact  that  we  have  shown  so  marked 
a  disposition  to  emphasize  the  theoretical  and  abstract  aims 
of  the  war.  The  recognition  of  general  principles  merely  as 
such,  of  forms  of  political  organization  and  doctrines  of  popu- 
lar rights,  have  seemed  the  appropriate  ends  for  a  nation  seek- 
ing no  tangible  interests  to  demand  as  the  fruits  of  victory. 
It  has  not  always  occurred  to  us  that  the  recognition  thus  de- 
manded might  be  a  mere  lip  service,  and  that  a  nation  so 

322 


AMEKICA  323 

skilled  in  dissembling  as  is  our  antagonist  might  purchase  a 
dangerous  immunity  by  conformity  to  these  shibboleths.  In 
short  there  has  been  an  element  of  serious  danger  in  this  con- 
fident assumption  that  we  were  free  from  danger  and  at  lib- 
erty to  espouse  ideals  while  others  were  compelled  to  think  of 
groveling  material  interests.  It  has  made  us  quixotic  and 
unsympathetic  toward  the  material  interests  of  our  Allies, 
careless  even  of  our  own. 

For  the  danger  was  there,  quite  as  real  and  quite  as  seri- 
ous for  us  as  for  the  others.  The  perception  of  this  fact  has 
become  clearer  as  the  war  has  progressed.  The  present  war 
was  not  aimed  at  America,  it  is  true.  Its  objectives  were 
prudently  limited  to  the  defeat  of  Russia,  the  appropriation 
of  the  colonies  and  capital  of  France,  the  incorporation  of 
Belgium,  and  the  dismemberment  and  plunder  of  the  British 
Empire.  But  with  Britain  destroyed,  France  plundered  and 
forced  into  alliance,  and  Russia  crippled  and  subject  to  Ger- 
man exploitation,  the  Kaiser's  purpose  to  "  stand  no  nonsense 
from  America"  was  ready  to  reveal  its  true  significance. 
Just  what  was  to  happen  to  us  is  not  clear,  nor  is  it  certain 
that  war  was  contemplated.  It  was  probably  assumed  that 
our  nonsense  could  be  dealt  with  by  less  expensive  means,  not 
an  unreasonable  assumption.  It  matters  little.  The  impor- 
tant thing  is  that  the  Kaiser  was  to  be  in  a  position  to  say 
what  he  would  stand  and  what  he  would  not  stand.  We  were 
to  recognize  his  authority.  If  the  lesson  of  this  war  were  not 
sufficient,  there  would  be  other  lessons  as  needed. 

There  is  still  a  tendency  in  certain  quarters  to  refer  to  these 
designs  with  a  certain  levity.  Such  an  attitude  is  not  war- 
ranted either  by  the  seriousness  of  German  designs  or  by  the 
American  capacity  for  defense.  If  the  Allies  had  been  de- 
feated,—  if  even  now  they  could  be  persuaded  to  accept  an 
inconclusive  peace, —  these  German  designs  would  be  realized 
with  terrible  literalness.     When  we  see  by  how  narrow  a  mar- 


324  THE  GREAT  PEACE 

gin  that  disaster  has  been  averted,  we  can  but  shudder  at  the 
danger  that  we  have  escaped. 

Whatever  our  purposes,  therefore,  in  entering  the  war,  our 
purposes  in  closing  it  should  be  shaped  by  this  fuller  revela- 
tion. We  know  now  why  we  ought  to  have  entered  the  war, 
and  that  must  determine  our  terms  of  peace.  Not  merely  as 
a  knight  errant  generously  espousing  the  cause  of  weaker 
nations,  but  as  one  that  stands  as  our  kinsmen  stood  "  with 
our  backs  to  the  wall,"  fighting  for  the  right  to  live,  must  we 
make  peace  with  our  enemy. 

First  of  all  we  must  insist  upon  the  exclusion  from  the 
Western  Hemisphere  of  any  power  which  might  endanger  our 
peace  and  our  independence.  More  specifically,  we  must  bar 
Germany  from  these  shores.  It  has  been  suggested  that  this 
take  the  form  of  the  recognition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a 
principle  of  international  law.  It  would  perhaps  be  better  to 
avoid  associating  such  a  declaration  with  this  historic  doc- 
trine which  is  too  intimately  associated  with  our  own  country 
and  too  much  motived  by  our  national  interests  to  command 
the  sympathy  of  the  Latin  American  republics.  It  is  these 
republics  that  are  sure  to  be  the  first  sufferers  from  German 
aggression.  Brazil  was  hopelessly  in  the  toils  of  German 
finance  and  marked  for  German  appropriation  before  this  war 
began.  From  such  a  country, —  better  still,  from  a  group  of 
such  countries, —  the  plea  for  protection  may  appropriately 
come.  It  is  for  diplomacy  to  arrange  these  important  mat- 
ters of  detail,  but  for  American  vigilance  to  see  that  the  neces- 
sary purpose  is  accomplished.1 

"Not  that  we  are  to  imagine  for  a  moment  that  such  an 

international  guaranty  will  make  us  safe  against  aggression. 

It  can  not  be  too  strongly  insisted  that  no  international 

i  For  the  author's  fuller  discussion  of  the  Latin  American  problem 
as  related  to  the  United  States,  and,  particularly,  to  the  problem  of  the 
Caribbean  and  the  Canal,  see  "  America  Among  the  Nations,"  Chapters 
V-XII. 


AMEKICA  325 

power  exists  or  is  likely  to  exist  which  can  of  itself  and  with- 
out national  aid  secure  such  ends.  A  coherent  international- 
ism will  be  a  partial  internationalism  with  powerful  enemies 
outside  that  do  not  own  its  law.  An  inclusive  and  all  em- 
bracing internationalism  would  include  the  dissensions  and 
the  dangers  against  which  it  exists  to  defend  the  world. 
Our  right  arm  must  be  our  defense  for  a  long,  long  time  to 
come.  But  recognition  is  not  without  its  value.  It  puts  a 
quietus  upon  minor  protests  and  at  least  insures  local  acquies- 
cence. And  if  the  worst  comes,  it  is  easier  to  fight  for  a 
recognized  right  than  for  an  unsupported  claim. 

But  more  material  interests  may  well  claim  our  attention. 
There  are  disturbing  ownerships  in  the  Caribbean  which 
menace  our  control  of  the  Canal,  the  most  vital  of  all  our 
possessions.  Holland  owns  her  Dutch  Guiana  on  the  Carib- 
bean coast.  We  could  have  no  more  innocent  or  well  disposed 
neighbor  if  Holland  were  independent.  But  Holland  is  not 
independent.  During  this  war  she  has  done  all  in  her  power 
to  remain  neutral,  but  Germany  has  compelled  her  to  grant 
concessions  which  were  a  breach  of  neutrality.  This  rela- 
tion is  always  potentially  present,  a  relation  of  dependence. 
The  relation  may  slowly  become  one  of  virtual  incorporation 
into  the  Germanic  unity  of  which  Holland  is  so  natural  a 
part.  Had  the  Germans  succeeded  in  retaining  Belgium  as 
they  intended,  the  incorporation  of  Holland  would  virtually 
be  an  accomplished  fact.  With  this  incorporation  would  go 
the  power  to  use  Holland's  colonies,  including  Guiana.  It 
was  precisely  this  danger  which  induced  us  to  acquire  the 
Virgin  Isles  from  Denmark  lest  later  forcible  annexation  of 
the  little  kingdom  to  Germany  might  give  the  latter  control 
of  a  territory  dangerous  to  our  safety.  The  danger  is  hardly 
less  in  the  case  of  Holland. 

France  is  similarly  situated,  her  islands  at  the  eastern  end 
of  the  Caribbean  being  a  close  counterpart  for  the  Virgin  Isles 


326  THE  GEEAT  PEACE 

and  her  Guiana  similar  to  that  of  Holland.  But  France  is 
stronger  and  seems  to  be  little  in  danger  of  incorporation  into 
a  German  Empire.  The  loss  of  such  colonies  as  the  result  of 
an  unsuccessful  war,  however,  is  not  impossible.  It  would 
have  resulted,  as  we  have  seen,  from  a  French  defeat  in  the 
present  war.  To  this  we  may  add  the  fact  that  these  trifling 
possessions  are  isolated  from  the  great  French  colonial  terri- 
tories and  are  doubtless  unprofitable,  the  maintenance  of  com- 
munications being  expensive.  France  is  at  present  heavily 
indebted  to  the  United  States  for  money  loaned.  In  another 
sense  the  United  States  is  more  deeply  indebted  to  France. 
Only  with  a  blush  could  we  accept  payment  of  her  debt  to 
us,  while  unable  to  pay  our  debt  to  her.  If  the  cancellation 
of  our  claim  or  some  very  generous  portion  of  it  against  the 
cession  of  these  scattered  fragments  of  earlier  empire  could 
simplify  the  relation  involved  and  lessen  the  burdens  of 
France  without  a  hurt  to  her  sensibilities,  it  would  perhaps 
be  of  general  advantage.  But  France  is  not  a  menace,  and  if 
she  prefers  to  continue  to  share  with  us  the  responsibilities  of 
the  Caribbean,  we  need  not  regret  it.  In  this  sense  the  case 
is  not  parallel  to  that  of  Denmark  and  Holland. 

More  important  than  any  adjustment  of  territory  is  the 
question  of  the  control  of  the  sea.  Like  Britain,  we  are  a 
naval  power.  Economically  we  are  less  dependent  upon  sea 
communications  than  Britain.  Isolation  would  not  mean 
starvation,  nor  would  it  sever  us  from  any  vital  part  of  our- 
selves. ~No  nation  is  so  well  situated  as  we  are  for  self- 
sufficient  existence.  Yet  the  blockade  of  our  coasts  would 
cause  us  almost  inconceivable  distress.  We  should  be  aston- 
ished to  find  how  long  is  the  list  of  the  necessities  for  which 
we  depend  upon  foreign  lands.  Many  an  industry  would  be 
brought  to  a  standstill  and  widespread  depression  would  re- 
sult. 

But  the  more  vital  fact  is  our  problem  of  national  defense. 


AMEKICA  327 

No  great  power  can  ever  attack  us  otherwise  than  by  sea,  and 
if  we  fail  to  defend  ourselves  by  sea,  we  shall  not  defend  our- 
selves. ~Not  that  land  defense  is  impossible,  but  it  is  certain 
to  be  the  one  for  which  we  are  least  prepared,  and  if  the 
stronger  arm  fails  us,  the  weaker  will  not  prevail.  We  are 
therefore  interested  hardly  less  than  Britain  in  the  problem 
of  control  of  the  sea. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  repeat  here  what  was  said  in  the 
last  chapter  on  this  subject.  Far  from  the  noise  of  battle  we 
have  been  free  to  indulge  in  idealistic  speculations  as  our 
Allies  have  not.  Kemote  realities  become  unrealities  and 
are  easily  exchanged  for  the  unrealities  of  speculation  on  even 
terms.  Let  us  develop  internationalism  into  a  reality  as 
rapidly  as  we  may,  but  let  there  be  no  interregnum  while 
nationalism  is  relaxed  and  internationalism  is  not  yet  effec- 
tive.    We  must  still  keep  the  seas. 

In  framing  the  treaty  of  peace  there  are  ends  to  be  kept  in 
view  which  are  more  vital  than  those  nominated  in  the  bond. 
Of  these,  none  is  so  important  to  us  or  to  the  world  as  the 
unity  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples,  and  this  for  two  reasons. 
In  the  first  place,  they  have  essentially  identical  interests, 
material  and  ideal.  All  are  industrial  and  commercial  na- 
tions, dependent  for  their  cooperation  and  for  their  contact 
with  the  world  upon  the  freedom  of  the  sea.  That  freedom 
is  in  their  keeping,  and  with  it  the  peace  and  prosperity  of 
the  world.  United  they  can  easily  meet  the  requirements  of 
their  responsible  position.  Divided,  they  will  exhaust  them- 
selves with  the  superhuman  task  and  eventually  fail.  The 
lessons  of  these  days  which  have  seen  the  two  navies  merged 
into  a  single  force  and  the  Union  Jack,  proudest  of  national 
emblems,  floating  from  an  American  flagship,  while  the 
Stars  and  Stripes  floated  from  the  Parliament  House  in 
Westminster  above  the  flag  of  Britain,  should  not  be  for- 
gotten. It  is  the  symbol  of  what  must  henceforth  be  if  we 
are  not  to  squander  our  force  and  risk  our  existence. 


328  THE  GKEAT  PEACE 

But  far  more  vital  is  the  union  of  our  ideal  interests.  We 
are  all  free  nations,  and  intent  that  the  world  shall  be  free. 
The  power  we  hold  is  held  subject  to  this,  our  common  pur- 
pose. In  no  selfish  particularism  of  race  but  as  the  begin- 
ning of  human  unity,  we  strengthen  the  bonds  of  common 
ideals  and  common  purpose  which  make  us  one.  The  world 
will  not  be  united  as  a  motley  assemblage  of  discordant  wills, 
divergent  cultures,  and  differing  developments,  all  by  the 
magic  of  an  agreement  and  a  mechanized  procedure.  The 
union  will  come  by  gradual  crystallization  around  a  congenial 
center.  Ours  is  the  privilege  and  ours  the  responsibility  as 
a  race,  of  furnishing  that  nucleus  of  crystallization.  At  the 
center  is  England,  mother  of  free  peoples  and  free  institu- 
tions. Around  this  center  is  the  larger  circle  born  from  her 
or  drawn  to  her,  the  circle  that  we  call  Britain.  All  Britain 
is  British  in  some  very  real  sense,  though  only  the  center  is 
English. 

Earther  reaching  is  the  larger  circle  in  which  we  find  our 
place.  It  is  not  English;  it  is  not  British.  It  is  Anglo- 
Saxon.  Nearer  by  far  to  England  than  much  that  is  British, 
this  outer  circle  after  all  owns  a  different  allegiance,  uses  a 
different  symbol,  and  enjoys  a  more  obvious  independence. 
Less  clear  is  the  bond  of  unity,  but  not  less  vital. 

Again  the  circle  enlarges  and  peoples  feel  the  mystic  bond 
who  are  neither  English  nor  British  nor  Anglo-Saxon. 
Erance  speaks  another  language,  owns  a  different  origin,  and 
boasts  a  different  culture.  But  Erance  is  free,  and  this  is 
our  talisman.  With  her  accession  the  widening  circle  be- 
comes the  circle  of  the  free  peoples. 

Build  about  this  center  the  league  of  the  nations.  Enlarge 
the  circle  of  the  free  peoples.  Strengthen  their  hand  for  the 
defense  of  the  world's  liberties.  Exchange  not  the  substance 
of  things  realized  for  the  shadow  of  things  imagined.  Wel- 
come the  humblest  accession  of  the  free  in  spirit,  but  bar  the 


AMEEICA  329 

proudest  of  the  unregenerate.  Compel  no  lip  service.  Trust 
no  deathbed  repentances.  For  neither  by  clever  contrivance 
nor  by  outward  profession  of  faith,  but  by  unobtrusive  growth 
and  transformation  of  spirit  will  mankind  attain  the  goal 
of  unity  and  peace  without  the  sacrifice  of  liberty. 


INDEX 


Adriatic,  198 

Africa,  69;  German  colonies,  310; 

South  Africa,  152,  255,  312  ff. 
Albania,  202,  240,  243,  251 
Aleppo,  259 
Alexandretta,  262 
Algeria,  79 
Alsace-Lorraine,  42,  61,  66,  175  ff.,      Cavour,  297 


control,     319-321;     trusteeship, 
79-81;  unity,  40  ff. 
Bulgaria,  3,  251,  283 

Cartels,  20 

Catholic;  see  Vatican 
Cattaro,  199 


287 
America,  82-84,  153,  268,  279,  281, 

302,  (Ch.  XX)   322  ff. 
Anatolia,  251  ff.,  265,  281 
Anglo-Saxons,  149  ff.,  262 
Arab,  Arabia,  76,  250,  255  ff.,  317 
Ararat,  252 
Armenia,  Armenians,  76,  242,  247, 

251-252,   255  ff.,   263  ff.,   281 
Australia,  19,  251 
Austria,    113,   131,   192  ff.,  207  ff., 

301 
Autocracy,  15,  147,  154,  245 
Avlona,  199,  202 

Baalbek,  262,  295 

Bagdad,  248,  259 ;— Railway,  137 

Belgium,  56,   111,   147,    (Ch.  XI) 

161  ff.,  173,  277 
Bessarabia,  220,  227 
Beyrout,  262 
Bismarck,  131 
Bohemia,    Bohemian,    46,    48-50, 

208,  215,  234,  241 
Bolshevik,  138,  201 
Bosnia,    Bosnian,    208,    227,    232, 

243,  251 
Bosphorus,  104 
Brailsford,  266 
Brazil,  94 
Brest-Litovsk,  295 
Britain,    British   Empire,   56,    85, 

113,  122,  151,  161,  257-258,  268, 


Central  Powers,  1 

China,  123  ff.,  301  ff. 

Chios,  251,  265 

Cilician  gates,  256 

Class  struggle,  16-19 

Clemen  ceau,  143 

Coal,  58  ff.,  180  ff. 

Colonies,    94,    105;    German,    155, 

310;    Italian,    205;    Portuguese, 

316 
Constantinople,      107,     249,     251, 

(Ch.  XVI)  270,  295 
Cordova,  248 
Corfu,  199 ;  pact  of,  233 
Courland,  147 
Crete,  251 

Crimean  War,  250,  274,  297 
Croats,  208,  227,  240 
Cromer,  80 
Cyprus,  251 
Cyrillic  alphabet,  233 
Czech,  Czecho-Slovak,  see  Bohemia 


Dalmatian,     201-202, 


Dalmatia, 

208,  227 
Danzig,  290 
Dardanelles,  32,  84,  104,  111,  114- 

115,  249,  273 
Democracy,  7  ff.,  126,  152,  236 
Denmark,  111,  113-115,  277,  325 
Diplomacy,  7,  127  ff.,  137,  302 
Dobrudja,  225 
Duma,  77 


281,  303,  (Ch.  XIX)  307  ff.,  327- 
328;    population,   183,  279;    sea      Egypt,  81,  85,  152,  251,  255,  259 

331 


332 


INDEX 


England,  English;  see  Britain,  etc. 
Euphrates,  252 

Finland,  296 

Fiume,  204 

France,  78-79,  86,  113,   123,   147, 

161,  (Ch.  XII)   175  ff.,  262,  268, 

276,  281,  312,  325-326 
Fryatt,  Captain,  101 

Galicia,  208,  241,  285,  288 

Gallipoli,  282 

German,  Germany,  19,  51,  57,  61, 
67,  86,  131,  (Ch.  X)  143  ff., 
208  ff.,  233,  273,  277,  285  ff.,  318, 
323;  barbarities,  155,  161  ff.; 
colonies,  155,  301,  310;  indem- 
nity from  France,  89  ff.,  102, 
115;  industries,  64,  168;  league 
of  nations,  117;  population,  183; 
potash,  65 

Gibraltar,  104,  111 

Greece,  Greek,  56,  65,  76,  256,  265, 
277 

Grey,  131 

Guaranties,  219 

Hague  Tribunal,  237,  298 
Hapsburgs,  235  ff.,  241 
Hedjaz,  256 

Herzegovina,  208,  227,  251 
Holland,  86,  159,  277,  325 
Hong  Kong,  276,  298 
Hungary,  207  ff . 

Imperialism,  47;  British,  307  ff. 
Indemnities,  87  ff.,  96,  171  ff.,  175 
India,  69,  152,  259 
International      guaranties ;       see 

guaranties 
Internationalism,  27  ff.,  51-53,  84, 

103  ff. 
Iron,  58  ff.,  180  ff. 
Isonzo,  197 
Istria,  203-204 
Italy,    39,    44-45,    59,    64,     (Ch. 

XIII)   191  ff.,  205,  251,  268,  281, 

297 

Japan,  15,  83,  123  ff.,  299  ff. 


Jehad,  250 
Jews,  256,  260  ff. 
Jugo-Slavs,  227,  235,  240 

Kiel  Canal,  104,  111,  114,  318 
Konigsberg,  290 

Language,  16,  33,  197  ff. 

League   of   Nations,    109  ff.,    328- 

329 
Lichnowsky,  137 
Lloyd  George,  155 
Lusitama,  101,  145 

Macedonia,  242,  251,  266 
Magyars,  208,  212,  225 
Malay  Peninsula,  70-71 
Manchuria,  305 
Mecca,  250,  255 
Medina,  255 

Mesopotamia,  252,  255,  258 
Militarism,  245 

Mohammedans,  79,  231,  243  ff. 
Monroe  Doctrine,  324 
Montenegro,  199,  227 
Moravia,  20 

Nationalism,  15  ff. 
Natural  resources,  55  ff. 
New  Zealand,  19,  151,  301 
Norway,  277 

Oman,  257 

Palestine,  256  ff. 

Panama  Canal,  104,  111,  325 

Panslavism,  285 

Peace,  preparation  for,  2;  pur- 
poses, 3 

Persian  Gulf,  252 

Philippines,  82,  153,  279 

Poland,  48,  147,  177,  179,  219  (Ch. 
XVII)  284  ff. 

Population,  183-184,  201 

Portugal,  55,  75-76;  colonies,  316 

Posen.  285,  200 

President  of  the  United  States, 
108,  128,  137 

Prussia,  42,  113,  161,  290 


INDEX 


333 


Race,  31  ff. 

Religion,  228  ff.,  243  ff. 

Restitution,  168  ff.;  in  kind,  171- 

174;  see  also  Indemnities 
Rhine  Province,  187  ff. 
Rhodes,  251 
Roman  Empire,  40  ff. 
Roosevelt,  121 
Rumania,     Rumanian,     76,     208, 

220  ff.,  235,  251 
Russia,  Russian,  52,  77,  93,   113, 

131,  212,  215,  223,  273,  277,  (Ch. 

XVII)  284  ff.,  303,  305 
Ruthenians,  212 

Samas,  251,  265 

Schleswig-Holstein,  113 

Sea,   access   to,   234;    freedom   of, 

103-104,  107,  317-319,  326-327 
Self  determination,  10 
Serbia,    Serbian,    48,    200  ff.,    227, 

240,  251,  282 
Sidon,  262 

Slavonia,  208,  227,  240 
Slavs,  203,  212,  232,  285  ff. 
Slovaks,  see  Bohemians 
Slovenes,  208,  227 
Smyrna,  256 
Spain,  55,  75-76,  84 
Suez  Canal,  104,  111,  261 
Sweden,  151,  277 
Switzerland,  405 
Syria,  256  ff. 


Taurus  Mountains,  256,  263 

Territory,  (Ch.  IV)  44 ff. 

Thasos,  251 

Thirty  Years'  War,  215 

Thrace,  251 

Tigris,  252 

Transportation,  47 

Transylvania,  212,  223,  225 

Treaties,  127  ff.;  secret,  201 

Trentino,  194  ff. 

Trieste,  4,  199,  202  ff. 

Triple  Alliance,  45 

Tripoli,  205,  251 

Tropics,  68 

Trusteeship,   (Ch.  VI),  67  ff.,  206 

Tsingtao,  301 

Tunis,  79,  251 

Turkey,    76,    94,    205,    (Ch.    XV) 

242  ff. 
Tyre,  262 

United    States    of    America,    see 

America 
Ukraine,  39 

Vatican,  192  ff.,  232 
Vladivostok,  295 

War  between  nations,  20 
Wilson,     see     President     of     the 
United  States 

Zemstvos,  77 


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